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ABSTRACT

This resource book is part of a program that was designed to advance a comprehensive curriculum development program for West Virginia in the area of conflicting ideologies. The resource book for secondary social studies teachers and administrators is concerned with basic information and teaching materials pertaining to the evolution of communism and the development of the political and economic institutions in the United States. Its purpose is to help teachers develop appropriate units for their classes, not to impose an instructional program on them. The source book is applicable to any teacher interested in teaching about communism. The contents of the book reflect the cooperative work of the project consultants and teachers. The first five chapters consist of topical summary papers by the consultants: Marxism-Leninism; the Bolshevik Revolution and development of Soviet communism; world communism; the Soviet communist regime; and political and economic institutions of the United States. These chapters are intended for teacher background information, not as student reading. The concluding chapter, prepared by the cooperating teachers, lists instructional materials by sections organized according to the first five chapter topics. Each section recommends bibliographies, teaching concepts, key terms, classroom activities, discussion questions, and educational media materials. (ND)

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TEACHING ABOUT COMMUNISM:

A RESOURCE BOOK

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TEACHING ABOUT COMMUNISM: A RESOURCE BOOK

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PREFACE

With the publication of *TEACHING ABOUT COMMUNISM: A RESOURCE BOOK*, the final phase of Project--Teaching About Communism is completed. Project TAC, a state-wide curriculum development program initiated in 1967, was funded through a generous grant of \$71,250 by the Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation. West Virginia Institute of Technology is greatly indebted to the Board of Directors of the Benedum Foundation for its support and in particular to Mr. Byron B. Randolph for his enthusiastic interest and concern for the objectives of the project.

Project--TAC exemplifies West Virginia Institute of Technology's continuing efforts to be of service in assisting to meet the needs of the education profession in the state. Designed to advance a comprehensive curriculum development program in the area of conflicting ideologies, Project--TAC included the establishment of a curriculum materials center, a five-week summer institute for teachers, and the publication of a teaching resource book. The curriculum materials obtained through Project--TAC consist of over two thousand volumes; these are housed in the new library on our campus. The summer institute was conducted in 1968 and was highly praised by those in attendance.

This resource book, addressed in particular to secondary social studies teachers and administrative personnel who are concerned with curriculum development in the area of conflicting ideologies, has been prepared in response to a need for a publication that would be concerned with basic information and teaching materials pertaining to the evolution of communism and the development of the political and economic institutions of the United States.

To ensure that this publication would effectively meet the aforementioned needs, all segments of the education profession were involved in its preparation. Through the cooperation of public school teachers, administrators, and nationally recognized scholars in academic disciplines, a topical outline was designed for the resource book. Each of the first five sections of the resource book was written by a scholar in the field; the final section concerning teaching materials was prepared by secondary social studies teachers

who received extensive preparation for their roles while attending the Vanderbilt University Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy in 1966

It is our sincere hope that this publication will be of assistance to those who must cope with the difficult task of teaching in the area of conflicting ideologies.

Leonard C. Nelson
President
West Virginia Institute of Technology

September, 1975

INTRODUCTION

Project--Teaching About Communism was initiated to assist educators to implement social studies programs in the area of conflicting ideologies. In the belief that a significant improvement of social studies instruction in our schools can best be attained through an enhanced cooperative relationship between scholars in the various social science disciplines, school administrators, and classroom teachers, Project TAC sought to design a program that would reflect the expertise, interests, and concerns of these professional groups.

The original idea for Project TAC was conceived in 1965, when Professor Ewing P. Shahan, director, Vanderbilt University Institute on Communism and Constitutional Democracy, contacted the West Virginia State Department of Education to ascertain its interest in instituting a model state-wide program in the area of teaching about communism. This writer, then program specialist--social studies in the state department, endorsed Professor Shahan's invitation, and the project was initiated. In cooperation with county superintendents of schools and officials of institutions of higher education, Professor Shahan and this writer selected eleven West Virginia educators to attend the Vanderbilt University Institute during the summer of 1966. After the completion of this initial phase of the project, this writer continued the project as a staff member of West Virginia Institute of Technology.

With the assistance of Professor Shahan and five highly trained West Virginia secondary school teachers who attended the Vanderbilt University Institute, the director of Project TAC designed the program. These teachers rendered invaluable service in planning the project and later served as assistants for the summer institute and the resource book. They were: Chester A. Ellison, Jr., social studies teacher, Wyoming County Schools; Lydia J. Hennen, chairman, Social Studies Department, Morgantown Junior High School; Beatrice B. Noll, chairman, Social Studies Department, North Junior High School in Martinsburg; Sister Mary Stephen Reynolds, a teacher and a member of the Sisters Auxiliaries of the Apostolate Motherhouse in Monongah; and Arlene Tokarz, social studies teacher, Notre Dame High School in Clarksburg.

Three basic objectives were established for the project. First, it was decided to establish a state curriculum center which would include books, films, filmstrips, records, and other media materials that could be utilized by teachers. The publication of a resource book on teaching about communism was the second principal objective. After reviewing all of the resource books that had been published to date, it was determined that the publication should include position papers by competent scholars in the disciplines and recommendations by educators pertaining to the instructional process.

The final objective of the project was to conduct a five-week summer institute for West Virginia educators; to ensure adequate in-service training for teachers and the proper implementation of the program at the local level, it was decided that each of West Virginia's fifty-five county school systems would be invited to send at least one person to the institute.

After the basic objectives of the project were approved by the West Virginia Board of Education on November 3, 1966, the director of Project--TAC prepared a formal proposal for a financial grant and submitted it to the Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation. On March 6, 1967, the Board of Directors of the Benedum Foundation generously funded the grant request.

Immediately after the funding of Project--TAC, Professor Shahan, the five West Virginia secondary school teachers, and this writer began to construct a detailed topical outline of the subjects to be presented in the resource book and the summer institute. To ensure that this state-wide program would be relevant to the needs of teachers, each school system in the state was requested to make detailed recommendations regarding the specific objectives of the project. After reviewing the questionnaires and consulting with scholars throughout the nation, a tentative topical outline was prepared. Upon the completion of the tentative outline, nationally recognized scholars were selected to act as consultants to the project.

During the 1967-68 academic year, these consultants worked closely with the director of Project--TAC and the

five West Virginia teachers. Through the excellent cooperation that was established, the objectives of the project were implemented and the topical outlines for the resource book and the institute were finalized. Each consultant prepared a position paper for his assigned topic and organized an instructional program for teaching one week in the institute; meanwhile, these consultants assisted the teachers in preparing recommendations regarding selected bibliographies for students and teachers, instructional media materials, and classroom techniques and activities for presenting each of the topics.

The contents of this resource book reflect the cooperative work of the consultants and the teachers. The resource book is organized into six chapters. The first five chapters consist of the topical summary papers of the consultants. Chapter I, **MARXISM-LENINISM**, was prepared by Professor Gerhart Niemeyer, professor of government, University of Notre Dame. This paper includes a discussion of ideologies such as atheism, materialism and humanism, as eighteenth and nineteenth century backgrounds to communism; social movements before the twentieth century; the tenets of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels; Marxism-Leninism; and more recent communist ideology.

Professor Herbert J. Ellison, director of International Programs, University of Washington, wrote Chapter II, **THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET COMMUNISM**. This chapter considers nineteenth century Russian revolutionism, the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin's regime, Stalin's regime and de-Stalinization. The topic of **WORLD COMMUNISM** is presented in Chapter III. Prepared by Professor Milorad M. Drachkovitch, senior staff member, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, this summary paper refers to the history of international communism, the communist conquest of East-Central Europe, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and present day events as they relate to the international scene.

Chapter IV, **THE SOVIET COMMUNIST REGIME**, was written by Professor Andrew Gyorgy, professor of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George

Washington University. It embodies a discussion of the Soviet Union's political, legal, and economic systems. Other aspects of Soviet culture are also considered. The final summary paper, Chapter V, **POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**, was prepared by Professor W. L. Gruenewald, chairman, Political Science Department, Ball State University. This chapter includes a broad interpretation of the theoretical foundations of democracy, the economic system of the United States, and contemporary economic issues.

The concluding chapter of the resource book, Chapter VI, **INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS**, was prepared by the teachers with the assistance of the consultants. Organized in terms of the chapter topics presented in the first five chapters of the resource book, each section of Chapter VI recommends bibliographies for teachers and students, teaching concepts, key terms, classroom activities, discussion questions, and educational media materials that can be utilized by classroom teachers in preparing instructional units. All of the instructional materials that are cited in the chapter will be made available to West Virginia teachers. Along with these materials, West Virginia teachers may request instructional materials consisting of over two thousand books and a wide variety of films, filmstrips, tapes, maps, sample teaching units, and previously published resource books that were collected by the curriculum center of Project-TAC. In addition, audio tapes of the summer institute lectures are available; these lectures do, of course, correspond to the topics of the summary papers in this resource book. To obtain all of the aforementioned materials, teachers should write: Director, Center for Instructional Technology, West Virginia Institute of Technology, Montgomery, West Virginia 25136.

TEACHING ABOUT COMMUNISM: A RESOURCE BOOK has been designed to assist West Virginia educators to develop teaching units that will be appropriate for their respective schools and grade levels. It was never intended that this publication should serve as an instructional program that would merely be imposed on a school system or its teachers. The summary papers that comprise the first five chapters are

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for the teacher's use. The reading level of this material is beyond the level of most students. The contents of the first five chapters are intended to give the teacher a basic background concerning topics that might be presented in teaching units; it is hoped that the individual teacher will be encouraged to read definitive works on these topics and the wealth of original source material that is available.

It would be impossible for this writer to list the names of all of those who contributed to Project-TAC. The contributions of Professor Shahan and the previously mentioned consultants and West Virginia teachers were absolutely essential to the project. This writer is also greatly indebted to the following persons associated with West Virginia Institute of Technology: W. Clay Hamilton, a former faculty member, who coordinated the activities of the summer institute; Ronald Alexander, assistant professor of history, who read the manuscript of the resource book; James S. Brill, director, Center for Instructional Technology, who provided assistance and advice concerning instructional materials; Suzanne M. Riggio, former director, Office of Public Information, who read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions regarding many matters pertaining to the project. This writer is especially indebted to Bernice Johnson who served as a secretary to the project and cataloguer of the curriculum materials center. Mrs. Johnson typed the manuscript of the resource book and contributed in many ways to all aspects of the project.

It is hoped that West Virginia educators will find this resource book to be of assistance to them in the design of instructional units. This writer sincerely solicits inquiries and comments from those who utilize it.

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September, 1975

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Chapter I

MARXISM-LENINISM

By Gerhart Niemeyer

A. Revolutionary Ideologies Before Marx

Communism has been called an ideology in arms. This means that it is a movement occasioned and initiated by a body of ideas which has the character of an ideology. In the beginning were the works of Karl Marx, some of them written in collaboration with Friedrich Engels, who added several books of his own later. "Marxism" as such, though, was not the product of Marx but rather of his followers, including Engels, who saw Marx's ideas as somewhat more of a complete system than he had allowed. The system of ideas carried a message demanding certain action, which in turn led to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's elaboration of the ideology into a body of dogmas concerning Party organization and revolutionary strategy. It was Lenin, too, who organized what is now the Communist party in strict accordance with the requirements of the ideology as he saw it. Thus, the sole reason for the Communist movement, or party, is the ideology first created by Marx, as interpreted and expanded by Lenin. For that reason, the ideology is now officially called Marxism—Leninism.

"Ideology" is a term that should be used strictly. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the term has denoted ideas stemming, not from the mind's openness toward truth, but rather from the will to power, or from the will to impose a preconceived idea on the world. These ideas are, therefore, basically irrational and untrustworthy. "Ideology," the word itself, goes back to Destutt de Tracy (1801), whose school of thought Napoleon Bonaparte brushed away contemptuously as "ideologists." Since then, the word has retained a derogatory character, meaning something like "doctrinaire," or "false consciousness." Marx himself used the word and concept prominently when he implied that all ideas or concept structures in the present-day society are meant only to mask the power interests of the ruling

class. Karl Mannheim, the famous sociologist and himself a Marxist, made a study of the phenomenon of ideology in his *Ideology and Utopia*. Recently, the term has been used in the sense of "distorted mentality" (Voegelin), meaning a mentality no longer oriented toward the understanding of reality but rather toward a fancy or dream of a non-existent reality. Sometimes this "second reality" has been presented in the form of a "utopia." *Utopia* (meaning "nowhere") was the name of a work by Thomas More, a chancellor of Henry VIII; it had a number of imitators later. A utopia is essentially an imagined social order which works in perfect harmony but only because some key feature of the actual human reality has been left out. Thus, Thomas More himself said that his utopia would work if it were not for "superbia," i.e., the besetting sin of pride which, however, is a basic feature of vitiated human nature that must be taken into account by any political structure.

Eric Voegelin has recently analyzed the type of ideologies that have emerged in the last century and a half. He refers to them as "ersatz-religions" because they envisage something like human salvation from all evil, not in terms of divine action, but political. Their goal is the creation of a future realm of perfect freedom and harmony. Voegelin's widely accepted meaning of the term distinguishes "ideology" from the antonym "philosophy" (or "theory"), meaning love of truth and deep insight into the world as given to us by experience, while "ideology" applies to irrational systems of thought based on the will to see the world in a preconceived way and not to acknowledge any facts to the contrary. When such doctrines bring forth political mass movements, they seek to attain total, or totalitarian, power precisely because their idea-systems conflict with actual reality and they desire to bend reality so as to make it conform. The modern totalitarian movements all have had ideological character which distinguishes them from an old-fashioned autocracy aiming merely at untroubled political stability.

Recent studies (Norman Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*) have thrown light on the history of ideological movements in our Western Civilization. One can distinguish two

waves, one of religious ideologies, which were prevalent from 1200 to 1600, and one of secular ideologies, from 1750 onward. Among the religious ideologies, there were some that organized themselves for political action and totalitarian power, controlling territory and maintaining armies. A predominant pattern of the religious ideologies turned on the expectation of an imminent millennium (the concept, "thousand years," stems from Rev. of St. John 20: 2-5), often imagined as a "third age," the "age of the Spirit" in which there would be no more laws, authorities, church, government, private property, or inequalities. Many of these groups considered themselves beyond good and evil and, thus, incapable of doing any wrong, an attitude which made them defy the laws. Others considered themselves the armed instruments of the coming utter transformation of the world, for the sake of which they would first have to conquer and suppress all their opponents. The last of these religious-political ideologies played a frightening part in the English revolution around the middle of the seventeenth century.

The ideologies that began to appear with increasing frequency and virulence from the second half of the eighteenth century can also be called millenarian, since they, too, looked toward a radically changed world free from all evil. While the religious ideologies, however, assumed some kind of supernatural intervention, even when they saw themselves as the armed forces of supernatural powers, the modern ideologies relied wholly on political action of some kind or another, i.e., on world-immanent factors, to bring about the envisaged millennium. The secular millenarian ideologies, to which Marxism was a late addition, sprang up in great numbers and varieties during the one hundred years after 1750. The most frequent patterns, though, contained certain common features: a) the idea of a perfect social order without government, private property, inequality, or other evil, as the historical setting for a fully human life; b) the idea of history as a movement, in stages, toward that social condition which would be history's climax, the movement described sometimes as automatic progress, sometimes as the deliberate realization of a utopia, and sometimes as a revolution or

series of revolutions; c) the identification, with this movement of history, of some social element that would act in the role of history's servant in the fulfillment of mankind's ultimate destiny.

When Marx appeared on the scene, a number of ideologies were very prominent.

Progressivism, the belief that all vicissitudes automatically and inevitably add up to the steady progress of the "total mass of humanity" was first formulated by Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-81) but received its most eloquent articulation through Marie Jean Antoine Condorcet (1743-94). He divided history into ten phases, of which the tenth, yet to come, would be the ultimate perfection of man, a world-wide culture, and the cessation of social evils. Progressivism did not bring forth an organized political movement, but, as a general tendency of thinking, it influenced the entire era.

Fourierism, named after Charles Fourier (1772-1837), envisaged a society in which men would live in well-ordered communities of 1,620 people each, their life being ordered in accordance with the structure of the human passions, which Fourier believed had been badly distorted by civilization and its morality. Once this social plan were realized, nature also would progress toward perfect harmony without harsh climates or arid soil. Fourier's doctrine was popularized by Victor Prosper Considérant in 1838. Although the Fourierist movement continued for some time and even founded a few settlements according to Fourier's plan, its decline was relatively rapid.

Saint-Simonism was initiated by Claude Henri De Rouvroy Saint-Simon (1760-1825), the first to look on the industrial age as the key age of history. He anticipated a reorganization of mankind under the leadership of the "industrial class" (comprising both management and labor) and thought up a new religion to go with the new order. Saint-Simonism was summarized by Armand Bazard in 1829. Bazard and Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin led the Saint-Simonians, who, after the death of their master, attained great influence all over Europe. Eventually, quarrels within

the leading group fatally weakened the movement.

Positivism's leading exponent was Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Saint-Simon's pupil, who broke away from Saint-Simonism to develop his own views. He is best known for his "three ages" of history, the "theological, metaphysical and positivist" ages. The third of these, still to be realized, would see a completely rational organization of all human life under the leadership of scientists and bankers. Comte also elaborated a new religion which substituted worship of mankind for worship of God, and an ethic of "altruism" for that of love. As an organized movement, positivism quickly declined after the founder's death, but, as the reduction of all knowledge to the methods characteristic of the natural sciences, positivism has become one of the most widespread attitudes of modern times.

Proudhonism was founded by Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), a contemporary of Marx and the most popular socialist thinker in France during the nineteenth century. In 1840, Proudhon formulated the equation "property=theft." He advocated the abolition of the state and, thus, became one of the originators of the anarchist movement.

Blanquism's basic tenets had their origins in 1795, toward the end of the French Revolution, when Gracchus Babeuf organized the first communist conspiracy, an enterprise that aimed at eventual dictatorship, abolition of all private property, and complete regimentation by the state. His message was picked up in the 1830s by August Blanqui (1805-1881), who preached class struggle and revolutionary dictatorship as the road to a new realm of freedom and envisaged a revolutionary technique in the form of action by small but well-disciplined cadres.

When Karl Marx came to Paris in the fall of 1843, the city had been a hotbed of secret societies, revolutionary papers and magazines, conspiracies, and insurrections for more than a decade. Socialist ideas had already played a role during the French Revolution. After the end of the revolution, the idea of socialism had fermented until, during the 1830s, it manifested itself in a variety of socialist schools and magazines. In 1842, the German writer Lorenz von Stein first

surveyed this phenomenon in a book called *Socialism and Communism in France*. He tried to reduce all these schools to a common denominator by means of a distinction between "state" (the government) and "society" (the web of economic activities), between which he discovered a number of "contradictions" that spawned socialist movements. He felt that these movements had inherited the promise of freedom and equality of the French Revolution and had carried it from the political into the economic sphere. Thus arose what was then called "the social question," namely the question of how freedom and equality could be realized apart from political rights, which usually meant the question of private property. Von Stein also pointed out that there was a new "class," the industrial workers, whose aspirations the socialists represented.

Marx's socialism was different from all the other varieties in that Marx thought the class struggle would eventually come to the point where the uprising of the workers as a class would accomplish the downfall of the present-day society and bring about the "realm of freedom." He called this "scientific socialism," referring to his doctrine of the "laws of history" as the "science" that revealed the necessity of the coming proletarian revolution and the future socialist age, and contrasting his "scientific socialism" with the "utopian socialism" of such men as Proudhon. All the same, the followers of Proudhon and other anarchists gained great influence under the leadership of Mikhail Bakunin (1841-1876), who later rivaled Marx for the leadership of the First International (1864-1873). The followers of Blanqui also were active in many insurrections. Among others, they predominated in the so-called Paris Commune of 1871, which briefly governed Paris following a successful socialist uprising. Meanwhile, in England, a socialist movement called Chartism rose strongly until it floundered of its own indecision in 1849. Later, after 1881, the new Fabian Society developed a non-Marxist brand of "gradualist" socialism which sought to realize its ideas through influence on administrations and legislation. In Germany, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) founded a labor party in 1863, but his emphasis on the state

and change through legislation was distinctly non-Marxist. In Italy, where Anarchism was widespread, socialist ideas appeared in the thinking of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), an Italian who figured significantly in the movement for unification of Italy.

After Marx's death, the varieties of socialism that predominated were mainly four: a) Anarchism, or, in its later form, Anarcho-Syndicalism; hostile not only to the state and organized government, but also to a strong party organization; b) Marxist Democratic Socialism, characteristic of the socialist parties organized at the Second International, 1889, with its center of gravity in the German Social Democratic party that resulted, in 1875, from the combination of Lassalleans and adherents of Marx; c) Fabian socialism, influential in England and, to some extent, in the United States; and d) Leninist Marxism, developed out of the rejection of the Second International after its failure to prevent World War I in 1914.

B. Marx's "Religion of Revolution"

Karl Marx was born in 1818 in Trier, a medium-sized city on the German-French border in the Moselle Valley. His parents were of Jewish descent, recently converted to the Christian religion. His father practiced law; there was no poverty in the family.

In 1837, Marx went to Berlin University, where he joined a circle of young Hegelians, followers of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who had died in 1831. Hegel had left to his followers the impression that he had attained the philosopher's goal in discovering the ultimate truth, not only for his age, but for all ages. His philosophy of history explained all change through the action of Absolute Mind (or Spirit) which, going through various stages of imperfection, would ultimately "come to itself" in the final stage of "absolute knowledge." Hegel's formulation that everything real is rational and everything rational, real, had led to a split among his followers, some of whom saw rationality in things that existed, while the others wanted to

bring about a rationality that did not yet exist. This second group, the "Left Hegelians," wanted above all to embody rationality in this world rather than leave it in the form of metaphysics, or merely thought-about "transcendence." The latter caused some Left Hegelians to attack Christianity as inferior to Hegel's kind of redemption. David Friedrich Strauss's *Life of Jesus* (1835) and Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity* (1841) set the pattern for this "critique of religion." Feuerbach argued that all religion was nothing more than a projection of man's own noblest attributes to an imagined being; in his view, man had created God, rather than God, man. Accordingly, man only need "take back" his own attributes in order to "be free." Bruno Bauer, Marx's teacher, was the leader in the "critique" of all political conditions in the light of the full rationality which Hegel was believed to have promised. Soon all Left Hegelians engaged in the "critique" of this or that, but particularly of Christianity and other forms of religion. This was the situation when Marx joined the fray.

Marx had obtained his Ph.D. from Jena University in 1841. He intended to become a professor, but about that time the authorities became suspicious of the Left Hegelians, and Marx found the door to the academy barred. He went to Cologne as editor of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, a liberal-progressive newspaper, in which he wrote on various social, legal, and political situations, always applying "critique" of everything for supposed irrationalities. Within a year, he was fired; a little later he went to Paris to join his friend Arnold Ruge in a literary venture of "critique," the *German-French Yearbooks*. Only one double issue of this periodical appeared, 1844, containing two contributions by Marx and one by Friedrich Engels. At that time, Marx established a friendship with Engels that was to last for life. The two collaborated on some works during the following years. In Paris, Marx made contact with the various socialist and communist societies then flourishing in the city; here he met Proudhon, Blanqui, Bakunin and other revolutionaries. Expelled by the French government, he went to Brussels, where, in 1847, he joined the "Communist League," a revolutionary

society mainly composed of exiled Germans. For this group he wrote, in late 1847 and early 1848, *The Communist Manifesto*.

At the time of the 1848 revolution, Marx returned to Cologne and the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, but was indicted. Although he was acquitted, Marx had to leave when the revolution collapsed. This time, he ended up in London, where he resided until his death. Having become convinced, in 1850, that a general revolution was not to flare up again in the near future, he turned to economic studies. For a livelihood, he wrote for American newspapers. Mainly, however, he depended on donations from Friedrich Engels, who, as the son of a successful businessman and a manager of the family enterprise himself, was able to help Marx again and again, even establishing a yearly allowance of three hundred fifty pounds for him. Nevertheless, Marx's financial position remained precarious, mainly because he insisted on a "respectable" standard of living without earning much money himself. Furthermore, he declined a chair at a German university in order to remain independent.

In 1864, Marx and Engels helped found the *International Workingmen's Association*, the so-called "First International." Its characteristic feature was a strong central council compared with which no real power resided in any bloc or group of members. Soon Marx's and Engels's position was threatened by Bakunin, who sharply opposed them on the questions of state and party organization. Bakunin was defeated, but with difficulty, and Engels transferred the International to the United States; this led to its practical demise in 1873. Marx was involved with his rival Bakunin once more in 1871, during the Paris Commune. Marx originally disapproved of the commune, while Bakunin hailed it enthusiastically. However, in order not to leave the myth of this revolutionary enterprise to the Anarchists, Marx subsequently endorsed it, too, and succeeded in attaching the symbolism to his cause. Other than in these episodes, Marx and Engels acted only as political advisors to their actively engaged followers, particularly in Germany.

Karl Marx is best known for two of his works, *The*

Communist Manifesto, 1848, and his three-volume magnum opus, *Das Capital*, of which only the first volume was published during Marx's lifetime in 1867. Engels edited and published the other two volumes in 1885 and 1894. A fourth volume, *Theories of Surplus Value*, was put together from Marx's notes by Karl Kautsky. It was prior to *The Communist Manifesto*, however, that Marx formulated his world view in a number of writings, few of which were published at that time. The most important of the "early writings" are: *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1844), *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (first published in 1932), *The Holy Family* (1845), *The German Ideology* (published in part in 1846), and *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847). The publication of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* in 1932 gave rise to a new wave of interest in Marx. A great number of books have been written since then on the "early Marx," or the "humanistic" Marx.

The "early writings" can be divided into two groups. Up to 1845, Marx was writing mainly about "alienation," the estrangement of man from his society and in his society, and what would be an order in which man could be at home. Beginning with the *German Ideology* in 1846, however, Marx turned his attention to the "laws" which, according to him, governed the forward movement of history in spite of what men thought and intended. These two quite contradictory emphases were then combined in the *Communist Manifesto*, which speaks of a necessary and impersonal movement of history toward a climax of a perfectly harmonious order. Marx's later works only elaborated his world view and its two disparate ideas. *Capital*, especially, consists merely of elaborate proofs of a conclusion Marx had reached almost twenty years before.

In the context of high school instruction, it may not be feasible to probe too deeply into Marx's philosophical thoughts. Simplifying rigorously, one may say that the writings of 1843-45 revolve around the thesis that whatever exists must be destroyed because it is irrational, untrue, and inhuman. This idea has three aspects: the utter unworthiness of everything that exists, the truth and humanity of things to

come, and "ruthless destruction" as the way from here to there. The concept by which Marx described the falseness and inhumanity of the present was "alienation," or sometimes "self-estrangement." These terms come from Hegel, by way of Feuerbach, but it is impossible to go into their history here. Marx wished to say that aspects of human nature and human life which belong together are torn apart and separated by virtue of the structure and the social order. He dwelled particularly on two manifestations of this fragmentation: a) Man's thought (above all, when it takes the form of universal and generalizing concepts) has become separated from his practical life. Man is confronted by the products of his brain as if they were realities with a life of their own. Whenever Marx encountered universal concepts, he saw in them evidence of "alienation," so that an institution like the state, which is based on the concept "man," also partakes of this alienation. Foremost among these "alienated" products of consciousness is religion. Philosophy runs a close second, followed immediately by political concepts. As an alternative to these generalizing ways of thought, Marx offered his own concept of "man in his real activity," as well as his belief that theory and practice really form a unity. If man is to have a human existence, the unity must be restored.

b) Man's labor has been estranged from him by the development of the "division of labor," causing production to be subjected to the forces of supply and demand. Marx proclaimed, in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, that man is a "self-creating" being. What he meant was that, unlike other animals, man could not survive on raw nature. He was forced to fashion for himself clothes, food and shelter, as well as tools to procure them, thereby creating "his own life" through the objects he produced. Thus, Marx identified labor with man's essence. As Aristotle said: "More than anything else, labor is man." From this, Marx concluded that when the labor process comes under the control of another, man is separated, or "alienated," from his own life and from his "species." The alien control over human labor is established, for instance, through slavery, but another form is

through the market forces of supply and demand, making someone else's wants dictate what one should produce and whether or not one may obtain a living through one's labor. The market forces, in turn, are consequences of the "division of labor," i.e., specialization in certain branches of labor, which deprive man of his universal character and make of him a special tool. The exchange and its laws then become an inescapable necessity. The forces of the market are not planned or designed and confront all men as an "alien, hostile power." A society based on the division of labor and the market exchange is an "alienated society," a whole system contrary to humanity.

What Marx had supplied through these ideas is a definition of evil in human life. Since the alienation, according to him, extended to the whole of society, the "destruction of everything that exists" is the prerequisite of the liberation, or emancipation, of man. At first, Marx may have imagined, together with other Left Hegelians, that this "destruction" could remain purely in the mind. As one "exposed" the irrationality of existing conditions, the slumbering rationality of people would be awakened. Marx conceded that this had been done successfully with respect to religion, but considered this only the beginning for a radical attack on all practical conditions of existence, for which religion merely served as a mollifying "opium." His name for that attack was "radical revolution," one which should be sweeping enough not to leave "the pillars of the house standing."

Such a revolution, to be sure, would not occur merely in the mind, but would be brought about by brute force. And who would supply the force? Marx gave his answer first in a general definition:

... a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal sufferings and claims no *particular right* because no *particular wrong* but *wrong generally is perpetrated* against it. ... a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society, which in a word is the *complete loss* of man, and hence can win itself only through the *complete re-winning of man*.

His specifications mean that there is a "class" which can represent all mankind in other words, a savior class. The specifications set, Marx then looked around for a living example and noted the class which was so much talked about then. Thus, he concludes his paragraph: "This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the *proletariat*."

C. The "Laws of History"

In the *German Ideology* Marx introduced a new idea, the idea that history moves according to inexorable objective laws which can be scientifically known. The idea had been conceived by others before Marx, but it was a new addition to Marx's own thought, and, what is more, nobody before him had used it as systematically. "We know but one single science, the science of history," Marx and Engels wrote. What they meant was that the knowledge of history's laws contained all the answers to human problems that had previously been supplied by philosophy, ethics, political science, and economics. They explained history's motion in terms of human material wants and their satisfaction, for the sake of which men developed "modes of production." This action engendered new wants, leading to technical changes which produced new "modes of production." The movement from one "mode of production" to another was subject to laws which could be scientifically formulated, Marx claimed. He insisted that, contrary to the history of the modes of production, there was no history of consciousness, i.e., consciousness did not follow its own laws of development, but simply followed along the lines of change in the modes of production. "Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by life." This is the materialistic explanation of history (and society), according to which man's economic activities are primary and fundamental, while the activities of his reflective mind are considered secondary and derived.

A most important point was Marx's belief that one could know the "laws of history" objectively, since they consisted in changes in the "modes of production" that could be observed and traced to such fundamental facts as wants and

techniques of production. From this claim of a "scientific knowledge" of "laws of history" followed the further claim that the future can also be known "scientifically." This entailed the substitution of history as a "science" for ethics and other disciplines of thought that are meant to instruct human choices. One more point is significant in this context: while Marx stated at first that the "driving forces" in history were human needs and the technology of their satisfaction, a few pages later he shifted his position to say that revolutions were the driving force in history.

There are, thus, two emphases in Marx which ultimately are incompatible. Historical materialism maintains that what happens in history occurs because of a necessity beyond anyone's control and obedient only to observable "laws." It also asserts that one can "scientifically" foresee that the present-day society (bourgeois society) will be followed by a socialist society, which will be the first society without class distinctions and class rule. One may call this Marx's evolutionary emphasis with the centerpiece being the concept of "inexorable laws." Both Marx and Lenin admitted that revolution, by contrast, is deliberate action requiring a certain type of consciousness. If, indeed, revolutions are the milestones of history, then there is such a thing as a history of consciousness, at least of revolutionary consciousness. The fulfillment of history would depend on what happens in men's minds. This is the revolutionary emphasis. Both emphases have had their adherents among Marxists, and Marxists have also tried to have both together, to combine them like Marx tried to do. The discrepancy, however, has had a tendency to show up again and again. Marx called his socialism "scientific" because he believed he could show that socialism and the revolution leading to socialism would come as a matter of historical inevitability. At the same time, he penned the sentence: "Men make their own history."

The emphasis on "laws of history," part and parcel of any variety of Marxism, has certain philosophical results, since it causes people to look on man and his society as a by-product of impersonal historical forces moving at their own speed and rhythm. This is the reason why people talk

only of the "early Marx" as the "humanistic Marx." Once Marx's attention was turned to the study of historical necessity, it, rather than man's humanity, was his chief concern. It is true he figured that historical necessity would eventually end up with the fulfillment of man's humanity in a classless society. But still his variety of socialism is concerned with social and political forces, the "character of the present epoch," and other questions of history's time schedule, and, thus, with the structure of impersonal change rather than with man's humanity.

The Communist Manifesto sums up Marx's world view. Apart from that, it is one of those documents which any educated person ought to have read carefully, regardless of how he feels about it. It consists of a preamble and four parts. Parts I and II are particularly important; Part III consists of a critical survey of socialisms other than Marx's and has chiefly historical interest; the brief Part IV contains some strategic principles.

Part I deals with three topics. In the first five paragraphs, we find the general idea that all history is essentially a series of class struggles, to which is added the assertion that "the class struggle" in our time has come to a decisive point because it has been "simplified." Two great hostile camps are said to be facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat. There follows a twenty-paragraph discussion of the bourgeoisie, its rise to power against the feudal class, and its "revolutionary part" in destroying all previous traditions. The bourgeoisie has developed the world market, subjected the countryside to the rule of the towns, created massive means of production, and loosened every social bond by the impact of free competition. Then comes a key sentence: "A similar movement is going on before our own eyes." The "similar" movement is supposedly that of the proletariat; therefore, Marx implies that this is the new class which will overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, just as the bourgeoisie overthrew the rule of the feudal class.

If we look closely, however, he describes the two movements in quite dissimilar terms. The bourgeoisie is said to have risen as the result of new markets and methods of

production; the proletariat is expected to rise through an incessant struggle which would go through various phases. It would mount in intensity until the "decisive hour" when the two camps would openly clash and the bourgeoisie would be overthrown. One should note a number of important ideas about the struggle: a) the various "battles" of the proletariat would aim, not at immediate results, but at the ever-increasing strength of the revolutionary forces; b) the proletariat alone would have the quality of a "really revolutionary class," meaning that it would not be induced by any attainment to give up its struggle for the total transformation of all society; c) the revolutionary situation would become ripe through the ever-increasing misery of the workers, to the point where the bourgeoisie would have to "feed its slaves" instead of "being fed by them;" and d) the revolution of the proletariat would differ from all other revolutions in history, because it alone would be capable of destroying private property, thereby removing the basis of class rule and class antagonism.

Part II of the *Manifesto* deals with the Communists and their programs; these, of course, are not the same Communists we know now, but rather the "Communist League" of Marx's day. The first six paragraphs define the Communists as the "most advanced and most resolute section of the working-class parties" and claim that they have over all others "the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march." The definition is today applied to the Communists of Leninist persuasion. These first paragraphs are followed by a defense of the Communists' major objectives: abolition of private property, the family, and nations. There is much sophistry in these pages, but it, too, applies chiefly to the Communists of 1848.

Toward the end of Part II, one finds two important paragraphs concerning what the proletariat will do with public power once it has conquered it. These paragraphs are frequently overlooked, but they deserve careful and repeated reading. Immediately following them, Marx lists a ten-point program, or platform. Most of these points belong to the arsenal of all liberal and progressive movements. Only a few

among them have a distinctly communist flavor, e.g., "establishment of industrial armies" and "gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country." Part II closes with two paragraphs which sum up Marx's anticipation of the "realm of freedom" he expected to ensue after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

Although it is important to study *The Communist Manifesto* in detail (except, possibly, Part III), it is equally important to stand back, as it were, and see the total combination of its ideas, i.e., Marx's message. Equating history with class struggles, or, rather, with "the class struggle," sets the framework for everything that follows. We gain the impression of a series of decisive changes in the structure of society in the past, each resulting from a revolution by which the ruling class was overthrown, its particular kind of property shoved aside, and a new "mode of production" initiated. The important point is that all these changes have led to the present situation in which there is a class struggle with a difference. On the one hand, the ruling class of today is different because it has played a revolutionary part in dissolving all traditional bonds and, at the same time, it has developed a means of production of unprecedented capacity. On the other hand, the revolutionary class is different because, alone among all revolutionary classes in history, this one is a class not possessing any property of its own. By its revolution it cannot set up a new class rule (which by definition would require a class owning the means of production). It must, instead, abolish all previous modes of production and all private property—thereby the foundation of classes and class rule. Finally, the situation is different in that "the class struggle" is polarized in our time into a struggle between only two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, all other classes being identified with one of these two. So it is in this period that one final battle will decide not only the doom of the bourgeoisie, but also "the class struggle" as it has gone on in human societies since time immemorial. From the victory of the proletariat will emerge a humanity freed from the ancient curse of private property and class antagonism. Human destiny will be fulfilled.

Marx's message thus turns chiefly on the struggle between the bourgeoisie and its "grave-diggers," the proletariat. He mentions a number of economic and political developments that will help this struggle. He makes clear that future socialism requires the previous development of production methods by the bourgeoisie. Essentially, though, the message lies in the characterization of the two "camps" and the prediction of the outcome: the bourgeoisie is the epitome of all evils that have ever beset mankind; the proletariat is the "only revolutionary class," propertyless, therefore untainted by evil and destined to liberate mankind. The proletariat has a "historical mission." To accomplish it, the working class must be conscious of it. By virtue of that mission, the proletariat is "the class that holds the future in its hands." In this character of the proletariat lies the guarantee which Marx holds out—history moves not only forward but upward.

D. From Capitalism to Socialism

Das Capital, Marx's life work, comprises three forbidding-looking volumes. The general reader can pick up the salient ideas in the first of them. Even though Marx is best known for this work, one must say that it does not add anything to his pre-1848 works through which he formulated his world view. *Capital* is mainly an elaborate proof of a foregone conclusion.

The ideas of Volume I fall into two groups, the first concerning the structure of "bourgeois society," the society based on the "capitalist mode of production," the second dealing with the development of that society toward its ultimate downfall in a final economic crisis accompanied by social revolution. The first group, the structural analysis, centers on the concept of surplus value, trying to prove that capitalism as a system is nothing but the instituted exploitation of labor; the concept of surplus value, in turn, is based on Marx's doctrine of economic value. For his prediction of the inevitable collapse of bourgeois society, Marx relied above all on his "general law of capitalist accumulation"; however, he also referred to the law of the declining rate of

profit and his theory of economic crises.

In general, it is noteworthy that the one major work to which Marx devoted his life after 1850 consisted of an analysis of the "present-day society," as he called it, rather than of the ideal society of the future, or of the entire series of societies which, according to his view, have succeeded each other in history. It was out of his study of the present-day society that he concluded the unavailability of the future socialist society, as well as the great good that must come from the "destruction of everything that exists."

The proof of the present-day society's total decadence hinged on the concept of surplus value. All economic value, Marx assumed, was determined by the amount of labor required to produce a good, or, to be more precise, the amount of labor that would be typically necessary to produce something in a given society at a given level of technology. This is the so-called labor theory of value, widely accepted in Marx's time. At present, economists use the so-called marginal utility theory of value, by which value is determined by the utility something has for the economic man "at the margin," i.e., at the point of a decision on whether or not to add or subtract a unit.

The labor theory of value has long been abandoned as unreliable. In Marx's writings, however, its significance lies not in economic analysis, but in an evaluation of the social relationship between employer and laborer. Labor is brought into the market like a commodity, Marx said, and sells at its economic value, determined, like that of other commodities, by the amount of labor required for production. Labor power is "produced," of course, by feeding, clothing, and housing a worker and his family. Whatever the cost of this upkeep may be, that is the value of labor power. Marx went on to say that every worker works off the cost of his own upkeep in a fraction of the full day for which he is engaged. If this fraction be one half, then, during half of the working day, the worker produces value equivalent to the value of his own labor power, but during the remainder of the day he produces value over and above what the employer had to pay to obtain his services. This "over and above" is what Marx

called surplus value, which he described as net gain for the employer.

Surplus value, according to Marx, is the sole source of all capital; therefore, capital is nothing but the value derived from labor for which the capitalist has not paid anything. This is called exploitation. Marx also asserted that wages tend to remain at subsistence level, since competition and the introduction of machinery compels each capitalist to depress his labor cost as much as possible. The charge of exploitation which Marx raised was not against the individual capitalist, but rather against the system as a whole, the capitalist being only a faithful if helpless functionary.

The "general law of capitalist accumulation" appears to have a complex conceptual structure, but it is simple. Marx assumed that competition is the driving energy of capitalism, but he saw mounting difficulties and deepening "inner contradictions" resulting from this. There is a whole catalogue of "inner contradictions," e.g., the "contradiction" between increasing wealth of the system as a whole and the increasing misery of the masses, the "contradiction" between more and more "social" production and private appropriation, the "contradiction" between rising production and diminishing or stagnating consumption, and so on. As capital "accumulates," it also "concentrates" in larger and larger units, which, in turn, are "centralized" in fewer and fewer hands. The class of capitalists grows smaller.

On the other hand, progressing technology of production causes an unemployed or half-employed surplus population, forming an "industrial reserve army" that becomes a perpetual source of cheap labor. Thus, larger and larger masses sink into ever deepening poverty and degradation. From the capitalist urge to expand production, there results, every once in a while, an incapacity of the market to absorb the total product. A crisis of the entire system is created. Such a crisis occurs periodically and supposedly grows worse. This trend combines with other tendencies to bring capitalism nearer to collapse to the same degree to which it succeeds in its own terms. Finally, "the centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point

where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

Capital is frequently considered an economic treatise. Actually, it is a sociological analysis, written in the language of economics, of the power structure of a certain type of society. The analysis seeks to show that the workers themselves, by producing surplus value, "forge the chains" which fetter them. The attentive reader is supposed to infer that only the workers themselves, by their insurrection, can put an end to the system. The sociological analysis, however, also has a moral function in that it is meant to provide factual grounds for the total condemnation of the bourgeois society as a system, irrespective of any particular, immoral action. From the sociological analysis follows the indictment of the system for exploitation, i.e., taking advantage of the workers' necessity to have to sell their labor power in order to live and appropriating to the capitalist value that actually belongs to the workers who created it. Finally, the sociological analysis is meant to demonstrate that, apart from everything else, the capitalist system is wasteful, inefficient, and beset by "contradictions" among its various aspects. As a system of production, it could not even be called rational. These judgments are implied in what appears to the reader to be a purely objective economic analysis.

The "early writings" form one group, *Capital* and some other economic writings (notably the *Critique of Political Economy*, 1859), another. A third group may be classified as "political writings," the most important of which are the *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* (1850), the *Class Struggles in France* (1850), the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), the *Civil War in France* (1871), and the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875). To these one might add the *Inaugural Address of the Workingmen's International Association* (1864), except that, according to Engels, this document does not fairly represent Marx's views. Because these writings, while not generally known, contain some important ideas on revolutionary

strategy, they were carefully studied by Lenin.

The *Address* (1850) was written during a period when Marx still expected a renewal of the revolutionary upheavals of 1848-49. It is an instruction to the German Communists concerning their relationship with the then revolutionary democratic (but not communist) elements of the bourgeoisie. Marx, in effect, told his followers never to settle for any particular objective.

If the democrats propose proportional, the workers must demand progressive taxation; if the democrats themselves move for a moderated progressive taxation, the workers must insist upon a tax whose rates are so steeply graduated as to bring ruin to big capital; if the democrats demand a regulation of the state debts, the workers must demand state bankruptcy.

Since Marx's writings were later dogmatized, these instructions were adopted by the contemporary Communist party. They meant that concrete demands, in themselves, must never be allowed to represent the revolutionary cause but must be used as a means to push revolutionary unrest beyond any change of settlement. Marx called this the principle of "revolution in permanence." Under the title "permanent revolution," this principle was later taken up by Leon Trotsky; however, it was discredited eventually as a result of his political defeat. Today, it is usually called "continuous revolution" and hailed as a Leninist principle.

The *Class Struggles in France* and the *Eighteenth Brumaire* together contain Marx's analysis of the revolutionary developments in France between 1848 and 1850. Marx first believed that the Revolution of 1848 was the revolution of which he dreamed. Actually, it was merely an aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789, with the feeble attempt to push it toward a socialist revolution turning out to be a failure. In these two works, Marx looked at this "defeat of the proletariat" in the assumed perspective of an assured future victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Having dismissed the possibility of a new revolutionary upheaval at that time, he began to see the struggle of the proletariat as a long conflict consisting of a number of "defeats" similar to the failure of 1848. Each defeat, how-

ever, would contribute toward the proletariat's growing strength and unity.

The struggle would also have to be fought with non-proletarian allies. Marx looked at both the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry in this light. In *The Communist Manifesto*, he had given the impression that the Revolution would be a single cataclysmic event, a mighty uprising that would immediately clear the air. His other political writings, however, make the Revolution appear as a long-term strategy continued for many decades. During this period, the proletariat would be inferior in strength and numbers. In *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany*, another political tract of this time, Marx and Engels even state that no proletarian revolution could succeed unless it obtained the support of the peasantry, the same peasantry of which Marx, in the *Eighteenth Brumaire*, had spoken in most contemptuous terms.

The *Civil War in France* represented Marx's desire to appropriate for his cause the myth of the abortive Paris Commune of 1871. Marx hailed this uprising as the first instance of a purely proletarian revolution which had briefly succeeded and "discovered" the political principle of the future proletarian rule. Actually, the Paris Commune adopted a radically democratic power structure. Marx's endorsement caused the deep confusion which we note later in Lenin's *State and Revolution*, where dictatorship is called democracy and vice versa.

The *Critique of the Gotha Programme* was a somewhat irritated reaction of Marx to the proposed platform of the two socialist parties in Germany which, in 1875, moved toward a merger. It contained, however, Marx's only elaborate statement of what he expected after the proletarian seizure of power. Here, he introduced the important concept of the "period of transition" when society would be no longer capitalist, nor yet socialist. In this period, there would be government through a "dictatorship of the proletariat." By "despotic inroads" it would manage a "revolutionary transformation" of society. Marx made no definite statements about the duration of this period, except that he

foresaw two stages in it. There would be a "lower" stage allowing no private property or exploitation and compensating each person in accordance with the work he contributed. Since this procedure raised legal problems of distribution, there would have to be a law and, presumably, a state to enforce the law. In the "higher" state, however, production would be so abundant that each person could receive from society "according to his needs." No legal problem of fair share would exist. In this stage, there would be no more law, also rendering the state superfluous. Engels, in the *Anti-Duehring*, spoke explicitly of an eventual "withering away" of the state. Thus, Marxism emphasizes the state only during the "period of transition" and looks for an eventual stateless society.

E. Marxism and Engels and Lenin

As George Lichtheim in his informative *Marxism, An Historical and Critical Study* (1961) has said, Marxism as an ideological system of ideas came into existence between Marx's death in 1883 and Engels' death in 1895. It was Engels himself whose works came to serve as something like textbooks of a system of ideas, particularly his *Anti-Duehring* (1878), or the extract from it published under the title, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*. One must also mention his philosophical essay, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Philosophy* (1888), and his *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884). Another philosophical work, *Dialectics of Nature*, was not published until 1925. Engels tended to assume that Marx had created a new universal science concerning both history and nature. He also assumed the authority to formulate its principles in sweeping generalizations. In doing so, he carried Marx's ideas into areas Marx himself never touched. At the same time, Engels, impressed not only by Marx, but equally by Charles Darwin, stated Marxism in more evolutionary terms than Marx had done. In this way, Marxism emerged as a system pretending to have explanations and answers for every possible aspect of knowledge and for all time. Engels particularly is responsible for the formulation of "dialectical materialism," now the

official philosophy of communism and not to be confused with Marx's materialist explanation of historical changes and social structures. Besides Engels, Karl Kautsky in Germany and Georgi Plekhanov in Russia helped to formulate Marxism as a system.

In the *Anti-Duehring*, as has been already mentioned, Engels formulated his well-known phrase that the state, after the Revolution, would "wither away"; this assertion was in opposition to the Anarchists, who wanted to "abolish" the state. Engels characterized the state as a temporary phenomenon of history, having the sole function to suppress the lower classes in the interest of the property owners. He gave the impression that the character of society would change as soon as the bourgeoisie was overthrown. "The first act by virtue of which the state really constitutes itself the representative of the whole of society—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—this is, at the same time, its last independent act as a state."

Unlike Marx, Engels apparently did not foresee a lengthy "period of transition" replete with a dictatorial "revolutionary transformation of society." He wrote as if the great social transformation would come almost by itself as the result of the proletarian insurrection. One has the impression that the change would be completed within a few weeks or, at most, a few months. Thereafter, the state would sink into obsolescence "like the bronze axe or the spinning wheel," and society would be run by a kind of business administration rather than by a government.

The *Anti-Duehring* and the *Ludwig Feuerbach* are the main sources for the philosophy called dialectical materialism which Engels created. Marx had merely explained historical change and social structure in terms of underlying economic foundations, and had assigned law, government, and all ideas to the "superstructure," as he said in his *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*. Dialectical materialism, however, is far more. It is a philosophy seeking to explain the nature of all reality in terms of contradictions, change, and generation of new essences in the process. Engels's dialectical materialism turned on three key concepts: a) the unity of

opposites, b) the "negation of the negation," and c) the transformation of quantitative change into qualitative change. On these foundations, Lenin later was to build a more explicit structure of dialectical materialism, solidified by Stalin into philosophical dogma.

Dialectical materialism neither added to, nor subtracted from, Marx's ideological message. It did, however, reinforce communist ideology's claim of having answers for every kind of question and explanations for every part of reality. Engels proclaimed an "either-or" antagonism in philosophy: what is not dialectical materialism is "idealism," and vice versa. To understand communist ideology, it is more important to know that there is such a thing as a general philosophy which communists claim as their very own and regard as exclusive of every other philosophy, than to be fully conversant with all the details of this philosophy. All the same, dialectical materialism is explained in every communist ideological textbook.

Engels' *Origin of the Family* further added to these pretenses of the ideology by sketching, in the brief compass of 150 pages, the complete evolution of mankind, discussing the institutions of family, property, and government. Again, he offered generalizations encompassing the history of East and West, North and South; whereas Marx had confined his analysis not only to the "present-day society" but also, as he said at one time, to the West. What is more, Engels offered a survey of historical developments for times prior to historical records. In the course of his argument, he managed to add one more cause to the socialist movement, the liberation of sex relations from the strictures of monogamous marriage.

The co-architect of Marxism in Western Europe was Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), the leading theoretician of the German Social Democratic party and author of the *Erfurt Program* (1891). Like Engels, he wrote abundantly, teaching Marxism to the masses. He had a great influence on Lenin until bitter controversy separated the two after the outbreak of World War I.

Another theoretical leader among German Marxists was Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), whose *Presuppositions of*

Socialism (1898) cast doubt on some of Marx's chief tenets. Bernstein pointed out that the development of capitalism had not conformed to Marx's predictions and that the masses had neither sunk into deeper misery nor become more revolutionary. Accordingly, he argued, socialists should no longer look for the Revolution or conduct an irreconcilable class struggle but, rather, seek to obtain more justice and welfare in society through legislation. Bernstein's views came to be called "revisionism," a term which now means any attempt to moderate the more radical and combative aspects of the ideology. Kautsky opposed Bernstein, nearly having him expelled from the party.

In spite of this official condemnation of Bernstein, the German Social Democratic party practiced a more "reformist" than "revolutionary" line, though it used revolutionary language. The German Social Democratic party constituted the center of gravity in the Second International, founded in Paris in 1889. The Second International, structurally a loose league of socialist and labor parties, pledged itself to action that would prevent the outbreak of a general war, or to stop that war after it had broken out. When war came in 1914, however, socialists in France and Germany supported their governments by voting for war appropriations. The Second International fell virtually to pieces, even though it was revived after the war.

The 1914 failure of the Second International marked the end of the Marxist movement which until then had grown steadily in numbers and influence. Reacting aggressively against the Second International and Bernstein's ideas, Lenin developed a new interpretation of Marxism which stressed the irreconcilability of the class struggle, the total character of the coming revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Consequently, a second Marxist movement began after World War I. This new wave of Marxism, in sharp opposition to the first, is called Marxism-Leninism. It is the core of communism as we know it now.

Communism is a foundation of V. I. Lenin. Although we have examined the writings of Marx and Engels, we must understand that the two men created no mass movement and

controlled no organization apart from the First International. The only precise way to define communism, therefore, is to call it the movement and the ideology established by Lenin. It continues to regard Lenin as its highest authority. This fact leaves no doubt about the identity of the subject matter for any study of communism. For this reason, the words "Communism" and "Communist" should be capitalized. These are the proper names which Lenin's movement gave to itself. Marx, of course, is relevant, but only insofar as he entered into the communist ideology by way of Lenin's interpretation. Logically speaking, it would make perfect sense to begin a study of communism with Lenin and only to "flash back" to Marx. Pedagogically, however, such treatment is difficult, since Lenin becomes much more understandable once one has comprehended Marx.

"Lenin" was a political alias used by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870-1924), the son of a school official in Simbirsk (now Ulyanovsk). Lenin's older brother, Alexander, belonged to a revolutionary and terrorist organization and was executed for being involved in a plot on the life of the emperor. The event strongly influenced the young Lenin. After studying law, he devoted his life wholly to revolutionary activities. Following two periods of banishment to Siberia, he left Russia in 1900 and joined a small group of revolutionary Russian intellectuals in Switzerland, where the group edited *Iskra*, a revolutionary newspaper. In 1903, the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic party met first in Brussels, then in London. Over a question of party organization, Lenin caused a split between his adherents and the other party members, the former from then on being called Bolsheviks, the latter, Mensheviks. This was the first time Lenin's ideology began to have both an organizing and splitting effect.

The Bolsheviks continued for some time as a faction of the Social Democratic party, but, by 1912, they had a full-fledged Russian party organization of their own. In 1918, the Bolsheviks constituted a separate party, the Communist party. During World War I, Lenin participated in two socialist international conferences in the Swiss villages of Kienthal and

Zimmernwald where he became the leader of the left radical opposition to the Second International and laid the foundations for the Third International, which he founded later, in 1919. After the overthrow of the Russian government in 1917, Lenin returned to Russia with the help of the German authorities. He immediately assumed leadership of the Bolsheviks and called for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, composed of liberals and socialists. After an abortive coup d'état in July, Lenin had to flee to Finland, from where he returned in September, urging an immediate uprising against the Provisional Government. This occurred, under Trotsky's management, in early November. During the years following the ensuing civil war, Lenin systematically destroyed all rival political forces and established the dictatorship of his own Party. He suffered a stroke in 1922, another one in 1923, and died in 1924.

Due to Lenin's way of treating Marx with blind faith, the aspects of Marx which he endorsed were enshrined as dogmas. Communists were allowed to quote them, but never to question them nor to examine them critically. Lenin himself changed much in Marx's body of ideas, possibly believing that he was merely bringing out the true Marx. Lenin's *Imperialism*, for instance, furnished a new picture of bourgeois society with many features not found at all in Marx's analysis. Lenin's concept of the Revolution implied the possibility of "making" the Revolution, even where conditions were not yet ripe, something that would not have occurred to Marx. Lenin's notion of the Party was wholly new. Lenin strongly emphasized the roles of consciousness and revolutionary theory, while Marx left these things to historical development.

With all these revisions, however, Lenin is inconceivable without Marx. All his thinking and planning revolved around the core of propositions which Marx bequeathed to his followers, to wit, that the present-day society is incurably and hopelessly evil and false, that its destruction at the hands of the working class is imminent, that from it will follow the emergence of a socialist society, and that class struggle is the requisite for the accomplishments of this change.

F. The Vanguard Party and Its Road to Power

The book in which Lenin first put forth his ideology in coherent form was called *What Is To Be Done?* (1902). This title, taken from a famous novel by N. G. Chernyshevsky in 1863, may stand as a motto for Lenin's entire work. Lenin, unlike Marx, was no longer addressing himself to questions of human nature and its unfolding, alienation, history, and the nature of the future. On all these matters, he assumed Marx had already found the truth, once and for all. Accepting Marx's pronouncements as his starting point, he asked what should be done about it. Thus, Lenin's ideological contributions are mainly in the realm of strategy and organization.

What Is To Be Done? contains the ideas that Lenin brought to the important Second Party Congress of the Russian Social Democratic party. The first congress, at Minsk in 1898, hardly deserved to be called that; it was the 1903 congress at Brussels and London that established and organized the Russian Social Democratic party. Lenin wanted a small, disciplined, and very homogeneous organization on the model of a military force; his opponents thought in the usual and traditional terms of a broad, mass party. The difference is important, but more important are the ideas behind it. Lenin thought of revolutionary "consciousness" as the prime requisite for a revolution. While Marx also had made the Revolution dependent on the growth of "class consciousness" in the proletariat, he had expected it to develop as a kind of sociological by-product of the class struggle. Looking back on a half century of proletarian moderation in Western Europe, Lenin now said flatly that the proletariat by itself would never attain more than a "trade-union" consciousness. It would never be interested in anything more than improving the workers' condition in the bourgeois society.

Revolutionary consciousness for Lenin was a consciousness no longer oriented toward the present-day society, but toward the socialist future earlier predicted by Marx. Lenin also sometimes used the term "independent thought," which meant independent of the influences of the present. Accord-

ingly, he stated that "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." The "revolutionary theory," i.e., Marxist view of history, could obviously be the property of only a few. Lenin distinguished sharply between the "spontaneity" of the masses, which to him was reactionary because it reflected the influences of the present, and "consciousness," which derived the purpose of action from the Marxist vision of the future. Only those who were capable of "consciousness" could form a party capable of functioning as the leader, the "vanguard" of the masses. The term "vanguard" evokes the image of a marching army whose destination is known only by the advanced element. Those who intended to be revolutionary without "consciousness" or "theory" would only be the "tail" of the masses (Lenin spoke actually of "tailism") and thus would remain, in fact, reactionaries.

Again and again, Lenin returned to the ideology as the decisive factor in the Revolution. In this context, he made a statement of far-reaching consequences. There are only two ideologies, he said, bourgeois and socialist, for "mankind has not created a third one." Consequently, he who deviates "in the slightest" from the strict path of socialist ideology is, in fact, already in the enemy's camp, though he may esteem himself a socialist. This "either-or" stricture of Lenin's became the justification for the practice of purges in the Communist party.

Lenin's insistence on socialist ideology, or "theory," as the sole basis of a successful revolutionary movement dictated his ideas concerning Party organization and discipline. The Party should not be an association of all who were in sympathy with socialist ideas, but only of those who were actively engaged in revolutionary work. He envisaged a small band of "professional revolutionaries" whose life would be dedicated entirely to revolution and who would be maintained for this purpose at the Party's expense. In the interest of maintaining the unity of theory, freedom of criticism would not be permitted. Discussion might be allowed before a decision had been made by the Party leadership, but afterwards the decision was binding on all and beyond criticism.

This principle was called "democratic centralism." It meant that discussion was allowed only to move toward a foregone conclusion. Authority in the Party would be built, not from the bottom up, but from the top down. The Party would deliberately be kept small and put under an army-like discipline. It is interesting to note the frequent use of military terminology in Lenin's writings. He envisaged the Party advancing over a causeway with swamp on both sides against a heavily defended fortress. This imagery suggested to him the need for a small, superbly armed, dedicated, and utterly disciplined band of fighters who, because of superior organization, would prevail over vastly more numerous and more powerful enemies.

A certain similarity existed between Lenin's party and Auguste Blanqui's cadres. Blanqui had some influence on Lenin by way of the Russian revolutionary writer, P. Tkachev, but Lenin always claimed there was an essential difference between him and Blanqui in that he, Lenin, never forgot Marx's insistence on the revolution by the "overwhelming majority" of the people. Accordingly, cadres were not enough. The Party had to obtain the support of "the masses," a term Lenin introduced. The relationship between the small, professional Party and the masses was to be maintained by a string of non-communist, mass organizations, each with members belonging for non-political reasons. The members were to be controlled, however, by a few Communists placed in key positions. Lenin later called these organizations "transmission belts." A number of these groups with large membership, strung loosely around the solid core of the Party, would enable a small number of Communists to manipulate a vast number of people. In this context, Lenin made the distinction between "propaganda" and "agitation." Propaganda he defined as the explanation of a great many ideas to people, or, rather, the propagation of the communist ideology, which only a few are able to receive. By contrast, agitation meant to dwell on one single idea, to expound on it ceaselessly, to reduce all questions or problems to this one idea, thereby arousing people emotionally. "Agitation" would be the mode of relation between the Party and the

masses.

In 1905, during the Russian Revolution of that year, Lenin wrote a book that first spelled out his strategy of how to attain power. To understand this idea, one must grasp the dogmatic way in which a Marxist would think of the Revolution in terms of time. Since Marx had declared that the Revolution would come as the result of historical developments beyond anyone's control, all Marxists would be concerned with the question of exactly where, in the scheduled course of history, they would be at any time, and whether their historical position were near the revolutionary stage. A "bourgeois" revolution was not supposed to occur until the feudal society had developed its utmost possibilities. A proletarian revolution would also presuppose the full unfolding of capitalism. A bourgeois revolution would be made by the bourgeoisie initiating the bourgeois society; a proletarian revolution, the socialist society. If Marx's historical materialism were to be true, this evolutionary explanation had to be regarded as the answer to the time problem of the Revolution. Russia, in 1905, was not a capitalist or a bourgeois society, whatever else it may have been. Therefore, the Revolution of 1905 could not possibly have been considered a proletarian one. Lenin and his friends visualized that it might succeed and result in a bourgeois government, which would introduce the typical liberal-democratic structures and freedom, though it might not look kindly on any attempts to prepare a proletarian revolution.

In this situation, Lenin conceived the idea of dovetailing the bourgeois and the socialist revolution. Actually, the idea had first occurred to Alexander Parvus and Trotsky. Dovetailing meant that the Communists would not let the bourgeoisie make its own revolution and maintain its government during the period appointed to it by history. The Communists would lead the bourgeois revolution after which they would set up a "democratic revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." After a brief period of "democratic" changes, the proletariat would oust the peasantry from the government and, using public power as its instrument, make the socialist Revolution.

In this plan, announced by Lenin in his *Two Tactics*, the "bourgeois revolution" was meant to be the revolution then imminent in Russia; the "next" revolution on history's calendar; the peasantry was identified as the "bourgeois" element with whom the proletariat would ally in order to make this "next" revolution. The two forces would then establish a revolutionary government. Lenin's reference to "democratic" changes applied not to the form of the revolutionary government, but to the content of its policies, e.g., the eight-hour day, universal suffrage, and other changes usually associated with a bourgeois democracy. "Dictatorship" meant that the revolutionary regime would not allow the "bourgeois" element to prevent the subsequent proletarian revolution. Lenin thus set up a program in which the Communists would come to power in alliance with the numerically superior peasantry. This union would be followed by a period of revolutionary government which would not try to realize socialist changes. All the same, the Communists would be in control of public power and, after a suitable period of ruling "together" with the peasantry, would push on to the "socialist Revolution" by what Lenin called "action from above." At that time, all the land would be taken away from the peasantry, who would then be treated again as the class enemy.

The entire mode of communist operations derives from this concept of alliances. To point out merely a few of its important consequences:

a) The Communists expected to come to power, not by preaching and teaching their own ideology, and not on the strength of their direct followers, but by appealing to their allies in terms of the allies' aspirations. Thus, power would be seized with the help of non-communist appeals to non-communist supporters. Land ownership would be one demand which the Communists would first concede and then take away. National independence would be handled similarly. The Communists assumed that their own followers would be small in number and inferior in strength and that they could attain power only in alliance with an element ideologically hostile. Hence, Lenin enjoined his followers to

“watch their ally as if he were an enemy,” and to treat him openly as an enemy when the time for the second revolution had come.

b) A clear distinction was thus established between “coming to power” and “the Revolution.” In Marx’s book, the “overthrow of the bourgeoisie” and the taking of power by the proletariat were one single operation. Lenin’s strategy envisaged a road to power that would not coincide with the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, but would occur in alliance with certain elements of the bourgeoisie. The Revolution would be carried out afterwards by “action from above,” i.e., the use of public power for the purpose of subverting social order and the traditions of the country. Joseph Stalin later called this process the “Revolution from above.”

c) Recalling the problem of timing the Revolution according to the supposedly objective schedule of history, Lenin now opened a possibility for the Communists to come to power at the beginning of the “bourgeois” stage of history. Moreover, he would bring forth a socialist revolution without giving the “bourgeois” society a chance to develop under its own government. In other words, Lenin conceived of a method of revolution that seemed to make it unnecessary to wait for the full development of capitalism before proceeding to the socialist revolution. Together with his typical emphasis on “revolutionary theory,” this meant that wherever there was a group possessing “revolutionary theory,” it could “attach to itself” any social element in any type of country and move into power, after which it could push toward socialism by “action from above.” A revolution could now be “made” almost at will, provided one followed Lenin’s strategy correctly.

In 1905, Lenin selected the Russian peasantry as the Communists’ allies. Later, in 1920, he extended the concept to other potential allies in other contexts, notably to the so-called “national bourgeoisie” in colonial and semi-colonial countries. In order to obtain the support of this ally, the Communists would advocate national independence, as incompatible with the ultimate conditions Communists envisage as peasant land-ownership. In 1935, and again in

1956, the Communists became interested in an alliance with the social-democrats and the progressive elements of the liberal bourgeoisie in Western countries. In either case, the Communists were willing to support the objectives appealing to their allies provided that, in return, they could "attach to themselves" their allies' numerical strength.

G. The Pattern of Communist Operations

During the first half of 1916, Lenin wrote *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, probably the strongest missile in the arsenal of communist ideological weapons. In this work, Lenin consciously set out to add to Marx's and Engels's ideas. He asserted that capitalism had developed beyond the system that Marx had analyzed. Competition had given way to monopoly, and industrial capital to "finance capital"—a concept suggested to him by Rudolf Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (1910). Marx had described the concentration of capital in larger units and its centralization in fewer and fewer hands. Lenin maintained that control had further contracted, passing into the hands of even fewer financiers who no longer directed enterprises as manufacturers, but, rather, confined themselves to "coupon clipping."

Monopoly, Lenin continued, meant that deliberate and organized control had replaced the anarchy of capitalist competition. Monopoly had now pervaded all of public life in capitalist countries. Governments, Lenin said, were nothing more than instruments of the monopolists, who sought to control the sources of raw materials and cheap labor by expanding their country's political control to those overseas areas vital to them. They also needed such areas because capitalist countries had now developed an exportable surplus of capital in need of investment opportunities. Lenin began to call the highly industrialized countries "collective capitalists," a concept not found in Marx. Imperialism, he asserted, had become a structural necessity for the "collective capitalists"; they could not prosper if they were unable to control overseas areas and exploit cheap colonial labor. In Lenin's description, the exploitation of colonial labor had, to

some extent, replaced the exploitation of the home proletariat. The proletariat had been "bribed" with a part of the "super-profits" derived from the colonies into acquiescing in their countries' colonial ventures.

Because of the necessity of controlling overseas areas, the imperialist countries had become involved in conquests. For the first time, the entire world was now "shared out" between a few "collective capitalists." In the future, argued Lenin, only a re-division would be possible. Imperialist countries would war with each other for control of the prized overseas possessions. Thus, Lenin concluded that wars are caused by imperialism, and imperialism alone. Indeed, he believed, wars are one of the endemic features of the entire imperialist world system. At the same time, though, imperialism had divided the world into two antagonistic "camps": the imperialist countries and colonial peoples. When, in time, the latter eventually would obtain more strength through economic development, an armed conflict would shape up between the two camps. In the decisive battle, imperialism would be overthrown, ending not only private property and exploitation but also war. Hence, said Lenin, to be against imperialism means to be for peace.

One can see how he transferred to the international scene Marx's picture of the class struggle mounting towards a "final battle." The "class struggle" was now being fought between entire peoples. The "final battle" had not the character of a domestic uprising, but of an international war.

Imperialism, Lenin maintained, was not something which capitalist countries were at liberty to engage in or not; rather, it was a "stage" of capitalism. Kautsky, with whom Lenin clashed for the first time over this question, had said that imperialism was merely a foreign policy adopted by bourgeois governments who could abandon it when they wished. Since monopoly had taken the place of competition and competition was the energy that drove capitalism ceaselessly forward, Lenin concluded that the stage of imperialism was capitalism's "highest stage." It could develop no further. The next event on the agenda of world history would inevitably be the proletarian Revolution.

Lenin's *Imperialism* gave a new twist to the communist ideology. Marx had seen the class struggle as taking place essentially within the various nations' walls, although he did say that it could not be successfully completed in one nation alone and that ultimately it would have to become a world-wide event. Lenin shifted the scene of the class struggle to the theater of world politics without giving up the domestic theater. Both were now linked. Lenin's new analysis enabled communists not only to interpret domestic events in the light of their assumption about the class struggle, but to similarly interpret international developments. Lenin also shifted the main accent of the concept of "contradictions" from the "contradictions" supposedly inherent in the capitalist economic system to the "contradictions" of a political nature between various imperialist countries. Furthermore, Lenin's thesis provided an apparently plausible explanation as to why the proletariat of Western industrial countries had not, as Marx predicted, become revolutionary. Lenin said they had been "corrupted" by their masters' bribes. Among the elite of the workers, the "labor aristocracy," there had developed "social-chauvinism," i.e., a feeling of solidarity between workers and their country which amounted to a betrayal of the Revolution.

Finally, Lenin's book provided new grounds for moral indignation against capitalism by picturing the fat monopolists, the "coupon clippers," the "parasitic capitalists" and their "super-profits," their unbelievable exploitation of colonial peoples, and their bribery of their own proletariat. The major ground for this moral indignation, however, was the evil which Lenin now ascribed exclusively to imperialism: war. Lenin's characterization of imperialism had enormous influence far beyond the ranks of communists, as witnessed by such figures as Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser.

While Lenin was hiding in Finland during the summer of 1917, anticipating his return to Russia to seize power, he wrote *State and Revolution*, published in 1918. It was an attempt to visualize the theoretical foundations of the power he was about to set up for communists on a dictatorial basis and to square its requirements with Marx's and Engels's

pertinent statements. The book is the most confused and, one may say, disingenuous work of Lenin, hiding rather than clarifying the communist ideology's position on governing power. All the same, the book is very important because, together with Lenin's pamphlet, *The Renegade Kautsky*, it is the text that served as a guideline for the operation of communist regimes.

The following concepts are particularly noteworthy:

a) The concept of the "period of transition," the period following the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, described by Lenin as a period in which classes would continue "for a long time to come" and the class struggle would intensify rather than abate; a period, therefore, when the Communists would organize the state as a dictatorial instrument of the Revolution with total power.

b) The concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," a "regime based on force and not limited by law." This kind of regime Lenin considered an integral element of the class struggle. "A Marxist is only he who extends the acknowledgement of the class struggle to the acknowledgement of the dictatorship of the proletariat." Again, Lenin clashed on this point with Kautsky, who called on the Soviets to organize their political regime as a true democracy. Kautsky reasoned that the Communists could afford democracy once they had taken from the capitalists the means of production, the basis of their power. Obviously, Kautsky's assumptions concerning the period after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie were as different from Lenin's as night from day.

c) The duration of the "period of transition." Lenin did not specify the length of this period in terms of years, but rather in terms of conditions. Two of these conditions he took from Marx: the "class enemy" must first be fully repressed, and the means of production must be developed to the point where they can produce abundance. To these, Lenin added a third, and the most significant, condition: only after men had learned to accept labor as their "prime want of life," after they had conformed to society so as to give it their best effort without stint, and only after they had developed the discipline of social order of their own accord,

only then could the state "wither away." As long as the state existed, Lenin maintained, there could be no freedom; freedom prevailed only where there was no state. In other words, the "period of transition," with its dictatorial restriction and repression, could end only if and when there appeared a "new man," the "new Soviet man." In this context, Lenin reiterated Marx's division of the period after the seizure of power into two stages, except that now Lenin called the "lower stage" socialism, and the "higher" one communism. According to this nomenclature, Soviet Russia today is still in the socialist stage.

d) The order of the future. In *State and Revolution*, Lenin made more detailed statements about the future society than had either Marx or Engels. He envisaged a society in which accounting, registration, and business administration would become so simplified that anybody with a knowledge of reading and writing could exercise these functions. No government would be needed, only an administration run by amateurs. As for quarrels between people, Lenin called these "excesses" which, at first, would be spontaneously prevented by bystanders but eventually would also "wither away."

Lenin's last contribution to the communist ideology was his *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (1920). The book was a polemic against communists who believed that the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia had already changed the nature of reality and brought about the millennium. They no longer wanted to take into account the facts of life. Lenin's view, by contrast, emphasized the "protracted struggle," destined to continue because the strength of the bourgeoisie had "increased tenfold" after the Bolsheviks' seizure of power. The proletariat, in spite of its victory, was still inferior in numbers and power.

The power of the enemy, Lenin insisted, was rooted not only in the ownership of the means of production, but also in the "terrible force of habit" nourished by "small commodity production." Lenin was obviously referring to the peasantry (small commodity producers) and present attitudes, unchanged by the Bolsheviks, which "surrounded the prole-

tariat on all sides' with "demoralizing" effect. One could not "vanquish" the peasantry like the capitalists, Lenin admitted. The struggle against them would be protracted, requiring, meanwhile, the strictest discipline and organization. Instead of resorting simply to force, one would have to employ the most varied methods of struggle.

In the same work, Lenin warned the communists in Western countries, who in view of the victory of their comrades disdained any contact with bourgeois institutions or parties, that the fight would be long and could not be won by a "revolutionary pose." The masses had to be won where their loyalties were; therefore, in order to win the masses, one must operate within the bourgeois institutions (parliaments, trade unions) and with bourgeois parties in order to destroy them from the inside. Communists must operate not only underground, illegally, but also legally and above ground. They must learn to zig and zag, to maneuver, to compromise, and to bide their time for the situation that is most favorable. They must wage class war with all kinds of weapons and methods, disdaining revolutionary romanticism and remaining flexible.

One should note that Lenin's interpretation of who the class enemy is and in what resides his strength differs radically from that of Marx. For Marx, the class enemy was the capitalist system, its strength consisting in private ownership of the factories. For Lenin, the most persistent class enemy was the peasantry (whom Marx never counted as "bourgeois"), and their strength resided in the "terrible force of habit," in other words, in the emotional tenacity by which peasants cling to their ways. Given Lenin's admission that the "force of habit" could not be vanquished by force and, also, given his requirement of the "new man" as the sole condition on which the "protracted struggle" could be called ended, one may say that the communists are engaged in a limitless struggle. The condition which they have stipulated for ending it amounts to a re-making of man, the creation of a man that is unlike any type of human ever known. It seems that the communists' struggle is likely to go on forever.

H. Post-Lenin Developments of the Ideology

Around 1950, the communists counted among their classic authorities five men: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung. Both Stalin and Mao have been demoted since then. Apart from intra-Communist politics, this is realistic, for neither of them contributed anything comparable to that of the first three.

Stalin enshrined in dogma Lenin's ideas about strategy and organization much as Lenin did Marx's ideas. For this reason, communism is an ideological enterprise that is dogmatic, not only about its world view, but also about its strategy. As we have seen, Lenin taught flexibility of method so that the dogmatization of strategy did not prevent the communists from conducting their struggle with great mastery of widely varied and even conflicting methods.

The works in which Stalin summed up "Leninism" were *Foundations of Leninism* (1924) and *Problems of Leninism* (1926). They are concerned entirely with ideas about organization and strategy, the dictatorship, Soviet Russia as an instrument of world revolution, and global revolutionary policies. Stalin, bitterly opposed by Trotsky, committed the movement to the policy of "socialism in one country," which would, first and foremost, consolidate communist power in Russia. Soviet Russia would be the prime instrument of the Revolution. Its foreign relations would be conducted with a view to the enhancement of Soviet power. Trotsky wanted to use the Russian Revolution as the beginning of a chain of proletarian revolutions in many leading countries, in other words, to internationalize the Revolution (he called that "permanent revolution"). Because of Stalin's victory in this quarrel, the power interests of Russia became merged with the ideological interests of the Party in pushing the class struggle forward.

In 1938, Stalin published the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, the so-called "Short Course," which became the official textbook on ideological indoctrination. Chapter IV presents a summary treatment of dialectical and historical materialism which still represents

the substance of this philosophy. Stalin defined dialectical materialism in four points: a) Everything is dependent on everything else; nothing can be considered in and by itself; b) everything is always in flux; nothing is static—something is always dying and something else coming up; c) development is not mere growth, but turns from quantitative to qualitative change; decisive developments occur by way of a “leap,” the movement being not only forward but also upward; and d) there are contradictions between what is growing and what is dying. Characteristically, Stalin did not confine himself to merely presenting these points. In each case, he added a moral about the political attitude demanded by these “truths.” Thus point (b) seemed to him to demand that one should act in politics not as a reformer, but as a revolutionary.

In 1950, Stalin wrote a pamphlet of the utmost importance: *Marxism and Linguistics*. Intervening in an ideological quarrel, he decreed that language should not be considered as belonging to the “superstructure,” which changes from society to society and depends on the ruling class of each society; rather, it should be looked upon as common property of all men, regardless of class. The science of linguistics was thereby freed from the strictures of dialectical materialism. By implication, the emancipation would also apply to the science of formal logic. In 1952, another pamphlet of Stalin’s, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet Union*, made the astonishing admission that the “law of value” described by Marx as characteristic of capitalism was still valid in the socialist economy of the Soviet Union and would remain valid for a long time to come. The pamphlet also contained some ideas about the end of the period of transition.

Regarding Mao Tse-tung, there is a legend describing him as a heretic who developed his own kind of revolutionary ideology. His heresy supposedly consisted in entrusting the Revolution to the peasantry rather than to the proletariat. Anyone familiar with Lenin, however, will remember that, beginning in 1905, he had envisaged a revolution led by Communists relying mainly on peasant numerical strength, an

idea he applied specifically to Asia in 1920. In 1926 and 1927, Stalin decided authoritatively that "rural soviets" were the proper model for a communist revolution in China. In *The New Democracy* (1940), Mao Tse-tung expressly acknowledged his indebtedness to Stalin's guidance regarding the Revolution in China. Mao always remained loyal to Stalin and Stalinism; at present, he blames the Soviet leadership precisely for having abandoned Stalin's pattern.

Mao was listed among the five communist "classics" mainly because of his two theoretical works, *On Practice* (1937) and *On Contradiction* (1937). These little books group the ideas of dialectical materialism together in even more sweeping generalizations than do Stalin's. One of the ideas worth mentioning is the distinction between "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions, which allowed Mao to state that contradictions would continue even after the Revolution. These would, however, be "non-antagonistic." He also introduced the notion of the "dominant contradiction" in each given situation without letting us know how one can detect which of the various "contradictions" is the "dominant" one. Even more than Lenin, Mao emphasized the importance of correct ideology for handling matters, but he was also inclined to present ideology in a way to make it suitable as an instrument for the government.

Mao's most original contribution is in the field of military strategy. During the Sino-Japanese war, he wrote a work, *On the Protracted War*, based on the assumption that Japan, though stronger, would lose the war because she was an imperialist power. Against this background, he developed a brilliantly-conceived political and military strategy of confining the enemy to "the cities" and harassing him with operations based in the "countryside." He demanded the political mobilization of the people and a "united front" for the purpose of warfare. This book has become a strategic manual for a number of revolutionary strategists, notably the North Vietnamese General Giap and Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, who modeled his own *Guerilla Warfare* (1961) on Mao's thought.

If one bears in mind that communist ideology contains not only Marx's world view, but also Lenin's strategic principles, one must allow that Nikita Khrushchev made a real contribution through his principle of "peaceful coexistence." What he developed was a global strategy combining principles of foreign policy, the use of force, and domestic politics which aimed at decisive domestic changes within the Western powers. Until 1961, the communists never possessed anything like a "blueprint for world conquest." They had developed global strategic patterns twice, at the Sixth Comintern World Congress in 1928 and at the Seventh World Congress in 1935, but neither of these envisaged anything like the complete road from the present to a future communist takeover in the West's leading countries. One may, therefore, call "peaceful coexistence" the first complete world strategy of the communists. Its sources are the following documents: *Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers Parties*, November, 1957; *Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties*, December, 1960; Khrushchev's very important speech commenting on the *Statement*, January 6, 1961; and the new *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, October, 1961. The strategy consists of three parts: a) a preference for wars of national liberation over world wars and local wars; b) a world-wide alliance between communists and anti-imperialist forces; and c) a plan for the "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism."

Lenin and Stalin had assumed the inevitability of a decisive military struggle between "capitalism and socialism." After the Soviet Union had developed a full range of nuclear weapons and was well along in the missile race, Khrushchev proclaimed a shift in the balance of forces that enabled the "World Socialist System" to prevent any world war by deterring its enemies. From this new power, he concluded that the abolition of war had become possible even before the overthrow of capitalism. In his speech of January 6, 1961, Khrushchev made clear, however, that communism had not renounced war. He distinguished between four types of war: world wars, local wars, wars of national liberation, and popular uprisings. While the Soviet Union was interested in

avoiding the first two types, it took a "very positive attitude" toward the latter two. In other words, "peaceful coexistence" meant a revolutionary strategy operating on a world-wide scale through "wars of national liberation," the Vietnam type, and "popular uprisings," the Cuba type.

The Party program declared that the "national liberation movement" was communism's most potent ally. At the same time, an offer of alliance was extended to the former partners of the 1935 United Front, the social democrats, progressive liberals, and pacifists, particularly those who opposed atomic armaments. The plan envisioned a coalition between Communists and all generally left-wing political forces that can, and will, rally under the common causes of "anti-war," "anti-imperialism," and "anti-fascism." In order to facilitate such a coalition, the Communist program commits the Party to an objective of "radical reforms." Previously, the communists had always refused to support reforms, except for tactical purposes, since they considered any attempt to improve the present-day society as hypocritical and non-sensical. They were committed to its destruction.

The present commitment to radical reforms rather than revolution is unprecedented in communist history. The "radical reforms" would consist of a complete change of a Western country's military and foreign policy, as well as disarmament, large-scale nationalization of industries, and "broad democracy," i.e., permissiveness for subversive groups controlled by communists. The communists would hope to enter the government as a part of a coalition of liberal progressive forces. Once in the government, they would launch a "mass struggle outside of parliament" in order to smash the resistance of their enemies. This achieved, the "peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism" would be unopposed. The plan follows the pattern which the communists executed in Czechoslovakia in 1948. It was described and analyzed by the Czech historian, Jan Kozak, in a report later published by the United States Government Printing Office under the title *The New Role of National Legislative Bodies in the Communist Conspiracy* (1961). The idea is to concentrate on the problem of getting communists into

positions of public power as members of a coalition, after which they can use the public confidence attached to the office, first to oust their coalition partners, and then to conduct the "Revolution from above."

I. On the Critique of Communist Ideology

The communist ideology has considerable power of persuasion and should not be taught to the unsuspecting student without careful and penetrating criticism. Communism has been most frequently criticized for its practices, but this kind of criticism does not touch the ideas from which the practices spring. A more profound criticism, therefore, concentrates on the ideas. For this purpose, the ideas of communism should be taken seriously, stated in the words of the original texts, and comprehended by means of more general categories of inquiry. By way of example, we shall offer here a criticism of the Marxist doctrines of alienation, exploitation, power of the ruling class, the laws of history, and the future transformation of all human life.

Many intellectuals attribute to Marx the original authorship of the concept of "alienation." This is not true; even in the modern history of ideas, the concept goes back, by way of Feuerbach and Hegel, to Johann Fichte and Jean Jacques Rousseau. If Marx's own narrow concept is put into a more general framework of inquiry, one finds that alienation—the experience that one is a stranger in this life and this world—was felt by men thousands of years ago. It was felt in ancient Egypt. It was also experienced by Socrates, who spoke of this life as a kind of death in the tomb of the body; by Plotinus, who first used the word "alienation"; and by St. Augustine, who saw men as pilgrims in this world away from their true home with God.

This recurring experience has been one of being separated from what is real truth beyond the appearances, from the timeless in the midst of fleeting time, and from one's fellow beings on account of one's separation from God. The experience and the symbols of alienation are as old as the written records.

Marx invented nothing new. He simply introduced a formula for alienation that took no account of the recurring experience; instead, he attributed it to that social structure which he called the "division of labor." What Socrates, Plotinus, and St. Augustine had expressed was disregarded, so that alienation appeared no longer as something recurring in the human condition, but as something that would disappear together with the abolition of the division of labor. How weak Marx's point really is becomes clear when one reads his statement about a "non-alienated" society which would make it "possible for me to do one thing today and another to-morrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic." This indeed would have to be the case, if Marx were correct that alienation results only from divided labor, and if divided labor could be abolished in an increasingly industrialized society.

Marx's charge of exploitation is a powerful one and must be taken most seriously. If one looks closely, the charge has three aspects: a) the surplus value is something that belongs to labor because it is produced by labor; b) the capitalist takes advantage of the worker's need to work in order to live and, thus, enslaves the worker by invisible threads; and c) capital keeps the worker's wages at the level of bare subsistence while it produces more and more wealth. It is difficult to deny that exploitation of workers does occur, but then attention should also be drawn to exploitation in other contexts which Marx ignored. Whenever human beings find themselves compelled by some necessity to which another holds the key, exploitation is possible, and there are always many who make use of the possibility. It is also true that many do not. What is more, in any human relation where exploitation occurs, we are also likely to find aspects of freedom from, and protection against, exploitation. Exploitation resides in many human situations and in human selfishness, but not exclusively in the economic structure. The most widespread occasion for exploitation is probably in sexual relationships. Frequent exploitation occurs within the

closely-knit bonds of the family. Marx, first of all, reduced the problem to artificially narrow limits. Secondly, he was unwilling to look at provisions and institutions designed to protect human dignity and independence. Labor has been particularly assisted by all kinds of such protections, even though exploitation is still found in the dependence of other groups.

Marx's concept of the surplus value, the centerpiece of his argument regarding exploitation, again describes an undeniable reality, but too narrowly. Civilization is possible only because people produce more than they require for their subsistence without being able to dispose of this surplus according to their personal whims. Surplus value is produced not only by manual laborers, but also by doctors, teachers, artists, and others. From surplus value the great works of public civilization are financed: roads, schools, hospitals, churches, and governments. This fact applies to a socialist society as well as to another type. In both cases, the employer collects the surplus value produced by manual labor, which in the Soviet case is the government and in ours a private company. The private company, however, passes on much of the surplus value to the government in the form of taxes, other parts to stockholders, and the bulk into investments that create new jobs. Marx's argument that the surplus value really belongs to the worker should have led him to the conclusion that the worker should have the disposal of it. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, however, he described the future society as one retaining that part of the surplus value required for reinvestment, public institutions, and government. Only from the remainder would the worker be paid. Thus, the existence of surplus value is not the problem; nor is the title to surplus value really at issue. What matters is how and for what ends surplus value is used. The most important use is investment. When the government collects the surplus value directly, it is likely to be invested in projects furthering the government's power.

The communist ideology assumes that power is virtually identical with ownership of the means of production. Government is a mere front. Both Marx and Lenin empha-

sized that political power is merely a derivative of ownership. Communism vaunts itself for having discovered the secret of power behind the political facade, and it promises that all forms of oppressive power, even the state itself, will disappear once ownership of the means of production has been abolished. The analysis of power is again artificially narrowed down, leaving out important evidence. True, business enterprises have power, but governments have more. And there are powerful unions, powerful religious bodies, and powerful universities to be taken into account. More important, however, is the fact that Marx and Lenin were aware of the "Asiatic" type of society in which property owners were weak and scattered; all power was monopolized by the central bureaucracy of the prince or ruler. Power issued from the control of public administration, rather than from ownership of the means of production. Thus, power is more widely based than Marx admitted. There is also political power which is not derived from ownership. What is more, this type of power seems to be particularly unassailable and immune to change. Since Marx and Lenin believed they could ignore the relative autonomy of political powers, they were not attentive to the dangers of concentrating both political power and the managerial control over people's livelihoods in one hand, the hand of the government. Their analysis of power is at best a half-truth which becomes an untruth by pretending that it is the whole truth.

Insofar as Marx's main points were based on social analysis, his thought is faulty because it is "reductionist," reducing both the scope of the problem and the relevant evidence, both violating the laws of open-minded inquiry. Reductionism is frequently the characteristic of ideological thinking, which starts out with a "position," i.e., the determination to look at things in one way and one way only. If somebody is determined from the outset to explain all reality only in terms of underlying economic phenomena, he will ignore or distort all evidence to the contrary, narrow the scope of investigation to questions that admit of such methods, and deny reality to anything else. In order to protect the doctrinaire narrowness of his explanations, he

must prohibit any questioning that would jeopardize the initial and arbitrary "position." The prohibition of questioning is characteristic of all ideologies. In the case of Marx, we find a flagrant example in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, where he forbids "socialist man" to raise the question "who created me, my father, grandfather, and so on, and the world?" The prohibition of questioning is particularly inadmissible in a body of ideas that claims to be "scientific."

A view of history is at the very core of the communist ideology. What is more, communists claim to know the "laws of history" with scientific reliability, and their knowledge emphatically embraces the future. Because of this pretense, their view of life is radically different from that of other people. In a sense, they retrospect the present from the vantage point of the future. Søren Kierkegaard, the nineteenth century Danish philosopher, criticized Hegel for this, pointing out that something that exists like man can only look on the future as a series of open possibilities, which means that he must be aware of standing within history and not at its end. This awareness has something to do with human rationality, and, by contrast, the communist claim to have certainty of the future of history entails irrationality. Communists assume the position of a being beyond and above time and cast themselves in a role not befitting the human situation. This certainty of the future is the root of whatever irrationality characterizes communist operations and conduct.

This basic irrationality is reflected in many of the concepts that play such a prominent role in the communist daily life. The Party is called the "vanguard" because it presumably is further advanced on the road to that certain future than other elements of mankind; the present is termed a "period of transition" through which one's mind is primarily on the "next phase," rather than on the present; political forces and actions which supposedly lead to the assumed future are called "progressive," which means the same as "good," so that the march of time takes the place of ethics; the "Party line" is considered not merely a directive of a political or-

ganization, but the concrete unfolding of the absolute in the course of history and, in this capacity, the only meaningful framework for all personal action. In all of this the communists are inclined to look upon the future as more real than the present; from this, they derive attitudes that have again and again baffled the world. None of these attitudes would be possible without the conviction that history has "laws" and that they can be "scientifically" known. The main objective to the communist conviction is, of course, that one can know only what is given, and history is not given as a whole. What is given, at least to some extent, is the past, while the future, as far as the human mind is concerned, is nothing more than a projection of hopes or fears.

The claim of the communist ideology that it represents a "science" is wholly spurious. Science is necessarily based on experience. Communist ideology, inasmuch as it pretends certainty about something that has not yet occurred, leaves the ground of experience. All science is subject to critical examination and re-examination, but communist ideology treats its classical authors as if they were possessors of revelation. Marx himself prohibited certain questions of a fundamental character. Since his time, the prohibition of questioning and criticism has been vastly expanded. Moreover, science is supposed to explain facts and, of course, is expected not to be in open conflict with them. Marxism has notoriously failed in its predictions. Contrary to Marx's "proofs," capitalism has not resulted in the ever-increasing misery of the masses, the proletariat has not become revolutionary, and the "inner contradictions" of capitalism have not prevented that system from further development. Contrary to Lenin's "proofs," the imperialist countries have not been ruined by the loss of their overseas possessions, and capitalism has developed an agriculture of immense productivity.

Communism's appeal often derives from the element of hope for a complete renewal of human life. Although hope is as old as mankind, communism has given it a new content and, what is more, a certainty based on its spurious claim to "science." In every culture, men have looked forward to

renewal, release from evil, and union with the forces of life and of goodness. All these aspirations center on man's relation with the divine ground of being as the origin of vaility and order. Among the many forms which this hope has taken, communism ranks very low. It promises that life will become different, new and integrated once the circumstances of our environment are radically changed, and it predicts this change will result mainly from the radical destruction of everything that exists. There is a wide gap in logic between radical destruction and radical renewal. The communists ask their true believers to leap across this chasm without offering them the aid of any supernatural grace. The communists concentrate wholly on the tasks of the class struggle and assert that, if these tasks are energetically and determinedly performed, one day the communist followers will be rewarded by the appearance of the new man. They do not point to any goodness evidenced in the past that would become the source of this new man. He will only be in the future as the result of a negative struggle. The communist ideology has hitched on to an ancient and ever-recurring human hope, but it makes demands on our credulity that exceed anything encountered in any religion.

J. Are Communists Ideologically Motivated?

An important controversy today concerns whether or not Communist leaders are actually influenced by the ideological outlook they profess. This question is the basis of our assessment of the other side. If the men in the Kremlin were wholly unimpressed by their own ideological statements and pretenses, one could assume that their interests would be confined to running their nation, preserving its security, and increasing its wealth and the well-being of its citizens. One would also assume that their outlook would be like that of normal men, that they would consider the future as a matter of open possibilities, that they would not arrogate to themselves the monopoly of knowledge concerning mankind's destiny, and that they would look on themselves as one nation among a number of others.

Nobody denies that the men in the Kremlin and their power machinery use ideological terminology and claim to be loyal to Lenin's authority. If what they say were true, one would have to assume that these leaders consider themselves engaged in a mission concerning all of mankind. One would further assume that they believe in their doctrine relating to the future and that they claim nothing less than total power over all their adversaries in the world, conceding nobody any right comparable to theirs. There is no room here to follow the controversy in all its ramifications. Rather, a clarification of what "ideological" and "irrational" mean in this context will be essayed as a contribution to the argument.

Those who believe that the Kremlin leaders are no longer interested in their own ideology point out that the letter of its demand has frequently been violated, that the ideology has frequently changed its content, that no ideological enthusiasm is to be found anymore, and that there is much resistance to ideological indoctrination. Much of this argument is based on a misunderstanding of what it is to be ideologically motivated. As laid down in books, the communist ideology is a huge and complex structure ramified in countless detailed concepts and definitions.

As present in the mind of a communist, these details are reduced to a few very fundamental assumptions about man, society, and history. He assumes without any doubt that the "present-day society," i.e., capitalism or imperialism, is the epitome of evil, corrupted beyond any hope of reform, and, moreover, doomed to an imminent end. He is positively certain that the "next" society in history will also be the ultimate, that it justifies all human hopes and desires, that a supreme effort on its behalf is the duty of every decent man, and that this society will surely come. Finally, there is no doubt in his mind that the price to be paid for this future society is an incessant and irreconcilable struggle against the "present-day society," that that struggle is his foremost duty as a communist, and that he is a member of a Party that has made the impossible possible and alone can be expected to transform mankind in the direction of its future destiny. These are three fairly simple convictions which are so

fundamental, however, that they could be uprooted only by equally fundamental convictions.

It is in such terms alone that one can grasp what "ideological motivation" means. We are talking here of an outlook on life and history, on oneself and others. With such an outlook, it is quite conceivable to have occur a number of changes without changing the outlook itself. This alteration is indeed what happened to communist ideology, which, in itself, is strong evidence that, in terms of the core, the ideology has indeed been a motivating force. One can say that communists are people who have consciously opted for this conviction and recognize each other in terms of it. The core conviction is surrounded by many more detailed concepts which one can call rationalizations. Surplus value, the "law of immiseration," and the "lower and the higher stage" are examples of such rationalizations. They have indeed been changed, not only recently, but from the very beginning, without affecting the core conviction. It is even possible to reduce the ideological motivation to a part of the core conviction, as evidenced by one prominent Marxist thinker of our day, Herbert Marcuse, who now admits that practically all of Marx's main tenets regarding capitalism and the proletariat have turned out to be wrong. Instead of ending his adherence to Marx, however, he turns around and asks: "How, then, can Marx's concept be saved?" He means how can one still overthrow capitalism without a revolutionary proletariat and a crippling economic crisis.

In the same way, the Chinese and Cuban Communists have developed new principles of strategy while clinging to the purpose of a radical revolution that would overthrow and destroy "Imperialism." Even the Russian Communists have found it possible to reinterpret many of the rationalizing concepts while holding to the main prospect: "We shall bury you!"

Resistance to communist indoctrination has indeed increased and become vocal since de-Stalinization began. This fact, however, does not necessarily prove the weakening of ideological motivation, which has always been the motivation of the true-believer-communists rather than that of their

victims or subjects. If Russian students protest against communist indoctrination, one cannot conclude that they have lost a conviction which they probably never had. On the other hand, one should realize that, for the communist, the ideology has provided a meaning of life, a purpose of action, and a substitute for religion. The unity of the Communist party through and after power rivalries has been most impressive and is difficult to explain if one assumes that the members are not motivated by ideological loyalty. The attitude of communists toward their subjects is still one of suspicion, towards other countries still one of perpetual hostility. It is difficult to see what would be the source of energy for leading communists if the hope which the ideology supplied to them were abandoned. Indeed, one may venture to predict that the day when the leading communists become persuaded that their assumptions were errors and their hopes illusions, the Party will rapidly fall to pieces.

First of all, the Communists would no longer look on their Party as "a miracle," as one of them put it when he said, "Lenin's Party has made the impossible possible." It is customary in Russia to give public thanks to the Party for every achievement of Russians in a way in which other peoples give thanks to God. Communists have in the past maintained their loyalty to the Party even at a moment when the Party deprived them of position, liberty, or life. In a world which is not what it should be, the Party is the single solid reality; to lose it would mean to lose a spiritual home. If the ideological motivation should fail, the membership would fall away from the Party like metal dust from a magnet when the power is cut off.

Secondly, the attitude of communists toward other people would change. Communists look on other people either as enemies or as supporters but never as fellow beings. They do not see any values which they can share, since the others live in the present while the communists live in the future. The communists regard themselves at best as teachers and guides, at worst as irreconcilable enemies, but never as men among men. If they were to change their attitude toward other people, it would be because they change their

attitude toward themselves. On the grounds of the ideology, they look on themselves as a group of elect, the sole knowers of the truth of history, of whom Lenin said: "Communists should know that in all events the future belongs to them."

Thirdly, they would stop referring to the present as a "period of transition" replete with struggles, defeats, and victories, but not suited to settlement, or enjoyment, or peace. They could then begin to look on human beings as ends in themselves and allow individual persons to pursue some of their own ends, rather than regarding all human activities under their control as means to the revolutionary strategy.

The communist irrationality stems from their view of history and from their assumed certainty of the future. As mentioned earlier, it is reflected in irrationalities characterizing many attitudes. The basic irrationality is not incompatible with pragmatic rationalities of an instrumental nature. Communists are extremely rational managers and strategists of conflict, provided one forgets that the assumption of a protracted irreconcilable conflict itself is irrational. Calling communists irrational, however, presupposes standards of rationality found outside of the communist world. This is not tantamount to saying that all non-communist governments act rationally, but only that governments function on a rational basis insofar as they work for the common good of their peoples here and now, bow to standards of right and wrong that are valid apart from their own political expedience, acknowledge the limit of "real possibilities" as furnished by the real world in which we live, recognize themselves as governments among governments and as men among men.

By contrast, communist regimes have described themselves as organized for the purpose of continuing the class struggle, which they conduct with a view to the power interests of the Communist party. As far as moral standards are concerned, Lenin declared that communists only acknowledged as their morality the interests of the class struggle; the Party Program of 1961, which made mention of the "universal standards of morality," listed a special set of

moral principles for the Party. Communists look on 'real possibilities' of the world in which we live only as obstacles to the "possible reality," which includes a new man fashioned in the image of the ideology. In this role, communists consider themselves basically unequal to all others and claim for themselves a standard of conduct that they are unwilling to concede to anyone else. Their Party is for them not a part within a whole, but rather the "whole," superordinated to family, country, and civilization. Thus, rather than operating in the way of governments in general, communist regimes operate as enterprises for ultimately ideological purposes.

Sooner or later, the communist persuasion will come to an end. With regard to Russia, at least, there is not much evidence that this time is near. In 1966, the regime brought out a new textbook, *Fundamentals of Scientific Communism*, to complete the slate of four textbooks used in public indoctrination. The new book deals mainly with the problems of "socialist society" — the phase in which the Soviets now consider Russia to be — and the ultimate development toward communism. This is a strong reiteration of the basic beliefs of the ideology, designed to be taught in all secondary and higher level educational institutions.

Not everywhere does the self-imposed ideological compulsion persist with the vigor that it shows in Russia and China. In Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, by contrast, leading intellectuals and even leading Party members seem to be breaking out of the ideological straightjacket. Philosophers once more are concerned with the problems of man, including those of the spirit. Political reformers have proposed and, to some extent enacted, moves towards liberty. Economists have argued for loosening the iron grip of the central government on production. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 has shown that there are limits to what the leaders of the Soviet Communist party will tolerate in this respect. Nobody can deny, however, that in these developments one can see real hope that the nightmarish age of armed ideologies may draw to its close.

Chapter II

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

By Herbert J. Ellison

A. Nineteenth Century Russian Revolutionism

Long before the appearance of Marxism, it was an established custom of the Russian intelligentsia to follow the latest trends in European radical thought. Even in the 1840s, Frenchmen visiting Russia were surprised at the frequency of lively debates about the ideas of the Utopian socialists, ideas which caused only a ripple of discussion in France. Thus, the eager reception of Marxism was part of an established tradition; Marx's ideas received wide circulation and extensive discussion among Russians even before they had any substantial impact in England where they were written and to whose problems they were presumed to have greatest relevance. Some of the Russian revolutionaries abroad, foremost among them the anarchist Michael Bakunin, had direct contact with Marx during the era of the First International. But it was not until the 1880s and 1890s that Marx's influence was widely felt.

The time was propitious in many ways. Marx's concept of scientific, industrial socialism found wide acceptance among an intelligentsia deeply committed to socialism but lately discouraged by the failure of populist socialism to win peasant support and thereby generate a social revolution. Some populists—the *People's Will* group—turned to direct action against the government to achieve their ends, only to dissipate their energies and their members in nets of violence. Others—the *Black Repartition* faction—clung to their faith in agrarian revolution, but soon lost many of their most effective spokesmen to Marxism. Among the latter was George Plekhanov, a disillusioned populist who became a convert to Marxism during his Swiss exile.

The fact that the *People's Will* group repudiated the peasants as the mainstay of a revolutionary drive in favor of

the organization of conspiratorial revolution by a disciplined minority was one evidence of a new attitude among the radical intelligentsia. After terrorism too had failed, they were much in need of a new revolutionary hope, and Marx's messianic proletariat seemed to many to be the answer. The development of an extensive industry and a large proletariat was still in the future, but the rapid industrialization of Russia, particularly from the 1890s onward, lent credence to the view that Russia was bound to undergo transformation into a capitalist and industrial state of the European type, populist claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

As so often in the past, the best opportunity for articulating the objectives of a new radical movement was provided by the hospitably free atmosphere of Switzerland. It was there that Plekhanov wrote his pamphlet *Socialism and the Political Struggle* in 1883, affirming the primacy of seizure of political power among the objectives of Marxist revolutionaries. In the following year he wrote *Our Differences*, a work which delineated the distinctions between Marxists and Populists. The faith in Russia's ability to find a unique path of development was replaced by an equally confident assertion that Russia must undergo capitalist industrial transformation. The idea of the moral debt of the intelligentsia gave way to the concept of historical inevitability, and the industrial workers replaced the peasants as the main social force behind the revolution.

In the late 1880s, after publication of Plekhanov's early works, Marxist circles, composed mainly of students, took form in many regions of the Russian Empire, from Petersburg to the Volga region and the Ukraine. New converts were won to the Marxist cause, and the influence of Marxist thought extended to the majority to the radical intelligentsia. The same ingredients which gave Marxism its great influence upon European intellectual life—particularly its ostensibly "scientific" statement of the economic and sociological reasons for the demise of capitalism and the development of socialism, and its special blend of the most inspiring Utopian socialist ideals with an impressive economics and sociology—won many converts in Russia as well. As the influence of

Marxism spread, the continuing industrial development of the Russian empire seemed amply to confirm Marxist prophecies, while the vigorous development of Marxist social democratic parties in Europe, the largest of which was located in neighboring Germany, provided a direct fraternal tie with a rapidly growing European socialist movement. It was both the spread of Marxist ideas and organizations and the example of the European socialist parties that led in the 1890s to the first efforts to organize a Russian social democratic party. By this time, social democratic parties had spread over most of Europe; only the Russian and British parties had yet to make their appearance.

Only nine delegates, observed and harassed by the police, made their way to the first Russian Social Democratic party congress at Minsk on March 1, 1898. The delegates represented the major Marxist organizations—those in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and the Jewish socialist *Bund* in particular. The party organization envisaged by the organizing congress was a fairly loose one, following the general pattern of the European parties and allowing a wide autonomy to the local organizations. No sooner was the party congress completed, however, than its delegates were arrested, thus undoing the organizational work. Between the Minsk congress and the Second Congress of the RSDLP held in Brussels and London in 1903, a vigorous competition took place for the organizational and doctrinal leadership of the party, a competition which set the character of the congress and decided much of the future of the Russian social democratic movement.

The debate among the Russian Social Democrats between 1898 and 1903 concerned the nature and purposes of the Social Democratic party. A considerable number of Social Democrats were coming under the influence of the revisionist Marxist ideas of Eduard Bernstein, which in Russia were known as legal Marxism. The legal Marxists, following Bernstein's lead, favored abandoning the revolutionary objectives of the party. They concentrated upon building a legal, mass social democratic party to work for the establishment of a parliamentary order. Another group, known in Russia as the Economists, wished to concentrate on specific and immediate

objectives—freedom of labor organizations and strikes, better working conditions and wages, and general civil liberties. The third major current in the Russian social democratic movement was that long championed by George Plekhanov, a current which is usually labeled orthodox Marxism to distinguish it from revisionist Marxist currents. Ever since the beginning of his work in Switzerland in the early 1880s, Plekhanov had insisted upon the primacy of political revolution among the goals of the Social Democratic party. In his struggle with legal Marxists and Economists to make his view prevail at the Second Congress, he was joined by an extraordinarily talented and energetic recent recruit to Russian social democracy, Vladimir Ulianov, later known as Lenin.

Plekhanov first met Lenin when the latter visited Switzerland in 1895. Lenin had read Plekhanov's pamphlet *Our Differences* two years earlier and was firmly convinced of the validity of the orthodox Marxist position. He therefore sought Plekhanov's advice and guidance in planning his own work with the Russian movement.

Born the son of a school inspector in the Volga provincial capital of Simbirsk, Lenin had completed his gymnasium education with a distinguished record and, in spite of the execution of his brother as an accomplice in the assassination plot against the life of Alexander III, gained entry to Kazan University. Subsequently expelled from the university, he managed, through the intervention of his mother in the Ministry of Education, to obtain permission to study for the bar as an external student. During the period following his expulsion from the university and before the completion of his legal studies, he was converted to Marxism. After passing the bar examination, he went to St. Petersburg to become an active member of a Marxist group known as The Elders. His work in St. Petersburg was the background to his Switzerland visit. Upon returning to Russia, he was arrested for social democratic activities, imprisoned for two years in St. Petersburg, and then sent into exile in Siberia for an additional three years. When Lenin returned to European Russia in 1900, he went from there to Germany where, with the aid of

the German Social Democrats, he and other orthodox Marxists were able to publish a journal, *Iskra* (The Spark), which became the main ideological organ for the orthodox Marxist group. Lenin's work on the editorial board of *Iskra* won him the sincere respect of his colleagues, though the uncompromising and often vitriolic tones in which he wrote of political opponents caused questions to be raised about his political ethics and purposes.

At the Second Congress of the RSDLP (July-August, 1903), begun in Brussels and moved to London after intervention by the Belgian police on the request of the tsar, the orthodox Marxists emerged the overwhelming victors. Because of the intervention by the police, the Economists had failed to secure the initiative in summoning the congress. This enabled the *Iskra* leaders to take the initiative and determine much of the delegate representation. Meanwhile, the advent of economic depression and the abortive government experiments in police unionism had done much to undermine the position of the Economists and increase sympathy for the cause of the revolutionary socialists. The *Iskra* group gained control of the party presidium, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Jewish *Bund*, one of the main supports of the Economists, made the victory complete. In the very moment of victory, however, it became apparent that the orthodox Marxists were not a united group, that within their ranks Lenin had formed a separate faction.

Overtly, the main issue at dispute between Lenin and his colleagues concerned the question of party organization. The majority of the party, led in matters of theory by Julius Martov, an old ally of Lenin from the days of work in St. Petersburg during the 1890s, favored a definition of a party member which required "regular personal assistance under the direction of one of the party organizations." Lenin urged an alternative definition, one requiring "personal participation in one of the party organizations," and implying a much tighter conception of the party. In the preceding year, Lenin had published one of his most important works, *What Is To Be Done?* (1902), in which he castigated all revisionists and outlined his conception of the kind of party organization

which would protect against infiltration by revisionist theory and assure concentration upon the goal of revolution. The party, as he described it, was to be a select body of professional revolutionaries, rigidly centralized and ideologically uniform. Only such a party would be an adequate instrument for attaining the revolution toward which Marxist socialists must work.

When he failed at the congress to secure victory for his definition of a party member, Lenin worked vigorously for control of the editorial board of *Iskra*, a position which he intended to use to win the party to his own views. In the vote on the editorial board, Lenin's faction was victorious, and the name Bolshevik, from the Russian word *bol'shinstvo* (majority), survived as a label from this single vote. Lenin's group actually constituted a minority in the party as a whole. However, the name, "Bolsheviks," and the name of the losers, "Mensheviks" (from the Russian *men'shinstvo*, or minority), proved more lasting than the control of *Iskra*. Shortly after the congress, Martov resigned. Recognizing that he could not control the journal without continuing protests from the party and from Plekhanov, Lenin himself left the editorial board of *Iskra*. By the time of the formation, in December, 1904, of a formally separate social democratic faction, the Union of Committees of the Majority, or Bolsheviks, Lenin had made it clear that he would split the party, if necessary, to assure victory for his own organizational and theoretical positions. There is ample evidence from his writings of the preceding years that he had formulated an alternative conception, not only of party organization, but also of party doctrine that would provide the basis for a permanent separation of the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks and from the mainstream of Russian social democracy.

Lenin's views were not simply the "orthodox Marxism" of Plekhanov, with its emphasis upon the primacy of the political revolution. Lenin had formulated an alternative conception of the nature of the stages of revolution, and of the class struggle and party alliances that would form the content of these stages. He accepted the basic Marxist

categories of feudalism, capitalism, and socialism, and he accepted the general view among Russian Social Democrats that Russia was still on the borderline between feudalism and capitalism, waiting for a proper bourgeois revolution. However, he defined the essentials of the class structure and class conflict in Russia in unique terms. As he saw it, the main feature of the class structure was the conflict between the whole of the peasantry and the landowning nobility. Because of the numbers of the population concerned, this conflict was of greater importance than that between the urban laborers and the bourgeoisie. He saw the first stage of revolution, which would complete the transition to capitalism, as consisting of a struggle between the whole of the peasantry and the landowning nobility in the countryside, and the workers and the bourgeoisie against the autocracy in the cities. However, he eliminated the bourgeoisie, that is, the liberals, both as an ally against the autocracy in the bourgeois revolution and as the leading political force in the capitalist stage of Russia's development that would follow. In effect, he virtually denied the bourgeoisie the entire historical role which Marx had assigned them. Moreover, there were already implicit in his views, on the eve of the 1905 Revolution, a brief transitional capitalist stage and an early transition to socialism. And during the "capitalist" stage there would be not bourgeois, i.e., liberal, but proletarian, i.e., socialist, political power. Lenin had thus radically revised Marxism, albeit without any abandonment of any of the Marxist program objectives. He sought a direct seizure of power by revolutionary socialists at the earliest possible moment, with little regard for the niceties of economic and social evolution as described in Marx. The seizure of power his primary concern, what he described as flexibility in the application of theory was in reality the subordination of the whole body of Marxist theory to that purpose.

The events of the Revolution of 1905 were an extraordinarily important experience for all the revolutionary groups, and not least for the Social Democrats. One of the most important effects of the revolution was to clarify the differences between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. When the

opposition parties succeeded, through united action in general strike, in paralyzing governmental administration and the economy and the government felt compelled to pacify the opposition by conceding a constitution in October, 1905, the Bolsheviks joined the Socialist revolutionaries in refusing to call a truce in the revolutionary struggle. Both groups continued revolutionary action against the government and resolved to boycott the pending parliamentary elections. The Mensheviks, meanwhile, followed the lead of the radical liberals, preparing to participate in the parliamentary elections in order to later continue agitation on the floor of the new parliament for a democratic political order and for social reforms. Lenin contemptuously dismissed the Menshevik tactic as "tailism", meaning that the Mensheviks, by following the path of the liberals, had betrayed the revolutionary proletarian cause.

In spite of these differences, and in part because of pressures for the unification of the two factions emanating from the lower party organizations, Lenin agreed to meet with the Mensheviks for a party congress in Stockholm in April, 1906, the Third Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. The differences over the alliance with the liberals and the boycott of parliamentary elections persisted. In the debates on the policies of the party for the period following the completion of the bourgeois revolution, i.e., the capitulation of the monarch, the Mensheviks stood firmly for a period of liberal democratic political leadership, while the Bolsheviks insisted upon a revolutionary dictatorship. These differences expressed themselves also in conflicting views of party organization and revolutionary alliances. One of the most heated issues was the question of the land settlement, an issue on which the Mensheviks offered a scheme of local control which would avoid excessive centralization of landownership and management in the hands of the state. Lenin supported an unqualified state ownership under the label of nationalization. Another vital issue at the congress was that of factional organizations. It was agreed that separate factional organizations would be abandoned, and it was incumbent upon Lenin to dissolve the Bolshevik

faction, an obligation which he chose to ignore following the congress.

At the Fourth Congress of the RSDLP in London in 1907, Lenin was still more insistent upon repudiating any collaboration with the liberals and upon the necessity of the revolutionary proletariat, i.e., the Social Democratic party, carrying out the bourgeois revolution on behalf of the bourgeoisie and without liberal collaboration. Thus, neither the Stockholm nor the London congress had removed any of the issues that separated Bolsheviki and Mensheviki; indeed, both had served only to clarify differences. Meanwhile, the political events in Russia—the receding tide of revolution and the strengthening of the government's hand by a vigorous reform initiative—convinced Lenin more than ever of the rectitude of his own views on party organization and revolutionary alliances and made him still more uncompromising in his attitude toward the Mensheviki. Having failed to win a victory for Bolshevism within the Social Democratic party by other means, he now sought to seize control of the party apparatus illegally. He summoned a meeting which styled itself a party congress in Prague in January, 1912. Though the meeting called itself the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP, the Mensheviki were not invited, and the new party central committee was entirely Bolshevik. That Lenin's peremptory action was not effectively checked by the Mensheviki was due mainly to the divisions in their ranks. The outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914 prevented an investigation of the affair by a committee of the Socialist International.

Although buoyed up somewhat by re nascent labor unrest in 1912 and after, revolutionary hopes were feeble indeed on the eve of World War I. Lenin seemed, however, to ignore the prevailing social and political circumstances, pursuing his purpose of forming a faction and a doctrine within the Russian social democratic movement which served the revolutionary cause as he conceived it.

The outbreak of World War I emphasized the fact that the Bolsheviks were isolated not only from their colleagues in the social democratic movement, but also in the Russian

socialist movement as a whole. Whereas the other socialists voted support of the war effort, the Bolsheviks denied their support. Lenin was exiled in Switzerland during the war, and there he played an important role among the segment of European socialists who repudiated socialist support for national war efforts and sought to form a new international organization of anti-war socialists. For Lenin, the war years marked the climax of the struggle of the capitalist states for markets, a climax which had reached a highly developed form of imperialist rivalry. Describing this rivalry in his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), he went on to insist that "the imperialist war must be turned into a civil war" and to suggest that the proletariat must turn its arms against the bourgeoisie in order to achieve both peace and socialism. The war years were depressing ones for Lenin and for the Bolshevik faction. Efforts to obtain an anti-war socialist international were unsuccessful, and the prospects for revolution inside Russia seemed dim, the war appearing to have welded the nation together with patriotic fervor. Lenin was therefore surprised, though pleased and characteristically well-prepared, when the news of the revolution of February, 1917, reached him in his Swiss exile.

On the eve of the 1917 revolution, Lenin's Bolsheviks were still not a party in the full sense but rather a faction of the RSDLP still carrying the Bolshevik tag. Lenin had postponed complete separation for a long time, hoping to win the whole party over to his banner. His action in Prague in 1912 was an effort to seize the symbols of party authority while excluding doctrinally unacceptable members—primarily Mensheviks. The confusion of party leadership in the years of political repression of revolutionaries at home and dispersal of leaders in exile abroad did not make it convenient for the Mensheviks to rally quickly to the defense of their interests. But by the same token, Lenin was unable to secure full control of a functioning party organization, since none really existed. He did, however, destroy most of the confidence that remained in his reliability as a Social Democratic colleague among the Mensheviks and thus deepened the division in the party.

When one looks at the Bolshevik faction in 1917, one is struck not only by the fact that it was a faction rather than a party, but also by the lack of outstanding leaders. Virtually all of the distinguished social democratic leaders who had participated in the organizing work of the 1890s and the early years of the century found themselves in the Menshevik camp. Lenin had failed to win the more distinguished senior social democratic leaders to his cause. In consequence, however, his control was far stronger than it would otherwise have been. In his colleagues, Lenin valued obedience more than intellectual independence. His insistence on uniformity of doctrine and his unqualified confidence in his own political orthodoxy tended to discourage debate and certainly to discourage rivals for the party leadership.

Thus, Lenin had formulated a doctrine before he really had a totally independent party organization. That doctrine was fully, indeed elaborately, formulated before 1917, even while the Bolshevik faction itself was exceedingly small and without deep roots either in the social democratic movement as a whole or in the working class. Lenin clearly felt little concern about the fact that he had a doctrine before he had a party, just as he felt little concern about the small number of followers and the absence of the more distinguished party names among his followers. His behavior had amply demonstrated that doctrinal orthodoxy came before all other considerations. It was vastly more important to have an orthodox and obedient following in a small faction than to have a large and doctrinally heterodox following in a large party organization. It was with this small organization that Lenin prepared to seize the opportunities created by the February revolution. Events later proved the great effectiveness of the party he had forged as an instrument of revolutionary action.

B. Bolshevik Revolution

The Russian Revolution of 1917 can best be viewed as the climax of a long period of political ferment and reform stretching back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century. While the development of intellectual opposition

helped to hasten the reforms in the 1860s, within government circles and upon the part of the new tsar, Alexander II, there was also a growing sense of the urgency of reform. The major achievement of the reform era was the emancipation of the serfs (1861), but the judicial reforms and the introduction of elected local government organizations indicated new directions in governmental organization as well.

The assassination of Alexander II by a revolutionist's bomb in 1881 symbolized the separation and hostility that had developed between the crown and the reform forces in Russia. The government's reform measures seemed always to fall short of the expectations of the growing political opposition, leading many of its members to an increasingly radical and uncompromising political program whose most extreme form favored political assassination. Ironically, revolutionary terrorism generated political reaction, not further reform, and the quarter century between the death of Alexander II and the Revolution of 1905 was a period of largely conservative rule during which the Alexandrine reforms were systematically reduced rather than extended. During these years, the government introduced a number of important measures to facilitate railroad construction and commercial and industrial growth, but it manifested unmistakably plain its devotion to the principle and practice of autocratic government and did little to alleviate the increasingly desperate plight of the peasantry or to deal with the problems of the growing class of industrial labor. Meanwhile, its position was further undermined by the growing influence of nationalism in the non-Russian borderlands of the empire, where questions were being forcefully raised, not only about autocracy, but about Russian rule in general.

In the context of this political and social ferment, two developments proved decisive. One was the rapid organization from about 1898 to 1904 of liberal and radical (socialist) political parties dedicated to the overthrow of the monarchy. The other was the embroilment of Russia with Japan in competition for imperial territories in East Asia bringing the two empires into war in 1904-05. The Russo-Japanese War, in which Japan inflicted a series of costly and

humiliating military defeats upon Russia, created an internal crisis in which political opposition flourished. The war was an unpopular and costly failure, and the government's embarrassment, aggravated by the brutal handling of peaceful demonstrations in January, 1905 (Bloody Sunday), initiated a series of popular disturbances which reached their climax in a nationwide general strike in September, forcing from the government a series of important concessions (the October Manifesto) which included the promise of a parliamentary monarchy.

The Revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto initiated a crucial era in the history of Russian revolutionism. For one thing, the Manifesto sharply divided the revolutionary opposition to autocracy. Part of the opposition, notably the Socialist Revolutionary and the Bolshevist branch of the Social Democratic party, insisted on continuing the revolutionary struggle and ignoring the Manifesto. On the other hand, the liberals, both moderate (now called Octobrists) and radicals (now called Kadets), as well as the Menshevist branch of the Social Democratic party, insisted on accepting the Manifesto and preparing for elections to the new parliament which was to meet in the spring of 1906.

The Kadets and the Mensheviks both entered the new parliament in the following spring. Their aim was to use it as a means to force the granting of a constituent assembly. The bicameral legislature, with limited control over the public purse and without any effective control over ministerial actions, was wholly unacceptable to both groups, who sought a unicameral legislature and other institutions of radical democracy, including universal suffrage and full cabinet responsibility to the parliament. Their intransigence, particularly their refusal to accept anything less than full democracy, served to perpetuate the division between the government and the opposition. It also prevented stabilization of even the more modest parliamentary concessions by which the government was prepared to abide. Moreover, the vigorous action of revolutionary terrorists during 1906 and 1907 and the equally vigorous activity of extreme right-wing nationalist groups—anti-liberal, anti-socialist, and often anti-

lenatic created a confusion and a bitterness in Russian political life that also contributed to the enfeeblement of the new parliamentary monarchy. By 1907, the government, having failed to win the liberals and moderate socialists to its agrarian reform program and its structure of parliamentary institutions, radically reduced the electorate. Having fully reconsolidated its power, it then proceeded upon a program of full repression of the revolution.

The period from 1907 to the world war were years during which Russian revolutionism was in retreat. The majority of the leading revolutionary figures were imprisoned or exiled, and the prospects for revolution seemed dim, indeed, as the government's agrarian reform program quieted the hitherto restless rural population and urban labor was again peaceful. There was also a mood of critical self-evaluation spreading among certain members of the intelligentsia (some of them formerly members of the Social Democratic or Socialist Revolutionary movements) who proposed a critical examination of the philosophical principles which had guided intelligentsia radicalism since the late nineteenth century, as well as a re-evaluation of certain specific programs, especially the fixed dogma of agrarian socialism. The invitation to self-criticism was by no means cordially received, but, coming as it did at a time of retreat, it contributed to the deepening of the mood of dejection which the revelations of duplicity in the Socialist Revolutionary terrorist organization, the factional disputes among the Social Democrats, and other events helped to engender within the ranks of Russian radicalism.

Thus, the years from 1907 until the outbreak of the war were years of disappointment for the leaders of the revolutionary opposition. The radical liberals were compelled to witness a steady diminishment of their strength in the parliament, or *Duma*, and a steady drift to the right of the opinions of their membership. The Socialist Revolutionaries were struck by intraparty divisions and scandal over the betrayal of the terrorist organization to the secret police. The Social Democrats were divided by the dispute between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, familiar since 1903, but reaching

a new peak of bitterness with the 1912 attempt of Lenin to seize control of the party organization by totally illicit means.

Hence, the current of Russian revolutionism seemed to be running slowly on the eve of the first world war. On the other hand, the policies taken to resolve the social and political problems, however impressive, upon which the revolutionary movement had thrived were not as yet adequate to create the kind of social and political stability which the government under Premier Peter Stolypin was seeking. Stolypin himself had fallen the victim of a revolutionary terrorist in 1911, an evidence that the revolutionary movement was still very much alive. The instability of the situation was such, as many perceptive statesmen of the time recognized, that a major national disturbance, such as that caused by the Russo-Japanese War, could still open the flood-gates of revolution. In 1917, as in 1905, it was an unsuccessful war.

The momentous year 1917 brought to Russia not a single revolution, but two—the overthrow of the monarchy in February and the Bolshevik coup d'état against the Provisional Government in October—separated by an eight-month period of political and social turmoil during which the liberals and moderate socialists sought successively to build an effective and stable government and lay the foundation for a constitutional democracy. This troubled period is vastly more complicated and difficult to comprehend than the dramatic revolutionary events which introduced and terminated it; yet in its complexities lies the essence of the Russian Revolution.

The first and most commonly discussed feature of the period from February to October was the effort of the Provisional Government, initially liberal and later predominantly socialist in membership, both to provide effective leadership for the country and to prepare the institutions of a political democracy to replace the conservative constitutional monarchy which had collapsed. The events of the Revolution of 1905 and its aftermath had revealed that the differences of political program and doc-

time between liberals and socialists made cooperation extremely difficult; the events of 1917 made it clear that these differences had not diminished.

A second major feature of the period was the war. World War I, which had already severely drained the vitality of the nation for over two and a half years, continued its destructive course, presenting as grave a challenge to the new government as to its unlamented predecessor.

The third major feature of the period was the eruption of currents of political and social revolution. Latent under the monarchy, these currents were endowed with new life by the removal of the old symbols and apparatus of government authority and by the manifold repercussions of the war. They centered mainly among the peasants, the industrial workers, and the national minorities.

Such were the major features of Russian life between the February and October revolutions. By examining them in more detail, one penetrates more deeply into a period that has often been characterized as the most crucial of modern Russian history.

The most impressive thing about the efforts of the Provisional Government to build a stable and effective administration and to prepare the way for constitutional democracy in Russia was the feebleness of the organization and instruments with which it worked. From the beginning, the overwhelmingly liberal Provisional Government leadership, heading the cabinet selected in early March, 1917, was deprived of full authority by the claims of the Petrograd Soviet. The preponderantly Menshevik and SR leadership of the Petrograd Soviet refused to claim power in the name of socialism and yet denied full power to the liberal Provisional Government. The Soviet assumed full authority in such matters as censorship and organization of the militia and claimed the right of veto over Provisional Government actions on all major questions of domestic and foreign policy, thus severely limiting the government's initiative.

Doubtless the diarchal structure of government did more than any other single factor to weaken the authority and effectiveness of the Provisional Government. But the

government also lacked the essential instruments of power. The imperial bureaucracy largely disintegrated following the March revolution. The institutions of self-government intended to replace it, outlined in constitutional enactments in the early days after the revolution, actually came into existence only in scattered regions of the country and never became an effective agent and spokesman for the government in the localities. The Provisional Government thus lacked the ability to transmit its will to the local level, usually depending upon the line of command established between national and local soviets, and hence upon the collaboration and approval of the soviets, to implement its decisions locally. As the forces of revolution gained confidence during the summer and autumn of 1917, even the voice of the soviets commanded scant attention in the localities. Anarchy, spreading rapidly, was also due to the lack of an effective police organization and to an increasingly ineffectual army. As the latter began to disintegrate in the late summer and autumn, sending armed and mutinous troops back into the towns and villages, it added powerfully to the forces of social disorganization.

Virtually every question with which one deals in the history of the Provisional Government leads back eventually to the problem of the war. The war demands were so insistent that the Provisional Government was often simply unable to deal with other problems. The commitment to the war, however, was also connected with political attitudes. The liberal leadership of the first Provisional Government, and especially the minister for foreign affairs, Paul Miliukov, held that the revolution had been primarily a revolt against the imperial government's failure to deal adequately with the war. These men held, further, that the government had a mandate to organize a more effective war effort and that the revolution would infuse the population with a new enthusiasm for the war. They were also committed to policies of Russian territorial aggrandizement, thinking in terms of gaining control of the straits to the Black Seas and of annexing the Austrian and Ukrainian territories—Galicia in particular.

Pursuit of an aggressive war policy quickly brought the liberal Provisional Government into headlong collision with the Petrograd Soviet. The moderate socialists of the Soviet sought immediate peace without annexations and indemnities. Their refusal to proclaim a unilateral peace, in view of the determination of the Allies to continue the war, meant that they were bound willy-nilly to continue the war themselves at a later date. However, they reacted aggressively to news of Miliukov's declaration to the Allies promising respect for the secret treaties and defining Russia's imperialist ambitions. The minister for war of the second Provisional Government of May 5, Alexander Kerensky, dealt with the crucial war problem after Miliukov's removal. Kerensky continued to be concerned primarily with that problem when he later became the prime minister of the Provisional Government and the dominant influence in its affairs from July through the Bolshevik Revolution in October. Kerensky agreed with other moderate socialists that Russia should renounce all imperial advantage and seek an early peace without annexations and indemnities. He shared Miliukov's view, however, that the revolution had infused a new fighting spirit into the Russian population. He sought to mobilize that spirit for a military offensive in July, which might give the Allied powers an advantage in any peace negotiations with the Central powers.

Kerensky's offensive, however, proved to be a catastrophic failure. After early gains, the offensive quickly spent its energy and suffered a series of reverses that turned into a virtual rout. The reverses brought the first large-scale demonstrations against the Provisional Government, a warning of things to come, and the first evidences of a powerful Bolshevik influence among those disagreeing with the government's war policy. Effectively speaking, there was no change in war policy from the aftermath of the abortive July offensive and the July Days that followed.

In the closing days of July there was, however, serious concern in the war ministry and among the cabinet ministers with the need to refurbish the military organization. On March 1, the Petrograd Soviet had issued its Order Number

One, which, in seeking to democratize the organization of the army, severely undermined the traditional structure of military discipline. The results of this order had been evident in the July offensive when, in defiance of their officers, soldiers had called a halt to offensive action. But soldiers' committees had debated whether this alternative was compatible with the Petrograd Soviet's declaration in favor of defensive war only. Among other measures, the efforts to strengthen military discipline led, in late July, to the restoration of the death penalty at the front lines. Also taking form was a more comprehensive plan which aimed simultaneously to refurbish military discipline and organization and, in an effort to assert the Provisional Government's independence of the Petrograd Soviet, to use reliable military forces to support the government. The plan is closely identified with the name of General Lavr Kornilov, the chief military collaborator of the interested Provisional Government ministers and the man later denounced independently by Kerensky as a traitor for his role in the enterprise.

The Kornilov affair (sometimes misleadingly called the Kornilov mutiny) failed, but the denunciation of the action as a military conspiracy against the Provisional Government served further to undermine the already shaky structure of officer-authority in the Russian army. Such events combined with defeatist propaganda and increasing disorganization and demoralization at the front to encourage widespread desertion. By late summer and early autumn, desertions having reached catastrophically large proportions, the Provisional Government, still sticking tenaciously to its war policy, was faced with the unpleasant sight of the army literally melting before its eyes. Soldiers occasionally commandeered whole trains to secure transport from the westward front. And the revolution in the army, coinciding with the revolution in the villages, both contributed to, and was stimulated by, that revolution. Soldiers going into villages with munitions lent new strength to the forces favoring revolutionary expropriation of private estates. On the other hand, peasant soldiers at the front, hearing of the expropriations in the villages, were determined to hasten home to secure their

share of the land. Hence, by the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power, the Russian army had been reduced to a disorderly rabble and was being dissolved by a widespread and uncontrollable series of mutinies against the officers and against the authority of the government.

The leaders of the Provisional Government, during both its liberal and moderate socialist periods, had been well aware of the currents of political and social revolution latent under the old regime. As these currents became more active during the summer and autumn of 1917, however, the leaders were rendered largely ineffective in dealing with them, not only by their preoccupation with the war and their insistence that all changes in the political and social order must be referred to the constituent assembly (a body whose summoning they repeatedly postponed), but also by their own political doctrines which clashed conspicuously with the aspirations of both peasants and national minorities. The forces of revolution, however, aggravated by the war and encouraged by the overthrow of the monarchy, would be neither restrained nor redirected.

The peasant question was one of the most vital and insistent of such forces to appear following the overthrow of the monarchy. If to the liberal leaders of the early Provisional Government the revolution meant the opportunity to institute a parliamentary democratic order, to the peasant the meaning was summarized in the old populist formula, "land and liberty." Since the emancipation, the peasants had acquired the majority of the lands of the private estates through purchase, and the Stolypin reform of the pre-war era gave promise of continued transfer of the lands of the nobility to peasant landowners. However, with the traditional view that the land was theirs by right persisting among the peasants, the disappearance of monarchical power and, even more significantly, of local police power, encouraged spontaneous peasant expropriation of the land and livestock of the private estates from the late spring of 1917 onward. Such actions upon the private estates usually began indirectly with pressures aimed to bankrupt them especially the refusal to work at harvest time or the insistence upon exorbitant

wages for either planting or harvest labor. Only at a later stage did the actions include direct expropriation of land and livestock. The Provisional Government received innumerable requests for protection against such depredations from wives of landowners absent at the front, but it lacked local police agents. The peasants, encouraged by the lack of resistance to such actions, continued on their path. The result was a steady increase in expropriations which, between March and October, virtually obliterated noble estates.

The liberal leaders of the Provisional Government did not object to the peasants receiving the land of the landowner, but they wished to do it through orderly parliamentary procedures. The moderate socialists who followed them sought, through their spokesmen in the Provisional Government and in the local soviets, to encourage the peasants either to temporarily refrain from expropriation or to place the land under the authority of the soviets rather than distribute it to individual households. Their efforts proved a complete failure, since the peasants wanted individual land holdings, not a perpetuation of a system of communal possession seen by the socialists as a prelude to future socialization. Peasant pressures in the expropriation drive reached their climax in October. The climax coincided with the disintegration of the army. In a frenzied month of activity, the peasants expropriated nearly half of the private estates that had remained at the time of the February revolution. Hence, the agrarian revolution, resisted by the liberal and moderate socialist leaders of the Provisional Government and the soviets, went its own course. For peasant Russia, the revolution was now virtually complete.

Among urban laborers, the war had created serious problems even before the February revolution. The most prominent of these were inflation and a severe decline of real wages. With the prices of basic foodstuffs and common consumer goods more than doubling in the course of the war, the workers' wages had not kept pace. After the February revolution, inflation became rampant. The Provisional Government, without the ordinary apparatus of government tax collection, had recourse to the printing press to meet its

expenses. The results were a several hundred per cent inflation of prices between February and October. This meant severe hardships for the industrial workers, who were paid little if at all. Faced with this predicament, the workers were increasingly hard-pressed and ever more attentive to the pleas of anti-government propagandists. Among the latter, the most important were the Bolsheviks and the anarchists, both of whom advocated a policy of workers' control as a solution to the workers' problems. Preaching class hatred instead of the desperately needed, close collaboration between workers and manager, such agitators urged the workers to organize and seize control of the factory. The workers would place management in the hands of workers' committees in a system called workers' control, which was to deal with problems by voting wage increases and other measures. In fact, of course, the workers' control movement had precisely the opposite of the intended effect. Seizing control and voting wage increases, the workers soon realized they lacked the knowledge for management and could not continue operating without capital and raw materials. The inevitable result was closure within a few days or weeks after the seizure and a further growth of unemployment. Workers' control only aggravated the already severe problems of industrial labor, even as it further reduced the capacity of industry to produce for the war effort.

The nationalities question was a vexing one for the Provisional Government. It faced the problems accumulated under the imperial government, and it was frustrated in dealing with the political leaders of these national minorities both by its preoccupation with the war and by the conflict of its political views with the aspirations of the minorities. The liberal and socialist leaders of the Provisional Government agreed upon independence only for Poland, a state whose future rested at the time in the hands of Germany. These leaders were ill-prepared to meet the demands of the other minorities. Faced with a desire for independence by all political groups in Finland, the Provisional Government was willing to withdraw the unpopular policies of its predecessor, restore Finnish constitutional privileges, and guarantee

Finnish autonomy, but not to grant independence. The same attitude prevailed toward the nationalist movement in the Ukraine. There, on March 4, a central focus for the nationalist movement was formed; it was called the Ukrainian Central Council, or Rada. Like the Provisional Government, the Rada was first led by liberal and other moderate elements, and later by socialists, the latter identifying more than their predecessors with the cause of national independence. In June, the Rada demanded not only autonomy for the predominantly Ukrainian provinces, but also a separate administration and army. When the Provisional Government refused these requests, the Rada pressed forward independently, compelling the Provisional Government to yield to its demands by early July. Having lost control in Finland and in the Ukraine, the Provisional Government's failure to formulate an effective nationalities policy was costing it favor not only there, but among many others of the minority nationalities. The weakness of the Provisional Government derived not only from its desire to postpone action until the meeting of the constituent assembly, but also from failure of its leaders to sense the rapid changes in the attitudes of the national minorities toward Russian rule.

The Provisional Government can be counted a failure in virtually all respects. It failed to establish an effective government, it failed to establish its own authority, and it failed to deal competently with the major problems that beset the country. There was no solution found to the problem of the war; under both liberals and socialists the country continued its hopeless fight even as its capacity for warfare diminished. As the forces of revolution among peasants, workers, and national minorities worked themselves out, the government leaders proved unable to control and direct them, losing much or all of the support of the groups affected. Seeing these trends, Lenin chose to bide his time during the summer and autumn of 1917, confident that the Provisional Government's popularity would diminish as the inadequacy of its policies became increasingly apparent.

Such was the background of events against which the challenge of Bolshevism appeared. Lenin returned to Russia on April 3 and quickly oriented the Bolsheviks away from support of the Provisional Government and collaboration with the non-Bolshevik socialists in the soviets. In his *April Theses* of the following day, he declared that the war was imperialist and that the only suitable policy was an immediate and unilateral peace. He also rejected the parliamentary state, and thus the planned constituent assembly, in favor of power for the soviets. Within a few weeks, after he had assured an acceptance of this line within the Bolshevik group, workers, in demonstrations against the government in early July, the "July Days", were shouting "Down with the Provisional Government! All power to the Soviets!"—a slogan they took from their Bolshevik mentors. Lenin was not then prepared to seize power, however, because the Bolsheviks did not control a majority in the soviets. The events actually meant a setback for the Bolsheviks. Arrest warrants were issued for the Bolshevik leaders, and Lenin, who quickly escaped to Finland, was charged with spying as a German agent. For a time, events seemed to favor the government. In the weeks that followed, however, it continually failed to deal effectively with the problems that faced it. The general decline in its prestige and power could only serve the Bolshevik advantage.

The Bolsheviks enjoyed considerable gains in party strength during the summer, advancing from 80,000 members in April to about 200,000 in August. That their popularity also increased is evident in their growing strength in the soviets generally and in their control of the Petrograd and Moscow soviets by early October. Their slogans of peace, land, and national self-determination were designed to appeal to war-weary soldiers, to land-hungry peasants, and to the aspirations of the national minorities. By mid-September, Lenin felt that the time had arrived for the Bolsheviks to seize power. The plan was mooted in the party for a few weeks. Finally, on October 10, the meeting of the central committee of the party approved, with only two dissenting votes, the decision to seize power. The work of organization

was done by Leon Trotsky, who had been chairman of the Petrograd Soviet since September 23. Preparation of the plans for the insurrection was completed within five days. On the night of October 24, the Bolsheviks sent armed detachments to occupy the major bridges, railway terminals, and public buildings of Petrograd. Kerensky departed from the capital on the following morning to search for support from troops outside the capital, but he was never able to return. During the course of the day, the Provisional Government remained in session in the Winter Palace, but, on the following morning, the last defenders of the Winter Palace surrendered, the ministers being taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks.

The ignominious demise of the Provisional Government gave ample evidence of the frailty of its foundations. Not only was effective resistance not apparent in the capital, but efforts outside the capital to organize resistance to the Bolsheviks failed completely. Even many who were hostile to the Bolsheviks (especially the army officers) were equally hostile to Kerensky and were unwilling to come to his aid. Kerensky merely found himself derided by many military officers whom he approached in his moment of desperation.

The takeover in the country as a whole was by no means as easy as in Petrograd. Bolshevik strength outside the cities of central Russia remained weak, and, even in these cities, especially Moscow, there was a long struggle for Bolshevik control. Not until the end of the civil war, some three years later, could the Bolsheviks claim effective control over the whole country.

It is the established view in Bolshevik historiography that the victory of the Bolsheviks in October of 1917 was inevitable. It is a view based on the assumption that social and economic forces had reached the point where the transfer of power to the party of the proletariat, i.e., the Bolsheviks, could not be avoided. Trotsky himself later explicitly repudiated this view, writing that the subtraction of Lenin from the circumstances of October would have been sufficient to prevent the Bolshevik revolution. All the events of the preceding months, reviewed historically, seem to suggest

precisely this conclusion. It was Lenin who took the party away from compromises and collaboration with the non-Bolshevik socialists in April, and it was Lenin who formulated the tactics and objectives of power seizure in the months that followed. It is, indeed, inconceivable that the Bolshevik power seizure would have been undertaken or would have succeeded without his initiative and leadership.

It is not, on the other hand, perfectly clear that the Provisional Government need have failed. However, without certain revisions of doctrine, without better leadership, and without a more realistic appreciation of the circumstances of Russia in the summer and autumn of 1917, such a failure would have been hard to avoid. The alternative to a Bolshevik seizure of power would seem to have been a pressing through, albeit fumblingly, until such time as the war ended and the government was able to turn its attention to finding solutions to the major problems that beset the nation. With their victory, however, it was up to the Bolsheviks to find solutions to these problems in their own way. This they set out to do immediately, using as their instrument the all-Russian Congress of Soviets which met on the day of their coup as the formal authority of the new government power.

C. Lenin and the Soviet Government in the 1920s

Soviet Russia passed through three stages of its development from 1917 to 1932. The first was the period of consolidation of political power and the civil war, 1917 to 1921. The second was the period of the New Economic Policy, 1921 to 1928. And the third, often called the period of "the real Bolshevik revolution," was that of the "first Five-Year Plan. Each had a distinctive character and left a special mark on Soviet life and institutions.

The period of consolidation of power followed immediately upon the Bolshevik revolution in October, 1917. Lenin commanded only a small party with small armed forces supporting it. Although he had the endorsement of the all-Russian Congress of Soviets for his seizure of power and for his legislative enactments and acted in the name of that body,

the effective power of the Bolsheviks to govern the country was initially no greater than that of their predecessors. Lenin began his legislative program immediately--the land law which nationalized the land but left it in the possession of the peasants, the proclamation of workers' control in industry, and the granting of the right of self-determination to the national minorities. He was immovable on the issue of Bolshevik control of the government, rejecting efforts by the non-Bolshevik socialists to gain ministerial positions. He maintained a Bolshevik power monopoly, even to the point of repudiating the results of the constituent assembly elections of November which failed to give the Bolsheviks a majority. Lenin forcibly dispersed that body when it failed to voluntarily relinquish its rights in January. Censorship was installed, and the Cheka, or secret police organization, so crucial to Bolshevik power in later years, was introduced in December.

By the spring of 1918, the Bolsheviks had reneged on a number of their promises and had taken actions which alienated many former supporters. Workers' control of industry was gradually being replaced by a system of centralized management. The handing of land to the peasants was being followed by early measures for agrarian socialization and, even more importantly, expropriations of grain by force for the supply of the cities and the army. Self-determination of the nationalities had been restated as self-determination for the proletariat, a formula which in practice repudiated any nationalist movement which was not led by local Bolsheviks and which sought independence of Soviet Russia. Finally, negotiation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in February, ratified by the all-Russian Congress of Soviets in March, sacrificed such great quantities of territory (reducing the Russian state in the west to the boundaries of the time of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century) that a Social Revolutionaries revolt broke out against the Bolsheviks, followed by the very rapid spread of anti-Bolshevik military and political organizations around the country.

The organization of military forces against the Bolsheviks

had begun in the Kuban region in January. The SR revolt was accompanied by the insurrection among the Czech forces in Siberia, which initiated a widespread anti-Bolshevik rebellion there. Later, anti-Bolshevik forces organized not only in Siberia and in the south, but also in the north west and in the north. With the additional complication of a large-scale German military action in the west, in spite of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and Allied intervention forces landing in northern European Russia, central Asia and the Far East, the position of the Bolsheviks seemed highly precarious.

Suddenly, however, the revolution in Germany in November, 1918, brightened the picture immeasurably. It opened new revolutionary opportunities, and the Red Army marched westward through the Baltic states toward Poland. It seemed to herald the long-awaited revolution in Europe, the revolution which Lenin regarded as essential for the success of the revolution in Russia. But the new hopes were short-lived. By the end of January, the bright prospects for communist revolution in Germany had vanished, and a democratic government had stabilized power in a way that the Provisional Government in Russia had been unable to do. However, the Allied decision to abandon the intervention in the following March—in spite of the advent of a communist revolution in Hungary during the same month—gave the Bolsheviks new hope. The massed offensive of the White Army during the spring and summer of 1919 was greatly weakened by the precipitate withdrawal of Allied intervention forces, especially the hasty withdrawal of the French from the Ukraine, opening that territory to Bolshevik penetration. In the months that followed, the Whites made some impressive advances, especially notable being the drive of Anton Denikin's forces from the south toward Moscow via the Ukraine, but, by the late autumn of 1919, the White offensive was collapsing on all sides. The forces in the south, managing to regroup in Crimea under the leadership of General Peter Wrangel in the closing weeks of 1919 and early 1920, took advantage of the Polish invasion of Russia in the spring of 1920 to break out of their Crimean lair and attempt a new offensive. The rapid collapse of Poland, however,

exposed the small White force to full-scale action by the Bolsheviks, which sent it scurrying in retreat. By the end of 1920, the Soviet government had concluded treaties with the Baltic states and Poland and was, at least temporarily, resigned to the loss of Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland. Elsewhere, not only had the Whites been defeated, but Bolshevik power was restored between 1920 and 1922. The last territory of the pre-war empire to be formally annexed was the Far Eastern republic in the autumn of 1922, following the withdrawal of Japanese military forces.

During the course of the civil war, the Bolsheviks undertook, even while engaged in a life-and-death struggle with their opponents, a program of socialization of the economy. They began with the nationalization of land, though for practical purposes the land was left in the possession of the peasants. They continued with the nationalization of the cooperative organizations, the major industries of the country, the banks, and foreign and domestic trade. At this time, there was even discussion about the abolition of currency: the introduction of full-fledged barter in trade. Such were the policies which were given the name "War Communism." They reveal an eagerness to press directly forward to full socialization of the economy, though there was much disagreement among party leaders as to the possibility of such a course. No one was more eager than Lenin to press onward with the socialization program at the end of the civil war. But it was clear to him that the time for retreat, not further advance, had arrived. Revolutionary opportunities abroad had virtually disappeared; meanwhile, the economic life of the country was severely disorganized. Agriculture produced about half of its pre-war output, industry was down to about a third, and heavy industry much further reduced in production. With the appearance of popular discontent and organized political protest against the Bolshevik leadership, the situation had become really dangerous.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy at the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921, marked a sharp turning point in the history of the policy of the Soviet Communist

party. Lenin originally conceived the New Economic Policy neutrally as a series of concessions to the peasants, noting that "only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia. . . ." The socialization drive and the forced requisition of grain were terminated. The peasant kept his land a-before, and forced grain requisitions were replaced by a fixed grain tax. Subsequently, private trade was also allowed to revive; small-scale, predominantly artisan, industry was restored; and other measures, such as denationalization of a number of industries and deflation of the currency, ensued. Lenin insisted that he was keeping control of "the commanding heights" of the economy, by which he meant the control of heavy industry, banks, and foreign trade. Yet, the fact remained that the overwhelming majority of the population, employed on small peasant farms, was still outside the socialized sector of the economy. Having undertaken economic concessions, Lenin turned to political restrictions. Outside the party, the non-Bolshevik socialists came under severe pressures so that, by early 1921, most of the prominent leaders had emigrated. Finally, in the summer of 1922, the trial of the sixteen important Socialist Revolutionaries still in the country marked the end of non-Bolshevik socialist activities inside Russia. Inside the party, the repression was no less swift and sure. Lenin dealt sternly with critics of the New Economic Policy and other aspects of leadership policy, purging no less than a fifth of the party membership within the first year after the introduction of the NEP.

In the years following the introduction of the New Economic Policy, one of the most important aspects of Soviet policy was that aimed at economic recovery and development. The anticipated recovery of the economy came fairly rapidly in the wake of the new policy. Agriculture reached pre-war levels of production by 1926, and industry did so by 1927. Nevertheless, both were marked by severe problems. In agriculture, the per capita production remained low, and the grain available for export—an important earner of foreign currency for industrial purchases abroad—was a small fraction of the pre-war figure. Expansion of peasant

farm production was retarded not only by the vastly increased number of small farms capable of producing only a very meager surplus for market, but also by the lack of incentives. Undermining production incentives were the tremendously high prices of industrial goods and the disproportion of prices between agricultural and industrial commodities, which, in its severest form, was known as the "scissors crisis." In industry, the problems were mainly that of very slow expansion after the initial recovery, high production costs, a low level of efficiency, and widespread unemployment, the last at times being nearly fifty per cent of the total labor force in the middle and late 1920s.

The agricultural problem, particularly troublesome, became a focal point of the economic debates of the 1920s. Lenin believed that the expansion of cooperation and electrification, accompanied by a steady growth of agricultural and industrial production, would make possible a peaceful transition from the New Economic Policy to the period of socialism. His heirs were most concerned about problems of industrial and agricultural growth; they were also greatly troubled by the slow development in both areas and by the simultaneous rapid growth of population. The agricultural policy was essentially a stalemate. The government was not prepared to encourage the vigorous development of small-scale peasant agriculture, technically or otherwise. Likewise, it was not prepared to go forward with full-fledged socialization which, it recognized, the peasants would resist. In this position of stalemate, at least one economist (Eugene Varga) and one party leader (Nicholas Bukharin) proposed re-examination of traditional dogmas on agriculture and recommended concessions to peasant individualism as a means of securing production increases. Such measures were tried tentatively in 1925 and 1926. The results were encouraging, but the general picture of industrial and agricultural growth remained unsatisfactory. However, at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, 1927, the party leadership secured endorsement of a program of industrial and agricultural development which emphasized a balanced industrial growth with considerable development of light

(consumer goods) industries and a steady expansion of heavy industry, as well as a slow and voluntary development of agricultural collectivization. This moderate, compromise measure was shortly to be abruptly replaced in 1928 and early 1929 by the Stalin First Five-Year Plan, the consequence of Joseph Stalin's victory in the party apparatus.

The Communist International (Comintern), organized in 1918, was the expression of Lenin's dream of an organizing center of world communist revolution. It bore many of the marks of the revolutionary utopianism which inspired its creation, issuing appeals for revolution and setting busily about the task of organization for revolution abroad. It bore also, however, the marks of Bolshevik organizational theory and practice, with its strong centralism, its subordination to the Russian Communist party, and its devotion to the creation of elitist and well-disciplined parties abroad. As with the earlier organization of the Bolshevik party, Lenin placed orthodoxy of doctrine and organizational loyalty above mass appeal, and, especially in the famous Twenty-One Conditions prescribing terms of membership, he excluded a large potential leadership and membership which refused to accept his own notions of the correct forms of party organization and doctrine.

The turbulent conditions of the immediate postwar years were discouragingly barren of lasting revolutionary victories. Indeed, lasting victories were won, as in the Ukraine and Transcaucasia, only where supported by the direct force of Russian arms. The revolution in Germany, so desperately desired, failed to develop into a communist victory; the victory in Hungary was short-lived. The effort to carry the revolution to Poland ran aground on the rock of Polish national resistance. By 1921, Lenin ordered abandonment of the period of revolutionary offensives in favor of a tactic more suitable to the times, a tactic that came to be called "united front." The "united front" policy aimed at extending the influence of communist parties abroad by seeking alliances with other radical groups—chiefly socialists in Europe and nationalist movements in Asia. The idea was that, by seeking alliances in a common cause, the Communists

would gain the opportunity to penetrate the leadership of socialist and nationalist parties and allied movements, winning the followers of these movements to their own banner. The Communists also sought to build international movements of labor (Profintern) and peasants (Krestintern) and to set up institutions in the Soviet Union for training communist cadres for work abroad.

The tactic of "united front" produced few significant results in Western countries. The communists achieved some short-term gains as parliamentary parties and in labor organizations, but the political tactic of union with the socialists proved a disaster when applied in Poland at the time of Jozef Pilsudski's takeover in 1926. More promising was the application of "united front" in relations with the Chinese Nationalist party (Kuomintang) from 1923 onward. Both Russian diplomatic influence and the influence of the Chinese Communist party grew apace. However, since the success of the nationalist efforts at territorial unification of northern and southern China were followed swiftly by a purge of the communists in the Kuomintang, the achievements of several years seemed to evaporate almost overnight. Nonetheless, the Bolshevized Comintern and its world-wide structure of obedient, administratively subordinated parties had acquired considerable organizational and tactical experience during the 1920s. Even in defeat, the Chinese Communist party was a vastly larger and more significant organization than it had been at the beginning of the decade. And in Europe, both Germany and Czechoslovakia had mass communist parties which played a considerable role in the political life of those two countries and would play a still more important role with the advent of the Depression.

D. The Stalin Era

Starting from a position of relative obscurity among the Party leaders but from a position of great power in the Party and state apparatus, Joseph Stalin successively allied with, and then turned against, the left-wing leaders of the Party, Gregory Zinoviev and Leo Kamenev. He first used them

against Trotsky and later turned against them in alliance with another group in the Party politburo (Nicholas Bukharin, Michael Tomsky, and Alexis Rykov) which represented the more moderate wing of the Party and which ultimately formulated the policies at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927. Stalin had seemed to be in favor of the moderate policies, but only shortly after the Fifteenth Congress, which saw the expulsion of the left-wing leaders from the Party, he began to speak out in favor of more radical policies of economic development and socialization. Somewhat later, he spoke of a "right-wing menace" in the Party, which ultimately was identified with his erstwhile allies. By the end of 1928, Stalin had secured his own policy and virtually isolated the men now stigmatized as the right-wing leaders. Economic policy was in his hands, and his First Five-Year Plan initiated a whole new era of rapid socialization of industry and agriculture, an era which abandoned the debates and doubts of the 1920s in favor of a vigorous and uncompromising advance on industrial expansion and agricultural collectivization.

Before looking at the significance of the First Five-Year Plan in more detail, one needs to examine several aspects of Party policy in the 1920s and their impact upon Soviet life. Two aspects of the impact of communism upon Soviet society are particularly significant. On the one hand, the Party was building its strength in all branches of Soviet society effectively during the 1920s. On the other, it was also building its control in religious, educational, and cultural life, as well as in the life of the national minorities. This control was built in a way that marked the rapid maturing of the structures of Soviet totalitarianism, which reached its full completion only under Stalin in the First Five-Year Plan era and after.

Religious life witnessed the abolishment, in 1918, of government subsidies for the church, religious education in the schools, and the right of the church to maintain its own schools. These measures were followed by heavy losses in clerical personnel during the struggle with the government in the period of the civil war and after. The first stage of the battle between church and state was concluded in 1925

when, following the death of the patriarch, the government refused to allow the election of a successor. Thus was the church stripped of its wealth and its independence of the political power and deprived of a large proportion of its personnel. The Soviet state had secured not only subordination of the religious to the secular power but had gone far toward reducing the influence of the church in Soviet society.

In education, the main developments were not only secularization and extensive educational experimentation, but also the establishment, in 1923, of the pattern of the Soviet school, the four-year school. Additional levels of two years were added to this for a full university preparatory course. In the middle of the 1920s, the government established a system of technical schools to train the specialists needed for the changing industrial and agricultural order. The influence of ideology in education was evident in the attempt to introduce a system of subject matter presentation known as the complexes, a system which sought to place each subject in the context of Marxist thought. Because the system was vigorously resisted in the course of the 1920s by the teachers, it possessed very limited effect. In higher education, the government radically democratized educational opportunity in the summer of 1918 by eliminating entrance requirements into the universities. This generosity had shortly to be qualified, however, because of a flood of unqualified students. Perhaps the most important development was the disappearance of the autonomy of the universities; from 1922 on, the Commissariat of Education appointed the chairmen and the faculty of the universities.

One is struck by the extraordinary vigor of cultural activity in the 1920s, especially the pervasive spirit of experimentalism, which produced so rich a belletristic literature and a great deal of fertile experimentation in the arts and architecture. Impressive, too, are the relative freedom of the writer and the long period of toleration in literary life, prevailing both before and after the special edict of toleration in 1924. By the end of the 1920s, however, this freedom was drastically reduced, especially for the national minorities,

whose literature displayed both a spirit of independence and political overtones not congenial to the Soviet government. Organizations in all branches of cultural life were established under the tutelage of the Party, and the way was prepared for the energetic positive direction of cultural activity which appeared in the course of the First Five-Year Plan.

Doubtless one of the most important aspects of the development of the structure of Soviet government and of Soviet centralism was the unfolding of the policies of the government affecting the national minorities. The constitution of the U.S.S.R., ratified in January, 1924, and essentially the creation of Stalin, denied any of the autonomy to the federal units of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of which political leaders among the national minorities had dreamed. The failure to achieve an authentic autonomy was due not only to the centralist structure of the Party, which imprinted its own character upon the state, but also to the views of Stalin himself, against which there was no effective resistance from either Lenin or Trotsky, or indeed any other highly placed party leader. The minorities were confined to the expression of their independent spirit in a fairly limited branch of cultural activity, but even there—notably in belletristic literature—the sphere of freedom was being rapidly restricted by the late 1920s as the government leaders came to fear the consequences of autonomous cultural activity in the border territories, particularly in the Ukraine.

Such were the main characteristics of the period of the New Economic Policy. The retreat of 1921 had led to only a very limited search for alternative economic solutions. The conquest of power in the Party apparatus by Stalin assured that the search would be cut off short in 1928 as he demonstrated his ability to make his will preponderant in Party leadership and policy. The Party apparatus, its leadership conquered by Stalin before the end of the 1920s, was greatly extended. Its membership had grown steadily during the 1920s, reaching a figure of over one and a half million, and the influence of the Party in Soviet society was vastly greater than at the beginning of the decade. The religious organization had been fully subordinated to state power, the

educational apparatus had been brought under state control, and the minorities had been regimented within the structure of a centralist constitution which was essentially the creation of Stalin himself. Such were the conditions of the country on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan.

The First Five-Year Plan can properly be called Stalin's Five-Year Plan. During the two years beginning in late 1927 and concluding at the end of 1929, Stalin was busily preparing the way for supplanting the economic program approved at the Fifteenth Congress in December, 1927, with an economic program of his own conception. In an atmosphere of artificially-created crisis, the policies of Gosplan, the state planning commission, were challenged by the Supreme Administration for the National Economy (*Vesenkha*), headed by the Stalinist Valerian Kuibyshev. By the end of July, 1929, Stalin had removed the men now stigmatized as "rightists"—Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov—from their main offices and, in November, secured public confessions of error from them. In December, 1929, Stalin implemented the Five-Year Plan as he conceived it, especially with the important scheme for the full collectivization of agriculture.

Between October, 1929, and March, 1930, some fifty-four per cent of the farms of the Soviet states were collectivized. The collectivization drive was suspended temporarily in March, but was resumed again in July. In spite of terrible resistance from the peasants and catastrophic losses (more than two-thirds) of horses and cattle, and very heavy losses of meat, milk, vegetables, and grain, the collectivization drive pressed forward. By the late 1930s, the 25,000,000 peasant farms of Russia had been reduced to some 200,000 *kolkhozes* (collective farms).

The changes in industry brought about by the First Five-Year Plan were less important in the organizational sense than were those in agriculture. The bulk of industry—some 84%—was already owned by the state or by cooperatives. Only the small shops, artisan industries, and private trade remained to be absorbed into the public sector of the economy. The main objective of the First Five-Year Plan was

the doubling of industrial production in a period of five years. The greatest emphasis was on the expansion of heavy industry—iron and steel, coal, and chemicals. But there was also expansion of the transportation network—roads, railways, and waterways—and emphasis upon electrification of the country and development of motor vehicle and agricultural implements industries. Consumer goods and housing received very limited attention in the plan and even less in the actual practice of the economic policy that followed. The results in industry were, however, vastly more encouraging than those in agriculture. The output of various branches of heavy industry increased three or four times over between 1929 and 1940, the Soviet Union becoming a major producer of motor vehicles and a large producer of agricultural equipment and chemicals by the end of the 1930s. The increase of hydroelectric power was also significant, but the transportation industries fared much less well, with the consumer goods production declining drastically.

The sacrifices and changes imposed upon the Soviet population were enormous. The peasants underwent a revolution in their mode of farming. Many of those who resisted, a group which included a majority of the peasant population, were often punished by confiscation of property and deportation. The suffering endured by peasants subjected to such measures was made still worse by the terrible famine which followed the rapid collectivization, a consequence of both the peasant slaughter of livestock and crop failure.

After collectivization, the peasants found themselves in a system of farming which, ostensibly cooperative, was in fact a socialized system. A manager was usually appointed by the state, and the quantity and kind of crops to be planted on the individual farm were determined by state planners. The peasants were obliged to make compulsory deliveries at extremely low prices so that, in fact, their per capita incomes were reduced below those of the 1920s. The industrial laborer also had an exceedingly difficult time. The First Plan witnessed a drastic reduction of real wages because the state used the technique of inflation to secure the funds needed for its industrial expansion programs. The simultaneous

disappearance of consumer goods from the market and the inflation of prices of the few goods remaining, as well as the terrible deficiencies of housing in the rapidly expanding industrial centers, substantially reduced the worker's standard of living. As with the peasant, a huge increase of compulsion in labor legislation was the government's main answer to the signs of resistance among the workers.

Such were the main features of the First Five-Year Plan. Total socialization of the whole economy and considerable expansion of the industrial sector had now been achieved, although carried out in a fashion that inflicted enormous sacrifices on the population and created grave economic and social problems with which Soviet leaders must still wrestle today.

From the end of the First Five-Year Plan in 1932 to the outbreak of World War II, the Party was primarily engaged in completing construction of the new agricultural and industrial system which the First Plan introduced. In this and in other ways, the impact of Stalin's leadership policies upon the Soviet Union was enormous. In the negative sense, they drastically reduced the freedom of the peasant and the worker. The peasant was left with virtually no rights in the management of the land. The worker was tied to his job and, by the outbreak of the war, could not change positions without permission. Additionally, there was a growing group of many hundreds of thousands of forced laborers. The deficiencies of the First Five-Year Plan and of Stalin's economic management in general revitalized opposition to the Party leadership. It is this opposition that explains much of the mood of the purge years. The purges had begun, especially vigorously in the Ukrainian party, before the show trials of the mid and late 1930s. But, in the latter years, they assumed the character not only of an enormous purge of the whole Party, but of mass purges which terrorized the civilian population and compelled acquiescence before Stalinist rule.

In the positive sense, one can say that these were the years when Soviet totalitarianism reached full maturity. This was particularly notable in intellectual life. The establishment of an official line in such branches of scholarship as phil-

osophy, history, and law not only eliminated non-Marxist currents of thought, but established orthodox Marxist models of work in each field. In belletristic literature, the relative freedom of the 1920s vanished. Fellow travelers and moderate Communists alike were deprived of the rights of publication, and many suffered severe persecution. Themes were now assigned to writers according to literary plans, and socialist realism—the doctrine that the aspiration rather than the reality constitutes the proper object of attention of the writer—became the order of the day in writing and criticism. In education, an enormous expansion of the schools and of higher education was accompanied by a still further extension of political control. Meanwhile, the religious establishment—orthodoxy, Judaism, and Islam—witnessed unprecedented harassment of clerics, closing of centers of worship, and other measures which dealt these organizations severer blows than anything they had yet endured in the Soviet period. Finally, the nationalities witnessed a total regimentation of their political leadership—with drastic purges of political and cultural leaders alike.

To summarize, the party leadership of the 1930s utterly repudiated the compromises of the 1920s in economic, political, and cultural life. Such crucial discussions as those concerning the revision of party doctrine in application to economic questions or the party's proper relationship to the intellectual and scholarly community gave way to militant proclamations of the Party line. The peasants' mode of life was revolutionized, and the urban population was doubled, reaching a total of nearly 56 million in the decade between 1928 and 1940. Government functionaries—managers in agriculture and industry, directors of cooperatives, planners, etc.—increased in number five times over in the same period, totaling some 11.5 million by 1940. The national minorities had lost all hopes of cultural as well as political autonomy. Such was the transition from the venturesome, experimental communism of the 1920s to the Stalinist communism of the 1930s. The change had not been accomplished overnight, to be sure. It is certainly clear that much of this withdrawal had begun earlier in the 1920s and that, in some ways, the

experimental mood persisted even in the early 1930s. By and large, however, Stalin's First Plan marked the very sharp dividing line between the two eras. The mature features of the Stalinist system had developed by the eve of World War II.

World War II presented the Soviet Communist party with what was perhaps the greatest challenge in its history. As in the Russian civil war, the challenge was not only military, but one of economic organization and political leadership as well. In the early stages of the war, the Red Army suffered almost uninterrupted retreat with heavy manpower losses. However, military reorganization, including significant personnel changes at the top, enabled the Red Army to absorb the first and heaviest thrust of the German offensive and, even in the first year of war, to undertake a counter-offensive which rapidly broadened its scope. The loss of more than half of the industrial and agricultural productive capacity of the country created enormous difficulties in economic organization for the Party, difficulties which it met with considerable skill. Particularly impressive was the massive transfer of industrial plants to the Urals and Siberia for the maintenance of industrial production there during the war. Politically, the task was to appeal effectively to the population, overcoming its flagging morale, and encouraging it to endure enormous sacrifices at a time when the military situation appeared hopeless. As during the civil war, the Party leadership demonstrated extraordinary firmness combined with a capacity for brutal disciplinary measures, as well as considerable skill in propaganda appeals to the population. The discipline in the army was extremely stern, the regimentation of the civilian population behind the lines equally so, and the organizing power of the Party and governmental apparatus were sufficient to maintain the resistance of even such a city as Leningrad, much of whose population starved but whose resistance continued nonetheless. The propaganda approach to the population was cast largely in nationalist terms. It was apparently clear to Stalin that Communist slogans would inspire few hearts for battle, but that nationalist slogans which appealed to the historical achievements of the past,

emphasizing military leaders and military greatness, could have considerable value. Such propaganda was accompanied by appeals to the national minorities as the Red Army advanced into their territories and by religious concessions, which included restoration of limited publication rights, modest opportunities for religious education, and, finally, the selection of the first Orthodox Patriarch since 1925. Such concessions applied not only to orthodoxy, but also to Islam, though the Jews gained nothing, since concessions to them had no political value.

The events of the war revealed the ability of the Soviet political system to absorb blows of fantastic severity and yet emerge in control of the situation. The popularity of the Communist party and of the Soviet government was at a very low level on the eve of the war. Its situation was certainly not improved by the terrible reverses suffered in the early stages of the war. However, the Party proved not only a powerful organization force in the face of the desperate needs of the war, but also a powerful disciplining force to hold the population together and compel it to continue fighting when the odds seemed hopeless. In this respect also, the situation is reminiscent of the civil war, when so often the cohesive and disciplining power of the Party was the one thing which stood between organization and anarchy in the war effort. One is also impressed by the skill of the propaganda and the concessions to the population in the war-time period which aimed at cultivating a sense that the Party was much more a part of the people and their aspirations than it had been before the war. These latter created widespread popular optimism about the possibilities for improvement in Soviet life in the postwar period.

Hopes for an alleviation of the severe features of Soviet life were quickly dashed by the experiences of the postwar years. Government policy bore faint resemblance to the aspirations nourished by the wartime propaganda and concessions, resembling rather the policies of the early First Plan era. The policies of the Soviet Communist party in the early post-war years were distinguished by renewed regimentation of intellectual life, reconstruction and expansion of the

Communist party apparatus.

The regimentation of intellectual life included both severe treatment of returned laborers and prisoners of war, all of whom were regarded as having collaborated to one degree or another, and the effort to isolate these returnees from contact with the rest of the population. Such policies seemed to aim, at least in part, at preventing them from spreading their impressions of the outside world. The regimentation in cultural life was dominated by the familiar theme of partisanship—the demand that all works of scholarship, literature, and art be politically oriented to serve the purposes of the party, which laid down the official line in every field of intellectual and artistic activity. Cultural policies also included a strong element of anti-Westernism, which has led one commentator to describe the tone of Soviet intellectual discourse during these years as an anti-West symphony rising in a powerful crescendo. Leaders in Soviet intellectual and cultural life endured severe regimentation of literature; heavy censorship of films and discrediting of producers whose works proved politically unacceptable; extensive rewriting of history and disciplining of historians and philosophers; a large-scale intervention in the sciences, especially in favor of Michurinist genetics as elaborated by the infamous Trofim Lysenko; and even the personal intervention of Stalin in the field of linguistics. Many writers and scholars suffered public humiliation, while others suffered the loss of positions and incomes because of attacks by the Party.

Industrial reconstruction and expansion concentrated initially on the repair of the war's destruction. It also rapidly developed into a program of industrial expansion which, between the end of the war and the death of Stalin in 1953, doubled the production of the major products of heavy industry and achieved much modernization of old industrial equipment and the addition of altogether new industries to the Soviet industrial establishment. The labor policies were similar to those of the 1930s, with low wages, long hours, and minimal attention to the general welfare of the worker. In agriculture, there was a discouragingly slow restoration of productive capacity. The per capita production as late as

1952 remained below that of the pre-war years. Use of the "link" system, which employed cooperative family labor and incentives of individual profit to increase production, was widespread in the early postwar years. However, a sharp attack on the "links" in 1950 heralded the introduction of a policy of rapid amalgamation of *kolkhozes*, a policy which steadily reduced the number of collective farms as it increased their size.

During the wartime occupation of the western borderlands of the Soviet Union, the Germans were struck by the lack of leaders among the national minorities. The circumstances were doubtless due to the thorough purge of nationalists, both non-communist and communist, and to the extensive purge of the intelligentsia of these territories during the 1930s. The Soviet nationalities policy introduced a major propaganda campaign after the war against the nationalism of the minority nationalities (even as Russian nationalism was flaunted without inhibition). This campaign sought simultaneously to discredit the West as an attractive alternative to ties with Russia and to advance even beyond the purges in intellectual life among the minorities during the 1930s. Clearly, the Party regarded minority nationalism as a continuing problem and was not going to leave it unattended. Moreover the necessity of fighting with guerilla forces in the Baltic states and the western Ukraine for a long period after the war indicated that the newly acquired territories had to be forcibly compelled to accept Soviet rule.

The membership of the Party grew rapidly in the postwar years. Having fallen from 3.5 to 1.9 million members during the years of the purges, the Party grew to 4 million by the time of the war. In spite of heavy losses during the war, still heavier recruitment raised the total membership to some 6 million by 1945, and a rapid growth continued afterwards, bringing the membership up to 7 million within a few years. Stalin was exalted after the war as "father, great leader and teacher of genius" and was in all respects the unchallenged master of the Party organization. The leadership had remained stable since the Eighteenth Congress of the party in 1939. However, there were signs of a struggle among the

second echelon leaders in 1946-48. During the Nineteenth Party Congress, as well as afterwards, Stalin was evidently preparing a new purge of the top level leaders; he expanded the size of the politburo from eleven members to twenty-five in the new presidium, and he prepared a campaign of propaganda which cast doubt upon the quality of leadership of key figures in the Party. By the time of the announcement of the "Doctors' Plot" on January 13, 1953, Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, Nikita Khrushchev, and Vyacheslav Molotov knew that the fierce winds of purge had begun again to blow. Only the death of Stalin, under very mysterious circumstances in March, 1953, prevented the purge from going full course. It was followed promptly by the reduction of the presidium to a smaller size and the restoration of the power of the old guard leaders of the politburo. Thus, the Stalin era ended as it had begun—in an atmosphere of conspiracy.

In foreign affairs, also, the Stalin era held important decisions for the Soviet Union. At the end of 1927, the Comintern abandoned the policy of "united front," hailing the advent of a new era of revolutionary opportunities. Within two years, the prophecy seemed amply fulfilled as the Great Depression laid its heavy hand upon the world economy, opening an era of political turmoil. For the Soviet leadership, the chief focus of attention, as in 1918, was Germany. Germany had been the pivot of Soviet diplomacy during the 1920s, the central factor in an alliance against the Versailles powers. But Germany appeared to be drifting toward reconciliation with her former enemies; moreover, Germany was hit harder than any of the major industrial powers by the Depression, her people suffering severe economic dislocation and massive unemployment for the second time in a decade. Hence, the German communists were ordered to abandon their "united front" with the socialists; the ally of the 1920s became the enemy in a period of political offensive which aimed to destroy not only the power of the German socialists, but the Weimar Republic as well.

The Soviet leaders miscalculated terribly the nature of

fascism and of Adolf Hitler. They callously worked for the overthrow of the republic and unwittingly contributed heavily to the victory of a totalitarian political power which soon threatened the peace of Europe and the security of the Soviet Union. Combined with the growing threat of Japan in the anti-Comintern pact of 1936, the danger was formidable indeed. In 1934, the "united front" tactic was rehabilitated, the communist parties abroad being urged to align themselves with parties of the left and center favorable to collaboration with the Soviet Union and the containment of German and Japanese aggression. The tests of this policy were several, but the most crucial was the German challenge to Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1938. The Soviets were excluded from the Munich negotiations which surrendered that country's western territories to Hitler and rendered it defenseless when he chose to devour it entirely the following spring. Henceforth, Soviet policy concentrated on an understanding with Hitler, which was achieved on August 23, 1939. By the terms of that agreement, the Soviets and the Germans divided their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, by definition covering the Baltic states, Poland, and Bessarabia.

Freed from the fear of a two-front war, Hitler launched his campaign against Poland at the beginning of September, 1939, dividing that country as agreed after the Soviet invasion a half month later. The Soviets consolidated their control over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with little trouble during the following months, and Rumania, under both German and Soviet pressure, surrendered Bessarabia without serious protest. But little Finland resisted stoutly, fighting heroically in defense of its land and its independence, and casting grave doubts upon the military effectiveness of the Red Army. Moreover, Hitler's lightning victories in the Low Countries and France the following spring, the eviction of British forces from the Continent, and his conquest of Denmark and Norway left the Soviet Union alone on the Continent to face the Nazi juggernaut. During the few months of uneasy peace that remained, Hitler moved relentlessly eastward, consolidating his conquered territories and his alliances, and forcing Yugoslavia and Greece into sub-

mission. By the spring of 1941, his armies stood poised on the Soviet frontier. On June 22, he launched a powerful, three-pronged attack which within a few short months had advanced to the gates of Moscow and Leningrad and seemed destined to bring Russia to her knees.

From the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the German invasion, communist parties abroad had attacked Britain and France as the enemies of peace. With the German attack, the line shifted abruptly, and the world-wide communist propaganda apparatus directed its venom toward Germany, meanwhile praising the democracies with whom an alliance was now forged. Soviet diplomacy, in the hour of national peril, could adopt only the supplicant's role. Once the tide of war had turned at Stalingrad early in 1943, Stalin adopted a more rigid posture toward his American and British allies, pressing hard for every possible postwar political advantage for communism and for the Soviet Union. The very nature of Germany's suicidal gamble for total power in Europe assured him of ample opportunities. The objective of unconditional surrender endorsed at Casablanca promised the total destruction of German power, the major power on the Continent since 1871. Unchecked by Germany, and with the Soviet Army in occupation of much of the area of Eastern and Central Europe, Stalin would be free to manipulate the inevitable postwar political and social dislocation to his advantage. The guiding purpose of Soviet diplomacy, therefore, was to strengthen communist forces in the area. One means was encouragement of communist-led resistance movements, as in Yugoslavia. Another was the sponsorship of communist-dominated exile governments to replace those which had sought exile in the West, as in the case of Poland. The Teheran Conference in December, 1943, found Roosevelt and Churchill prepared to accede to most of Stalin's demands on Eastern Europe, largely, as Churchill has noted, out of a mistaken estimate of Stalin's postwar intentions. At Yalta, in February, 1945, Roosevelt sought Stalin's early entry into the conflict against Japan, offering incentives which paved the way for the postwar Soviet role in Korea and China.

Soviet relations with the Western powers had deteriorated badly even before the end of the war, the thorny issue of Poland being the foremost cause. In the aftermath of the war, as the Soviets proceeded with the systematic preparation for communist takeovers throughout Eastern Europe and obstructed efforts at collaboration in Germany and Austria, the alliance foundered, giving way in 1948-49, in the tense climax of the Berlin Blockade, to the era which came to be known as the Cold War. When, in 1947, America proclaimed the Truman Doctrine in response to Soviet pressures on Greece and Turkey, the Soviets turned to rapid and complete consolidation of communist power in Eastern Europe, a process completed with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948. The new communist offensive was world-wide, communist parties throughout Europe and Asia launching offensives against former allies, whether ~~socialists or nationalists~~, in a series of insurrections which spread from Malaya to France.

In Europe, the new offensives merely served complete systems of control long in the making. In Asia, the most spectacular achievement was the Chinese Revolution, which, by the end of 1949, had consolidated control over mainland China. A climax and dangerous miscalculation occurred in Korea, where the launching of a direct military offensive for taking over the south was met by a United Nations military effort initiated by the United States. The conflict led eventually to a stalemate. The years of the Korean Conflict marked the climax of the Cold War. From the Soviet viewpoint, these were years of frustration. Checked in Berlin and Korea, the communist offensive had come to a halt. Indeed, there were clear signs in the last months before Stalin's death that the era of offensives was about to be brought to an end with the initiation of yet another era of "united front" or an appropriate equivalent.

E. The Post-Stalin Era

Four major aspects of Soviet life since Stalin can be singled out for special attention: the trend in leadership; the

problem of relations with the satellite states of Eastern Europe and with China; the problem of maintaining control in intellectual life; and the problem of industry and agriculture.

The new leaders talked a great deal of collegial leadership in the early years after Stalin's death. However, Beria was removed from his position as the head of the NKVD and shot as early as the summer of 1953. Subsequently, the key roles were played by Malenkov as premier and Khrushchev as first secretary of the Communist party. A disagreement centered on the question of heavy industry versus consumer goods soon developed between them. Malenkov was removed as premier at the beginning of 1955. Khrushchev then vigorously asserted his own initiative in government policy in the succeeding year and a half, a period which reached a climax at the Twentieth Congress with the famous secret speech about Stalin. The congress further relaxed controls over domestic intellectual life and the satellite states, contributing much to the thaw of 1956 and to the rebellions in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1956. Khrushchev's policies thus contributed substantially to the creation of a very dangerous political predicament. It was mainly for this reason that he faced resistance in the presidium by the spring of 1957. Behind the announcement of the expulsion of Malenkov, Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich from the presidium in July, 1957, and their public denunciation as the anti-Party group, lay important events. When faced with a demand for his resignation from a majority of the presidium, Khrushchev pitted the Party Central Committee against the presidium and managed to reverse this decision of the presidium majority. From 1957 onward, Khrushchev's leadership of the Party seemed very powerful. However, the discussions at the plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee were frequently stormy and critical of Khrushchev's policies. The perennial agricultural problem was especially difficult, and efforts to hide failures in this field were unsuccessful.

Between 1962 and 1964, opposition to Khrushchev's leadership gained strength; this resulted from a dissatisfaction with his adventurist foreign policy, especially the handling of

the Cuban crisis in 1962; his often hastily conceived and implemented industrial policies; and his agricultural policy, which, in 1963-64, reached a period of such extreme shortages that grain had to be imported from the United States and Canada. In October, 1964, Khrushchev's opponents emulated his performance of 1957, appealing to the Central Committee to secure his removal from office. As has been frequently noted, the most obvious feature of the new leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin is its colorlessness. Brezhnev occupies the position from which both Khrushchev and Stalin built their power. He is first secretary of the Party, as well as head of the bureau of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and a member of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Kosygin is chairman of the Council of Ministers. Behind the colorless facade which they provide, there have been important changes occurring within the Soviet Union.

The problem of the Soviet relationship with the satellite states thrust itself forward aggressively after Stalin's death. The revolts in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia during 1953 gave some warning of the explosiveness of the pent-up forces there. The response of the new Soviet leadership was a policy of concessions which reached a climax in 1956. Khrushchev's secret speech, indicating among other things the despotic and irrational way in which Stalin had directed the affairs of the East European communist parties, contributed much to accelerating the thaw in Eastern Europe, as did the developing ferment in intellectual life, particularly in Poland and Hungary. The efforts by the Soviets to slow the march of events in Poland in the summer of 1956 brought forth a vigorous response from the Polish party. Only by concessions to the independence of Polish leaders could the Soviets achieve control of a developing revolution in Poland. Nothing, it seemed, could contain the situation in Hungary. The October demonstrations in Budapest broke into open rebellion; efforts to pacify the rebels led to replacement of the party dictatorship by a coalition government, promises of restoration of democracy, and, finally, a Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and a proclamation of neu-

trality. Only by decisive military action was the Soviet government able to restore communist control in Hungary and gain control of the revolutionary ferment which might quickly spread to the whole satellite empire.

In the aftermath of Hungary, the Soviet leaders sought to rebuild the unity of East European communism, but it was clear that the kind of unity of the Stalin era could never be reproduced. For a few years, a relative calm prevailed; Hungary was engaged in efforts at recovery from the destruction and demoralization of the revolution; and in Poland, Wladyslaw Gomulka sought to contain the pressures for change and maintain communist rule. For all of the East European communist leaders, Hungary was a frightening evidence of the depth of popular hostility toward their regimes and of the possibilities for outright anti-communist revolutions when this force was unleashed. Thus, the late 1950s and early 1960s were an era of relative calm. Beneath that calm, however, new pressures were developing.

Much of the dissatisfaction with communist rule in Eastern Europe in the early 1960s centered on the failure of economic policies and the relative economic stagnation. Pressures for more experimental policies and for revision of hallowed communist economic dogmas were strong, coming to the surface most vigorously in Rumania during and after 1966. Similar pressures developed in Czechoslovakia in 1967, leading to innovations in economic policy and to demands for greater political freedom which carried with them much of the vigor and scope of similar demands heard in Hungary in 1956. In both Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the impressive factor was that the new leadership was calling for an independent national communism of the Marshall Tito variety in Yugoslavia, rejecting the Soviet model of economic organization and the Soviet "road to socialism." These basic ways were declared inappropriate to national needs or simply economically unproductive. Equally impressive was the vigor with which the leadership sought a renewal of ties with Western Europe, making trade agreements, seeking broader and freer cultural ties, and reaffirming a basic unity with the European community from which they had been detached after 1947.

The relationship with China proved an increasingly troubled one from 1959 onward. The Soviet leadership made every effort to conceal the dispute until 1963, when it issued a series of responses to Chinese charges openly acknowledging the seriousness of the rift. On the Chinese side, meanwhile, the position had developed that the Soviet Union had abandoned revolutionary communism, had become revisionist, and had to be displaced from its leadership of the world Communist movement. Worse still, from the Soviet viewpoint, was the frequently repeated charge that the Soviet Union had formed a bloc with the United States, dividing the world into two spheres of influence. Since the Chinese accompanied these charges with claims to Soviet territory and with essentially racist appeals against the Soviet Union as a white European imperialist power, there seemed little chance of closing the breach.

Thus, the unity of the communist world in the Stalin era had, by the mid-1960s, been replaced by an open leadership struggle between the Soviet Union and China, increasing separation of the Soviet Union from the states of Eastern Europe, and a vigorous independence of Soviet tutelage on the part of communist parties abroad. The impact of these changes in a world charged with a new wave of political radicalism remained to be seen.

The problem of cultural thaw has been one of the most challenging for the Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin era. The process began very soon after the death of Stalin, especially in belletristic literature. There was criticism of the bad quality of much of the postwar literature and a rehabilitation of literary figures of the past such as Isaac Babel, Yu Olesha, Michael Zoshchenko, and Anna Akhmatova. Even Feodor Dostoevsky was eventually rehabilitated. A much wider range of literature became available to the Soviet reading public, and tentative criticisms of the doctrine of socialist realism appeared. Hitherto forbidden themes, such as the evils of bureaucratic government and, more sensitive, life in the prison camps of the Stalin era, came forth in literature. Prominent literary figures such as Ilya Ehrenberg were able to publish literary memoirs detailing some of the evils of the

Stalin era's repression in literature. Criticism of past policies of intellectual regimentation was applied also in historiography, economics, sociology, jurisprudence, psychology, and the sciences. Removed were the most unattractive features of control in the sciences, including the pre-eminence of T. Lysenko in the field of genetics; the more irrational Party dicta on scientific questions, notably the prohibition against Albert Einstein's theory of relativity, were withdrawn. The problem constantly facing the Party leadership was that of where and how to set the limits to intellectual ferment. The early stages of the thaw were marked by great uncertainty and attack and counter-attack. The agreement to publish *Doctor Zhivago* by Boris Pasternak in 1956 indicated something of the confusion in literary censorship. The revolutionary events of 1956, in which the East European intellectuals played so prominent a role, were followed by drastic measures of intellectual repression, not only in the East European states, but also in the Soviet Union.

Yet, the thaw in Soviet intellectual and cultural life continued, albeit with frequent setbacks and often bitter debates between party ideologues and leaders of the literary and artistic community. The encouragement of measures of de-Stalinization by Khrushchev provided a pretext for publication of works sharply critical of the Stalin era, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, the now famous story of a day in the life of a labor camp inmate, a story for whose particulars Solzhenitsyn could draw on his own experience. But soon the Party leadership complained of a flood of similar manuscripts, charging, rather revealingly, that some writers were using the pretext of de-Stalinization as a cover for more basic criticism of communism and of the Soviet Union. Similar ideological counter-attacks were launched against works appearing in other fields of intellectual and cultural life, all of them evidence that the Party found itself trying to stem the tide of intellectual ferment which would, given the opportunity, sweep away the structures of communist orthodoxy. For those who sought to bypass the censorship and sent their

works abroad, the penalties were severe, as the trial of Yuli Daniel and Andrei Sinyavsky demonstrated. The frequency of trials of writers in 1966-67 was evidence both that the ferment continued and that the leadership was determined to control it.

In agricultural policy, the Khrushchev era opened with an effort to openly acknowledge the seriousness of the agricultural situation inherited from the Stalin era. This was done in September, 1953. Subsequently, the main approach to the problem of grain shortage, the key problem of Soviet agriculture, was the aggressive effort to develop the arid-free lands of Siberia and Central Asia. Between 1953 and 1960, this agricultural program was the keynote of Soviet agricultural experimentation, though its successes were severely limited. The unsatisfactory results of the program could not be indefinitely concealed; indeed, in 1959 and 1960, they became the object of troublesome scrutiny by the plenary sessions of the Party Central Committee. The policy of amalgamating the collectives continued during this period, following the pattern set in 1950. This amalgamation contributed nothing to the solution of production problems, however. Meanwhile, the general situation of Soviet agriculture continued to be highly unsatisfactory.

It was not until the autumn of 1963 that the seriousness of the situation was again openly acknowledged. A plan was announced to shift course completely and concentrate on more intensive cultivation of the best land areas of the country, with particular attention to the use of chemical fertilizers and further mechanization, especially in small farming operations. The new agricultural policy was slow to be introduced, but it was accompanied by heavy shifts of investments to agriculture, a long-neglected sector of the economy, and by a steady rise in agricultural production. By the 1967 harvest, it appeared that the situation had been sufficiently remedied. A repetition of the crisis of 1963 was unlikely. Still, the Soviet Union was a very long distance from development of the modern agricultural economy that underlay the affluence of the United States. Moreover, the improvements following 1963 had been gained, like so many

improvements in the past, by the sacrifice of the collective principal, by a virtual abandonment of the program of remodeling collective farms into state farms, and by large concessions to individual incentive for greater production both on private plots and on collective and state lands. These concessions were distasteful not only ideologically, but economically as well, for they inevitably diverted resources from industrial investment.

Industrially, the advance of the Soviet Union since 1953 in total production continued to be impressive through the early 1960s. However, there were signs in the late 1950s of a slowing down of the rate of industrial growth and of certain very painful problems. Among the latter was the continued low level of productive efficiency. Another was the lack of development of many of the more modern branches of industry, the retardation, particularly, of the chemical and associated plastics industries. Still another was the need for modernization of many branches of industry with the transition to more modern methods of power production, traction, etc. The problem of labor shortage faced the Soviet leaders for the first time in their history, and once again the challenge of Western supremacy in technical modernization became, as in the era of the early Plans, a dominant feature of Soviet discussions of industrial needs. Finally, the rate of growth in the early 1960s had fallen behind that of some of the more advanced industrial states. The combination of a retarded agriculture and a low agricultural product with an industry facing labor shortages, low efficiency, and the need for technical modernization presented the Soviet leaders with a grave complex of economic difficulties.

Among the most pressing and controversial problems was that of industrial organization. From 1962 onward, a small group of Soviet economists had suggested the introduction of profit motivation into management. Often referred to by the name of one of the foremost proponents, Professor Evsei Liberman of the Kharkov Engineering and Economics Institute, the scheme was introduced experimentally on a small scale, but has not yet led to major modifications of Soviet industrial organization.

To evaluate comprehensively the extent of changes in the post-Stalin era, one ought to note the continued expansion of industrial power with emphasis upon military power, the efforts to increase agricultural production, and the continuing efforts to transform the institutional structure and mentality of Soviet society after a communist pattern.

Party controls were less conspicuous and inhibiting in cultural life than under Stalin. The coercion of the individual Soviet citizen had been substantially relaxed, especially in its legal forms. There was more contact with the outside world, and there were steady improvements in a still very modest standard of living. Thus, from the viewpoint of the individual Soviet citizen, the post-Stalin era represented a period of substantial changes. For the government, it continued to produce a range of exceedingly complex and difficult problems.

In external affairs, the most significant development was the disintegration of the unity of the Communist camp, the greater independence of the East European parties and of parties outside the orbit, and the direct conflict between the Soviet and Chinese parties. The Vietnamese war notwithstanding, there appeared to be a steady broadening both of contacts and of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, though the rapid broadening of the arena of Soviet diplomatic and military activity into the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and elsewhere created new potentials for serious conflict, as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis illustrated.

Chapter III

WORLD COMMUNISM

By Milorad M. Drachkovitch

The huge topic of world communism may be studied from many angles—historical, doctrinal, organizational, etc. The angle of observations to be used in this essay-survey is cross-sectional in the sense that it will explore, historically, the interaction between the doctrine of Karl Marx (including the multiple interpretations of that doctrine by Marx's followers) and the international communist movement, with their nineteenth century antecedents, but with emphasis on the events in our century.

A. Ambiguities of Nineteenth Century Marxism

To begin with, one should keep in mind that there existed a basic difference between Marxism and other socialist and nonsocialist revolutionary movements which either preceded Marx's own thought and action, or were their contemporaries. The key element of this difference is the fact that Marx inaugurated the so-called "scientific socialism," i.e., he asserted that the total transformation of human society from its capitalist bondage into a new socialist freedom was scientifically necessary, independent from ethical considerations and human will, because inscribed in the impersonal historical process itself. In the speech Friedrich Engels delivered on March 17, 1883, at the grave-side of Karl Marx, he said that "just as Darwin discovered the law of the development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history." To be a Marxist, therefore, means that one possesses, or believes to possess, the key toward understanding the unfolding of human history.

In spite of the postulate that Marxism is "social physics," there existed in Marx's own personality, as well as in his teaching and action, a basic ambiguity which had played a

capital role in the Marxist revolutionary movement. This ambiguity was the result of the coexistence of two mutually incompatible elements in Marxism: its "economic determinism" and its "revolutionary voluntarism." The former corresponded to the Marxist affirmation that the degree of economic development attained by a given people, or during a given epoch, forms the foundation, the base, of their social and political order with everything else (the state institutions, the legal conceptions, the ideas on religion, etc.) being the reflection of these hardrock, economic, determining factors. The implication of this view was that since human relationships were predetermined by their economic roots, men could not at their own will make or unmake what existed beyond their realm of influence. In his *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, written in London in January, 1859, Marx was explicit: "No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself." In other words, socialism will come on the stage of history only when capitalism has reached its highest point of development.

On the other hand, Marx, by his temperament and convictions, was a fiery revolutionary who believed that his task was not simply to describe these impersonal laws of historical process and to wait for their maturation, but also to contribute personally to the destruction of the bourgeois-capitalist social and economic order which he loathed. In this connection, as particularly visible in his private correspondence, he believed in the revolution as the result of human actions, irrespective of the ripeness of objective conditions for the revolution. This distinction between objective ripeness and subjective revolutionary will become in the twentieth century the crucial element, not only of dispute among the Marxists, but of a split in the Marxist movement. Moreover, historical record of our century has shown that—contrary to the economic determinism of the "science" of Marxism—the less a country was (and is) economically and

socially developed, the more its revolutionary voluntarists had (and have) a chance to seize power and proclaim the advent of socialism.

Marxist ambiguities do not end here, however. Marx's own vision of the replacement of capitalism by socialism was the result of his belief that socialism (and communism in its wake) would not simply destroy the capitalist modes of production and the inequities of bourgeois society, but would, in fact, represent a progressive, qualitative step in human destiny, encompassing the best features of the bourgeois-capitalist society while eliminating its negative, exploitative side. At the same time, however, by the violence of his attacks against the existing order and his emphasis on the absolutely necessary revolutionary upheaval, Marx had encouraged the aspirations of those who believed that socialism and communism should be built only after total destruction and elimination of all the features of the bourgeois society. Here again, Marx had left an ambiguous legacy which in this century meant that persons and movements claiming his political heritage came to irreconcilably opposite views and policies.

Finally, Marx has been, above everything else, a student and a critic of capitalist society, and he has not left any blueprint for a future socialist society. This also explains, as will be seen, why the communist parties which have seized power in several countries during the twentieth century would not profit from Marx's teaching in their own efforts to build socialism. In this connection, Marxism was and remains an effective tool of critique and struggle against capitalism, but it helped very little in building a new, socialist humanity, about which Marx dreamed but wrote only in very vague terms. All the communist rulers in this century have had to build their own realities which, in spite of claims of Marxist orthodoxy, have varied considerably from each other. And the international communist movement itself, while paying lip service to its founding father, has evolved through the last five and a half decades in ways barely compatible with Marx's own ideas and prescriptions.

All the preceding remarks suggest that, in the sections which follow, the world communist movement will not be observed as something unfolding according to the rules of a scientific necessity, but as a movement inspired by an exceptionally gifted student of history and an impassioned revolutionary. Marx's legacy has been interpreted in variegated and often mutually exclusive ways by other impassioned revolutionaries who have called themselves "Marxists" and who only incidentally profited by and followed the teachings of a typically nineteenth century doctrine.

B. Marx and the First International (1864-1876)

Since the revolution was for Marx "the driving force of history," it was of utmost importance for him—and his followers—to devise the most appropriate instrument of its implementation. Here again, both in theory and in practice, Marx was not of one mind. He had been a member of small, revolutionary sects which he later abandoned and criticized in favor of a different concept of mass workers' parties. Likewise, he had been a believer in "permanent revolution," telescoping, so to speak, the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions; but he had also admitted the possibility of a longer lasting evolution of political systems, including the establishment of communism by peaceful means in some countries (such as the United States, England, and Holland). This discrepancy between Marx the revolutionary and Marx the gradualist was particularly visible and significant in the ideological orientation and political leadership he and his friend Engels gave to an emerging international organization in 1864.

On September 28 of that year, at a meeting in London attended by representatives of various workers' and socialist groups from England and the continent, the International Workingmen's Association (IWA) was established. Historically known as the First International, it was a heterogeneous organization, both in ideas and in participants, yet one of its primary aims was to protect English trade unions against the import of foreign labor. At least on the surface,

this complexity was overcome by the fact that everybody accepted a common program drafted by Karl Marx, who came out from a political isolation of several years and decided to take an active part in the new association, believing that it finally represented a genuine movement of the working class.

Since Marx was not the founder but the invited formulator of ideas for the new organization, he was anxious to avoid any ideological exclusivism and organization along sectarian lines. Several years later, in 1872, he wrote that the IWA was conceived as "the real and militant organization of the proletarian class in all countries linked together in their common struggle against the capitalists." This basic idea of what the IWA should be was expressed in the association's general rules, which Marx drafted. It was said there that "the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves," that the aim of the struggle of the proletariat should be "the abolition of all class rule," and that the conquest of political power was "the great duty of the proletariat." Initially, at least, and in spite of the establishment of a general council serving as an international coordinating agency among the different national and local groups of the IWA, the association was loosely organized, and each of its sections had the right to preserve full autonomy. Only in 1871, at a London conference of the general council, were its powers extended in order to achieve greater centralization and limit the independence of national and local sections. But this was done more because of internal conflicts within the IWA than because of a change in principles.

The First International never became a mass organization, and from the outset it suffered from internal feuds. The most significant was the conflict between the followers of Marx and the followers of two anarchist political figures, the Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and the Russian Mikhail Bakunin. The anarchists accepted Marx's critique of capitalism, but opposed his views on the methods of anti-capitalist struggle as well as his concepts of the state. Since, for the anarchists, every authority was an enemy and, since they rejected all the institutions of the bourgeois society,

they were against participation in political and parliamentary processes of any kind, favoring a direct and total struggle for the destruction of capitalism and its replacement by completely free, federated communities on both the domestic and international levels.

Bakunin, in particular, was an implacable foe of Marx; he even had his own secret political organization working within the framework of the IWA. He accused Marx of authoritarian methods in conducting the IWA, and he and his followers strove to capture the leadership of the association. Marx and his supporters combatted the anarchists at the several congresses of the IWA and managed, finally, at the Hague congress in 1872, to expel Bakunin and some of his friends from the association. At the same occasion, the seat of the general council of the IWA was transferred from London to New York, a fact which represented the end of the association's activities. It vegetated for a few years in the United States and was formally disbanded at a meeting in Philadelphia in 1876.

Besides these internal troubles, other events contributed to the IWA's demise. The most important was the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, followed by the brief and tragic events of the Commune of Paris (March-May, 1871), which adversely affected the IWA's international activities. Moreover, the British trade unions, which initially supported the First International, grew progressively colder toward it and finally lost interest in its activities. Paradoxically, the anarchists and some other revolutionary groups who disagreed with Marx seemed for several years to be more active and influential than Marx and his followers, although they, too, could not achieve more significant political results.

In spite of its short life span and many difficulties and defeats, the First International played an important role in the political and social history of the nineteenth century. It was, in a way, an indirect result of the social consequences of the Industrial Revolution and of many battles against the prevailing political and social conditions. The idea of organizing the working class politically and internationally not only had enthusiastic adepts but left a legacy and inspiration even when the IWA formally disappeared.

C. Diluted Marxism of the Second International (1889-1914)

Two conditions had to be fulfilled before a new international socialist body could be established. The first was the spreading of Karl Marx's revolutionary ideas; the second was the establishment of genuine national socialist parties adopting Marxism as their ideological creed. During the 1880s, socialist parties of Marxist obedience were organized in practically all western European countries, and, at a meeting in Paris in 1889, the representatives of these parties established the Second International.

From its beginnings, the new body had adopted the three basic guidelines mirroring Marx's thought: the idea of irreconcilable class struggle as the motor force of history; the internationalist outlook of the proletarian struggle and organization; and the emphasis on political organization and militancy. At the outset, the anarchists had again tried to oppose Marxist predominance in the Second International, objecting particularly to its strictly political methods of struggle, but, at the fourth congress of the International (London, 1896), they were officially expelled from the new organization.

The complete ideological dominance of Marxism in the Second International did not mean, however, that it was free of controversies. In fact, in practically all western European countries, the socialist parties were divided into three co-existing factions. On the right, there were the so-called "reformists," or "revisionists," who were following the ideas of the prominent German socialist, Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932). He was critical of some basic tenets of Marxism, believing, in particular, that socialism would be achieved through full democratization of society and not through a violent revolution for which the working classes were neither politically nor socially prepared. The second, and largest, current was that of officially orthodox Marxism, the leader of which was another prominent German theoretician of Czech origin, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), who opposed Bernstein's views as harmful to the revolutionary

movement of the proletariat. Despite its revolutionary phraseology, this current grew accommodated to the western European political system which, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was significantly changing in the direction of democracy and social progress. Finally, at the extreme left stood pure revolutionary Marxists who believed that only a most determined class struggle could lead to the radical transformation of the existing society. The most prominent representative of this current was Rosa Luxemburg (1870-1919), also a militant in the German Socialist party.

During the first eleven years of its existence (during which time it held five congresses), the Second International did not have anything comparable to the general council of the First International, i.e., a central organ which would try to synchronize the activities of national socialist parties. Only in 1900, at the Paris congress, was there established a permanent secretariat, called the International Socialist Bureau. However, in spite of the secretariat's existence, the Second International never became an effective political body able to make decisions binding to its national sections. The congresses of the International debated important problems of the day, but the militant resolutions of these congresses were not and could not be internationally implemented. The leading party of the Second International, the German Social Democratic party, by far the strongest and best organized, was not willing to submit itself to any sort of genuine international discipline and did not want to assume anything comparable to a true revolutionary leadership.

Two issues in particular were debated at the Second International's congresses. One was the problem of socialist "ministerialism," that is, socialist participation in a progressive bourgeois government. The issue raised profound controversy in socialist ranks, and a resolution on this subject, adopted by the Paris congress of the International, was ambiguous. It permitted such participation under specific circumstances, but stated that it could not be regarded as a normal way of beginning the conquest of political power. Even more heatedly debated was the problem of war. All

Marxist socialists, by doctrinal definition, were professing proletarian internationalism, and socialist deputies were opposing in their respective parliaments the foreign and military policies of their governments. All socialists were, or professed to be, opposed to military conflicts and wars, but they disagreed among themselves on the ways and means of how to oppose a general European war most effectively. A militant minority wanted the International to proclaim a general strike in case of war. The majority, headed by the German socialists, did not want to accept such a policy, considering it unfulfillable. As a compromise, the Stuttgart congress of the International (1907) voted a strongly worded antiwar resolution, which, instead of endorsing the idea of a general strike in case of war, adopted an amendment of the left wing of the International, which stated that in case of war the socialists should use the situation in order to "hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule."

In the final analysis, in spite of its official Marxist ideology and the fiery oratory at its congresses, the Second International was far from being able to decisively influence the political history of its time. Three elements in particular explain its limitations: the nationalist feelings permeating all social classes in every country; the political democratization and social diversification of the Western European (and American) society which contradicted Marxist formulas of simple class struggle between a handful of capitalists and a huge mass of exploited proletarians; and its own internal weaknesses which prevented it from acquiring ideological unity and a solid international organization able to combat effectively the existing political and social order.

For all these reasons, at the outbreak of World War I, the Second International collapsed in the fullest sense of the word. The masses of people, including members of socialist parties, were swayed by patriotic fever, and the overwhelming majority of socialist leaders resolutely supported their national governments. Symbolically, the president of the Second International, Emil Vandervelde, became a minister in the Belgian government.

The Second International was thus among the victims of

the general collapse of European order and stability, which, with some rather minor disturbances, had existed since the end of the Napoleonic wars. Out of the chaos of the war and the failure of the Second International came a fateful split in the international socialist movement. This was due, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik victory in Russia in 1917, to the particularly activist interpretation of Marxism by the Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

D. Lenin's Reorientation and Revision of Marxism

Lenin was one of the most important—if not *the* most important—political personalities of the twentieth century. Three of his essential contributions to the history of our time were the building of a political party of a new type; the engineering of the Bolshevik revolution in October, 1917; and the founding of the Third, or Communist, International. All this was done in the name of Marxism, though, in fact, in all these fields, Lenin partly followed the thought of Marx and Engels, partly innovated upon it, and largely went against the established grain of Western European Marxism.

In Lenin's case, we encounter the crux of the already discussed ambiguities of Marxism. The central one was the discrepancy of Engels' and Lenin's views with regard to the essential tool of the revolutionary process. In his last writing, a few months before his death in 1895, Engels left a sort of political testament in his new introduction to Marx's study *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*. In this introduction, Engels rejected the 1848 "rebellion in the old style" and said that "the time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscientious minorities at the head of unconscientious masses is past." In contrast, he stressed that the proletariat had at its disposal "a new weapon and one of the sharpest . . . universal suffrage." He described the German Social Democratic party as "the most numerous, most compact mass, the decisive 'shock force' of the international proletarian army," and prophesized that, by the end of the nineteenth century, German socialists "shall conquer the greater part of the middle strata of society, petty-

bourgeois and small peasants, and grow into the decisive power in the land before which all other powers will have to bow, whether they like it or not." It is irrelevant here that Engels was wrong in his prophecy; the important point is that he expected socialist victory through the democratic use of universal suffrage.

Seven years later, in 1902, Lenin wrote a booklet under the title, *What Is To Be Done?*, which contradicted Engels without polemizing against him. Lenin explained that the working class by its own effort would not strive to achieve the revolution but would develop only trade-union consciousness. He argued that the idea and spirit of the revolution should be brought to the workers from without, by the revolutionary intelligentsia of bourgeois origin which has mastered the theory of socialism and which has inaugurated a new type of political party led by professional revolutionaries. He took, thus, a position exactly opposite to that of Engels by advocating revolution-making by the "small conscientious minorities" over the "unconscientious masses."

At that time, Lenin was strongly criticized by other Marxists for his "elitist" ideas which implied the imposition of non-worker leadership to the workers' movement. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, in a 1904 pamphlet entitled *Leninism or Marxism*, criticized Lenin's views as "a mechanical carrying-over of the organizational principles of the Blanquist* movement of conspiratorial circles onto the social-democratic movement of the working masses." in the entire pre-1914 period, Lenin was practically isolated in the European socialist movement, although he was active in the Second International (together with Rosa Luxemburg, he was among the authors of the amendment on war at the Stuttgart congress of the International).

With the outbreak of World War I and the adoption of patriotic attitudes on the part of the overwhelming majority

*Auguste Blanqui (1805-1881) was a famous French revolutionary conspirator, founder of several secret communist groups, and believer in seizure of power by a sort of military coup perpetrated by these groups.

of socialist leaders, Lenin took a violently different, internationalist position. He started to publish numerous articles, later pamphlets and books, assailing the "betrayal" of the leaders of the Second International and advocating the creation of a new, genuinely revolutionary international. Two of his most prominent slogans at that time were: "The Second International is dead, long live the Third International" and "Transform the imperialist war into a civil war." Until the outbreak of the February, 1917, revolution in Russia, which overthrew the tsarist regime, Lenin's influence in socialist circles remained negligible although felt among radical socialists, who were tired and dissatisfied with the duration of the war.

As soon as Lenin reached Russia in April, 1917, his two essential political preoccupations were to prepare the Bolshevik party for the seizure of power, and to establish a new, genuinely revolutionary International. On the first count, he was not willing to allow the new Russian government the opportunity to organize and consolidate its democratic rule. Over the protest of some of his closest collaborators, who objected that the Bolsheviks did not have the right to stake the whole future of the Russian revolution on the card of an armed uprising, Lenin ordered in October, 1917, the party organization in Petrograd to stage a coup against the Kerensky government, an operation successfully accomplished by the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, headed by Leon Trotsky. Instead of waiting for the impersonal laws of history—according to the deterministic Marxist tenets—to do the revolutionary job, Lenin's voluntarism proved to be of crucial importance. In the apt words of a historian, Russia was not ripe for socialism, but she was ripe for a seizure of power by a Leninist party.

With the success of the Bolshevik coup d'état, Lenin's situation changed fundamentally. From a powerless oppositional politician, he became the master of the huge Russian state. His methods of government, however—the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January, 1918, the suppression of the freedom of the press, and the persecution of all political opponents particularly the non-

Bolshevik Marxists—provoked strong criticism in Western socialist circles. Rosa Luxemburg, though sympathetic to some aspects of the Bolshevik revolution, asserted in a pamphlet written in 1918 that Lenin was “completely mistaken in the means he employs,” and claimed that the Bolshevik rule was “not the dictatorship of the proletariat, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians.” The Bolshevik coup was assailed as non-Marxist by many Western Marxists, above all Karl Kautsky, but these attacks only confirmed Lenin in his willingness to settle accounts definitively with Western socialists of non-Bolshevik persuasion.

E. Lenin's Molding of the Third International

During 1918, while coping with manifold problems of the new communist rule in Russia, Lenin never neglected to encourage in every possible way the revolutionary activities in other European countries. His attention was particularly directed to Germany, where, in November, 1918, a republic was proclaimed and a potentially revolutionary situation came into existence. Lenin counted especially on radical outbursts in Germany, believing that communist victory in that centrally located European country could play a decisive role in the worldwide communist triumph. It should be noted that in Germany, as elsewhere, the formerly left, radical wing of the Socialist party was now establishing a new political organization, adopting the name of the Communist party, and looking to Lenin and Communist Russia for inspiration and leadership.

Early in 1919, Lenin decided to take decisive steps in organizing the new revolutionary international. He was prompted to do so because in February of that year several socialist parties of central and western Europe had convened a meeting in Berne, Switzerland, with the aim of reconstituting the Second International. Early in March, as a countermeasure, Lenin organized an international conference in Moscow, which decided to establish the Third or Communist International (best known by its abbreviation, Comintern).

It is significant that the founding congress of the Comintern was extremely unrepresentative, judging by its international participation. The congress was attended by fifty-two persons said to represent various international communist and left-wing socialist organizations. Thirty-five delegates had deliberative voting rights and represented nineteen groups; seventeen delegates had consultative votes and were said to represent sixteen groups. The Russian Bolsheviks were in full command, while the overwhelming majority of non-Russians who attended the meeting were actually either former prisoners of war who lived in Russia or individuals who happened to live there at that time. The only genuine and strong foreign communist party whose representative attended the meeting was the German Communist party. However, its delegate, Hugo Eberlein, had a mandate of his party not to accept an immediate creation of a new international because the German communists believed such action to be premature (this was particularly the opinion of Rosa Luxemburg who was assassinated in Berlin in January, 1919). Lenin did not want to follow German suggestions and decided to go forth with his cherished idea of establishing a new international revolutionary organization in total opposition, ideologically and organizationally, to the Second International.

From its inception and through the first three years of its existence (1919-1922), the Comintern was directed by Lenin according to his ideas and concepts of a revolutionary party organization. The most appropriate way to illustrate the Leninist molding of the new International is by analyzing briefly the salient features of the first four Comintern congresses.

The First Comintern Congress (March 2-6, 1919) did not achieve much beyond its historic decision to establish the new revolutionary international. Its manifesto, written by Trotsky, indicated by its militant tone what were the chief aims of the new body: "Our task," said the manifesto, "is to generalize the revolutionary experience of the working class, to cleanse the movement of the disintegrating admixtures of opportunism and social-patriotism, to mobilize the forces of

all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thereby facilitate and hasten the victory of the communist revolution throughout the world." It should be noted that the manifesto expected the revolutionary wave to first engulf the western European countries so that "the emancipation of the colonies is possible only in conjunction with the emancipation of the metropolitan working class." As a sharp counter-distinction from the practices of the Second International, the Comintern was conceived as a strictly centralized international party organization whose headquarters, composed of representatives of different communist parties, should serve as a general staff of the world revolution.

From March, 1919, to the middle of 1920, Lenin and his followers in the Comintern were profoundly convinced that the revolutionary wave would continue to spread westward of Russia and that the Bolsheviks would not remain as isolated power holders. In May, 1919, the first president of the Comintern, Grigorii Zinoviev, wrote that "Europe is hurrying toward the proletarian revolution at breakneck speed." While historical events proved this to be wishful thinking, Comintern ranks began to swell by new adhesions, chiefly through the split of left wings from socialist parties and the establishment of new communist parties. At the same time, the Comintern was attracting other radical elements, especially anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, who viewed in Lenin's victory a revenge over the Second International, which did not tolerate them in its ranks. Many of the newcomers were poorly acquainted with Lenin and his ideas and threatened the cohesion of the Comintern by their disparate views.

In order to clarify the situation, Lenin wrote in April, 1920, one of his best-known and most significant booklets, "*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*." It was directed against those leftist foreign communists, who in their revolutionary zeal, were rejecting any cooperation with the non-communists and any compromise in political confrontations. Thus, the central theme of the booklet was to teach the inexperienced communist militants to "master all

means of warfare," rejecting both right-wing "opportunism" and left-wing "sectarianism." In a typical sentence, Lenin required "absolute centralization and the strictest discipline" within each communist party and also within the Comintern, and maintained that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is a persistent struggle, bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society." He advised the foreign communists to work within bourgeois parliaments and reactionary trade unions in order to foster the communist cause by influencing public opinion and the working masses. Admonishing communist militants to be tactically flexible while never forgetting their final revolutionary aim, he wrote: "Strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with an ability to make all necessary practical compromises, to maneuver, conclude agreements, zigzag, retreat, etc., so as to hasten the day of seizing power." Zinoviev called Lenin's pamphlet "a Bible for the entire working class," and a historian of the Comintern stated that it could be compared "for force of argumentation, realism, directness, and convincing power with Machiavelli's *The Prince*." It is understandable, then, that this writing of Lenin is being used even today as the most effective training manual for communist cadres everywhere.

Lenin's "Bible" was prepared in view of the Second Comintern Congress which convened in Moscow (July 23—March 7, 1920) in the presence of 217 delegates from forty-one countries. While the First Comintern Congress was essentially a manifestation, the Second Congress established the real basis of a communist international organization. It adopted the famous twenty-one conditions of admission to the Comintern, largely drafted by Lenin. The conditions were very harsh and required that all the new communist parties sever all ties with the socialists. Besides legal organizations, the communists were asked to create parallel illegal organizations; they had to undertake periodic cleansing (purging) of their membership; they had to give "unconditional support to any Soviet republic in its struggle against any counter-revolutionary forces"; and they had to recognize that "all the

decisions of the congresses of the Communist International, as well as the decisions of its executive committee, were binding on all parties belonging to the Communist International." The congress also adopted the statutes (by-laws) of the Comintern which followed closely the statutes of the Russian Communist party. It elected the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), with its seat in Moscow. As the British historian E. H. Carr put it, "the historical role of the Second Congress, as distinct from its ostensible and even from its conscious purpose, was to establish Russian leadership of Comintern on an impregnable basis."

The Second Congress took place at a time when it still appeared that the international situation was promising to the communist cause; the Red Army was sweeping westward into Poland, and the situation in many European countries seemed favorable for the Revolution. Soon afterward, however, the ebb of the revolutionary tide began in many places (Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia). In Russia itself, the Bolsheviks were faced with an intense opposition within their own ranks which came to a climax with the uprising of the "red sailors" in Kronstadt in March, 1921. At the same time, a revolutionary attempt in Germany, "the March action," directed by a high Comintern emissary, failed completely. It led to the expulsion of the president of the German Communist party, Paul Levi, who criticized the Comintern's instructions as inept. In view of all this, Lenin realized that it was time for a strategic retreat, which found expression at the Third Comintern Congress held from June 22 to July 12, 1921, in Moscow. In their reports to the congress, Lenin (speaking about Soviet Russia) and Trotsky (about the world situation) both admitted that the bourgeoisie had regained self-assurance and that the proletariat was compelled to essentially defensive struggle. In contrast to the preceding congress, the emphasis this time was put on the necessity to "win predominant influence over the majority of the working classes" in all the countries, while all of the Comintern's national sections would be amalgamated "into a single international party of common

proletarian propaganda and action." The same congress adopted fifty-nine theses on the structure of communist parties and on the methods and content of their work, which enhanced even more the Bolshevik predominance over the Comintern.

The role of the Second Comintern Congress, in Lenin's mind, was to help establish independent, disciplined and militant revolutionary communist parties; the role of the Third Congress was to make them tactically flexible under the changed international conditions, when the first wave of revolutions was ebbing. This first Comintern tactical re-orientation was accomplished concomitantly with Soviet domestic and foreign political adjustments to new realities. In internal affairs, at the very moment when the Red Army crushed the Kronstadt rebellion, Lenin launched the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) which represented a partial re-introduction of capitalism in order to solve the most pressing economic problems without relinquishing the Bolsheviks' total political control over the country. In December, 1921, following Lenin's decisive initiative, the ECCI adopted the slogan of the "United Front" for all workers' parties and organizations in the fight against capitalism. It was both a step forward and a concretization of the main slogan of the Third Comintern Congress, "To the Masses," and consisted in inviting the non-communist socialists and trade unionists to join the communists in establishing a common anti-capitalist front. Early in April, 1922, a summit meeting of communist and socialist leaders took place in Berlin but failed to establish the cooperation of leftist forces. The essential reason for the failure was that the communists openly proclaimed in their publications that the United Front was only a temporary political maneuver aimed to separate socialist leaders from the rank and file of socialist and trade union masses which then would come under communist influence and control. Lenin, in a directive which became known only in 1965, explained that the aim of the United Front was to overthrow the socialist leaders and that the United Front device was to be used by the communists while fighting for power but not after seizing it.

Early in 1922 the communist regime in Soviet Russia re-entered the international diplomatic arena when its representatives attended the economic conference at Genoa (April 10—May 19). Lenin directed the behavior of the Soviet delegation at Genoa in every detail, and his secret instructions to that delegation (made public for the first time in the mid 1960s) insisted on a two-pronged approach: on the economic level, the Soviet negotiators should try to obtain the best conditions for intensified trade with capitalist countries (on many occasions Lenin had insisted that trade with Western countries was “absolutely essential” to the Soviet Union); and, on the political level, the aim of the Soviet diplomats was “to isolate America and divide the powers.” Although the Genoa negotiations did not produce the desired economic results, Soviet diplomacy stunned the world by unexpectedly signing a separate treaty with Germany in Rapallo, Italy, on April 16, inaugurating in that way diplomatic shifts which, on many occasions in the future, would characterize Soviet foreign policy (for example, the Soviet-Nazi pact of August 23, 1939). In sum, Lenin left for both the Russian communist state and the Comintern a legacy of Machiavellian maneuverings in different fields. In dealing with the Western world, particularly the United States, the Soviet rulers would try to obtain commercial and technological advantages necessary to build up Soviet economy; Soviet diplomats, on the contrary, would probe the weakest political links to “divide” Western powers. As for the Comintern, its sections would put to use all means and tactics, according to circumstances, from violent revolutionary attempts to the United Front ventures. (The United Front tactics will be refined, as we shall see, at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935.)

The Fourth Comintern Congress (November 5—December 5, 1922), the last congress that Lenin attended and addressed, endorsed definitively the tactics of the United Front. Its most characteristic feature, however, was a highly pessimistic speech delivered by Lenin. He complained that the resolution on the organizational structure of the communist parties adopted at the Third Comintern Congress was

"almost thoroughly Russian," blocking the way to further Comintern success. He asserted that "we have not understood how to present our Russian experience to foreigners," but he himself did not offer any remedy; he stated simply that "the most important thing in the ensuing period is study." It is thus of great importance to realize that, at the end of his life, Lenin was deeply worried by many aspects of both the Russian communist regime and the Communist International. He recommended in his testament that Stalin be removed from his post as secretary general of the Bolshevik party and intimated clearly in his last writings that he viewed with apprehension the growing role of communist bureaucracy as well as the inequality of ethnic relations within the Soviet state. The irony of the situation was that, while he established the Comintern in 1919 with utmost lucidity and energy, he died in January, 1924, with a clear indication that he himself was at a loss as to how to transform the Comintern into a genuinely international revolutionary organization.

Moreover, despite his early conviction and expectations that the world revolution would move from Russia westward, he came progressively to change that perspective and concluded in his last article written on March 2, 1923, that "the final issue of the struggle depends in the last analysis on the simple fact that Russia, India, China, etc. constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe." By quoting these three industrially underdeveloped countries as guarantors of socialist victory, he decidedly rejected the deterministic aspect of Marxism, but he correctly prophesized (at least as far as China was concerned) that a Leninist party of professional revolutionaries, using all political weapons that he left as a legacy, could lead peasant masses to communist victory, irrespective of what "scientific" Marxism would or could say.

F. Stalin as Lenin's Heir and Chief of the Comintern

If Lenin was the founding father of the Comintern and directed with a firm hand the earliest phases of its activities,

his physical incapacitation and death had two important consequences: the sharpening of the struggle for power within the Russian Communist party and at least a temporary disarray in the international communist movement. The domestic struggle for Lenin's succession had its ramifications in many of the Comintern sections, and, in a number of communist parties (French, Norwegian, Polish, English, American, Italian), factional battles erupted. The Fifth Comintern Congress, which met in Moscow between June 17 and July 8, 1924 (the first Comintern Congress without Lenin), dealt with the troubled situation. The official report of the ECCI deplored "a crisis of the entire Comintern as the result of feelings of panic which could be discerned here and there among the most uncertain elements." To cope with the so-called "right and left political deviations" within the various Comintern sections, the Fifth Congress decided to purge "the survivals of traditional social-democratic ideas in the communist parties" and to overcome them by "the Bolshevization of the communist parties."

As a corollary of the "Bolshevization," a series of other organizational measures were taken, aiming at further strengthening of the ECCI's supervisory powers over the national Comintern sections. The Fifth Congress, however, did not bring satisfactory solutions, and the post-Lenin crisis of leadership within the Russian Communist party continued to trouble many of the Comintern sections. Moreover, in 1926 and 1927, the Comintern suffered supplementary failures in Great Britain and China. Contrary to the Comintern's expectations, the British domestic difficulties in 1926 did not usher in radical upheavals. A year later, erroneous directives sent to the Chinese communists contributed to their crushing, although temporary, defeat by Chiang Kai-shek's forces.

The interregnum period of the Comintern came to its end with Stalin's emergence in 1928-1929 as the undisputed master of the Russian Communist party and the Soviet state. He was then free to end the period of confusion in Comintern's history and to mold it according to his own ideas and will.

The central concept of Stalin's rule over Russia, with its deep repercussions for world communism, was contained in the notion of building "socialism in one country." For several years after Lenin's death, his successors and contenders for supreme power debated the most appropriate domestic and international policies which the Russian Communist party should pursue. Stalin, secretary-general of the Party since 1922, seemed at first undetermined in his own views, apparently standing on quasineutral grounds among the warring Party factions. After succeeding in an extraordinarily skillful way to eliminate one rival faction and personality after another, Stalin decided to adopt what could be termed an extremely leftist domestic policy through the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1933), total agricultural collectivization of the country and its most radical industrialization. Appealing particularly to the young cadres of the Communist party to drastically reshape Russian society in the shortest period of time, Stalin was trying to utilize the country's national energies on the greatest scale. His endeavor thus was of greatest importance, not only for communism in Russia but for the subsequent behavior of other communist regimes (particularly those of China and Cuba); instead of counterposing internationalism and nationalism as abstract Marxist ideology would command, Stalin was trying to harness national energies and put them into the service of the Communist party. This attitude, as will be seen, was strongly criticized by many of his opponents (Trotsky, in particular), but it represented one of the essential features of Stalinism and perhaps a chief explanation of its survival. When, in June, 1941, Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin's defense appeals were essentially based on Russian patriotic feelings and not on Marxist ideological allegiance.

The adoption of the "socialism in one country" concept did not mean that Stalin abandoned every interest in the international Communist movement. The rationale for his attitude was that, since the foreign communist parties were not able to seize power in their own countries, it was the task of Russian communists, the only successful wielders of power, to strengthen at the utmost the "citadel of com-

munism" the Soviet Union while pursuing an effective foreign policy directed toward weakening the capitalist, "imperialist" states. In fact, Stalin imposed total discipline on the Comintern in a fashion similar to his handling of Soviet domestic affairs. Thus, the Sixth Comintern Congress, which took place from July 17 to September 1, 1928, mirrored the radical "leftist" policies which Stalin was introducing in the Soviet Union. The chief slogan of the congress was "class against class," which discarded the earlier United Front tactics and enjoined all the Comintern sections to wage the most intransigent struggle against all communist enemies, with particular emphasis on social democracy. Besides the lengthy seventy-six theses on "the fight against imperialist war and the tasks of the communists," the congress adopted a detailed program, the first explicit program of the Communist International. Stating that the Comintern is "the only international force that has as its program the dictatorship of the proletariat and of communism, and that it comes out openly as the organizer of the international proletarian revolution," the program presented a dramatic picture of "the revolutionary crisis . . . coming inexorably to a head in the very centers of imperialism," resulting in the establishment of a "world communist system."

The program anticipated that a consequence of the contradictions within the world's economy and of the accentuation of the general capitalist crisis would be "the armed attack of imperialism on the Soviet Union," which would "lead with iron necessity to a tremendous revolutionary explosion. This explosion [would] bury capitalism under its ruins in a number of so-called civilized countries; in the colonies it [would] unleash the victorious revolution . . ." In this connection, the Soviet Union was hailed as "the base of the international movement of the oppressed classes, the center of the international revolution, the most significant factor in world history." Consequently, the duties of the international proletariat were "to defend the country of proletarian dictatorship by every means against the attacks of the capitalist powers." Among other significant features of the program, two merit particular attention. One was the

insistence on "systematic help to the revolutionary liberation movement of the colonies" as one of the most important strategic tasks of the Comintern; the second was long and extraordinarily harsh attacks on "socialist reformism, the chief enemy of revolutionary communism," assailing even the left-wing socialists ("Austro-Marxists") as "a particularly dangerous enemy of the proletariat, more dangerous than the avowed adherents of the predatory social imperialism."

The violent language of the Sixth Congress might have helped in producing the type of fanatical communist militant which Stalin wanted to build. In a broader sense, however, the tactic of "class against class" did not bring political dividends. By isolating themselves, the communist parties in many countries lost their mass appeal. More specifically, because of the Comintern's general line, the Communist party of Germany fought German Social Democrats as its main enemy and, in doing this, facilitated the victory of Hitler's National Socialist movement.

The Nazi regime in Germany and the threat which it represented for the Soviet Union contributed essentially to a full tactical switch in the Comintern line, accomplished at its Seventh Congress which convened in Moscow from July 25 to August 20, 1935. Instead of the sectarian "class against class" approach, the 1935 congress reverted to the earlier United Front line and launched the slogan of an "anti-fascist popular front," appealing not only to the socialists but to all anti-fascist political forces in all countries. In his famous report to the congress, Georgi Dimitrov, secretary-general of the Comintern, strongly criticized past mistakes and the danger of communist isolation. In fact, his themes represented a series of variations on Lenin's "*Left-Wing*" *Communism* . . . Dimitrov explained in detail how the communists should work and maneuver to attract non-communist partners. The final resolution of the congress stated that "the establishment of the united front of the working class is the decisive link in the preparation of the toilers for the forthcoming great battles of the second round of proletarian revolutions."

The refurbished tactic of the "popular front" was successful only in France and Spain, but it contributed signally in breaking the communist isolation which existed as a consequence of the Sixth Comintern Congress. Together with the sweeping changes of Comintern's main line, another fundamental, and certainly the strangest, aspect of Stalin's handling of world communism was the duality of what happened to foreign communist parties in their own countries and what befell the persecuted foreign communist leaders who escaped to the Soviet Union as political refugees. In the period between 1929 and the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, the former were politically trained and conditioned in the spirit of total obedience to the political directives coming from Moscow and to the cult of Stalin's personality. A former Yugoslav communist leader, Milovan Djilas, describing his Stalinist enraptures in the 1930s, wrote that for him and his comrades Stalin was "infallible and sinless." On the other hand, the great mid-1930 purges which were sweeping away practically the entire team of old Bolsheviks, Lenin's comrades-in-arms, also engulfed countless foreign communists living in the Soviet Union. It is a paradoxical historical fact that Stalin's police exterminated more foreign communist leaders than the police in all countries where the communists were persecuted, including Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

The conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact in August, 1939, represented another sharp turn in the Comintern line by the temporary abandonment of the "popular front's" anti-fascism. As a corollary, many non-Russian communists broke away from the party, but the overall discipline of the Stalinist-molded world organization was not disrupted. The true believers retained their faith in communism and the Soviet Union and considered the pact a necessary Machiavellian move on Stalin's part. With Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941, the former Comintern's "anti-fascism" once again became the slogan of the day. Stalin's realization of the necessity to keep the alliance with Western powers

in tact in the fight against Nazi Germany led him to dissolve the Comintern in May, 1943. In the official act of dissolution it was said that the working-class movement had outgrown its task and that, in the end, "the Comintern became in fact an obstacle in the path of further consolidation of the working-class parties." While the formal end of the Comintern was hailed in many circles in the West as proof of Stalin's willingness to achieve more confident relations with his Western allies, it was in reality only a skillful and diplomatic gesture aimed to impress Western public opinion. Actually, with or without the Comintern, those foreign communists who had formally espoused the Stalinist cause continued to behave without that supreme communist body as they did before. The prestige of Stalin's Russia, particularly after World War II, was such that, with few exceptions, the world communist movement gave the impression of being a monolithic bloc. That impression lasted, with minor exceptions, until Stalin's death in 1953.

G. Leon Trotsky's Challenge to Stalin

The most prominent among Stalin's internal political rivals and opponents was Leon Trotsky (1879-1940). He became a Marxist revolutionary around the turn of the century but only joined the Bolshevik party in August, 1917. Still, after Lenin, he was the chief builder of communist power in Russia, first as the organizer of the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in October, 1917, and later as the creator and head of the Red Army. As early as 1923, during Lenin's illness, Trotsky became Stalin's political rival. In his testament, Lenin called Trotsky "the most able man in the present central committee." By his position as the commissar of war between 1918-1925, Trotsky played an outstanding role and enjoyed great popularity within the Bolshevik party. Moreover, he was very active in the early Comintern affairs and was the author of many manifestoes the communist world organization was issuing. In spite of all this and his great intellectual superiority over Stalin, he very ineptly countered Stalin's methods of intra-party fighting. In 1925,

he was maneuvered to resign as the commissar of war; at the end of 1927, he was expelled from the Bolshevik party and then exiled from Moscow; in 1929, he was deported. From the various countries in which he lived as a political refugee, he continued his political struggle against Stalin and his rule. Finally, in August, 1940, a Stalinist agent pretending to be Trotsky's follower assassinated him in Mexico.

Trotsky's main criticism of Stalin was directed against his practice of "socialism in one country." In 1928, already in exile near the Chinese frontier, Trotsky wrote a full-fledged criticism of Stalin's views, later published as the *Third International After Lenin*. He attacked Stalin's views from a position of pure Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. He argued that "the national orientation of the proletariat must and can flow only from a world orientation and not *vice versa*," and contended that the Soviet Union could not develop socialism independently from the conditions and tendencies of world economy and of the world political system. Opposing Stalin's allegedly "national-reformist" viewpoints to his own "revolutionary-internationalist" ideas, Trotsky asserted that without the aid of the international revolution the communist regime could not hold out and that, consequently, it was "most necessary to spread the revolution to neighboring countries and to support insurrections there, arms in hand . . ."

Continuing his anti-Stalinist struggle from abroad, Trotsky established in September, 1938, the so-called Fourth International, of which he became the leader as long as he lived and a subject of political veneration by his followers after his death. A few months before he died, in a "Letter to the workers of the U.S.S.R.," Trotsky wrote that "the goal of the Fourth International is to extend the October revolution to the whole world and at the same time to regenerate the U.S.S.R. by purging it of the parasitic bureaucracy."

The Fourth International never became an organization of real political significance. However, because of its "Leninist" revolutionary attitude toward capitalism and its criticism of the "bureaucratic" regime in the Soviet Union (and later in China), it continued to exercise influence among

some segments of radical intellectuals and students around the world. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Trotskyite organizations, while quarreling among themselves on ideological and organizational problems, attracted the interest and allegiance of many students, particularly in France, and contributed to the renewal of radical political agitation in many Western countries.

II. Communist Conquest of East-Central Europe

With the end of World War II, the situation of world communism changed fundamentally. Instead of the Soviet Union being the only communist-ruled country, the Soviet Red Army in its westward push had been able to accomplish something that it failed to do in 1920, namely, to create by its presence in East-Central Europe the precondition for the build-up of new communist regimes in several countries. This process was not abrupt but unfolded in several sequences.

Before the war, the communist parties in East-Central Europe, with some exceptions (such as Czechoslovakia), were basically small, persecuted, and largely ineffective political groups which survived essentially because the leaders and cadres were fanatically devoted Stalinists and the Soviet Union exercised attraction and influence in some circles even beyond the communists themselves. It was necessary that the material and spiritual devastations of the war transform the entire political picture of the region, thus giving to the communist minorities a possibility to assert themselves in a decisive way. For this to happen, the following seven elements were necessary:

- (1) The ideological element incarnated in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist vision of the historical necessity of communist worldwide victory.
- (2) The existence of an operational tool, that is, of a "Bolshevized" communist party, in each country.
- (3) The application by the communist parties of a series of tactical devices, conceived and experienced to a certain extent during the Comintern period: the application of

“united” and “popular” fronts with non-communists and the political readiness to change tactical behavior abruptly vis-à-vis allies and foes alike.

- (4) The realities of the international situation with its two-pronged determinants: the presence of the Soviet Red Army and the Western resignation not to intervene in any resolute way in the postwar political orientation and development of East-Central Europe. The Declaration on Liberated Europe, part of the Yalta communiqué signed on February 11, 1945, by the highest representatives of the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain, solemnly proclaimed “the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live” and pledged the “establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people,” but it remained a dead letter because the Soviet government was not willing to comply with the declaration and the Western powers were unwilling to do anything to enforce it.
- (5) Specific internal conditions in each country with a common denominator of the already mentioned material and moral devastations of the war as well as divided political forces of non-communists.
- (6) Techniques of political maneuvering and pressure by the communists: democratic promises, popular reforms, threats of coercion, political eliminations, propaganda — all these variegated methods of political struggle used even before the open onslaught for total communist power.
- (7) Proceeding by stages. With some variations in specific cases, the communist seizure of power in East-Central Europe took place in two to three years. During this period the postwar regimes underwent changes from a sort of “neither Soviet nor bourgeois regime” in which several parties participated, to the full-fledged “dictatorship of the proletariat,” i.e., complete communist domination.

Taking these seven elements into account, one may distinguish three different ways in which the new communist

regimes were established. One was a simple incorporation of the prewar independent countries into the U.S.S.R., as was the case of the three Baltic republics, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Another was the violent seizure of power almost immediately after the end of the war, as with Yugoslavia and Albania, which allowed only a very short period of political tolerance of non-communists. And the third was a gradual seizure of power in other countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. This third approach merits some supplementary remarks.

Communist gradualism can again be explained by taking into consideration the following five elements: (1) Stalin's caution and unwillingness to alienate abruptly and completely his Western war allies; (2) awareness that the communists in each country were a strictly minoritarian element and that it was necessary to increase step by step their influence before final assault; (3) process of "anti-fascist" purges, encompassing not only the real collaborators with the Nazis during the war, but also using the stigma of collaboration as a tool to liquidate political enemies; (4) necessities of postwar physical reconstruction of various countries and introduction of piecemeal reforms enjoying popular support; and (5) expectation of genuine popular support through electoral processes.

This last aspect certainly played an important role in the Soviet and domestic communists' decision to abandon cooperation with non-communist parties and to seize complete power. Thus, for example, at the elections in Hungary on November 4, 1945, the Smallholders' party (agrarians) obtained 57 per cent of the votes; Social Democrats 17.4 per cent, and the Communists 17 per cent. In Austria, partially occupied by the Red Army, in the elections of November 25, 1946, the Popular (Catholic) party obtained 1,600,000 votes and eighty-five seats; Social Democrats 1,430,000 votes and seventy-six seats, and the Communist party 174,000 votes and four seats. Likewise, in Berlin early in 1946, 82 per cent of the Social Democrats voted against the proposed fusion between the Socialists and Communists. Even after the imposed fusion of these two parties in East Germany, the

elections of April, 1946, gave to the new communist-dominated Socialist Unity party 47 percent of the votes and to the two other tolerated parties (Liberals and Christian Democrats) 49.1 per cent.

These electoral returns, mirroring popular dispositions, also indicate another aspect of communist gradual seizure of power. In the first phase, there existed genuine coalition governments of several parties in which the communists insisted on having the levers of power in their hands: police, army general staff, and the publicity machinery. This phase was followed by what Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading British expert on East-European affairs, called the "bogus coalitions," in which the communists eliminated their toughest political opponents while still tolerating genuine non-communists as political partners. This phase then was replaced by a full-fledged, monolithic communist regime in which the power was exclusively in communist hands with non-communists allowed to occupy public functions under the condition that they obey communist orders. This latest phase was completed, again with some individual variations, in all the countries by the end of 1947, and it culminated with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948.

To complete this picture of transformation of a "plebian kind of bourgeois democracy," into a "people's democracy," one should consider:

- (1) The support which the domestic communists received from the Soviet military administration in the occupied country (particularly Germany), or the decisive intervention of high Soviet personalities in various countries (such as Andrei Vishinsky in Rumania or Valerian Zorin in Czechoslovakia).
- (2) The systematic communist efforts to take into their hands or to influence decisively the "commanding heights" (a term stemming from Lenin's own teaching) in both political-administrative (police-army-justice) and economic lives (mines, power, communications, and heavy industry).

- (3) The creation of "national fronts" encompassing non-communists but with political decisions in communist hands, as well as capture of leadership in mass organizations (trade unions, youth, women, and a cluster of other corporative or political organizations).
- (4) The so-called "tactics of salami," as graphically formulated by the Hungarian Communist leader, Matias Rakosi. It consisted of "slicing" the various non-communist political forces one after the other, splitting the toughest enemy, the agrarians, by politically eliminating their "right" wing and absorbing or paralyzing their "left" wing, and imposing fusion on the Social Democrats, excluding from any political activities those who opposed the fusion. At the end of this process, full-fledged communist control, in the Stalinist sense, was established. It was then tightened by the establishment of a new international supervisory body.

I. The Episode of the Cominform

A little over four years after the dissolution of the Comintern, another international communist organization was founded in September, 1947, at a closed meeting held in Poland. Every step in planning the new organization was personally supervised over the telephone by Stalin in Moscow. The name of the new body was the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, known more commonly as the Cominform. Despite Stalin's paternity, basic differences existed between the Comintern and the Cominform. First of all, when the Cominform was established, the communist parties in East-Central Europe had already been in the process of securing their monopoly of political power, a basic difference from the situation of the Comintern times when the communists reigned only in Russia. Second, contrary to the Comintern's quasi-universality, the Cominform had very restricted membership. It consisted of only nine communist parties, seven in power (Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia) and the two strongest parties in

Western Europe (France and Italy). For reasons still unknown, the communist parties of Albania and East Germany were excluded, though they exercised power in these two countries; likewise, the powerful Chinese Communist party, already on the road to power, was not invited to become a member of the new organization. Again, contrary to the situation in the Comintern, which, at least on paper, had broad political tasks and competence, the Cominform was charged only with "organizing the exchange of information and, where necessary, the coordination of the activities of the communist parties on the basis of mutual consent." The Cominform Bureau was to be composed of representatives of central committees of member parties; it edited a newspaper, and its first location was in Belgrade. Finally, another distinction between the Comintern and the Cominform was that many of the most prominent Comintern members, still alive and many in power, were not invited to take part in the establishment of the Cominform or in its activities.

The Cominform never acquired real importance. It can be said that it was established by Stalin in order to allow a greater degree of Soviet control over the communist parties of East-Central Europe. It played a role in Stalin's conflict with Tito (as will be seen later), but besides that and the publication of its newspaper, the Cominform's existence was uneventful. It survived formally until Stalin's death in 1953, but on September 17, 1956, after the reconciliation between Tito and Stalin's successors, the Cominform officially suspended its activities. In the document of its dissolution, it was said that, under the new conditions of the communist and workers' parties, "neither the composition of the Information Bureau nor the tenor of its activities corresponded any longer to these new conditions."

With the dissolution of the Cominform, the international communist movement entered into a new phase. From that time up to the present, there were no attempts in Moscow to recreate a formal, international communist directing body. Under the changed conditions of the post-Stalin era, communist interrelationships had to change also. The Communist party of the Soviet Union continued to be the strongest

communist party, though its world leadership jeopardized by the Chinese party. This new situation will be examined later, but it is important to stress that Lenin's and Stalin's party exercised an unrivaled world communist leadership as long as these two men lived. The Comintern and Cominform were simply reflections or tools of Russian communist pre-eminence.

J. The Stalin-Tito Conflict

After the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, it appeared that communist dominance over East-Central Europe in its Stalinist form was definitive and irreversible. Only a few months later, however, on June 28, 1948, the world was startled to learn that Stalin, through a Cominform declaration, was excommunicating the communist leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz-Tito, universally considered as the most "Stalinist" of all the communists in power. It is important and instructive to analyze briefly how and why this first breach in communist monolithism occurred.

The case of Yugoslav communism is one of the most extraordinary in contemporary history. In 1936-37, the Yugoslav section of the Comintern, outlawed at home, was considered in Moscow as one of the most unreliable and unpromising. Five out of six former secretaries of the Yugoslav party, which was on the verge of being officially dissolved, perished during the purges in the Soviet Union. Then, in the fall of 1937, the Comintern appointed as the new secretary-general of the Yugoslav party Josip Broz-Tito, the only Yugoslav communist leader whom it considered trustworthy. His task was to try to revamp the moribund party and to "bolshevize" it. Tito succeeded, indeed, in building a new, tightly-knit illegal party in Yugoslavia, whose devotion to the Soviet Union and Stalin, as seen in Milovan Djilas' previously quoted testimony, was boundless. In fact, this negligible political force of the middle 1930s was the only Comintern section which, after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June, 1941, was ready and willing to launch

a partisan warfare against the German occupiers of Yugoslavia in order to alleviate the burden of the assailed Soviet Union and to prepare the ground for its own post-war seizure of power.

The war history of Yugoslavia was exceptionally complex. One of its most distinctive features was the civil war under the occupation between the pro-Soviet partisans under Tito and the pro-Western "Četniks" under General Draža Mihailović, who was the first to organize the resistance movement shortly after Yugoslavia's dismemberment by the Axis forces in April, 1941. The two resistance forces at first collaborated in the struggle against the Germans, but by the end of 1941 they engaged in mutual all-out hostilities while continuing to fight the occupiers in their own ways. Mihailović was appointed Minister of War by the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, in January, 1942. In view of the terrible German reprisals against the civilian population, and the lack of military means to sustain frontal battles, Mihailović continued to organize his underground movement. While the stronghold of the Mihailović resistance was Serbia (centrally located in the Balkans, and of major importance to the Germans) and his fighters and sympathizers were essentially Serbs in the different parts of the country, the composition of Tito's partisans was ethnically more variegated. During the largest part of the war his main forces operated in the western, peripheral, mountainous regions of Yugoslavia. There, in western Bosnia, in 1943, Tito created a provisional government, putting into practice the Comintern device of a united front. However, his merging the anti-fascist, "national-liberation" stage with the "revolutionary" stage of the struggle during the war displeased Stalin. For tactical reasons he did not want the two stages to combine but to follow each other, the second belonging to post-war developments. He feared in particular that Tito's radical behavior and waging of the civil war against a rival led by a member of a government stationed in London could complicate Soviet relations with Western allies. He consequently advised Tito, by way of Comintern telegrams, to be tactically more cautious. Western allies, however, especially the British,

with representatives in both Yugoslav resistance camps, decided after the capitulation of Italy in the fall of 1943 to support militarily and diplomatically only the partisan side. They invoked military reasons and the greater anti-Axis militancy of the partisans to justify the switch and the abandonment of Mihailović. The Teheran conference (November, 1943), by putting the stamp of approval in favor of Tito, reassured Stalin that Western allies disregarded the political coloration of Tito's partisans and their post-war aims. The final act in Yugoslavia's war drama was the entrance of the Soviet Red Army into Serbia in September, 1944, while the Western allies refrained from landing on the Adriatic coast. Soviet military presence and Western absence decided the outcome of the civil war and final communist victory. The paradox of the situation was that both the democratic West, indifferent to Yugoslavia's post-war destiny, and Stalin's Russia, pleased with Western indifference and forgetful of Tito's earlier "sectarianism," helped the Yugoslav Communist party in decisive ways to climb, in record time, from pre-war impotence to a post-war monopoly of power.

Stronger than any other East-Central European communist party in 1945, the Yugoslav party preceded them all in speedily establishing an exclusive communist regime, despite its "democratic" war promises. In practically everything, it copied the Soviet constitutional and economic blueprint, while Tito, in words and deeds, proudly appeared before the world as the most militant non-Russian communist. Having been vindicated in pursuing a radical stance in his overall policies during the war, despite Stalin's cautioning, Tito intended to carry them on in post-war circumstances, too. But his very revolutionary zeal and his inclination to promote a foreign policy of his own, conceived independently from Stalin's orders and intentions, met with Stalin's, this time irreversible, disapproval. At a time when Stalin did not want to provoke the West, Tito nearly came to blows with the Western allies over Trieste, while giving full support to communist-led insurgency in Greece and shooting down American airplanes flying over Yugoslav territory. Tito also

planned with his old friend from the Comintern days and now ruler of Bulgaria, Georgi Dimitrov, a sort of a Balkan federation, an idea unpalatable to Stalin. Likewise, at the founding meeting of the Cominform, the two Yugoslav representatives behaved as the most radical, "leftist" communist delegates of the gathering.

In domestic affairs also, Tito's copying of Soviet institutional blueprints did not mean that he wanted to allow the Soviets complete control. Frictions multiplied, reaching major proportions at the beginning of 1948. For three months, between March and June, with the outside world unsuspecting, the central committee of the CPSU (Communist party of the Soviet Union) charged the Yugoslav Communist party with a series of political deviations. The Yugoslavs denied the charges. Since the secret exchange of letters did not bring any results and Tito refused to go personally to plead his cause with Moscow, the Cominform was used as an instrument to publicly denounce the Yugoslav party.

The act of accusation was extremely harsh, even absurd, but that was exactly the element which helped Tito's defense. The Yugoslav party leadership was accused of pursuing "an incorrect line on the main questions of domestic and foreign policy"; it was charged with "an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union and toward the CPSU"; its stands were compared to "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism"; the party was blasted for "taking the path of a populist, kulak party," suffering from "petty-bourgeois nationalism," and from "boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit." Ominously enough, the resolution ended by appealing to the "healthy elements" inside the Yugoslav party that "should the present leaders of the Yugoslav party prove incapable of [recognizing their mistakes openly and honestly and rectifying them,] their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the party." It was an open invitation to the party leaders and rank and file to overthrow Tito and his closest friends.

Tito, naturally enough, was not ready to capitulate. He did not find it difficult to refuse Cominform's sweeping

accusations point by point. To make them even less accurate, he accentuated for a while the collectivistic features of the Yugoslav economy. At the same time, he insisted that a "grave misunderstanding" was at the heart of the conflict and professed eagerness to eliminate it. Internally, however, the Yugoslav police acted vigorously against the domestic Cominformists, some of whom even lost their lives, with many more being arrested and spending years in jail. It soon became obvious that Stalin did not want any reconciliation, and the conflict grew in intensity. In 1950, threatened both militarily and economically, Tito was obliged to turn to the West, particularly to the United States, for indirect protection and direct economic aid. He also started a socio-economic "deStalinization" of the Yugoslav regime by introducing the principle of economic decentralization and the so-called workers' self-management of enterprises.

In 1951-52, the Tito-Stalin conflict reached a climax. The Yugoslav ministry of foreign affairs published a white book in 1951 devoted to examples of political and economic forms of aggressive pressures against Yugoslavia by the governments of the Soviet Union and the East-Central European countries. The sixth congress of the Yugoslav party (November, 1952) turned into a huge anti-Stalinist demonstration, with Tito accusing Stalin of every imaginable crime and declaring that even Hitler would envy the methods Stalin used to liquidate entire ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. The congress was an inverse echo of the ferocious anti-Titoist propaganda emanating from the Soviet Union and other communist-ruled countries.

With Stalin's death in March, 1953, the intensity of the Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel progressively diminished. In May, 1955, Nikita Khrushchev made his famous trip to Belgrade, where he publicly declared that Stalin's late chief of police, Beria, was responsible for the conflict which Khrushchev wanted to liquidate. As a price of reconciliation, he was willing to subscribe to a Titoist formula that "questions of internal organization . . . and of different forms of socialist development were solely the concern of the individual countries." Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the

twentieth congress of the Russian Communist party in February, 1956, was another step toward the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Tito's own evolution, in this respect, was visible during his triumphal tour of the Soviet Union; in a speech at Stalingrad, on June 11, 1956, he declared: "In time of war as well as in time of peace, Yugoslavia marches shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet people toward the same goal—the victory of socialism."

After the outbreak of anti-Soviet upheavals in East-Central Europe in the fall of 1956, and, following the adoption of the new program by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (as the Communist party of Yugoslavia was officially renamed in 1952) in April, 1958, Soviet-Yugoslav relations entered a new phase of tensions and disagreements, which, however, could not be compared with the virulence of the Stalin-Tito conflict. The undulatory pattern of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was again confirmed at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, which Tito condemned, and, in turn, his regime was criticized in the Soviet press. Then again, following Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September, 1971, and Tito's to Moscow in June, 1972, the relations between the two countries and parties improved ostensibly to such a degree that Tito was awarded the highest Soviet decoration, the Order of Lenin.

To sum up, the first post-1945 open communist split was not caused by Tito's rebellion against Stalin, but by Stalin's decision to purge his former agent who, once in power, was disrupting communist discipline. Since Stalin failed to dislodge him, Tito was necessarily pushed toward de-Stalinization of his regime, and, in the process, a new form of communism emerged. Since 1950 and in waves of sometimes contradictory reforms, Tito experimented extensively with Yugoslavia's economy without relinquishing the monopoly of communist political power. The importance of this first breach in the Soviet monolith diminished, however, with a series of new international events.

K. Communist Victory in China

Contrary to the Bolsheviks in Russia, whose road to power was extremely short once the tsarist regime was abolished, the Chinese communists had to pursue a very long and complicated struggle before assuming supreme power. When analyzing the circumstances under which the Chinese communists had to fight, one should note the fierce civil war they waged, with some interruptions, against the nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek for over twenty years; the unorthodox way of having to rely heavily on the countryside and the peasant guerrilla forces before capturing the towns; and the role of international events and foreign powers, which contributed considerably to the final outcome of the Chinese civil war.

Founded in 1921, the Chinese Communist party (CCP) had an intricate history of relations with the Comintern, whose emissaries at different times played a very important role in shaping CCP policies. For several years before 1927, following the Comintern instructions, the CCP cooperated closely with the Kuomintang, the Chinese nationalist movement. The "united front" formula of communist-nationalist cooperation broke in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek attacked the communists and brought the CCP to the verge of destruction. It survived, however, though the next ten years were full of difficulties because of internal factional disputes and constant persecution by the governmental nationalist forces. Mao himself had disagreements with other party leaders and was even dropped from the politburo and sent to his native Hunan province to stage a peasant uprising. In 1928, the forces under him numbered only about one thousand. He continued, however, to organize the peasants and to build up a Red Army in the mountains. In 1931, he was elected president of the Chinese Soviet Republic in the Kiangsi region. Governmental troops continued their pressure against the communists, and, in one of the particularly dangerous moments, the CCP leadership decided to undertake the "long march," leaving Kiangsi in southwestern China on October 16, 1934, with one hundred thousand men. The

march lasted over a year and covered some eight thousand miles, ending after constant fighting and many changes in direction in the northeastern part of China. Only twenty thousand of the initial troops survived. The Chiang Kai-shek forces continued harassing the communists, who were virtually saved by the Japanese invasion of China and the necessity of the nationalist government to offer resistance.

The Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945) completely changed the domestic situation in China. For about four years an anti-Japanese "united front" was established. The communists formally accepted nationalist leadership and agreed to abolish their own "Soviet" governments and Red Army; in return they were admitted into the national government, a fact which offered them an excellent opportunity to enlarge their influence. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 was a blow to the united front, and in January, 1941, the conflict between the nationalists and the communists started again, definitively ending the united front cooperation. During the next two years, Mao Tse-tung was thoroughly purging the communist ranks of all the "deviationist" elements, leftovers of the united front tactics. He imposed absolute military discipline in his ranks and had indeed a monolithic military power tool in his endeavors to achieve final victory. The nationalists could not achieve a similar internal discipline. Their government, moreover, was beset by the staggering problems of a ruinous war against the Japanese and the even more complicated problems of postwar reconstruction. Foreign powers also played a very important role after the war against Japan was won in 1945.

The relations between the United States and the Chinese nationalists remain a subject of controversy. During the war, the United States promoted Chinese participation in postwar affairs as a great power. Simultaneously, both during and after the war, the United States government pursued a policy of accommodation between the nationalists and the communists, favoring, in particular, a coalition government of the two forces. This policy provoked disagreements between the United States and the Chinese nationalists, who complained about the inadequacy of American aid and especially

resented the stoppage of ammunition delivery as a means of pressure to achieve accommodation with the communists. Two schools of thought in the United States have interpreted the postwar events in China and the reasons for communist victory in the civil war in 1949. According to one school, communist victory was due to their greater military effectiveness, popular support, and superior political leadership. In such a perspective, the role of the United States was minimized, and the communist victory placed as, in the words of Dean Acheson, secretary of state at that time, "the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not." The other school of thought interprets the events differently, ascribing a major responsibility to United States foreign policy for the communist victory in China. According to the former congressman Walter Judd, himself a specialist on China, four United States policy decisions contributed signally to undermine the nationalist positions and to help the CCP in its thrust for power: (1) the decision of the Yalta Conference (held by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in February, 1945) which gave the Soviet Union effective control of Manchuria, "thereby destroying what the Chinese, under Chiang Kai-shek, had fought eight years against Japan to try to regain and which had been promised to the Chinese by us at Cairo (the 1943 conference)"; (2) "the four cease-fires into which we forced the Chinese government when it had the upper hand during 1946, thereby destroying the confidence of the Chinese in us and decisively weakening the morale of the armed forces"; (3) "the 1946-47 embargo on 30-calibre ammunition"; and (4) "the de-activation" of about 180 of Chiang Kai-shek's 300 divisions, "throwing their officers and men into the street, in effect, leaving them little alternative except to go over to the communists," further demoralizing the remaining 120 divisions. Another international element which played into communist hands was the Soviet decision, in the spring of 1947, to supply the Chinese communist troops with Japanese arms captured in Manchuria.

Whoever may be right in this controversy, it is certain that the CCP under Mao's leadership was pursuing its final

aim—the seizure of political power—with utter determination and political skill, hiding, whenever necessary, its ultimate aims from both the Chinese people and the foreign world. Conversely, the nationalists were not able to cope successfully with tremendous postwar problems, particularly with the galloping inflation. Moreover, their internal discipline could not be compared to the communist totalitarian molding. Finally, while Stalin, despite his refrain from intervening in Chinese internal affairs, helped the communists through the delivery of former Japanese arms, the Americans maintained an uneasy and vacillating relationship with Chinese nationalists. Some influential segments of American public life advocated a sympathetic attitude toward the communists, whom they viewed as “agrarian reformers.”

Communist victory in China represented an immense boost for the international communist movement. Contrary to the situation in East-Central Europe, the Soviet Red Army was not implicated in directly helping the CCP. The latter's victory had thus two essential aspects: one was the result of the CCP's political training and application of some basic tenets of Leninist-Stalinist devices; the other was Mao's original contribution, in particular the successful waging of the protracted guerrilla warfare, transforming itself into a full-fledged and finally victorious military endeavor.

L. Khrushchev's Post-Stalin Policies

As long as Stalin lived, the problems of the international communist movement seemed simple. In the Soviet Union, his personal despotism was absolute; in Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia since 1948, the newly established communist regimes were totally dependent on the Soviet power center; the Chinese communists, in power since 1949, did not indicate any proclivity to challenge Soviet leadership, while Stalin himself was cautious not to alienate them; in the non-communist world, the official communist parties were following the Stalinist political line without deviation.

After Stalin's death in March, 1953, the situation began to change, first imperceptibly, then with greater speed. For several years, as after Lenin's death, there existed a struggle for power among Stalin's successors, out of which Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1972) emerged as the victor. In February, 1956, Khrushchev's first rival for the supreme power, Georgi Malenkov, resigned as chairman of the Council of Ministers; in June, 1957, Khrushchev succeeded in eliminating the powerful Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov group from the ruling party presidium; in February, 1958, he achieved full supremacy by eliminating Nikolai Bulganin as chairman of the Council of Ministers and cumulating the two supreme positions of party first secretary and prime minister. While maneuvering for the top position in the Soviet party and state administration, Khrushchev had to face a series of momentous changes in both the domestic and international realms, initiating some of the changes and reacting to the others. The most significant of his political moves was without doubt his famous secret speech held at the twentieth congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February, 1956. In this long and unexpected speech, presented strictly for the party elite behind closed doors, Khrushchev assailed Stalin's "cult of personality" in the strongest terms. His central argument was that Stalin had committed countless crimes against the party and that such behavior was inadmissible and harmful. In a typical sentence, Khrushchev attacked Stalin for discarding "the Leninist method of convincing and education" and for abandoning "the method of ideological struggle for that of active violence, mass repressions and terror." Stalin, in Khrushchev's words, "acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws. Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even despair." The startling historical fact is that, while Stalin was deified for nearly twenty-five years of his rule, his

main successor was now debunking that very "cult" which for decades was the basic conditioning factor of Soviet citizens' minds.

Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" had profound repercussions. The most dramatic took place in Eastern Europe where, in the fall of 1956 (as will be seen later), a near rebellion happened in Poland and a full-fledged popular revolt shook Hungary; Soviet troops were used to crush the Hungarian dissenters, but, in spite of Soviet repression, a new era was emerging in the entire realm of communist satellite states. Khrushchev, in fact, wanted to combine the hard application of force and a new, softer approach in rebuilding the inter-communist relations. To tackle the problem differently, he decided to use the latent possibilities of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) founded by Stalin in 1949 but left dormant. After several conferences during 1957, a meeting took place in Moscow in May, 1958; its aim was to promote closer economic cooperation. In attendance were the general secretaries and prime ministers of all European communist-ruled countries and high-level officials from Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam. The basic decision made at the meeting was to proceed with a "bloc-wide economic integration through extra-long-term supranational planning." The conference enhanced the concept of "socialist division of labor," i.e., increased specialization in various fields of production among the Comecon members. The elimination of differences in the level of development of individual countries would be the result of both short-term and broad "perspective" planning for the entire territory of the Soviet Union and East-Central Europe.

Khrushchev's idea of economic integration had some similarities with the process then underway in Western Europe. It was designed specifically to implement his "theory of a simultaneity," defined by him at the twenty-first congress of the CPSU (January, 1959): "By successfully employing the potentials inherent in socialism, the socialist countries will enter the higher phase of communist society more or less simultaneously." A few days later, in a speech in

East Germany, Khrushchev spoke about the forthcoming "consolidation of the single socialist economic system . . . eventually making the question of borders a pointless one." Concepts of the "system of international division of labor through the coordination of national economic plans, specialization, and cooperation in the production within the world socialist system on the basis of voluntary participation" were endorsed in the conference statement of representatives of eighty-one communist and workers' parties (Moscow, November, 1960), as well as by the new program of the CPSU adopted at its twenty-second congress in the fall of 1961.

Khrushchev's imaginative grand design failed, however, to become reality. The Sino-Soviet split encouraged the Rumanian communists in particular to oppose the principle of socialist division of labor and central, bloc-wide planning which would condemn Rumania to remain the producer of agricultural goods at the expense of building industry. The Rumanian communists defended their position by using Lenin's argumentation of the necessity of industrialization for a socialist country. By their opposition, the Rumanians succeeded in thwarting the process of supranational integration as imagined by Khrushchev.

The Sino-Soviet conflict (to be treated in more detail later) remained, until the end of his rule, one of Khrushchev's major preoccupations. His innovations in foreign affairs, particularly his personal diplomacy exemplified by his visit to the United States in September, 1959, displeased and disturbed the Chinese leaders. The concept of "peaceful co-existence" among states with different social orders, presented by Khrushchev as the key to Soviet diplomacy, became the central target of Chinese attacks. To clarify the issues, Khrushchev delivered a speech on January 6, 1961, before a meeting of the highest party organizations in Moscow. In his speech, he very explicitly defined his attitudes toward the problems of peace and war. He said that "the problem of preventing a world thermo-nuclear war is the most burning and vital problem for mankind." He made a distinction among world wars, local wars, liberation wars, and

popular risings. He said that both world wars and local wars should be combatted, the latter because they could grow into a world thermo-nuclear and rocket war. On the other hand, he gave his firmest support to the "national liberation wars," stating that "such wars are not only admissible but inevitable," and that "we recognize such wars . . . and will help the people striving for their independence." The Chinese took issue with Khrushchev's distinction among wars, contending that the result of a nuclear war would "certainly not be the annihilation of mankind" and that, on the "debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher than a capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves."

Because of his inability to come to terms with the Chinese, Khrushchev was compelled to wage a cold war simultaneously on two fronts: one against the United States and the entire system of western alliances and one against Maoist China, which openly attacked him and insisted that the vanguard role of the international proletarian revolution had passed from the Russian to the Chinese Communist party. In this twofold confrontation, Khrushchev devoted much energy cultivating friendly relations with the underdeveloped countries, striving to build with them an "anti-imperialist" front. At the same time, he did his best to maintain the ascendancy of the CPSU in the world communist movement.

It was during the period 1957-1961 that Khrushchev reached the pinnacle of his career. A year after the Hungarian uprising, two achievements enhanced Soviet might and prestige: on August 26, 1957, a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile was successfully fired, and, on October 4, the first space satellite, Sputnik I, was launched into orbit. When, a few days later, the communist leaders from everywhere, including Mao Tse-tung, gathered in Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, this new sense of overall communist strength was graphically expressed by Mao himself who declared that "the east wind was prevailing over the west wind." The banner harvest of 1958, the steady growth of the rate of industrial

production, and the largescale program for industrial innovations (expansion of the chemical industry, the building of new fertilizer plants, the construction of irrigation facilities, etc.), seemed, and were, impressive enough, projecting a picture of a dynamic society having left behind the nightmare of Stalin's era.

All this was mirrored in the new program of the CPSU adopted at its twenty-second congress on October 31, 1961, superseding the earlier 1919 party program. In glowing terms, the program contrasted the world socialist system "advancing steadfastly towards decisive victory in its economic competition with capitalism" and the period of the decline and collapse of capitalism. "An inexorable process of decay has seized capitalism from top to bottom — its economic and political system, its politics and ideology." The program stated that the great objectives of the working class could be realized without world war and that the workers could win state power by peaceful means, without civil war, through political cooperation with other parties and social organizations, and through workers' and people's fronts. The possibility of a nonpeaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was solemnly reaffirmed, besides restating that the CPSU had as its duty "to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation."

The 1961 program also described the successive stages leading toward the final building of communism in the Soviet Union. "In the current decade (1961-1970), the Soviet Union, in creating the material and technical bases of communism, will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A., in production per head of population." Then, "in the next decade (1971-1980), the material and technical bases of communism will be created, and there will be an abundance of material and cultural benefits for the whole population . . . a communist society will on the whole be built in the U.S.S.R."

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, a series of events put unexpected stumbling blocks in his path to full-fledged communism. During 1962-63, a decline in the Soviet in-

dustrial growth rate and a sharp fall in agricultural output tarnished the glowing predictions of the program and dealt a heavy blow to Khrushchev's own political career. He was not helped any better by his periodic and hasty reorganizations of the state and party machinery which offended many vested interests. His confrontation with the United States in October, 1962, over the ballistic missiles he surreptitiously tried to introduce into Cuba revealed his bluff and hurt his prestige. His conflict with Mao grew worse and certainly contributed to his downfall in October, 1964.

It is too early to make any definitive judgment about the personality and reign of Nikita Khrushchev. Only history will tell whether his attempts to decongeal Stalinist domestic and foreign policies were beneficial or detrimental to the interests of communism in Russia. His flamboyant personality, which explains many of his hasty measures of reform, introduced into the history of world communism another figure who tried to use the uncertain Marxist compass in navigating through the turbulent waters of our time.

M. Upheavals in East Germany, Poland and Hungary

Everything seemed stultified in East-Central Europe as long as Stalin lived, and everything began to move almost immediately after his death. To understand this momentous and rather abrupt change, one should first have a glance at the main aspects of Stalinism in the satellite countries.

Economic collectivization and political terror were the two most significant features of communist regimes in East-Central Europe, once the road to full-fledged Sovietization had been cleared from obstacles existing in the immediate post-war period. The Stalinist concept of "socialism in one country" was extended to the newly acquired satellites. Each had to become a miniature replica of the Soviet Union, and thus had to develop heavy industry, wage war against independent peasants, and destroy small private industry and independent craftsmen. Terror served as a means for fulfilling these ends as well as for keeping communist power intact and inculcating the young generation with a primary loyalty to

the Soviet Union. Political terror, however, was not only directed against the non-communists, for, during the phase of full-fledged Stalinism (1950-53), the various communist parties themselves were submitted to intensive purges. In some cases (in Poland and East Germany), the purges were essentially political without including physical violence against the party members. In other cases (in Bulgaria, Hungary, and especially Czechoslovakia), the purges were violent and bloody and closely resembled the Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Another element to be added to the picture was overt and/or camouflaged economic exploitation of individual countries by the Soviet Union. One figure will indicate its extent. Through various devices (the overpricing of Soviet goods and underpricing of products coming from East-Central Europe; the functioning of joint companies in various countries; and the maintenance of Soviet troops and technical advisers, etc.), the Soviet Union gained during the period 1945-56 a total of \$20-25 billion through the exploitation of the satellites. Roughly during the same time, Soviet aid to the bloc countries amounted to \$2 billion.

Taking all these features together, East-Central Europe developed many trends similar to those of the Soviet Union under its early economic plans; significant increases in industrial production, rapid urbanization and growth of industrial population, uneven but accelerated steps toward land collectivization, etc. On the other hand, the list of shortcomings or overt failures was no less noteworthy: the low level of agricultural output, the general neglect of consumer goods production, currency "reforms," extensive and unfulfilled public works, extraordinary inefficiency and waste, forced labor, etc. Moreover, behind the screen of feverish work and public unanimity, countless individual grievances accumulated imperceptibly. Nobody dared to express the slightest open criticism, but something in the grim collective atmosphere suggested the gathering of a storm.

With Stalin's death, the entire structure of "people's democracies" seemed immediately threatened. On June 17,

1953, something happened that would literally be unthinkable under Stalin. An atheistic, unplanned, and leaderless workers' rebellion raged for twenty-four hours practically all the major cities in East Germany, especially East Berlin. Workers' dissatisfaction with the living conditions was combined with widespread popular resentment toward the communist regime. Even in the Western world watching with amazement but without any intention or idea how to help the insurgents, the Soviet tanks promptly restored "order."

Trying to learn from the dramatic case of East Germany, the communist regimes in some other countries, Poland and Hungary in particular, inaugurated a "new course," opening some safety valves such as concessions to the peasantry, increase in consumer goods production, and new respect for the "socialist legality" in order to avoid popular explosion. Everywhere, including the Soviet Union, it was obvious that one could not rule Stalinistically without Stalin and that new forms of public life had to be devised. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's rule at the twentieth congress of the CPSU and the Soviet official acceptance of the principle of a "different road to socialism" in different countries contributed in precipitating events in East-Central Europe.

Two crucial events illustrated the mounting tensions in Poland and Hungary. On June 28, 1956, the workers at a factory in Poznan staged a demonstration which evolved into a riot and ended in a battle between the rioters and the police, resulting in 53 dead and over 300 wounded. Several hundred persons were arrested. Although the riots were officially castigated as a "provocation" by the "enemies of people's Poland," they were explained a few months later by the highest party official, Wladislaw Gomulka, as a protest "against the evil which was widespread in our social system." In Hungary on October 6, the public reinterment of the chief victims of the Stalinist purge trials of 1949 took place; it turned into a huge, silent but threatening manifestation against the regime.

In both Poland and Hungary, the communists in power tried halfheartedly to blunt widespread dissatisfaction by putting aside the most prominent Stalinist figures and by

making minor reforms within the system. In the second half of October, events took a divergent course in Poland and Hungary. Despite an extremely tense situation, the Polish Communist party was able to maintain both public order and its own authority and, at the same time, placate the Soviet Union. The key factor in this situation was the reinstatement of Wladislaw Gomulka to the post of first secretary of the party. He had been purged politically in 1949 as an opponent of Stalinist methods of communist rule in Poland. His popularity as a former victim of Stalinism, his promises of the democratization of the regime, and his ability to convince the Soviet leaders that Poland would remain communist with respect to both its domestic and international policies contributed in cooling off the general atmosphere. Another element of this cooling off was the turn of events in Hungary.

As in Poland, Hungary was seething with unrest during the summer of 1956. A very important factor responsible for the mood of public criticism was the Petöfi club (named after Sandor Petöfi, a Hungarian poet who lost his life in 1849 in the Hungarian war of independence), composed of young intellectuals, many of whom were members of the communist party. Club meetings served often as outlets for denouncing the regime's abuses. More important than all the expressions of public dissatisfaction was the fact that the ruling communist party was divided into basically two factions, the Stalinists still in power and the reformers headed by Imre Nagy, challenging the Stalinists. This conflict, which weakened the regime's effectiveness and demoralized communist cadres, explains in the final analysis why it was possible for a genuine popular revolution to start on October 23. It began with an entirely peaceful demonstration and without an uprising planned in advance. The rebellion started only when the government refused to listen to a moderate list of grievances presented by the students and particularly when the agents of the secret police opened fire on the crowd assembled outside the radio building listening to the prime minister's speech. Within twenty-four hours, the rebellion engulfed the entire country. The most remarkable fact was that within these twenty-four hours the entire structure of the communist

regime collapsed. Practically no party organization continued to function. The Soviet troops stationed in Hungary intervened at first, then took positions awaiting instructions from Moscow; the units of the Hungarian army refused to open fire on their compatriots, and some of the soldiers actively joined the rebels.

During the next several days, particularly between October 27 and November 1, the new government of Imre Nagy, finally taking the upper hand in the wake of the Stalinists' demise, made several momentous decisions: it formed a genuine coalition government with prominent non-communists; it abolished the one-party system and promised the dismantling of the secret police; it announced the holding of free elections and declared the neutrality of Hungary and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, a military treaty signed in 1955 binding the Soviet Union and the other countries of East-Central Europe with the exception of Yugoslavia. After hesitating several days, which indicated discussions and probable disagreements among the Soviet leaders on how to react to the Hungarian events, the Soviet troops intervened with new forces. Their overwhelming military superiority crushed the uprising. In place of Imre Nagy, who was arrested and later executed, a new pro-Soviet government headed by Janos Kadar was established.

The impact of the Hungarian rebellion was enormous though certainly blunted by the simultaneous Israeli-Franco-British military intervention against Egypt. As in the previous East German crisis, the Western powers could not devise any policy of helping the Hungarian freedom fighters in any way. Their ordeal prompted the United Nations General Assembly to appoint a special committee which issued a detailed report on the entire event. It concluded that "what took place in Hungary in October and November, 1956, was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people. . . . From start to finish the uprising was led by students, workers, soldiers, and intellectuals, many of whom were communists or former communists. . . . The real power in Hungary [between October 23 and November 4, 1956] lay

with the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils which had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and had replaced the collapsing structure of the communist party.¹⁷ The report denounced the massive armed intervention of the Soviet military forces in Hungary as an aggression according to the charter of the United Nations. The report, however, was not conducive to any action on the part of the world organization.

The crushing of the Hungarian revolution indicated clearly that the Soviet Union was not willing to allow any part of its sphere of direct interest to achieve genuine independence and to go beyond the stage of exclusive communist control. Still, as discussed earlier, Stalin's heirs, particularly Khrushchev, realized that carrots should follow sticks, and that inter-communist state and party relations in Eastern Europe should be reshaped to avoid the repetition of the October, 1956, events.

N. Fidel Castro's Role in Cuba and Plans for Latin America

Shortly after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, which dealt a heavy, though temporary, blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union and to the political fortunes of the communist parties around the world, the international communist movement marked a significant, though unorthodox victory in Cuba. The advent of a communist regime in Cuba followed a different pattern than was the case in East-Central Europe and China. In Cuba, the communist party was founded in 1925, and its secretary-general, Blas Roca, even today a prominent political figure in Cuba, assumed his functions in 1934. Roca himself was a Stalinist in the strictest sense of the word, was appointed an alternate member of the ECCI in 1935, subsequently emerged as one of the leading communists in Latin America, and proved to be an excellent organizer and flexible tactician in Cuba. In the words of a historian on Latin American communism, "Roca has converted the inconsequential communist party into a cohesive political force through rigid discipline and

timely cooperation with Cuban strong men Fulgencio Batista and Fidel Castro." Members of the Cuban Communist party, appointed ministers in Batista's cabinet in 1943-44, were the first communists to hold high positions in any Latin American government. In 1953 the second Batista regime outlawed the Cuban party, but the party rejected armed struggle against Batista and preferred strikes and demonstrations, considering also the alternative of elections in which the party would try to establish "front" alliances with other oppositional forces, or even a new accommodation with the regime. The armed struggle approach was used by a small group of anti-Batista guerrilla fighters who, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, landed in Cuba from Mexico in December, 1956.

From the beginning the communists maintained a two-fold attitude toward Castro and his July 26 movement (so-called in memory of an earlier insurreccional attempt by Castro in July, 1953). They openly criticized some of Castro's tactics and plans. Two of the reasons for the failure of a general strike on April 9, 1958, instigated by Castro, were that the trade unions did not want to support the strike and the communists themselves did not help in its implementation. With Castro's victory over Batista at the end of 1958, the communists realized the great potential which Castro and his movement could represent for the furtherance of communist aims. As for Fidel Castro, his appeals for the fight against Batista were made essentially in the name of the restoration of the 1940 democratic constitution. In the manifesto of July, 1957, Castro formally promised general elections at the end of one year after the overthrow of Batista and an "absolute guaranty" of freedom of information, preservation of all individual and political rights. He was ready for cooperation with the communists in the anti-Batista struggle, but not for submission to them.

With Castro's victory, which came more because of the internal disintegration of the Batista regime than because of Castro's or the communists' strength, the situation changed radically. During the next year, sharp internal confrontations took place in Cuba ending with the defeat of the anti-

communists in Castro's own July 26 movement and with Castro's personal decision to side with the communists, domestically and internationally, irrespective of his own formal promises to restore democratic constitutional rights. With Castro's approval, the anti communist elements were purged from his own political movement, from the Cuban army, and from the trade unions. At the end of 1959, the battle was over for all practical purposes; the new Cuban brand of communism was emerging, a combination of the powerful personality of Fidel Castro and the fusion of his radical political followers with the cadres of the old communist party.

The question arises why and how Fidel Castro decided to cast his lot with the communists (his total, official espousal of the communist cause came in his speech of December 2, 1961, in which he said, "I am a Marxist-Leninist"). The most convincing answer appears to be given by Theodore Draper who suggests that Castro had been "suddenly and unexpectedly catapulted into power without a real party, a real army, or a real program . . . His political gifts were of a demagogic, not a creative order . . . He did not have the disciplined and experienced cadres, the ideology, and the international support to switch from one type of revolution to another, and only the Cuban and Russian communists could make them available to him." Moreover, according to Draper, "the revolution was made and always controlled by de-classed sons and daughters of the middle class, first in the name of the entire people, then of the peasants, and finally of the workers and peasants."

Here are then these peculiarities of the coming of communism in Cuba: a self-centered political leader who betrays his own democratic promises because he comes to the conclusion that communist ideology, experience, and know-how in the process of maintaining political power are the best guarantee for his personal political success. "Castroism" thus represents this new blend of the old communist cadres and the new, revolutionary middleclass personnel which will not only rule with an iron hand over Cuba, but will believe and proclaim that it has a revolutionary answer for all the Latin American countries.

In this sense, after assuring a firm grip on the domestic situation, Castro (born in 1926) and his political friend Ernesto "Che" Guevara (Argentinian by birth and younger by two years) began to develop a specific theory for revolutionary action in different Latin American countries, based essentially on the Cuban experience and at strong variance with both the Soviet and Chinese political and tactical precepts. Castro and Guevara aspired, in fact, to develop an original and independent branch of international communism, with the power base in Cuba serving in every sense to help revolutionary guerrilla movements throughout Latin America.

The peculiarity of the Castroist approach toward revolution in Latin America was most adequately expressed in a by-now famous booklet by the French intellectual and admirer of Castro and Guevara, René Debray, who, in the fall of 1966, wrote his *Revolution in the Revolution?*, repeatedly revised and corrected by Castro himself. This "primer for Marxist insurrection in Latin America," as it was called in this country, sharply criticized both the pro-Soviet Latin American communist parties (assailing their "false start thirty or forty years ago") and the pro-Chinese "Marxist-Leninist" parties and groups which have failed in their objectives. According to Debray, the tactics of the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communists led only to a "dead-end street," while Cuba indicated the only revolutionary "shortcut." The "staggering novelty" of the Cuban revolution was that its guerrilla army, and not the old communist party, was the vanguard party which formed an organic whole of both the political and the military sides of the struggle and, in this way, led to victory. Consequently, for the genuine revolutionaries in Latin America, the "principal stress must be laid on the development of guerrilla warfare and not on the strengthening of existing parties or the creation of new parties. That is why insurrectional activity is today the number one political activity." For the "successful revolutionary struggle to be effective, it required a new style of leadership, a new method of organization, and new physical and ideological responses on the part of the leaders and militants."

Parallel with the propagation of these views went Castro's active sponsorship of a series of international gatherings and organizations through which he intended to further his aims. The most important of such endeavors was the so-called First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference (known as the Tri-Continental Conference) held in Havana in January, 1966. It was a global meeting of representatives of communist parties (including the Soviet and Chinese), and of other revolutionary "anti-imperialist" movements. Its general declaration was couched in vehement, inflammatory terms, blasting "Yankee imperialism" as the main pillar of world aggression and supporting the movements of "national liberation" throughout the world and their right to "meet imperialist violence with revolutionary violence."

Four permanent international organizations were set up at the Tri-Continental Conference: (1) the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization, with the task to "unite, coordinate and encourage the struggle of people of Africa, Asia and Latin America against imperialist colonialism and neo-colonialism headed by U.S. imperialism"; (2) the Committee of Assistance and Aid to the National Liberation Movements and of Struggle Against Neo-Colonialism, conceived as the most important executive arm of the aforementioned organization; (3) the Tri-Continental Committee of Support to the People of Vietnam, established to offer every support and aid to the Vietnamese people "including the aid with volunteers and arms, within the framework of each country, each continent, and tricontinental"; and (4) the Latin American Solidarity Organization, established by the Latin American delegates to the conference. The last organization held its first conference in Havana on July 31-August 10, 1967.

The holding of the Tri-Continental Conference and the establishment of the Latin American Solidarity Organization represented, in the words of an American radical writer, the birth of a new "Fifth International." Its most militant, both romantic and tragic, hero was Che Guevara who, sometime in 1965, disappeared from Cuba to help organize Castroist type revolutionary movements in different parts of Latin America.

He was critical of the Soviet and Chinese unwillingness to use their full might in helping the communist side of the Vietnamese conflict, and in his letter to the July-August, 1967, Havana conference, he violently criticized "those" (meaning the Soviet Union and Communist China) who "keep up a war of insults and tricks" who "refuse to make Vietnam an unviolable part of socialist territory." Appealing impassionately for a holy war against the United States, Guevara repeated several times that the most pressing task of proletarian internationalism was to create "the two or three Vietnams." His practical revolutionary work, however, did not match his rhetoric. He formed a small guerrilla band in a remote part of Bolivia, hoping that impoverished peasants would soon flock to his side. He shunned the urban-based, traditional Bolivian Communist party, and failing to enlist the peasants for his revolutionary scheme, was killed in October, 1967.

Che Guevara's failure and death symbolized in a way the inability of Castroist efforts to supplant older communist patterns of militancy or to foreclose the emerging of newer and different radical forms of revolutionary struggle. Pursuing his policies, Castro came necessarily into conflict with older, pro-Moscow communist parties in Latin America, as well as with the more recent pro-Chinese splinter communist groups. Pro-Moscow communists in particular viewed the Castroist approach as adventurous and potentially dangerous. On his side, Castro openly criticized the Soviet Union and other communist regimes for establishing diplomatic and trade relations with some of the Latin American governments. By disagreeing with Moscow, Castro created a paradoxical situation. Because of his total enmity toward the United States and the latter's retaliatory economic and political sanctions (endorsed by the Organization of American States, i.e., the quasi-unanimity of Latin American governments), Cuba was entirely dependent on the Soviet Union for its economic survival and political-military protection. While tactically disagreeing with Moscow and Moscow-oriented parties in Latin America, Castro played a daring game on the assumption that Moscow would have to

support him economically because it could not abandon the first communist regime in the Western Hemisphere.

By the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, the appeals of the Castroist "Fifth International" had progressively diminished, while the ties between the Cuban and Soviet Russian regimes grew stronger. After trying for several years to keep a stance of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Castro moved closer and closer to Soviet positions. He fully endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. In June, 1969, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, the Cuban delegate declared that "Cuba will unyieldingly be at the side of the U.S.S.R." Widespread dislocations and failures of the Cuban economy in 1970, particularly the lag in sugar production (which led Castro to offer, rhetorically, his resignation on July 26, 1970), made Cuba even more dependent on Soviet economic help. Castro visited the Soviet Union twice in 1972, making enthusiastic speeches about his Soviet hosts, and, in January, 1973, the Soviet government offered the Cuban government an extremely favorable, five-part economic package agreement. Finally, in July, 1973, Cuba was admitted as a full member to the COMECON, an indication that her economy was now organically tied with the Soviet-East European integrative schemes.

No less significant was the ineffectiveness of the Castroist road experimented with in several Latin American countries (Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, Bolivia). Prominent guerrilla leaders either perished or were forced to go into exile, while urban guerrilla warfare, discounted earlier by Castro, made impressive strides in other countries such as Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Still, Castro's popularity did not vanish, and the Cuban example, enhanced by the myth of the dead hero Che Guevara, continues to fascinate and inspire many groups throughout Latin America. Fidel Castro himself has come, if not to moderate his ambitions, at least to show greater patience and to admit that the paths to revolutionary victory may differ.

But if the Soviet leaders were able to circumscribe the Castroist challenge so that an effective "Fifth International" did not materialize, they had to face a different and much more serious challenge from their Chinese Maoist comrades-antagonists.

O. Mao Tse-Tung, "The Lenin of our Times"

Mao Tse-Tung (born in 1893) occupies an exceptionally important place in the history of world communism. This is not because he is an original political thinker, but because he was an extraordinarily successful revolutionary leader and then the protagonist of one of the strangest socio-political experiments in modern times.

The undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist party since 1935, Mao had distinguished himself as an original strategist of the communist revolution, waging protracted guerrilla warfare from sustaining rural bases combined with a peasant guerrilla army led by the Chinese Communist party. Mao, as the architect of the initially rural revolution, has been rightfully put beside Lenin, the executor of the urban revolution. But the importance of Mao's revolutionary strategy is not only that it succeeded in China, but also that Mao considered it as having much wider, international significance. In the first volume of his *Selected Works* (1951), it was said that "all or at least some of the colonial peoples of the East can hold big or small base areas and maintain revolutionary regimes for an extended period, carry on protracted revolutionary war to encircle the cities from the countryside, and proceed gradually to take over the cities and win nationwide victory in their respective countries." The same ideas have been developed by Mao's one-time closest political friend, former Minister of Defense Marshal Lin Biao, in an especially heralded article published in all the major Chinese newspapers on September 3, 1965. In that article, Lin Biao emphasized that Mao's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of cities from the countryside "is of outstanding and universal

practical importance for the present revolutionary struggle of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys . . . Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.'

Such a claim of quasi-universal applicability of the Chinese revolutionary pattern represented a challenge to Soviet international leadership. But this is not the only example of such a challenge. Up to 1956-1957, Mao Tse-tung had not claimed any Chinese peculiarity which could project him as the rival to Russian communists, still officially considered the leading force of the international communist movement. With the twentieth congress of the CPSU and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, Chinese policies have increasingly adopted an independent course. Although he has certainly been displeased with Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin's "cult of personality" (applicable tacitly to his own position in China), Mao has experimented with internal liberalization beyond de-Stalinization in Russia. Already in May, 1956, but more solemnly in Mao's speech on February 27, 1957, the Chinese party had launched the slogans "Let a hundred flowers blossom," and "Let a hundred schools of thought contend," inviting not only party members but even non-communists to criticize the party's policies. The probably unexpected flood of criticism led, a few months later in June, to a halt. Mao specified this time that words and actions will be allowed only, among other things, if they were "beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction" and "tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken the leadership of the communist party." The so-called rectification campaign which followed indicated that Maoist "liberalization" was so circumscribed that it became meaningless.

In the spring of the following year, Mao inaugurated one of the most ambitious and significant of his plans, the so-called "great leap forward on every front in our social con-

struction." Mao issued a call to overtake and surpass Britain in the output of iron and steel and other major industrial productions in fifteen years. The target was to develop industry and agriculture simultaneously, while giving priority to heavy industry. A few months later, in the most solemn way, and as an expression of a "spontaneous popular movement," were established the "people's communes," a shortcut in the final transition to communism. The communes were presented as the implementation of an old utopian socialist and Marxist trend. They were owned by "all the people," with the two-fold system of "free supply" (distribution "according to need") and of wages (distribution still "according to work") and with their own militia. Most ambitiously, the task of the communes was to eliminate "the difference between town and country, worker and peasant and mental and manual labor." Once again, tacitly, the Chinese example was presented as the most original and suitable for the speediest realization of communism. Its implication that a collectivized economy is more important than an industrialized economy as a precondition for communism was openly challenging the blueprint of Soviet communist development. Conversely, the Soviet theoreticians could not fail to stress that the material and technical backwardness of the Chinese economy disqualified China and its leaders' pretensions to offer to the world their shortcut to communism. In fact, only five months after the proclamation of the communes, it became obvious that they could not achieve their announced goals. The regime had to retreat and to admit, in fact if not openly, that the "great leap forward" was not attainable and that the panacea of "people's communes" remained a utopian dream and not a social reality.

Whatever the practical failures of the Chinese communist regime might have been, the essential ingredient for its maintenance in power was the prestige and authority of its chairman, Mao Tse-tung, around whose personality a cult similar to that of a Soviet Stalin was systematically created. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" has been proclaimed as the supreme truth in all fields of public life, domestically and internationally. Dissatisfied with many aspects of communist

work in China, and quarreling bitterly with Russian communists, Mao launched the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" whose professed aim was to completely reshape both the Chinese society and the Chinese Communist party. On August 8, 1966, the central committee of the party adopted sixteen basic theses about the "cultural revolution." The first thesis stated that despite its overthrow, the Chinese bourgeoisie was still trying "to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a comeback." In such a situation the task of the party was "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, . . . and to transform education, literature and art . . . so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system."

To achieve this aim, large numbers of youths, the so-called "Red Guards," were organized and given free rein in this purging endeavor. Through the media of big-character posters and public debates, the Red Guards were encouraged to "launch resolute attacks on the open enemies—representatives of the bourgeoisie." More importantly, since starting the "cultural revolution" implied a lack of party vigilance, the communist party was not simply purged politically from the enemies of the "thought of Chairman Mao," but new "cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses" were established throughout China, often as substitutes for party organizations. All this contributed to an extremely confused and confusing situation, and the armed forces—the People's Liberation Army, under the command of Mao's heir-apparent, Marshal Lin Biao, had to intervene in some instances to maintain order.

Probably the essential reasons for launching the "cultural revolution" and exposing the country to such internal turmoil was Mao's apprehension that the communist party was lacking its initial revolutionary ardor and his view that the infusion of young revolutionary blood by the Red Guards could prevent the degeneration he detected in the Soviet Union under Stalin's heirs. In this sense, Mao went so far as to practically disrupt the normal functioning of the com-

tinuous party. The consequence was that the army increasingly became the best organized and most cohesive force in mainland China. On the other hand, the movement of the Red Guard, which had been launched in the military, unraveled, after having caused much dissatisfaction by its rule behavior and branding the youth through into action and then pulled back.

Internal turmoil caused by the cultural revolution led to temporary isolation of Communist China in world affairs, including Mao's efforts to successfully challenge the CPSU for the leadership in the international communist movement. Still, Maoist accusations of Soviet "betrayal" of the worldwide revolutionary struggle, which in many instances resembled the attacks Lenin used to make against the Second International and its "social traitors," made Maoist China and its radical message of cultural revolution an attractive point for dissident communist groups around the world. Since 1969, however, a new, post-cultural revolution phase of Chinese communist affairs began with mainland China progressively abandoning the chaos of the cultural revolution and re-entering, in spectacular fashion, on the worldwide diplomatic and political stage.

The first signs of internal consolidation were visible at the ninth congress of the Chinese Communist party which convened in April, 1969. The authority of the revolutionary committees, which, during the cultural revolution, superseded that of the party, was deemphasized in favor of a "core group" of party members within these same committees. Simultaneously, the army continued to exercise its predominant role in the country, a role enhanced by the serious military clashes with Soviet troops at the border (more about this will be said later). Mao, of course, remained the supreme leader but the new party charter, adopted at the congress, contained an unusual provision designating Defense Minister Lin Biao as Mao's eventual successor. The composition of the party's directing organs made it clear that the cultural revolution had very deep purging effects since about 70 per cent of the central committee was composed of new members. At the very top, the five-member standing committee of the

politburo reflected an uneasy compromise between the more radical and more moderate elements.

Normalization of public life continued throughout 1970, with further efforts to restructure and tame political life, and to remedy the dislocations in economy and higher education. During that same year, Chinese diplomacy showed signs of increased vigor, and the Peking regime was recognized by Canada and Italy. These efforts brought results in October, 1971, when Communist China was admitted to the United Nations and obtained a permanent seat on the security council, replacing Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China in Taiwan, which was expelled from the world organization.

At the same time, however, a major internal event, still shrouded in mystery, indicated the lack of cohesion at the political and military top. In September, 1971, Mao's official successor, Marshal Lin Biao, was reportedly killed in an air crash in Mongolia, and, at the same time, certain high military officials disappeared, namely the chief of staff of the Chinese Armed Forces, the political commissar of the Navy, and the head of General Military Logistics. According to official statements made later, Lin Biao was escaping China after the failure of his conspiracy to assassinate Mao and to establish a military dictatorship. Lin Biao's downfall and the ensuing purge of his associates strengthened the authority of the now second-in-command after Mao, Premier Chou En-lai (born in 1898). His domestic and international status was even more enhanced when U.S. President Richard Nixon made his unprecedented visit to mainland China in February, 1972.

But it is in the international field that Maoist China has taken the greatest strides since 1969-70. Spectacular improvement in relations with the United States was explained on the grounds of revolutionary expediency, and the September, 1971, issue of the *Red Flag*, theoretical journal of the Chinese party, quoted an earlier article by Mao Tse-tung who, in a Leninist way, had explained the value of temporary alliances and had extolled "the art of waging all kinds of struggle in a flexible manner." What the press did not openly say, but what certainly was among the reasons explaining the

Chinese foreign political shift, was that, from their viewpoint, a rapprochement with the U.S. could serve as a reinsurance policy in view of the persistence of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Similarly, earlier strident Maoist appeals to the Third World revolutionaries have been subdued and replaced, to a large extent, by the establishment of closer diplomatic and economic ties with Third World governments, another tactical shift designed to enable the Peking government to compete more effectively with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many of Mao's disciples around the world have been disappointed by the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and the Chinese government's siding with some Asian and African governments (in Ceylon and Sudan) against the local revolutionaries; some of the former true believers (for example, in the United States and Italy) have accused Mao of "revisionism." Others, however, have interpreted the new Chinese foreign policy as a sign of Machiavellian wisdom, and the organ of the North Korean Communist party termed President Nixon's visit to China as "a trip of the defeated." In any case, the prestige of the Chinese communist regime has grown considerably around the world, among governments as well as in public opinion, and the accounts of many non-communist western travellers through mainland China resemble, in their enthusiasm, those of their predecessors who, in the mid-1930s, visited Stalin's Russia.

To sum up, in contrast with the xenophobic rigors of the cultural revolution, the Maoist regime has abandoned with gusto its earlier self-imposed isolation and obviously enjoys the role of a major world power, buttressing its credentials by systematically developing nuclear military capabilities and striving to assume the leadership of the still shapeless "anti-imperialistic" bloc. It is more difficult, in this context, to foresee the role the Chinese Communist party will play in the future within the international communist movement, but it is certain that it will continue to challenge the overall Soviet Russian leadership.

This leads us now to review, in a more systematic fashion, the causes as well as the outbreak and development of the Sino-Soviet conflict, a major political schism of our time and

certainly the one which "deterministic" Marxism could neither conceive nor explain.

P. The Sino-Soviet Conflict

If Stalin was not able to have his way with Tito, he succeeded at least in isolating the "revisionist" Communist Yugoslavia and apparently to keep intact his dominance and influence among the other communist states and parties. As long as he lived, there never transpired on the Chinese communist side any intention to deny Soviet Russian communist pre-eminence. This did not mean that the Chinese communists did not have reason to complain about Stalin. Mao Tse-tung was aware, of course, that it was Stalin who, in the late 1920s, influenced the Comintern's policy in China which had temporary catastrophic consequences for the Chinese party. Likewise, Mao knew that, as late as 1948, Stalin did not believe in a prompt communist success in China and even advised Chinese communists to seek an accommodation with Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Tse-tung, after his victory, did not consider it necessary to publicly reproach Stalin for his lack of confidence. In view of his own domestic situation and needs, he tried to maintain the best possible relations with the Soviet Union and to profit from its cooperation and help. Stalin, on his side, also tactfully did nothing to complicate the relations between the two countries and parties. On February 14, 1950, a "Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" between the Soviet and Chinese governments was signed, pledging all-round military and economic assistance and cooperation.

For several years after Stalin's death, practically up to the spring of 1960, Sino-Soviet relations appeared to follow the normal, friendly course. Today, however, it is known that there existed, at least since 1956, a series of misunderstandings which were slowly building their momentum. To start with, the Chinese communists considered Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin at the twentieth congress of the CPSU

(February, 1956) a dangerous political act and objected to not being informed in advance about the speech. The following year, Mao Tse-tung came personally to Moscow to attend a communist summit meeting which produced the well-known Moscow Declaration of November, 1957. In a speech at the Moscow airport on November 2, Mao spoke in superlative terms about the Soviet Union, adding that "the peoples of our two countries have already formed a fraternal alliance in their common struggles, and there is no force on earth which can separate us." The declaration of the Moscow meeting itself did not indicate any disagreement, but some of its radical formulations suggested Mao's sponsorship (later, when the Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open, the Chinese party accused the CPSU of placing the resolutions of its own congresses above the Moscow Declaration). In the words of the British historian, Edward Crankshaw, "the basic difference arose from the fact that Khrushchev viewed the declaration as an instrument of Soviet state policy, while Mao viewed it as an instrument of the revolutionary process."

During the next two years, a series of Chinese domestic and Soviet foreign political initiatives at first provoked tacit mutual dissatisfaction and served later as ammunition in public settlements of accounts. As described earlier, in the spring of 1958, the Chinese communists adopted their "great leap forward" economic policy and then established their communes as a shortcut to communism—initiatives unpalatable to the Soviets. In the realm of foreign policy, two events during 1959 particularly complicated the Sino-Soviet relations. When China invaded Indian territory in August-September, the Soviet government expressed its regrets and emphasized its friendly relations with both the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India. In February, 1963, the Chinese declared that this Soviet statement of neutrality between a socialist and a capitalist country was the first public indication to the outside world about the Sino-Soviet disagreements. The second event which displeased the Chinese leader was Khrushchev's trip to the United States in

the second part of September, 1959. It was reported later that Khrushchev's talks with Mao during his visit to mainland China in October were far from friendly.

An article in the *Red Flag*, entitled "Long Live Leninism" and published on April 13, 1960, commemorating the ninety-fifth anniversary of Lenin's birth, marked the beginning of veiled though unmistakable anti-Soviet attacks on the part of the Chinese. For a couple of years, and with growing intensity, the two sides were exchanging indirect accusations and counter-accusations, the Chinese assailing the Yugoslav "revisionists" publicly while, in fact, aiming at the Russian party, and the Soviets condemning Albanian "dogmatism," having in mind the Chinese.

Despite the mutual disagreements which now were reaching the surface, the two parties achieved a temporary truce during the international conference of eighty-one communist parties which met in Moscow for an extended period of time in November, 1960. The long statement following the conference (usually referred to together with the Moscow, 1957, Declaration) represented a compromise between the Soviet and Chinese viewpoints. It used radical revolutionary language: the world triumph of socialism was inevitable, and the capitalist system was undergoing "an intense process of disintegration and decay." United States "imperialism" was "an enemy of the peoples of the world." World war could be prevented, but, in accordance with Chinese views, "should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it." The central Soviet tenet of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems was endorsed as the only alternative to a destructive war, but it was explained that "the coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism." Both peaceful and non-peaceful transitions to socialism were mentioned. The hopes of those who wanted to split the socialist camp were said to be "doomed to failure," and it was proclaimed that "all the socialist countries cherish the unity of the socialist camp like the apple of their eye." The CPSU was confirmed as "the universally recognized vanguard of the world communist

movement, being the most experienced and steered contingent of the international Communist movement." The Chinese communists were complimented for contributing to the change in the balance of world forces in favor of socialism: "by giving a further powerful impetus to the national liberation movement the People's Revolution in China exerted tremendous influence." By contrast, the "Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist 'theories' in concentrated form" was unanimously condemned, and the Yugoslav "revisionists" were accused of carrying on "subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement." Proclaiming that the task of all communists was "to launch a determined offensive on the ideological front," the statement condemned both "revisionism" and "sectarianism," adding, however, that the former "remains the main danger."

Despite the formal unanimity of the November conference and the verbal radicalism of the Moscow statement, Sino-Soviet relations were not improved. Chou En-lai, head of the Chinese delegation to the twenty-second congress of the CPSU (October, 1961) left the congress before its end, after having publicly defended the Albanian party previously criticized by Khrushchev. While in Moscow, Chou En-lai placed a wreath on the tomb of Stalin. In December, 1962, both parties circulated confidential memoranda among the other ruling communist parties, the Chinese accusing the Soviets, and the Soviets denying the charges. Finally, on February 27, 1963, the official organ of the Chinese Communist party, *People's Daily*, published the first lengthy account describing the various phases of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the basic issues of disagreement. Since that time up to the present, it has been unnecessary to use the "Yugoslav" and "Albanian" pretexts; both sides continued their campaign of mutual vilification from then on, openly and directly.

Three particular instances should be mentioned to illustrate the intensity of the conflict. Throughout the later phases of the Vietnam war, despite the military and political support the Soviet and Chinese governments gave North

Vietnam, both sides accused each other of handling war aid inadequately and of being surreptitiously in collusion with the Americans. Then, during the cultural revolution in China, mobs of demonstrating Chinese students battered with Soviet offices in Moscow while the Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Peking and invaded a Soviet consular office there. But the conflict reached its peak in 1969: in March, fighting broke out on an island in the Ussuri river on the northeastern border of the two countries, resulting in injury and death for many Chinese and Soviet soldiers; in August, another military clash occurred on the Chinese western border between the Soviet Kazakhstan and the Chinese Sinkiang. Consequently, both sides intensified military buildup along their borders and speculations ran high in the West about the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike against the Chinese nuclear installations. In September, however, border negotiations began between the two governments following a meeting at the Peking airport between the Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin and Chou En-lai. The border talks continued in the ensuing years without achieving tangible results. A certain detente was noted on the governmental level in November, 1970, when a four-year ambassadorial boycott ended between the two countries and a trade agreement was signed. Still, the verbal battle continued unabated on the party-propaganda level. For example, on the eve of the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU in March-April 1971, the main Chinese newspapers celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Commune of Paris and unleashed strongest attacks on Soviet leadership. Here are a few samples of these attacks: "The Soviet Union is a paradise for a handful of bureaucrat-monopoly-capitalists of a new type, a prison for the millions of working people . . . May we ask the Soviet leaders: Is it a 'milder' form when you send large numbers of armed troops and police to suppress the people of different nationalities in your country? . . . when you station large numbers of troops in some East European countries and the Mongolian People's Republic to impose a tight control over them, and even carry out the military occupation of Czechoslovakia, driving tanks into Prague? . . . when you engage in military expansion

everywhere and insidiously conduct all manner of subversive activities against other countries . . . Brezhnev and his gang are going all out for militarism and the arms race, spending more and more rubles on more and more planes, guns, warships, guided missiles and nuclear weapons. It is by means of this monstrous apparatus of violence that these new tsars oppress the broad masses at home and maintain their colonial rule abroad." The Soviet side did not remain silent either, and at the end of March, 1971, the Far-Eastern Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a book containing strong accusations of the Chinese communist leadership, charging it particularly with "breaking the unity of socialist countries and communist movements" and with "fanatic ideological struggle against the CPSU and other communist parties."

It is a moot question what result the Nixon administration policy of negotiations and accommodations with both communist giants will have had on the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the midst of 1973, in any case, the military buildup on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border persisted, and mutual propagandistic accusations, somewhat subdued in tone, continued to flow.

Passing now from the description of the phases of the conflict to its substance, one may distinguish between the openly proclaimed and the hidden causes of the Sino-Soviet split. In an overall survey, four open issues may be identified.

(1) Tactical disagreements on how to wage the international class struggle. For example, in the aftermath of the Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba in the fall of 1962, the Chinese assailed the Soviets for their initial "adventurism" (surreptitiously bringing the nuclear-missiles to Cuba) and then for their "capitulation" before the United States (taking the missiles out of Cuba). For years since that time, the Chinese have hammered on the theme of Soviet "betrayal" and alleged Soviet-American collusion aiming at anti-Chinese world domination. On their side, as seen above, the Soviets have insisted that Chinese sectarianism has prevented the establishment of a genuine world-wide, anti-imperialist bloc. Recent Chinese and Soviet rapprochement

with the United States has complicated for both sides the use of the "collusion" argument with the Americans, although the mutually accusatory charges of who is betraying the international class struggle by plotting with Western "imperialists" have not disappeared.

(2) Issues dealing with nuclear and economic cooperation. The Chinese have been persistent in denouncing the Soviets as a treacherous ally since the departure of Soviet technicians and their families from mainland China in August, 1960. Lack of Soviet support to recover Taiwan (Formosa) has also been often mentioned. The Soviets have denied these charges, noting the huge economic aid, over 34 billion rubles, they offered to China in the period 1950-61. In a similar vein, the Soviets have been accused of sabotaging the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the United States. The Soviets, in turn, have charged the Chinese of fomenting a military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, so that they may "sit on the mountain and watch the fight of the tigers." Likewise, the Chinese authorities have been blamed for placing obstacles in the rail transportation of Soviet war material to North Vietnam.

(3) Territorial issues. Even more ominously, the Chinese have opened some Sino-Soviet territorial issues, challenging the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. In an interview with a group of Japanese journalists on July 10, 1964, Mao Tse-tung attacked the Soviet Union for placing Mongolia under Soviet domination and for aspiring to annex the Sinkiang area and other Chinese territories north of the Amur river. He intimated to his Japanese listeners that the Soviet Union had seized the Kurile Islands legitimately belonging to Japan and blamed the Soviet Union for appropriating a part of Rumania, separating a portion of East Germany, and dividing a part of Poland. "They took," said Mao, "everything they could." A corresponding theme in Soviet rebuttals can be found in the CPSU theses on the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, in which the "Mao Tse-tung group" was accused of "taking up a policy which combined petty-bourgeois adventurism with great-power chauvinism disguised by Left phraseology."

(4) Leadership of the international communist movement. As a natural consequence of political disagreements, the Chinese party had at first tried to convince the CPSU to adopt Chinese views, and, when it failed, it had begun to set up a sort of a rival international communist movement and to split pro-Soviet communist parties. It has already been mentioned that the Maoist blueprint for a revolutionary struggle of racially colored and economically underdeveloped continents against the United States and former European colonial countries was put forward as the most valid example and approach. Calling Mao the "Lenin of our time" meant for the Chinese faithful and their followers everywhere that Mao's task in the present world corresponded to Lenin's struggle fifty years ago when he attacked and split social democrats and created a new communist international. The meaning of the "east wind prevailing over the west wind" was then extended to signify Maoist leadership of the international proletarian struggle which the CPSU has allegedly abandoned. The Soviet party's total rejection of such views was reflected in its continuous efforts to assemble the largest possible number of foreign communist parties which would be willing to denounce Maoist "heresy."

Besides these open issues, one should take into account some hidden causes of the conflict. One such cause is what could be called a discrepancy of revolutionary levels in both Russia and China. The fact that in one country the communists came to power in 1917 and in the other in 1949 means that the Russian post-Bolshevik society is distinguishable by its many institutional, economic, and psychological features from the still relatively fresh revolutionary China. In other words, the successors of Lenin, the founding father of communism in Russia, and Mao, the founding father of communism in China, necessarily view in a different light the problems of socialist essence as well as the ways to achieve communism under dissimilar conditions. In the Soviet Union, the classics of communism are Marx, Engels, and Lenin; in China, besides these three, Stalin is still praised as a major communist figure, and Mao, the "Lenin of our time," is put on the highest possible level as the only living classic of

Marxist thought (invariably called "the thought of chairman Mao").

All these differences suggest that, at least as long as Mao lives, the chances of a genuine Sino-Soviet reconciliation are minimal. Moscow's denunciations of the "Maoist clique" in China or Peking's predictions that the rule of "revisionists" within the CPSU will not last long indicate that both sides count on internal factional strifes in the enemy camp to get rid of the present leader.

Q. Leonid Brezhnev's Domestic and Foreign Policies

Nikita Khrushchev's downfall in October, 1964, initiated the third period of "collective leadership" in the Soviet Union (the first period followed Lenin's death and lasted until 1928; the second extended between 1953-1957 in the wake of Stalin's death). The first public gesture of Khrushchev's successors was to denounce his rule. On October 17, the official organ of the CPSU, *Pravda*, without mentioning Khrushchev's name, denounced his "harebrained scheme, half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions divorced from reality, bragging and bluster, attraction to rule by fiat, unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already discovered." After such a denunciation, the new regime set out to straighten Khrushchev's wrongdoings.

During the next near-decade a new team of leaders shaped the policies of the Soviet Union and its ruling party. Despite occasional disagreements and some official changes in the politburo, the top decision-making body of the party, the post-Khrushchev rulers showed a great deal of cohesion in conducting state and party affairs. However, despite its initial collective-leadership character, the period following the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU held in March-April 1971, was marked by the increasing prestige and authority of the CPSU secretary-general, Leonid I. Brezhnev (born in 1906). He emerged as the undisputed leader of the sixteen-

member politburo, outdistancing its two other most prominent members, Nikolai Podgorny, nominal head of the Soviet State, and Aleksei Kosygin, Soviet premier. Brezhnev's political style differed in both form and substance from Khrushchev's more innovative but erratic politics. Contrary to Khrushchev's virulent attacks on Stalin and his de-Stalinization schemes which had introduced confusion and disaffection into the ranks of the party bureaucracy, Brezhnev put a halt to de-Stalinization (even allowing partial rehabilitation of Stalin as party and war leader) and relied on the existing organizational structure of the party to enhance its overall control and to administer more efficiently the Soviet, officially called, "developed socialism." Likewise, with greater consistency than Khrushchev, Brezhnev insisted on the Leninist orthodoxy of the CPSU's domestic and foreign policies.

Having established his own preeminence, Brezhnev engaged in restructuring the top and checking the general membership of the party. On April 27, 1973, in a unique reshuffling in the history of the Soviet party, three new full members entered the politburo: foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, defense minister marshal Andrei Grechko, and the head of the secret police Yuri Andropov (while two members, considered opponents of Brezhnev's policies, were dropped). Some Western commentators estimated that this unprecedented simultaneous inclusion of the highest representatives of the Soviet Army, police and diplomacy into the top policy-making body represents a sort of leadership formed at times of crisis. In any case the reconstruction of the politburo indicated Brezhnev's willingness to be in closest contact with those heading the most important departments of the state machinery. At the same time, the CPSU leadership decided to weed out undesirable elements from party ranks by reissuing party cards—an operation conducted in 1973-1974.

Besides pursuing an extremely active foreign policy (to be reviewed later), Brezhnev's regime paid particular attention to the overall development of Soviet armed forces, strength-

ening their might and combat capability. Combining, thus, the elements of Lenin's teaching on party and army roles, and Stalin's use of nationalism (as discussed earlier), the Soviet Union under Brezhnev has achieved the status of a world superpower, with only the United States in the same league. This ascendancy is aptly described by a noted British Soviet affairs expert, Malcolm Mackintosh: "[Brezhnev and his colleagues share] the conviction that in the long run history is on the side of Russia and the Soviet Union. This is held on the nationalist ground that it is now the turn of Russia to enjoy the power and prestige so long denied her, as well as on the ideological ground that fundamentally the Soviet system is politically correct, and sooner or later will, through the process of history, come to be accepted as a model throughout the world."

All this does not mean, of course, that the Brezhnev regime has eliminated domestic difficulties and has found ways to cope with the deficiencies of the Soviet economic system. Despite the official claim that the national question in the Soviet Union had been definitively solved, nationalist, centrifugal agitation persisted (essentially in the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Georgia), and Brezhnev himself admitted, in a speech at the fiftieth U.S.S.R. anniversary celebration in December, 1972, that "nationalistic prejudices, exaggerated or distorted national feelings, are extremely tenacious and deeply imbedded." Thus, for example, the self-immolation of a student at a Lithuanian university in the spring of 1972 provoked clashes between the secret police and thousands of youths shouting "freedom for Lithuania"; in Georgia, the wave of nationalism was responsible in large part for a major change in political command, and in the Ukraine, prominent intellectual dissidents and nationalists were arrested and severely punished. Soviet authorities were also sensitive to the hostile radio propaganda emanating from Peking and directed to the non-Russian ethnic groups in Asia. Imposition of a high levy on Soviet Jews wanting to immigrate to Israel became a source of embarrassment to the regime, having attracted international attention and protests. Intellectual dissent also plagued the regime, particularly be-

cause the leaders of the dissent were world-renowned writers and scientists such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature, and Andrei Sakharov, one of the most prominent Soviet physicians. An unofficial Human Rights Committee, led by Sakharov, fought desperately for greater intellectual freedom and political liberalization, with Sakharov complaining that the Soviet society was infected with "apathy, hypocrisy, narrow-minded egoism, and hidden cruelty." A widespread net of underground literary and political publications and a growing interest in religion were other aspects of the same phenomenon of dissent. The regime, however, reacted ruthlessly against all forms of domestic opposition. The most active members of the dissident movement were either removed from their regular professional posts, or imprisoned, or driven to exile abroad. One particular aspect which caused wide international protest was the confinement of dissenters to psychiatric hospitals. Significantly enough, while Khrushchev's domestic liberalization paralleled his greater openness toward the West, Brezhnev was imposing stern ideological conformity coupled with persecution of dissenters while approaching the Western world with appeals for cooperation and reduction of international tensions.

Largely successful in tightening internal controls and disarming budding opposition, the Brezhnev regime has been beset with both structural and current economic problems. From an overall viewpoint, 1972 was the least satisfactory economic year since the downfall of Khrushchev. Targets of the ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) were not reached, particularly in agriculture, the perennial weakspot of the Soviet economy. That required turning to the West, especially the United States, for the purchase of grain, which negatively affected the balance of payments. The rate of economic growth, industrial production, labor productivity, and output of consumer goods suffered setbacks, so that the regime was forced to reorder its economic priorities at the end of 1972 and to try to overcome existing shortcomings by improving administration and strengthening labor discipline and supervision. More importantly, to achieve the necessary

modernization of the Soviet economy and to build what some commentators call "computer communism," Brezhnev has turned to a device introduced by Lenin and practiced by Stalin, namely to harness Western technological and industrial know-how to the needs of the faltering Soviet economy. This element certainly had high priority in the overall conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

It is impossible to describe here all the facets of Soviet foreign policy on practically all the continents. One must therefore select and evaluate its most important aspects. In many respects, Khrushchev's collective heirs, and then Leonid Brezhnev himself, have pursued the early Khrushchevian foreign policy, minus his personal style. Like Khrushchev in the case of Hungary in 1956, they appeared at first to tolerate the genuinely liberalizing communist experience in Czechoslovakia under Alexander Dubček during the first half of 1968, and then, as in Hungary twelve years earlier, ordered a massive invasion of the country in August. Following that dramatic event, which had temporarily aroused a wave of indignation around the world, Brezhnev came forth to proclaim the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in any country of the "Socialist commonwealth" in which a "threat to the cause of Socialism" was thought to exist. This concept of limited sovereignty within the socialist community, which Brezhnev formulated in his speech before the fifth congress of the Polish Communist party in November, 1968, became henceforth known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine had momentous repercussions for three reasons: they clearly indicated that the Soviet Union was willing to use military force to prevent any domestic course which the Soviet leadership might consider objectionable in any of the "people's democracies"; they also showed that Western powers, including the United States, were resigned to the Soviet domination of East Central Europe; and they alarmed the Chinese communist leadership lest the Brezhnev doctrine be used as a pretext to attack the Maoist "deviationist" regime.

For a couple of tense years following the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw-pact maneuvers in different East Central European countries nurtured rumors of a Soviet invasion of Rumania and Yugoslavia, whose unorthodox foreign policies have been, in many instances, at odds with those of the Soviet Union. Then, in the early 1970s, with "order" being restored in Czechoslovakia and outcries in the West about the invasion quieting down, the Soviet diplomacy reverted to intensifying contacts with the Western world, hammering on themes of peaceful coexistence, international security and detente, and economic-scientific cooperation. For obvious reasons, Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues were most interested in establishing a new kind of relationship with the United States, and the agreements signed both during President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, 1972, and secretary-general Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June, 1973, were clear evidence that a new stage of the relations between the two countries was emerging.

To introduce a brief evaluation of Soviet policies and motives vis-à-vis the United States, both in general and especially under Brezhnev, I shall quote the words of a prominent American historian and occasional diplomat with deep knowledge of Soviet affairs, Archibald Cary Coolidge, who already in 1922 wrote that "as the richest, most successful bourgeois capitalistic state of the day, the United States embodies the most advanced type of the form of society which Communists regard it as their chief object in life to destroy, but as it has the largest amount of available capital it is the country which can do the most to build up Russia and finally it is the one which has shown itself by far the most generous in relieving Russian distress." Keeping in mind this fundamental observation, and updating it to fit the present circumstances, one may say that the Soviet leaders view and approach the United States as a *partner*, *provider*, and *enemy*. Each of these approaches is dictated by specific reasons which need further elucidation.

The "partnership" aspect stems from the Soviet goal of maintaining on the par with the United States the exclusive status of a nuclear superpower, which in turn necessitates reaching political and military agreements and building mech-

anisms to prevent local conflicts escalating into nuclear war. In the nuclear field, the "partnership" between the two countries started with the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August, 1963, prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outerspace and under water, but permitting continued underground testing. Five years later, in 1968, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. under United Nations auspices. A further step was taken by the signature in Moscow in May, 1972, of the Soviet-American Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Offensive Arms. In a similar vein, during Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June, 1973, both sides expressed willingness to continue talks on further limitation of strategic offensive weapons. It should be noted, however, that while both governments are certainly anxious to prevent a nuclear holocaust, the overall military equilibrium is not a stable one. In fact, the Soviet-sustained efforts to replenish their huge military arsenals with the most modern types of weaponry (efforts unobstructed by public opinion pressures and parliamentary opposition and investigations) have brought results in the sense that the previously existing American nuclear superiority has become a parity between the two countries, the Soviet quantitative strength matching the U.S. qualitative weapon advantages. But the announcement in the middle of August, 1973, that the Soviets made a breakthrough in the arms race, successfully testing for the first time the so-called MIRV's warhead missiles (MIRV's being an abbreviation for Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles), may represent—in the absence of effective American counter-measures—that the Soviets have not only closed the technological gap in the military field but have also gained a strategic edge.

The "provider" aspect of Soviet interests in American technology, foodstuffs, credits, and investment capital, is practically as old as Soviet Russia itself. Lenin had been extremely eager to attract American capital and engineers and to obtain Western credits to rebuild Russian industry. Stalin had candidly admitted to an American businessman in

1944 that "about two-thirds of all the large industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union had been built with United States help or technical assistance." No wonder, then, that Leonid Brezhnev, facing economic difficulties briefly outlined above, wants on his side—in the words of an editorial in the *New York Times*—"that the anticipated fruits of detente include massive transfers of American capital and technological know-how to speed up Soviet development and—invariably—the growth of Soviet power." In fact, the 1972 harvest failure prompted the Soviet government to purchase 17.4 million tons of U.S. corn and other grain, worth \$1 billion. Besides such transactions and conclusion of normal trade contracts, Soviet leaders are anxious to negotiate obtention of extensive long-term credits under favorable repayment conditions, which would not only help Soviet technology but would allow the regime to avoid shifting budgetary expenditures from the military buildup to the pressing economic needs. The increase in trade volume would certainly benefit many American businessmen, but the granting of the most favored-nation status to Soviet exports would be another major boost to the Soviet economy.

The "enemy" aspect of Soviet attitudes vis-à-vis the United States is also imbedded in the very core of Lenin's ideas and subsequent Marxist-Leninist ideology. While the official policies of the Soviet government waver according to the temporary diplomatic needs, the ideological and political hostility of the CPSU toward American institutions and policies remain unchanged. For example, at the time when Soviet diplomacy was in full swing hailing the new "provider" aspects of cooperation with the American government and businessmen, the main resolution of the twenty-fourth CPSU congress proclaimed that "the reactionary tendencies and aggressive aspirations are most pronounced in the policy of U.S. imperialism, which presents the greatest danger to the independence of peoples and world peace, and is the main obstacle in the way of social progress. What is especially characteristic of the U.S.A. is its aggressive foreign-policy line, and its inflation of militarism, which carries with it the

danger of a world war." Similarly, Soviet party leaders and chief ideologists have consistently asserted that peaceful co-existence does not mean the ideological rapprochement and conciliation between the communist and capitalist systems, but, on the contrary, the intensification of the international class struggle. This explains also why Soviet representatives at the first two stages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki in January and July, 1973, were adamantly opposed to Western proposals for a free exchange of people, ideas, and information. As for the detente in East-West relations, Brezhnev himself had explained that it should essentially serve communist political purposes. Addressing the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties on Problems of European Security, held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April, 1967, he said that the cold war climate was seriously handicapping favored anti-communism in the West. "Conversely," he stated, "recent years have demonstrated with particular force that when international tensions relax the hand of the political barometer swings to the left. The certain improvement in the relations between Communists and Social-Democrats in some countries, the perceptible abatement of the anti-Communist hysteria and the increased influence of West-European Communist parties are directly connected with a certain easing of tension on the European continent." These words found a quasi-identical echo six years later in a *Pravda* editorial of August 26, 1973, in which it was said that the Soviet aim in seeking closer economic and political relations with the West is to "isolate the reactionary, aggressive forces of the capitalist world and to strengthen world socialism as well as the Communist, workers and national liberation movements."

The complex three-corner pattern of Soviet-U.S. relations outlined in previous paragraphs may also be applicable to Soviet relations with Western Europe. "Partnership-provider" aspects are perceptible in the proliferation of bilateral political contacts and in the signing of trade agreements with different West European governments, as well as in the Soviet Union's particular interest in the conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe, which was held in Helsinki and Geneva in 1973. As for the bilateral relations, in ways reminiscent of Soviet diplomatic moves under both Lenin and Stalin, Brezhnev's foreign policy has been oriented especially toward a new closeness with West Germany. On August 12, 1970, a non-aggression treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic, and, one year later, a four-power agreement on West Berlin was also concluded. Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May, 1973, was considered by many commentators as a historical event for both political and economic reasons. Politically, it was a very important stage of the Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) which German Social Democratic chancellor, Willi Brandt, was pursuing, aiming at a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Economically, the new agreements signed between the two countries opened possibilities of increased economic and industrial cooperation for both sides. A German analyst wrote in this respect that from the Soviet viewpoint "the vast Soviet potential, combined with German technology and organizational skill would represent an unbeatable duo." As for the Helsinki-Geneva conference, it should be seen in the context of the "peace offensive" proclaimed at the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU. From many official Soviet pronouncements, three elements emerged, reflecting basic Soviet aims to be achieved at the conference: recognition of and respect for existing territorial and political realities in Europe—that is, confirmation of the status quo in Eastern Europe; expansion of economic, scientific, technical and trade relations; establishment of a permanent mechanism to explore and survey common political, economic, security and cultural affairs of Europe.

As for the "enemy" aspect, one should stress again the insistence of both the Soviet and East-Central European communist leaders that diplomatic rapprochement and increased technological and trade cooperation with the West have nothing to do with domestic tightening of controls over dissidents and ideological intransigence. Moreover, as succinctly put by Malcolm Mackintosh, the kind of European relations which the present Soviet leaders would like to see

would be "an Eastern Europe firmly under Soviet domination, its political systems and frontiers unchallenged by the West; a Western Europe divided both politically and economically, without binding military ties or defense links to the United States; each country with minimum forces deployed only on its own territory, and, hopefully persuaded of the need to make its own bilateral deal with the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues." This statement hints at the notion of "Finlandization," often mentioned and analyzed in the West European press, which implies the long-term Soviet aim of making Western Europe as dependent politically and economically on the Soviet Union as the nowadays formally independent but actually subservient Finland.

Soviet diplomatic initiatives and attitudes in other parts of the world should finally be mentioned to illustrate Soviet global interests on all continents. Already in 1969, after the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Soviet diplomacy promoted the establishment of an Asian security system resembling somewhat Soviet schemes in Europe. Inoperative for several years, the idea of an Asian collective-security system was revived early in 1972 and pushed with even greater insistence in 1973. The Asian idea, much less developed than that concerning the all-European security system, aims to contain both Chinese influence and potential pre-eminence in Southern and Southeastern Asia, as well as to undermine any attempt to revive the American-supported Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). On the Asian continent, too, the Soviet Union has strengthened its ties with India by signing in August, 1971, a twenty-year pact provided for mutual nonaggression and increased trade, and promising more technical aid. In a somewhat similar, though more remote, vein, Soviet diplomacy has also pursued closer economic and political ties with Japan (in 1972, the largest non-communist Soviet trading partner), paralleling on the Asian scene the recent rapprochement realized in Europe with West Germany.

In the shifting world of Middle Eastern policies, Soviet-Arab relations have been marked by significant ups and downs in recent years. During the 1967 Arab-Israel war, the

Soviet Union gave full support, short only of direct military involvement, to the Arab side. However, the close cooperation with Egypt under the rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (who died in 1970) suffered a notable setback under his successor, Anwar el-Sadat, who ordered on July 18, 1972, the withdrawal of most Soviet military advisors and experts from Egypt. Another setback for the Soviet Union took place in September, 1971, when Sudan recalled its ambassadors from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, following an attempt by the Sudanese Communist party and left-wing officers to seize power in July. As a sort of compensation, however, the Soviet Union strengthened military and political ties and increased its influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In several other Middle Eastern, as well as African, states, the Soviet policy consisted of supplying, whenever appropriate, economic and military aid, competing with both the United States and Communist China. As for Latin America, the Soviet government, and especially the CPSU, showed great interest in the "united front" experiment of the Chilean government led by the Marxist president Salvador Allende, and, after his overthrow on September 11, 1973, the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with the new military regime. These developments in Chile underscore Cuba's unique position in the Western hemisphere and, as already discussed, her ever stronger political and economic ties with the Soviet Union. Soviet policy in other Latin American countries varied according to circumstances. It was generally low-keyed, in view of the geographic remoteness, although in some countries, such as Peru, the Soviets offered military and economic aid, while in others they tended to cultivate both friendly diplomatic relations and intensified trade.

Soviet global foreign policy, reflecting the status of the U.S.S.R. as the second world superpower and serving to enhance even more its might and prestige, should also be viewed in connection with the CPSU's persistent efforts to maintain its leading role in the international communist movement. In this respect the Soviet party under Brezhnev's leadership has strived to stave off both the challenge of the Chinese party to replace it as the leading international com-

munist party and the inclinations of some parties generally following Moscow's line to conduct their affairs more independently. As a vehicle to achieve these aims, especially in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border clashes with China in 1969, the CPSU convened, after several consultative sessions and postponements, the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, which met in Moscow on June 5-17, 1969. It was the third such conference since the dissolution of the Comintern, the first and second having been held, as we have seen, in 1957 and 1960 under Nikita Khrushchev's rule. The 1969 conference was attended by seventy-five party delegations, with the conspicuous absence of the Chinese party and, in general, a very weak representation of Asian parties; those which abstained either followed the Chinese leadership or were unwilling to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This time, contrary to the 1957 and 1960 conferences, which offered a facade of unity to the outside world, some of the CPSU policies—those relating to the dispute with the Chinese party, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and to questions of party autonomy and international obligations—were openly discussed and criticized by some of the participants. Despite this display of disagreement, the CPSU positions were supported by a large majority of participating parties while the critics did not go beyond making dissenting remarks on specific points and/or refusing to sign unreservedly parts of the main document issued by the conference under the title "Tasks at the Present Stage of the Struggle Against Imperialism and United Action of the Communist and Workers' Parties and All Anti-Imperialist Forces." This document made no direct reference to the controversy with the Chinese Communist party or to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although some fifty delegations criticized the "Maoist leadership," and Gustav Husak, Alexander Dubček's successor as the new leader of the Czechoslovak party, tried to deflate criticisms of "some fraternal parties" in relation to the invasion of his country.

In the years following the Moscow meeting, the CPSU managed to consolidate its position within the international

movement, although it never succeeded (and did not even try, at least not formally) in recreating an international communist organization along Comintern lines. On the other hand, as was expressed at the meeting of leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries held in the Crimea on July 30-31, 1973, all the ruling parties in Eastern Europe (with the exception of the Yugoslav and Albanian parties, who did not attend the meeting) endorsed the "peace program" of the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU and especially the purposes of the Helsinki conference.

A British-American expert on international communist affairs has recently analyzed the alignments and fortunes of the world Marxist-Leninist parties which—if one counts small splinter groups, Castroist guerillas and adherents to the four contending Trotskyist internationals—comprised some 300 organizations by the autumn of 1972. If one sets aside splinter groups and takes into account only the well established communist parties, one obtains, according to the same author, the following picture: "The CPSU can count on the totally uncritical alignment of six ruling parties (five in East Europe plus that of Mongolia) and forty-nine non-ruling parties (seven in West Europe, fourteen in the Middle East and Africa, twenty-four in the Western Hemisphere, and four in Asia). Likewise, the Chinese Communist party can count on one ruling party (Albania) and eight non-ruling parties (all, except the New Zealand CP, in Asia). The remaining twenty-seven parties, of which five are in power, have shown varying degrees of independence. Nearly all of them, however, were among the seventy-five parties that attended the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, which would indicate that they do on occasion align themselves with a Soviet-initiated action. In fact, a number of the independent parties—although not the majority—are independent only over the issue of Czechoslovakia."

The preceding statistical survey indicates that the international communist movement is essentially pro-Soviet. Moreover, the existence of Soviet-dominated international communist front organizations (such as the World Federation

of Trade Unions, World Peace Council, etc.) facilitates the orchestration of protests and demonstrations in many parts of the world. The perennial interest showed by the CPSU leadership for the world revolutionary process has been vividly expressed in an article published in the October, 1971, issue of the CPSU central committee's organ, *Kommunist*. It was written by Boris Ponomarev, a secretary of the central committee specializing in relations with the international communist movement. In the apt summation of Ponomarev's lengthy article, Professor Lothar Metz (writing for the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on International Security) stated: "Through the prism of Marxism-Leninism Ponomarev perceives unprecedented opportunities for revolutionary action resulting from an increasingly grave economic and political crisis in the non-communist world. His main worry seems to be whether communist parties—Soviet-oriented, of course—are subjectively capable of exploiting these opportunities. Therefore he gives them considerable advice on how to improve their organizational and political capabilities in the true and tested Soviet-approved way."

The Brezhnev regime faces a contradiction which has existed since the days of Lenin and the foundation of the Comintern, namely the conflict between the interests of the Soviet state and those of foreign communist parties—the best illustration of which is the fact that the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations with many governments, especially in the Middle East, which persecute local communists. For several decades the official Soviet dogma has been that everything that strengthens the Soviet Union also benefits the world revolutionary process and, that despite occasional reversals, the capitalist system is doomed. The task of non-Soviet communist parties was (and remains) to adapt their activities to local conditions, without abandoning their Leninist goals and allegiances to the first country of communism. Brezhnev has experienced, as Khrushchev and Stalin before him, that some foreign communist parties view their tasks differently, but he certainly believes, as he forcefully expressed in his report to the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU, that everything must be done to strengthen the Soviet

while the deepening general crisis of capitalism will cause of communism everywhere in the world.

Communism in Albania, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia

The scope of this study does not allow the analysis of important facets of world communism and of its problems and ramifications in individual countries and regions. However, however, three cases which, because of their character and relevance, should be included in this study. These cases concern recent and disparate communist regimes in three countries on two continents: Albania, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia.

Early to Yugoslavia, the history of communism in Albania is full of odd events and sharp reversals of policy. In its very short history, the Albanian Communist party (founded on November 8, 1941) has switched its ideological and political allegiance three times. Initially, between 1941 and 1945, the party had been completely under Yugoslav control. Two members of the Yugoslav Communist party were instrumental in forming the Albanian party and were its ideological and military mentors during World War II. After the war, the Albanian communists proceeded, as the Yugoslavs speedily imposing their full power and eliminating anti-communist rivals. In this, as well as in the general political and economic orientation, Albania became a satellite of Yugoslavia. In November, 1946, a customs union between the two countries was established, and, afterwards, talks about Albania's incorporation into Yugoslavia and a federal republic were held. Within the Albanian party, however, a faction opposed to such close relations with Yugoslavia persisted, and, when the Stalin-Tito conflict broke out in June, 1948, that faction headed by the present secretary, Enver Hoxha (born in 1908), took the upper hand and reversed the Albanian party's political course.

In the next seven years, Albania adopted a stridently anti-Yugoslav attitude. It now became a full-fledged Soviet satellite, with Soviet advisors replacing Yugoslavs and with the Stalinist instead of the Titoist

prototype serving.

With the death of Stalin and, particularly, following the Khrushchev-Tito rapprochement in 1956, Soviet-Albanian relations began to deteriorate. Enver Hoxha, who had purged real or assumed "Titoists" in his party, feared that he could again become dependent on Belgrade if Tito came to terms with Moscow. Khrushchev tried to assuage the Albanian apprehension, even visiting Albania in the spring of 1959. On that occasion, Enver Hoxha profusely hailed the Soviet-Albanian friendship, calling it "firmer than granite" and "as eternal as our mountains." Such words, however, were followed by very different political deeds. With the flaring up of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1960-61, the Albanians engaged in open polemics with the Soviet Russians and, as explained earlier, were used as targets of Soviet attacks actually directed against the Chinese. At the twenty-second congress of the CPSU (October, 1961), Khrushchev assailed the Albanian party leaders for their Stalinist inclinations. The Albanians answered a few days later in a first open anti-Khrushchevist blast, denouncing the "anti-Marxist lies and attacks [which] serve only the enemies of communism and of the Albanian People's Republic, the imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists." On November 25, the Soviet government decided to withdraw its ambassador from Tirana, and, on December 14, the Albanian embassy staff left Moscow.

From that time up to the present, the Albanian Communist party has become the staunchest supporter and ally of Maoist China. It has maintained an extremely rigorous, indeed Stalinist, domestic political regime. In February, 1967, the Albanian version of the "cultural revolution" was announced, patterned in many respects after the Maoist example. A particularly strong attack was made on religious institutions and, in September, an official party organ exulted that "under their [i.e., the party and Hoxha] shining guidance together with the entire populace, youth has created the first atheist state in the world." In the same spirit, the Hoxha regime has hammered day after day against its twin targets: American "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism." At the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the

Bolshevik Revolution, Albanian leaders called on the "real revolutionaries of the Soviet Union" to "rise, found a new Bolshevik party and give signal for the overthrow of the revisionist counter-revolution."

In view of Albania's tiny population (estimated at 2,300,000 in 1972), this peculiar behavior of the Albanian Communist party is much more significant than the size of the country it dominates. It illustrates the importance of the factor of nationalism (Albanian-Yugoslav antagonism) which the communist regimes were supposed to overcome. It also indicates that, because of the Sino-Soviet split, tiny Albania was and still is able to attack and challenge with impunity the Soviet giant. Despite its small size, the Albanian Communist party plays an important role, both because it remains consistently Stalinist and because it is the only original European communist party which is officially aligned with the Chinese Communist party.

The case of communism in Vietnam, both North and South, is unique in its combination of virtually all elements of contemporary communist politico-military warfare. In fact, the Vietnamese communists blended some of the basic precepts and characteristics of Lenin's, Stalin's, and Mao's teachings and practices into their revolutionary struggle. From Lenin they took the organizational principles of the party and the concept of "united front" maneuverings; from Stalin, the totalitarian toughness in politics and economics, plus the need, in wartime, to mix patriotism and communism, or to put the cause of nationalism in the service of the party; from Mao, the theoretical as well as practical lessons of waging the revolutionary guerrilla war. This apprenticeship of the fundamentals of twentieth-century Marxism-Leninism was furthermore enhanced by a series of favorable domestic and international factors and by the long-lasting role of the party's founding father, Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969), surrounded by a homogeneous leadership in which the military chief, Vo Nguyen Giap (born in 1912), merits particular mention.

Formal history of Vietnamese communism began in June, 1925, when Ho founded the Revolutionary League of Young

Vietnamese in Canton (China). Prior to this, he had already acquired rich political experience. Active in the ranks of French socialist youth after World War I, he attended the founding congress of the French Communist party in December, 1920. In subsequent years he obtained extensive theoretical and practical training as a student at a Comintern school in Moscow and as a participant in several Comintern-related congresses. He spent much of his time in the Soviet Union and in China as a professional revolutionary during the inter-war period and was thus in close contact with both the Russian and Chinese communist leaders (which may explain his ability and inclination to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict of the 1960s, while obtaining indispensable military aid from both sides for his purposes in Vietnam). The Indochinese Communist party was founded in Hong Kong in January, 1930, and despite name changes, it developed and maintained highly cohesive leadership, both during Ho's lifetime and after his death, a phenomenon described by a Vietnam expert as "probably the longest uninterrupted directorate in world communism." In the inter-war period the party followed the Comintern line, including the struggle against the Trotskyists and the "united front" cooperation with groups of Vietnamese nationalists. However, the party's most significant activities took place during and after World War II. The Japanese occupation of Indochina and the arrangements between Japan and the France of the Vichy regime favored the establishment of the Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Minh) in southern China in May, 1941, a typical "united front" organization under communist control. It was instrumental, first, in the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1945, and, second, in the waging of the first Indochinese war against France (1946-1954). In the process of creating the DRV, the Viet Minh could count on the support or non-opposition of the British, Chinese Nationalist, and American forces. In the long and bitter struggle against the French, three elements worked in favor of the Viet Minh: its ability to neutralize or destroy nationalist leaders and to appear as the key force in anti-French resistance; communist

victory in China, and the subsequent Red Chinese military aid to the Viet Minh; and the collapse of the fighting will of the French government.

With the Geneva agreement of 1954 which ended the anti-French war and partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel, a new situation was created. The communist rule was now firmly established in the North, but, during that same year, some 860,000 people fled from North Vietnam and settled in the South to escape the communist regime. A strong underground Viet Minh network remained in the South, temporarily quiescent, while a new Nationalist regime under Premier Ngo Dinh Diem tried to rebuild the republic practically from scratch. The chances for unification elections in 1956 called for by the Geneva agreement dwindled due to Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to hold such elections and because the exclusivism of the communist rule in the North made free elections meaningless. In fact, during the period 1954-56, the communist regime in the North assumed both Stalinist and Maoist characteristics. A very harsh land reform was introduced leading to Soviet-type collectivization. As a result—according to a prominent expert on Vietnam, the late Professor Bernard Fall—“close to 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed in connection with the land reform and at least twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps.” Early in November, 1956, at the very time that Soviet tanks were crushing the Hungarian rebellion at the other end of the communist bloc, a popular upheaval took place in North Vietnam. Since there was no support from abroad for the plight of the North Vietnamese peasants, their rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed. Ho Chi Minh, however, realizing the degree of popular dissatisfaction, openly admitted mistakes and the ferocity of the Stalinist-type, forced collectivization, and offered self-criticism and abandonment of previously employed methods. At the same time, the Hanoi regime initiated its counterpart of the Maoist “Hundred Flowers” campaign, which at first brought about an outburst of criticism against the state of affairs in North Vietnam but then led to systematic and long-lasting suppression of formal opposition to the regime, especially among intellectuals.

The establishment of antagonistic regimes in two parts of Vietnam led to the Second Indochina War which, in the words of Professor Fall, "began by deliberate Communist design in South Vietnam early in 1957." The awareness that the pro-American Nationalist regime in the South was becoming increasingly effective politically and economically prompted the Vietnamese communists to fight it (as well as its American protector) by reactivating the Viet Minh network and the revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Relying on three basic assets: organization, leadership, and use of violence, the communists stepped up the propaganda campaign and selective terrorism against the village leaders and rural administrative cadres of the Saigon government. (President Kennedy in 1961 assailed these practices as "deliberate savagery of the Communist program of assassination, kidnapping and wanton violence.") In 1959, the central committee of the Vietnamese Communist party called for national unification by "all appropriate means," and, in September, 1960, the third party congress resolved "to carry out the Socialist revolution in North Vietnam" and "to liberate South Vietnam from the yoke of U.S. imperialists." The general communist strategy of the two-stage revolution was now in evidence: a "national-democratic revolution" to be pursued in the South while a definitive Socialist revolution was taking place in the North. In December, 1960, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was created to assemble all "democratic and patriotic" elements in the fight against the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, to implement the national-democratic revolution and to negotiate re-unification with the North. The NFL thus became another variant of the "people's front" device, and the fighters who under communist command pursued military battles were now known as the Viet Cong.

The Second Indochina War became particularly violent and complicated after the assassination of Premier Diem in November, 1963, and the increasing infiltration of North Vietnamese regular army units into the South. This military movement began from October, 1964, onwards and caused the intervention of U.S. combat and support troops in

February, 1965. From then on, the Vietnam conflict was internationalized in the sense that the American troops were joined by military units from the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, while the North Vietnamese were assisted by the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Russians supplied heavy arms and machinery, fighter planes, and ground-to-air missiles; the Chinese provided ammunitions, small arms and military and civilian technicians.

According to Sir Robert Thompson, leading British expert on guerrilla warfare, the Second Indochina War can be roughly divided into four periods. The first, from 1959 to the end of 1964, was a classical insurgency which turned into a guerrilla warfare phase. Here again the communists employed elements of the military strategy used against the French, with General Giap applying Mao-Tse-Tung's teachings on guerrilla operations to new circumstances. (Another authority on Vietnam, Douglas Pike, in his masterly study entitled *Viet Cong*, wrote that "Mao-Giap became to revolutionary guerrilla warfare what Marxism-Leninism is to Communist theory.") The second period of the war, from 1965 to the end of 1968, was fought as a main force war between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. The so-called Tet (Lunar New Year)-offensive began in late January, 1968, and, from the military viewpoint, turned into defeat for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong because the offensive failed to promote mass uprisings while the best Viet Cong military units were destroyed. On the other hand, the Tet offensive achieved a striking psychological victory in the United States and contributed to the weakening of public support for the official American policy in Vietnam. The third period, which lasted from 1969 to the end of 1971, was characterized by the joint American-South Vietnamese policies of pacification and Vietnamization which further reduced the Viet Cong insurgency in the South. This in turn provoked a three-pronged conventional invasion of South Vietnam by the North at the end of March, 1972. This fourth period, which ended with the peace agreement between the Nixon administration and the North Vietnamese government in January,

1973, had the following three characteristics: General Giap's "Blitzkrieg" offensive failed again to bring desired results; the North Vietnamese troops, however, established various enclaves on the territory of South Vietnam; the withdrawal of American troops left the antagonistic Vietnamese partners to face each other, under the assumption that they would be able to transform an uneasy military truce into a longer lasting political settlement.

This extremely condensed sketch of communism in Vietnam—from which was purposefully left out any discussion of American involvement in that country and particularly the ways in which successive U.S. administrations pursued the war militarily and politically—cannot be terminated with any definitive conclusion. After a series of post-World-War-II communist failures in Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, and Burma, Vietnam, together with Cambodia and Laos, had been the only region in Southeast Asia in which the communists were able to achieve a significant politico-military success despite the fact that their final goal is still unattained. One may be certain, however, that they will continue to fight for final victory in Indochina, even if they have to change their strategy and become more patient than they have been in the past. Needless to say, the outcome of their efforts will depend largely on the ability of the Saigon regime to resist them effectively in the military field without U.S. support while maintaining a viable political and economic structure. One may at the end, stress again the uniqueness of many aspects of communist militancy in Vietnam which, while inspiring many communists and revolutionaries around the world, will also be difficult to match under different historical and geo-political conditions.

Passing on to a brief survey of communism in Czechoslovakia, we face another story replete with dramatic and unpredictable events, though distinct from those in Albania and Vietnam. At the beginning, Czechoslovak communists had been considerably behind their counterparts in other European countries in establishing a coherent party. It was only after Lenin's personal intervention that a united, multinational Communist party of Czechoslovakia was organized

in October, 1921, comprising several ethnic groups (Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Poles and Ukrainians) which composed the new state that had been established in 1918. For several years after its establishment, the Czechoslovak party had difficulty aligning itself with Moscow. At the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, it was criticized as the worst section of the International, and a complete change of leadership was ordered. During the 1930s, the party headed by Klement Gottwald followed Stalin's policies without reservation and did not play a major role in domestic affairs. In the apt description of a political scientist, Paul Zinner: "as a revolutionary force, it amounted to nothing. As a parliamentary factor, its influence was also nil." It is noteworthy that, contrary to the situation in other East European countries in which the communist parties were outlawed and persecuted, the political climate in democratic Czechoslovakia was hospitable to the communists. During the war and the ruthless German occupation, the party maintained its organizational network and propagandized its views clandestinely, but its overt resistance to the Germans was minimal.

A new phase in the life of the Czechoslovak Communist party began after the end of the war. With its well-trained, disciplined, relatively young and dynamic cadres, the party emerged as a major political factor in the country. In the first post-war government, communists held key posts in the ministries of interior, information, and agriculture. During national elections in May, 1946, the party obtained thirty-eight per cent of the votes and had 114 deputies in the 300-seat parliament. More importantly, the communists succeeded in imposing a limitation on the number and types of political parties in the country, and, through the establishment of the National Front chaired by Klement Gottwald, they had a convenient political tool to prevent other democratic parties from consolidating the non-communist majority. The communists were particularly skillful in dealing with the president of the republic, Eduard Beneš. They succeeded also in dominating the trade unions, infiltrating the police, neutralizing the army, and building

other mass organizations as transmission belts of their influence. Still, in a country ingrained with democratic tradition and unoccupied by the Red Army, they were not able to seize power through parliamentary means. Moreover, at the beginning of 1948, the polls indicated decreasing communist support in the forthcoming spring elections. To avoid the possibility of an embarrassing defeat and probably under the advice and pressure of the Soviet party who was just then preparing Tito's expulsion from the Cominform and tightening the communist rule in East Central Europe—the Czechoslovak communists implemented a political coup in February, 1948. President Beneš, succumbing to their pressure and threats, capitulated to the communist ultimatum and did nothing to encourage other parties to defend the democratic order. The leaders of these parties were unable to resist effectively, and the national assembly was adjourned *sine die* on a communist initiative. The weakness of the democratic majority was thus one of the crucial assets of the determined communist minority. In June, following President Beneš' resignation, Klement Gottwald became president of the republic; the Social Democratic and Communist parties formally merged; the new government comprised eighteen communists and six handpicked representatives of non-communist splinter parties, and the elections held in May featured a single electoral list of the National Front, endorsed by eighty-nine per cent of the electorate, with the communists securing 214 out of 300 seats. With much less violence than in any other East Central European country, the Czechoslovak communists attained their monopoly of power and aligned Czechoslovakia, domestically and internationally, with Soviet political prototypes.

Strangely enough, and in striking contrast with the "softness" with which it seized power, the Czechoslovak communist party underwent the most extensive and violent Stalinist purge of all other East-Central European countries in the period between 1950-1952. The purge affected mostly the party leadership—fifty out of ninety-seven members of the central committee and six of seven members of the party

secretariat. In November, 1951, Rudolf Slansky, deputy prime minister and former secretary-general of the party, was arrested and accused by President Gottwald of playing "a leading part in the anti-party and anti-war conspiracy." Vladimir Clementis, former foreign minister, was among the many other high party and state functionaries who were apprehended. The trial of these two and other officials in November, 1952, had an openly anti-semitic character (Slansky himself was a Jew) and was similar in many ways to the Soviet purge trials of the late 1930s. Eleven of the accused, including Slansky and Clementis, were hanged in December, 1952. The ferocity of the purge perhaps explains the relative passivity with which Czechoslovakia watched the explosive events in Hungary and Poland in the fall of 1956. In subsequent years, Czechoslovakia appeared to be one of the most docile and resigned Soviet satellites. Then, in the mid 1960s, internal non-conformist forces began to stir again, both within and outside the party, especially among intellectuals and economic planners, leading the country toward genuine liberalization which a decade ago seemed unthinkable.

The first open criticism of the regime's domestic and foreign policies was manifested at the Czechoslovak writers' union congress in June, 1967, and was followed by student demonstrations in October against conditions existing in college hostels. The decisive breakthrough came in early January, 1968, by the replacement of Antonin Novotny, first secretary of the party, with Alexander Dubček. In March, Novotny also resigned as head of state and was replaced by General Ludvik Svoboda. It was under Dubček that a flood of reforms unfolded. A leading expert on East European affairs, Professor William Griffith, enumerates five factors which drove out Novotny and unleashed the reforms. (1) Novotny's complicity in the Stalinist crimes had undermined his authority and prestige during the de-Stalinization period. (2) Economic weaknesses which the established centralized Soviet economic model could not overcome persisted. (3) The role of the intelligentsia increased, either in the form of Marxist "revisionism" among many party

members searching for a new synthesis of democracy and socialism, or in the form of re-emergence of non-communist democratic tradition going back to the democratic and humanistic ideas of T. G. Masarik, the great philosopher-statesman and founder of Czechoslovakia. (4) Attitudes among the intellectuals changed toward both the Germans and the Russians, with the democratic and technologically developed West Germany appearing as a more suitable economic partner than the technologically inferior Soviet Union. (5) Slovak nationalism, shared by communists and non-communists alike, emerged and was determined to achieve equality with the Czechs.

The case of Alexander Dubček (born in Slovakia in 1921 but raised in the Soviet Union and educated at a Moscow party school) is significant for several reasons. Considered a weak man and a leader who certainly did not intend to abolish the party's dominant position or to break the alliance with the Soviet Union, Dubček nevertheless was engaged in bitter feuds with the conservative (Stalinist) faction within the party and was willing to inaugurate reforms in the country. In the words of Professor Griffith, "to get rid of Novotny, Dubček gave freedom to liberal Communists in the communication media. Once free, they led the massive thrust toward economic rationalization, free speech and press, equality ('symmetrical federation') for the Slovaks, improved political and economic relations with the West (especially with Bonn) alongside the primary alliance with Moscow, a reform of the Communist party and a degree of institutionalized political opposition which, many of them hoped and expected, would lead to a genuine multiparty system." Under Dubček's "Czechoslovak Spring" the balance of forces both within party and government moved toward reform which was best expressed when the central committee adopted a new Action Program in April, 1968, promising a "New Model of Socialist Democracy." Dubček, in fact, did not go as far as Imre Nagy in Hungary twelve years earlier (see section on Upheavals in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary) but became extremely popular in a country galvanized by hopes and expectations that it was recapturing its democratic traditions and values.

The trend toward democratization in Czechoslovakia obviously alarmed the communist leadership in the Soviet Union and perhaps even more in East Germany and Poland. They saw in Dubček's policies dangerous experimentation which, if left unchecked, would not only lead Czechoslovakia on the fatal road from de-Stalinization to de-Leninization, that is, toward the liquidation of the Communist party's dominant position in society, but could also have a nefarious impact on their own positions at home and on the communist movement in general. There were other communist heads of state, such as Ceausescu of Rumania and Tito of Yugoslavia, as well as the leaders of the Italian and French parties, who advised Moscow to proceed cautiously and not to take abrupt and violent measures against Dubček's regime but to try to channel its policies in the right direction. Many international communist consultations and visits were exchanged in the spring and summer of 1968. The CPSU leaders themselves appeared divided about what to do in Czechoslovakia. Finally the decision was reached to employ the most drastic measure—a military occupation of the country by Warsaw-pact troops. On August 21, 1968, a flawless invasion of Czechoslovakia took place, but the military success failed to produce a political counterpart for no one initially was willing to openly accept power from the hands of the invaders. Despite the quasi-unanimous passive resistance of the population and the wave of international protests and demonstrations, the Soviet leaders appeared determined—as seen earlier in the discussion of the Brezhnev Doctrine—that no significant change in the “socialist commonwealth” under their direct supervision could be made without their approval. Soviet leaders certainly calculated (and at least up to now were proven right) that they would find a new team of docile communists in Czechoslovakia to administer party and state affairs, that the initially exasperated population would be resigned to a new submission, that protests abroad would subside, and that the essential was to preserve intact the Soviet “imperial” domain. Whether the military “surgery” would prove to be an effective solution in the long run to the problem of Czecho-

slovakia—and by implication to other East Central European countries tempted to follow the 1968 Czechoslovak path—remains to be seen.*

S. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Paradoxes of Present-day Communism

As amply demonstrated in the preceding chapters, world communism is not a simple, coherent, and static phenomenon but, on the contrary, a very complex one with aspects changing constantly and often in unpredictable and spectacular ways. For that reason, it is impossible to conclude with any definitive statement. The greatest probability, if not certainty, is—barring any cataclysmic international events—that the communist movement in the foreseeable future will advance in some parts of the world, suffer defeats in others, will split and regroup, and pursue its militancy at least as long as the communist parties at the helm of powerful states continue to profess the Marxist-Leninist ideology, maintain their monopoly of political power, and guide and inspire followers around the world. Under these circumstances the communists of all stripes will continue to believe in their final world-wide victory, which does not mean necessarily that history will put the stamp of approval on their wishes. And since the future of communism is as uncertain as everything else in our changing world, some final observations about world communist strengths, weaknesses, and paradoxes may be in order.

In this connection, two concepts should be simultaneously kept in mind: communist expansion and com-

*As a footnote to history and as an illustration of how sudden eruptions may shake communist regimes in East Central Europe, one should mention the domestic upheaval in Poland in December, 1970. In response to a government decision to increase the price of food and other consumer goods, widespread rioting broke out in several Polish Baltic ports followed by clashes with police and the army, attacks on Communist party headquarters, and demonstrations spreading to other parts of Poland. The essential aspect of that episode was the working class character of the riots which led to the removal of Wladislaw Gomulka (communist leader since 1956) and his replacement by Edward Gierek who made concessions to the workers' demands.

at fragmentation. The concept of expansion should be
d in a historical perspective, with the Bolshevik revolu-
of 1917 as the starting point, followed by the emergence
veral communist states after the end of World War II,
ented by communist victories in China and Cuba, and
characterized by communist militancy in practically
non-communist country of the world. As for com-
st fragmentation, it unfolded from the end of the
ist monolithism up to the present "polycentric" situa-
Communist "polycentrism," however, should not be
stood as a reflection of a fixed number of political
rs or axes around which other communist parties gravi-
To be precise, only Moscow and, at a considerable
nce, Peking, qualify as real world communist centers
h, because of their power, influence and prestige, are
wed and obeyed (in a stricter or looser sense) by other
nunist parties and groups. It should be added that other
nunist party-states and communist movements without
ance to any existing communist regime, have aspired
some still do) to build an international "center." In the
Titoist Yugoslavia has aimed to become a point of
ction to many dissident communist groups and indivi-
s in various countries. A few years ago, Cuba sought to
me a "center" for Latin America and, together with
h Korea and North Vietnam, formed an axis in more
al terms, an informal alliance of smaller communist
ers dissatisfied with the policies of both the Soviet Union
Maoist China (particularly their quarrel), offering its own
el of communist militancy as an inspiration to revolu-
aries around the world. Also in the recent past, the
anian Communist party practiced a kind of "national
munism" following a hard domestic line and, at the same
e, a foreign political course which was at odds on many
nts with that of the CPSU.

All these tendencies faded quite recently, with Yugo-
avia and Rumania aiming to accommodate, not rebel
against or challenge, the Soviet Union, and with Cuba adher-
ing even closer to the Soviet camp. But, if no real and durable
centers able to compete with Moscow and Peking arose,

something else developed in place of further polycentrism. Individual communist parties in Western Europe (Italy, Sweden, Holland, Spain, Britain) and in Asia (Japan) showed propensities to tailor their own domestic policies and tactics, while criticizing some aspects of Soviet and CPSU policies (in Europe) or even openly quarreling with both Moscow and Peking (the striving Japanese Communist party). Their varying dissenting positions improved their domestic political situation and increased their chances of accession to power (in Italy), without forsaking the essential Leninist features of their organization and tactical maneuvering.

This "nationalization" of some communist parties should be counterposed to the significant and, in some instances, even spectacular re-emergence of the international Trotskyist movement, claiming to represent the only authentic Marxist-Leninist revolutionary orthodoxy, unspoiled by the bureaucratic sins of both the Moscow and Peking regimes. Today there are some seventy Trotskyist parties active in forty countries and divided into four contending "Fourth Internationals." Despite internal divisions, Trotskyist groups served as a major catalyst in the near-revolutionary events which shook France in May-June, 1968. Likewise, besides being active and loud on many American university campuses, the Trotskyists were the moving force of the so-called National Peace Action Coalition which mobilized large numbers of people in major American cities (especially Washington, D.C. and San Francisco) on April 24, 1971, demonstrating against the war in Vietnam. It is doubtful whether the Trotskyist and other independent revolutionary communist groups, being too small, undisciplined, and lacking levers of revolutionary power, will ever represent more than an occasional, localized, and eruptive force; still, these independent communist movements, by their very fervor and militancy, give a supplementary illustration of the twin concept of communist expansion and fragmentation.

Let us proceed now, in a systematic way, to outline some of the basic reasons behind communist successes in the past as well as the present. Four factors appear as paramount: (1) The role of a messianic ideology, in which communism

appears as the necessary and inevitable result of the historical process itself, and thus a movement capable of the final resolution of conflicts and social contradictions. Viewed from this angle, communism pretends to be a political movement which corresponds to a "scientific" necessity of modern times while also satisfying the utopian expectations of those irreconcilably opposed to the established order in society. Communist movements, particularly in the non-communist world, are strengthened by their appeals to revolutionary destruction, total commitment to building a new political and social order, and the perspective of unlimited power the communist parties promise their followers.

(2) The role of communist success. Even when they quarrel among themselves, all communists point to the accumulation of the global communist strength during the last half century.* They project themselves as an uneven but irresistible trend of history, with fourteen communist parties exercising power, many more formal and militant communist parties fighting for power, even more numerous radical groups which are willing to cooperate with the communists, and countless non-communists and even non-radicals, ready for different reasons to follow communist leadership. None of the established communist party-states has as yet been overthrown and dismantled, a major communist argument that the trend toward their universal victory is irreversible.

Communist determination to keep power at any price impresses both followers and opponents of communism. Methods of global social engineering (such as economic planning, industrialization, land collectivization, educational planning and comprehensive social insurance programs), or at least some aspects of these collective measures to build new socialist societies, encounter sympathy and approval even among non-communists. Soviet military might and techno-

*According to the figures compiled by the U. S. Department of State, total membership of all the communist parties, including splinter groups, but excluding the small Communist party of the United States, was estimated in 1972 at about 47.7 million, 44.8 million or 93.9 per cent belonging to the fourteen ruling communist parties. Of this total, the combined party membership in mainland China and the Soviet Union comprises 71 per cent. This means that the communist parties not in power represent only 6.1 per cent of world membership, that is, 2.9 million.

logical achievements or Chinese nuclear successes work in very much the same way. Communist propaganda of world-wide dimensions, which hammers only on successes and systematically omits to mention failures and shortcomings, contributes also to the picture of strength and progress. Moreover, communist ability to exploit emotions and political dispositions which are theoretically at the antipodes of Marxist internationalism (such as nationalism, racial hatreds, and xenophobic attitudes) helps communist advances to a considerable extent and reinforces the impression the communists want to create, namely, that their side is winning and that non-communists would be wise to join the bandwagon.

(3) A systematic methodology for waging political warfare, one of the strongest communist weapons from Lenin's days up to the present. The arsenal of these weapons is widespread and goes from the broadest "fronts" with the non-communists destined to achieve victory through parliamentary and electoral confrontations to peasant guerrilla warfare led by small bands of professional revolutionaries aiming to seize power violently.

(4) Irresolution and mistakes of the non-communist world and, in particular, Western inability to profit, at appropriate times, from communist weaknesses, which have helped the communists overcome their own shortcomings and maintain or advance their position.

Just as with global communist strength, let us examine the four factors of global communist weakness. (1) The very utopian character of communist promises has opened a permanent gap between theory and practice, with glaring shortcomings of communist societies undermining their professed aims and justifications. None of the four promised attainments of communism—freedom, equality, abundance, "new men"—have even approached their realization. It is significant, as stressed earlier, that the intellectuals (writers, poets, journalists, and students), whose role everywhere is to describe the situations and aspirations of their societies, are in the forefront of criticism of communist regimes and have been and remain a specific target of official control and systematic repression. It is this critical role of the intellec-

tuals which has been responsible for the "death of the apocalyptic spirit" of communism in East-Central Europe and for the oppositional ferment against communist regimes everywhere.

(2) The discrepancy between theory and practice has also contributed to what the former Yugoslav communist leader, Milovan Djilas, has described in his book, *The New Class*, as a "permanent civil war" between rulers and the ruled in communist countries. This term, of course, should be understood in a figurative sense, but it aptly describes the phenomenon that exists behind the facade of official harmony and unanimity—the potential for unrest and explosion which occasionally erupts in one form or another.

(3) International communist splits, and particularly the Sino-Soviet conflict, represent at least a potential fundamental communist weakness. Mutual accusations and charges of extraordinary virulence contribute to ideological confusion and blur communist historical perspectives. The "scientific" pretense of Marxism appears preposterous in view of what the Chinese communists say about their Russian comrades and vice versa. Sino-Soviet inability to maintain even a semblance of unity creates serious organizational problems and encourages tendencies toward fragmentation. At the same time, new, radical revolutionary groups, operating outside the conventional communist framework, complicate the situation and disrupt "unity," which Lenin viewed as a precondition of communist success.

(4) Failure of Marxist predictions concerning the fate of Western capitalism and the emergence of affluence within the developed industrial societies have not only complicated communist ideological pronouncements, but have meant that many aspects of Western social and cultural lives have profoundly influenced and attracted large strata of communist-ruled countries, including segments of communist parties. While the communists may claim rightfully that nobody has been successful in depriving them of the monopoly of political power, Western influences as well as national reassertions have deeply permeated societies in East-Central Europe and are being felt in the Soviet Union as well. While

communist propaganda has enough material to build images of Western social "decadence," the dynamism and success of Western "socialized" capitalism have made the Western world irrecognizable from the viewpoint of Marx's nineteenth century predictions, and even "new economic models" experimented with in East-Central Europe borrow some of their devices from neo-capitalist practices.

This entire essay-survey of the ideological and political history of world communism has revolved around a basic paradoxical phenomenon of our time: the modern communist movement was shaped by a doctrine—Marxism—whose postulates required the unfolding of a very different story. The logic of "scientific" Marxism presupposed that a maturing and dynamic industrial society, proceeding by stages, would come to socialism after having exhausted all the productive capabilities of capitalism. In reality, the reverse occurred: the less a society was developed industrially, the more able were its militant communist parties in seizing political power and reshaping socio-economic structures. Instead of being the servant of economics, as Marxism would require, politics was its master.

This reversal was conceived in theory by Lenin in 1902 with his "party of a new type" concept and confirmed in practice by the Bolshevik coup of October, 1917. In both instances, Lenin had revised some basic tenets of Marxism (remaining, however, faithful to some others). What followed after him, in the sequence of communist "isms" (Stalinism, Titoism, Maoism, Khrushchevism, and Castroism), was a perpetuation of revisions of the basic dogma, with every communist regime pretending to be the only faithful interpreter of the doctrine while, in fact, adapting it to the regime's specific needs. The "scientific" character of Marxism disappeared in its pragmatic or opportunistic application by every ruling communist group.

Another paradox should be added: Marxist nineteenth century doctrine minimized the role of the individual in the historical process. This again had its logic: if the impersonal modes of commodity production conditioned everything else, the individual was an object and not a subject of history.

In reality, the striking feature of communist movements and regimes in the twentieth century is the paramount role played by individual leaders. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Tito, and Castro are eminently, in the words of the philosopher Sidney Hook, "event-making individuals." The doctrine which preached economic determinism inspired movements dominated by the voluntarism of their leaders.

Thus communism was not a product of any historical or socio-economic necessity. It was not brought forth by the maturation of any abstract objective processes but as voluntary acts of determined men who profited from chaotic moments in the history of their countries to impose their rule. They had, of course, a set of ideas which they wanted to put into practice, with one central concept believed to be of cardinal importance: the abolition of private property over the means of production. Marx led them to that point and then left them to their own devices. The collectivization of society, however, did not bring the expected all-healing results. Socialism under the rule of communist parties went along divergent national roads, introducing new and original social measures to coexist with old and new social illnesses. Whatever these new societies have become, they are imperfect societies in view of their own final aims, with basic defects which would horrify the founding fathers of the movement.

It is, therefore, essential for those who want to understand the nature of communism, to be well acquainted with its history: from it they will learn that communism is man-made and not history-preordained; that it is both effective and vulnerable; that its leaders strive to conquer the non-communist world while, at the same time, engaging in fratricidal struggles among themselves. What the non-communist world needs is not anti-communist propaganda, but adequate knowledge of these contradictory aspects of communism. Communist leaders believe that contradictions in the camp of their enemies will lead to communist victory; we know today that communist contradictions go deeper than those which unavoidably exist within open societies.

Chapter IV


THE SOVIET COMMUNIST REGIME

By Andrew Gyorgy

A complicated duality of Party and government spreads through every phase of life in the Soviet Union; the Communist party controls the informal and often semisecret area of politics, while the government presents its formal and more public aspects. The actual ruling organization of the U.S.S.R. is its Communist party. The government is a tool in the hands of the Party and operates according to Party policies, which are guided and controlled by Party officials at every level of administration. Thus, a tremendous overlapping of functions and of personnel develops at higher levels: the majority of government officials are Party members, and, of course, all officials must be subservient to the ruling Communist party.

The "interlocking directorate" of the dual government is made obvious by the fact that almost all leading Party officials have equivalent high government offices; the same persons have in their hands the main lines of command of both Party and government. These two organizations even go so far as to announce national policy in joint decrees. At the top of the structure, distinctions between Party and government tend to fade completely, and supreme authority in both is often vested in one man. Both Stalin and Khrushchev have held the two top positions of chairman of the Council of Ministers (government) and first secretary (Party) simultaneously, thus exercising total control over the affairs of their vast country. After Khrushchev's dismissal, the top jobs were split between Leonid Brezhnev, who became the first secretary (later renamed secretary general), and Aleksei Kosygin, who was appointed prime minister or chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, in the past, what was true of the top position also extended through the whole system. Party and government have displayed this "interlocking directorate" all the way down through their organizations,

with Party officials exercising authority at the expense of the government proper. The Soviet Union is clearly a one-party state, controlled and ruled by its Communist party.



A. Organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The first secretary of the Communist party is the most powerful person in the Soviet Union. He may, or may not, hold the office of premier (or chairman of the Council of Ministers) in the government, but, since the Party overshadows the government anyway, the immense powers of the first secretary are not diminished if he is not simultaneously head of the government as well. Why is this the key position in the Soviet Union? Primarily, because it is the nerve center of the entire Communist party, dominating, from its lofty summit, the approximately 10 million members of that organization. The first secretary (until 1952 better known as the general secretary and since 1966 again referred to as secretary general) is automatically a member of all other Party committees and agencies, and, with unlimited political authority, he is in a position to pack the roster of the Presidium or Central Committee with his friends and supporters. As presiding officer of the Central Committee and, particularly, of the mass meetings of the Party congress, he can determine the names of the speakers, the order of their appearance, the agenda, and the issues to be "played up" or quietly omitted. Decades of continuous tradition have created an aura of tremendous power surrounding this post, which has been held by the Soviet Union's most awesome dictators: Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, and, currently, Leonid Brezhnev. Georgi Malenkov was the only fleeting exception. He held the secretary's post for only two weeks following Stalin's death and then was forced to yield it to a more ruthless competitor, Nikita S. Khrushchev. The first secretary is not only the head of the Party in internal Soviet affairs, but is a dominant figure in world communism. Until the Sino-Soviet dispute directly challenged Moscow's world leadership position, the leader of the Soviet Communist party was also the acknowledged head of the international Communist movement. In view of the enormously high stakes and rewards, the post is obviously the most sought-after appointment on the Soviet political scene. The term "struggle for succession" is accurately applied to the competition for

this most powerful position in the Party, since even the premier's post in the government is not by itself significant enough to provoke bitter civil war-type feuds among the competing leaders.

The Presidium of the Central Committee can be described as the center of real and final authority in the Soviet Union and as the "inner core" of its communist movement. Headed by the all-important first secretary, the Presidium is the carefully selected executive committee of the larger and unwieldy Party Central Committee and is actually small enough to act as the highest collective policy-making body of the Party. The size of the Presidium has fluctuated through the years. In 1952, shortly after the nineteenth Congress had met, the twelve-man Politburo (Political Bureau) and the Orgburo (Organization Bureau) were reorganized under the new name, Presidium of the Central Committee, and its membership was enlarged to 25. Subsequently, the size of this chief Party unit was reduced and is composed, at present, of 12 full (voting) members and 6 candidate (alternate or non-voting) members. The first secretary has great influence in the selection of members to the Presidium. Like Stalin and Khrushchev, Brezhnev has replaced many of his predecessor's choices. Some are relative newcomers in Soviet politics, comparatively younger men who have acquired most of their political experience in the years since 1953.

Under Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev and his successors, the Presidium has been composed of the dictator's closest friends and supporters, further enhancing the considerable powers already vested in this group. It has assisted the first secretary in making all Party decisions and is in charge of directing the work of the Central Committee when that body is not in session. As the supreme political clearing house within the Party and the main channel of communication between the leader and the Central Committee, the Presidium is concerned with a tremendous range of governmental affairs. Meeting in secrecy, its deliberations cover both internal and foreign political issues, as well as problems in the economic, social, and cultural life of the country. Its decisions form the "Party line," and, once the Presidium deter-

mines the "Party line," both the membership and the government have to follow it. In this gigantic policy-making task, the Presidium is assisted by the Secretariat and a small administrative staff in controlling the execution of Party policy throughout the Soviet Union.

Under the Presidium, the Party organization moves along divergent channels with the Secretariat and Party Control Committee achieving approximately the same level of significance in the Party hierarchy. In recent decades, the importance of the Secretariat has steadily risen. Today, it forms the administrative headquarters of the Party, thus complementing and balancing the Presidium, which is the political nerve center. The Presidium and the Secretariat can be considered as a unified executive, chaired by the first secretary.

Since the secretaries are also members of the Presidium and of the Central Committee, this overlapping and interlocking small nucleus of leaders actually constitutes the most powerful officials of the U.S.S.R. Although the individual secretaries are theoretically "elected" by the Central Committee, in actual practice the Party leaders decide on the slate of secretaries, and the Central Committee subsequently approves the prepared list as a matter of formality. The size of the Secretariat has also fluctuated. Although, under Stalin, it usually had 5 members, the 1952 Party reforms raised this number to 10. Since Stalin's death, the number of secretaries has varied from 3 to 10. Since December, 1957, the Secretariat has stabilized with 10 members who have played the role of top-level administrative assistants to the first secretary.

The administrative duties of the Secretariat involve the short-term, day-to-day supervision and control of Party affairs and the direct administration of the Party personnel and machinery, while, indirectly, they control non-Party, national matters as well. The secretaries are powerful individuals called upon to execute Party policy and to stress the Party viewpoint at all times in the realm of national policies. Their assignments range over such important problem areas as: (1) Soviet Communist party relations with foreign

communists and with the international communist movement itself; (2) control over Party organizational and personnel matters; (3) culture, education, agitation and propaganda matters, and youths' and women's affairs; (4) agriculture; and (5) Party schools and academies for ideological research and training.

The Party Control Committee has an interesting and important dual function of surveillance combined with judicial powers. Its main role is one of control, beginning at the top with the central Party organizations, such as the Presidium, and extending all the way down to the local parties and the rank-and-file of the membership. In this "control agency" capacity, it determines whether party members are adhering to the "line" and carrying out Party policies; it acts as a watchdog committee for the Party leadership, performing the significant function of being the "eyes and ears" for an ever-vigilant body of rulers. The Control Committee has its own personnel stationed throughout the country on every Party echelon, and these agents are then supposed to report successes and shortcomings in the Party's programs and policies directly to central headquarters in Moscow.

The second function of this committee has been described as being the supreme court of the Communist party. It has semijudicial powers to punish offenders by reprimand or dismissal, and it can bring violations to the attention of the regular courts. The committee also sits as a "Party-court of review" to consider appeals from Party members who have been punished for one reason or another.

The Party Control Committee, along with the Secretariat and the members of the Central Committee, can be described as the intermediate level of the Party officialdom. These agencies are composed of full-time professionals, the so-called *apparatchiki*, who together form the apparatus, or *apparat*, of the Party and are key performers in a communist society. They are well-paid officials who run the national Party administration and act as official clearing-house channels in enforcing official directives from the top-level down, while simultaneously supplying the regime with a continuous flow

of political information from below. They do not usually participate in the all-important political process of decision-making; their main task is to supervise, from their central vantage point, the overall execution of Party policies.

The Central Committee is "elected" at each regular Party congress of the membership, and it is supposed to serve until the next congress is convened. In theory, its principal function is to act for the large and unwieldy congress in the long periods that elapse between the meetings.

Officially, little is known about the real substance of the Central Committee's function and powers. It usually meets twice a year in total secrecy but occasionally holds an open (plenary) session whose stenographic record is published. The committee's membership has fluctuated considerably through the years as different Party congresses fixed the numbers at different levels or, in actual practice, formally approved a detailed membership slate already prepared by the ranking leaders of the Party. At the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Party Congresses (1961 and 1966 respectively), the Central Committee membership was established at 175 full (voting) members and 156 candidate (alternate, or non-voting) members. This was a considerable increase in the size of the Central Committee when compared with the size of the same committee elected by the Twenty-First Party Congress (1959).

MEMBERSHIP OF COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANS IN THE U.S.S.R.

Year	Congress	Presidium			Central Committee		Delegates to Party Congress	Total Party Members
		Full Cand.	Full Cand.	Full Cand.	Full Cand.			
1952	19th	25	11	10	125	111	1,192	6,882,145
1956	20th	11	6	8	133	122	1,269	7,215,505
1959	21st	14	9	5	123	111	1,375	8,239,000
1961	22nd	11*	5*	9	175	156	4,008	9,716,005

*In 1962, the Presidium was enlarged to 12 full and 6 candidate members.

The Central Committee appears to be the principal battle arena of the Communist party. It combines the role of an executive body with a certain amount of policy-making. It is charged with the general supervision of Party activities and, in this capacity, serves as a link between Party officials in Moscow and those subordinates, scattered throughout the country, who form the immense bureaucratic machinery of the Soviet Communist party. Since, however, the committee's membership roster includes the most influential officials in the Soviet Union, it is a significant participant in the dissemination of major domestic and foreign policies. A recent U.S. Senate report summarized this key function of the Central Committee in the following manner:

Members of the Central Committee hear the regime's major policies elaborated and the necessities for courses of action expounded, and receive a certain psychological "recharging of batteries" for the tasks and responsibilities laid down. They in turn transmit that information to officials and fellow workers . . . and import some of the enthusiasm for the aims and policies of the top leaders. The Central Committee is therefore a useful tool for disseminating and implementing policy and for highlighting especially important areas of current concern.

The Central Committee has always seemed more influential in Soviet politics when a "struggle for succession" was taking place among the leaders or, as after Stalin's death, when a "collective leadership" period was in progress. In such unusual situations, the Central Committee actually became the key policy-maker, despite its large size, while the Presidium could not exert its customary authority because of the disagreements and divided loyalties of its members. Such was clearly the case during the 1953-1957 era while Khrushchev was gradually consolidating his personal power.

The long-term importance of the Central Committee should not be exaggerated, however. Once the single-dictator leadership is reaffirmed, the emphasis will almost immediately shift from the unwieldy Central Committee to the small and tightly organized Presidium. This latter group can meet more frequently and more informally and can be controlled by one man much more directly and effectively than the 175

members of the Central Committee. Since Stalin's death, the Central Committee has regained some of the original authority which it exercised early in the Leninist period; still, in the hierarchy of the Party, it has always been subjected to the predominant prestige and position of the first secretary and the Presidium.

The Party Congress is more a body of approval and endorsement of the leaders' decisions than a vigorous initiator of new policies or ideas. Theoretically, the Congress is responsible for setting over-all policy for the Party, revising rules for the organization of the movement, and hammering out Party tactics. In reality, the Congress has developed into one of the regime's major propaganda agencies, automatically and enthusiastically approving all principles and policies submitted to its huge gathering by the dominant Party leadership. Since Stalin's death, the Party congresses have tended to become more meaningful in substance, although the operational details have not changed fundamentally.

According to Communist party rules, the Party Congress is supposed to meet once every four years. The irregular meeting dates clearly attest to the fact, however, that the history of these congresses (and their relative significance in the life of the Party) has been a varied one. Stalin's contemptuous treatment of the Party congresses was indicated by his refusal to call on them for 13 years. The Eighteenth Congress met in 1939, and it was not until 1952 that the Nineteenth Congress was finally convened. Since Stalin's death, there have been four congresses: the Twentieth (February, 1956), the Twenty-First (January-February, 1959), the Twenty-Second (October-November, 1961), and the Twenty-Third (March-April, 1966).

Delegates to Party congresses are formally elected from the Party's membership-at-large at various local and regional conferences. Until the Twenty-First Congress (1959), the ratio of representation in the Congress consisted of one voting delegate for each 5000 Party members and one non-voting delegate for each 5000 candidate members. As Party membership increased rapidly, the ratio was then changed so that one delegate now represents many more members. At

the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Congresses, held in 1961 and 1966, more than 4000 voting delegates were in attendance, and representatives of communist parties from over 80 countries were also present.

Recent congresses have exploited this convenient platform with its large audience. They are being used to review and summarize past experiences of note and, simultaneously, to launch new tasks and to explain radically changed policies for the future. For example, Khrushchev, in a bold speech to the Twentieth Congress (1956), denounced Stalin and exposed, in detail, Stalin's crimes of the previous 31-year period; at the same time, Khrushchev's new "peaceful co-existence" foreign policy was introduced. In 1959, at the Twenty-first Party Congress, a novel "economic plan" to increase Soviet production and to raise the standard of living was decreed. Greater emphasis has been placed on international communist policy considerations at these congresses, and there has also been increased participation by foreign communists. Communist leaders from other countries are not only admitted as guests, but are called upon to deliver formal and major addresses, and even to take stands on issues affecting international communism. Both the Twenty-second and the Twenty-third Party Congresses (1961 and 1966) further deepened the dispute between Russia and Communist China, adding fuel, in the form of angry speeches, to a fire which had been raging openly among world communist leaders ever since the Bucharest and Moscow conferences. Thus, at least four successive congresses seemed to play a more meaningful role in shaping recent Communist party history.

In its procedural aspects, the average Party congress reflects the principle of "democratic centralism" so characteristic of communist operations in strategy and tactics. Congresses are allowed a certain amount of latitude for debate and discussion until the Party leaders have reached their decisions. After that point, the Congress has only one remaining duty: to carry out the Party's orders with blind obedience. The political impact of the individual Party congresses has been summarized by Professors Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner:

Before adjourning, the delegates obediently ratify every policy put before them by their leaders Thus the main functions of the Congress are to give formal approval to the current Party program and rekindle the enthusiasm of Communist functionaries, who are expected, on returning home, to infect their colleagues with their newly refurbished zeal.

B. Organs of the Government of the Soviet Union

The recurring and varied use of the term "Presidium" may be disturbing to the student. Altogether, there are three types of presidiums in Soviet politics, one on the Party side, described earlier, and two on the governmental side. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers is the first of two to be reviewed in connection with the operation of the government.

According to the Soviet Constitution of 1936, Article 64, the "highest executive and administrative organ of the state power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R." The council, itself, is headed and controlled by a small executive committee, officially known as the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. This Presidium consists of the premier (or chairman of the council), the two first deputy premiers (or first deputy chairmen), three deputy premiers (or deputy chairmen), and two or three other individuals appointed to this group by the larger Council of Ministers. In theory, the Presidium, as the head of the Council of Ministers, is supposed to handle the current, daily tasks relating to national administration, leaving the council itself to grapple with broader and longer-term issues. In practice, however, the Presidium of the Council looms large as the actual policy-maker, far overshadowing the Council (or Cabinet) of Ministers, whose work is most often restricted to routine administrative functions. Indeed, one could suggest that the Presidium of the Council performs duties and occupies a prestige position on the government side akin to that of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the Party side.

The analogy is further strengthened by the fact that both of these presidiums are approximately equal in size and

that both are normally headed by the same man as long as the dictator insists on being both first secretary of the Party as well as premier of the government. Prior to the current division of these top-level assignments, Nikita Khrushchev had occupied both positions and through the years had given an immense amount of political weight to the Council-Presidium. The overlapping membership of the two presidiums brings into further sharp relief the "interlocking directorate" aspects of the Soviet Party and government. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee are, in many instances, also members of the Council of Ministers' Presidium.

Under the over-all control of the premier, the Presidium is rigidly organized on the basis of rank. The two first deputy premiers usually divide the major governmental areas of responsibility between them; one is concerned, for example, with foreign affairs, while the other is occupied with domestic matters. Either of them can also be called upon to play the role of acting-premier in the absence of the premier who might be traveling abroad, sick, or taking a vacation. Just below the first deputies, the three deputy premiers are generally assigned responsibilities for one specific field of key importance to the government, such as economic planning, light or heavy industry, or defense production. Finally, the additional appointed members of the Presidium may represent a special field in which crises or national difficulties have occurred, such as agriculture, finance, or foreign trade. In such critical situations, the council (cabinet) minister involved in a field of special interest is temporarily promoted to the Presidium and included among its high-ranking and more senior members. The primary reason underlying the makeup of the Presidium is to shift sensitive political issues from the Council of Ministers, too large and complicated an organization for speedy consideration of governmental problems, to a smaller and more tightly structured group. The presence, or at least direct concern, of the premier himself lends added prestige and weight to the daily Presidium deliberations.

Ranking immediately below the Presidium, the Council of Ministers (or Cabinet in the Western sense) is composed first of all of the premier (chairman), the first deputy premiers, and the deputy premiers already mentioned, while the bulk of its membership consists of the heads of the various ministries, state committees, planning commissions, and selected agencies. Usually, certain other governmental representatives are also included because of their special position. Like so many other Party and government organs in the Soviet Union, the council has steadily grown in membership from an original group of 15 to more than 60 in 1946. Following Stalin's death, the number of ministries was sharply reduced, and the council temporarily appeared as a manageable-sized group of 26. By 1956, the council again had expanded to about 50 ministries, and, by the latter part of 1959, it had 65 members.

Theoretically, the council is elected by the parliament, the Supreme Soviet, for a four-year term. In theory also, the individual members are supposed to be accountable to the same national legislature. In practice, however, the top Party leaders decide on the cabinet list, which is presented by the premier personally to the Supreme Soviet and is accepted with unanimous enthusiasm, and without any debate, by that docile body of representatives.


Here, in the case of the Council of Ministers, the gap separating the formal democratic theory of "division of powers" from clearly dictatorial practices emerges more clearly. The constitutional powers delegated to the Council of Ministers are broad and comprehensive, and range from directing the work of the ministries to national planning; from setting up the national budget to conducting foreign affairs and supervising the country's armed forces. In actual practice, however, from the period of Lenin and Stalin through the Khrushchev era all the way to the current Brezhnev and Kosygin period, the council has been completely overshadowed by the Party leadership rather than the governmental organs of the state. Not only does the Party Presidium perform the usual ministerial functions associated

in the West with the traditional forms of cabinet government, but this displacement of political importance, subordinating the role of the government organs to the dictates of the Party, is made easier by the tremendous overlapping of personnel between government and Party agencies. Through decades of Soviet political practice, most of the Party Presidium members have also served as chairman or deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Their power and prestige in the complex hierarchy of Soviet communism is derived from their Party standing and not from their nominally splendid government appointment.

The numerous ministries in the Soviet government are classified into two major categories: the All-Union ministries and the Union-Republic ministries. The former possess exclusive jurisdiction over the governmental functions assigned to them; and exert exclusive authority throughout the entire country; their operations center in, and radiate from, the federal capital. These bureaucratically overgrown giants include such economic-oriented ministries of the country as transportation and communication, foreign trade, and armaments and munitions. Although in recent years a number of basic economic activities have been shifted from All-Union to more restricted regional (Republic) levels, the All-Union category is still dominant and implies an iron-clad system of central planning and direction, operating straight from Moscow and disregarding the subdivisions of the country.

The Union-Republic ministries actually operate on two levels simultaneously. Each republic has a ministry in the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in Moscow and a corresponding ministry in each of the 15 republics which are parts of the federal construction of the Soviet Union. The central (Union) ministry works through the regional (Republic) ministry which, in practice, will act as a local arm, an extension of Moscow's power. In these dual arrangements, it remains clear at all times that the Republic ministry is a subordinate branch, inferior in every way, to the central decision-making power of the ministries at Moscow. In this category of Union-Republic ministries, we find such essential

areas of modern government as the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, armed forces, justice, and finance. Recently, several economic ministries have been shifted from the All-Union to the Union-Republic category.



Special mention must be made of those Union-Republic cabinet ministries which are related to the permanent police functions of the state, and which buttress the "dictatorship of the proletariat." These are, primarily, the ministries of state control, state security, and internal affairs (interior). These agencies had previously been unified in one large branch under Stalin's dictatorship, but have been broken up into these three fragments following the 1953 liquidation of Lavrenti P. Beria, the last all-powerful police chief of the U.S.S.R.

The recent sweeping reorganization of the security and economic ministries is by no means the last reform wave in Soviet government and politics. Indeed, the constant change in organization, the trends toward consolidation alternating with attempts toward decentralization, make it most difficult to be both timely and accurate in surveying this ever-fluid field.

In describing the parliamentary background of the Soviet government, we must again distinguish sharply between constitutional theory and political practice. The theoretical guideline is the constitutional statement that "the highest organ of state power in the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R." All important governmental functions are supposed to originate with the Supreme Soviet. A particularly important function of this parliament is the appointment of the Council of Ministers, which acts as the real executive branch of the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet also elects a presidium of its own to represent it when it is not in session.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is a 33-man body serving as a parliamentary executive committee for the slow, unwieldy houses of the Supreme Soviet, which are seldom called in lengthy session. As the official representatives of the Soviet State, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has broad constitutional powers on paper. However, it exercises this authority only to the extent that the top Party leaders approve of it. The Party totally controls the Presidium; in fact, the members of the Presidium invariably are also ranking officials of the Party. The membership consists of a

chairman, who is the official and ceremonial head of the Soviet State and government; a secretary, 15 deputy chairmen, and 16 members. The 15 deputy chairmen of the Presidium, who, in their own republics, serve as chairmen of the presidiums of their local soviets (parliaments), represent the 15 individual Union-Republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, we find here "interlocking directorates" on the governmental level between the federal government in Moscow and the 15 individual republic governments which form the U.S.S.R.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet combines within itself all three major political functions of twentieth-century government: it operates as a legislative, executive, and judicial body. Acting as the formal and collective head of the government of the Soviet Union, it is authorized to declare war, decree national mobilization and martial law, appoint and remove ministers and military commanders, and to conclude all types of international agreements. Its judicial powers are of a supervisory nature: it controls, in theory, the work of the Supreme Court and of the Soviet Union's top attorney-general, the procurator general. Even here, political practice considerably detracts from the significance of this Presidium, since it normally approves of the suggestions and decisions presented to it (often personally) by the chairman of the Council of Ministers. In all such situations, the executive branch of the government and the Party overshadow the role of the legislature.

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is organized as a bicameral assembly. One house is known as the Soviet of the Union, and the other, the Soviet of Nationalities. Both houses are equal in importance; there is no distinction in the Soviet government between an upper house and a lower house of the legislature. The Soviet of the Union, composed of 738 deputies, is elected on the basis of total population: one deputy for every 300,000 citizens; while the Soviet of Nationalities, composed of 640 deputies, is elected on a more complicated territorial basis by the different nationality units. The deputies are elected for a term of four years. According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 135, "all citizens who have reached the age of 18 . . . have the right to

vote in the election of deputies . . . Every citizen of the U.S.S.R. who has reached the age of 23 is eligible for election to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R."

The national "elections" are usually preceded by tremendous Communist party propaganda campaigns stressing the widespread and allegedly popular appeal of both the elections and the candidates. Practice again differs sharply from theory. Normally, the Party authorities carefully select one candidate to run for the given electoral district. Thus, the single-slate election does not offer the voters any choice of candidates whatsoever; hence, the usual and utterly meaningless 97 to 99 per cent popular vote for the Party-selected-and-endorsed candidate. The voter does not even have the alternative of not voting. Since participation in elections is compulsory, staying away from the ballot box is not considered safe in a police-state.

Although the impression is created that a "popular election" launches a deputy into a significant and active parliamentary career, this, in practice, is not the case at all. Whether he sits in the Soviet of the Union or in the Soviet of Nationalities, the Supreme Soviet deputy is never entrusted with independent choices or meaningful alternatives, as would befit a legislator or decision-maker in a Western-style parliamentary form of government. The short duration and infrequency of Supreme Soviet sessions denotes the lack of importance and "rubber-stamp" characteristics so typical of contemporary dictatorships. While the Supreme Soviet is supposed to meet twice a year, it often meets only once, and, usually, the total length of its sessions does not exceed 30 days a year.

Instead of long sessions, there has been, in recent years, more use of the committee system to bolster the strength of the Supreme Soviet. Since 1957, the standing commissions of each house have met more frequently and have had more intensive discussions of impending legislative acts. The Soviet of the Union has three such standing commissions: one in Legislative Proposals (31 members), one in Budget Affairs (39 members), and one in Foreign Policy (23 members). The Soviet of Nationalities has four major commissions: Legis-

lative Proposals (31 members), Budget (39 members), Foreign Affairs (23 members), and an Economic Commission (31 members).

C. The Governments of the Union-Republics

The description of union-republic governments is facilitated by the fact that they are small-scale duplicates of the larger pattern of the federal government centered in Moscow. Their councils of ministers are, for example, strikingly similar to the All-Union Council except that their primary responsibility is for local republic affairs, such as interstate commerce, local judicial administration, and the republic's own educational system. The presidiums of local parliaments (also referred to as Supreme Soviets) are appointive executive committees, composed of the leading state (republic) officials. Parliaments, however, are one-chamber legislatures in the individual republics elected on the basis of population figures and not in accordance with nationalities. The nationality principle is obviously less complicated in each of the individual republics and not even applicable at this level in some of them. The single-chamber legislature is in other ways comparable to the Soviet of the Union on the federal or national level.

The lesser political subdivisions, such as the regions, rural, and city districts, and even the village and city-ward levels, are all governed, at least nominally, by their own Soviets or "Councils." The Soviets are large legislative bodies with impressive governmental powers on paper but little leeway for independent action in practice. In most cases, small executive committees are selected by regional Communist party officials from among the more reliable Soviet members, and these committees then wield the influence and exert the powers which have been theoretically ascribed to the Soviets. These practices are justified on this level in the same way as they are justified in the national government. Since the Soviets have too large a membership for efficient operation, their administrative (and even legislative) roles must be undertaken by smaller and more compact local "presidiums":

the carefully screened and chosen executive committees. In reality, these committees act as "transmission belts" between the government and the Communist party, always maintaining the fiction of governmental independence while obediently serving the purposes of the regional and national Party leadership.

D. Total Social Control

Although immense changes have occurred in world communism since Stalin's death in 1953, communist societies retain certain fundamental features. Two basic characteristics have been obvious wherever communism has been established. The first is the centralized control over society; the second is a revolutionary change from the previous class structure.

Centralization and control are essential techniques in an "total" society based on a political dictatorship. In contrast with the voluntary and free nature of a democratic society, life under communism is severely restricted. It has been described as a closed society when compared with our open way of life. These are useful adjectives since they reflect the regimentation brought about by a communist regime.

Although communism may never give up its technique of total supervision, which is essential to the perpetuation of a closed society, its methods of control change from time to time. In Stalin's Russia of the past and in Mao's China of today, the principal means of social control have been terror, intimidation, and suspicion. In its more relaxed version, displayed in Khrushchev's and his successors' Russia, communism may actually forego the use of physical terror and violence as unnecessary buttresses to its safely established rule. However, intimidation and suspicion are basic psychological characteristics which are not eliminated at any phase of development. People live a "closed-in life" with an air of secretiveness surrounding all forms of social communication.

A great deal of social strain can be generated by the tenuous relationship between Party members and the non-party majority. In practical terms, the Communist party

membership serves as a built-in network of control reaching into every corner of society. The members act as "eyes and ears" for the more remote leadership and keep a constant check on the attitudes, thoughts, and behavior of every citizen. Lenin's description of the membership as "transmission belts" of society is applicable to each Party member who serves as an individual pipeline of information and observation, linking the masses of the people with the leaders.

The political control is centralized, radiating out from Party headquarters and spreading through every level of the social structure. In every town, village, or collective-grouping, the Party controls by means of vigilance. The Party secretary of a town or a collective farm is not only the representative of a distant political organization, but he also acts as the decision-maker on all local economic and political issues. As a two-way channel of communication for higher levels of the Party bureaucracy, he passes downward the decrees of the upper-echelon hierarchy, while reporting back the local reactions of the city dwellers or village inhabitants.

Although only three to four per cent of the Soviet population belongs to the Communist party, the 13 million membership of the Soviet Communist party, the 18.5 million members of the Chinese Communist party, and the 1.6 million members of the East German party offer ample opportunities to their respective leaderships to safeguard and intensify the Marxist-Leninist regime. A few policemen can usually control a large mob, and a handful of prison guards may suffice to hold in check a good-sized prison population. The Communist party membership is large enough to assure the presence of sufficient guardians and supervisors to achieve totalitarian, or total, rule.

E. The Social Pyramid in a Communist Society

Marx and Lenin forcefully advocated the overthrow of the existing social order and the introduction of a brand-new and wholly revolutionary society. They also outlined the utopian goal of the social system: the classless society of the

future. This Marxist dream-world was based on the assumption of an inevitable "class struggle" which would result in the achievement of total social, political, and economic equality for all of its members.

What has happened to this utopian goal? Of all Marxist theories, this one has been the most blatantly distorted in communist practice. Today's "classless society," whether in China, Russia, or the ex-satellites of Eastern Europe, is the most rigidly divided rank-and-privilege-conscious society of the modern world. The communist social pattern introduces far bigger cleavages among existing classes and a stricter stratification than any traditional capitalist society ever produced or ever imagined to create.

The Soviet Union seems to have reached the stage of a status quo society, and the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 are only historic memories today. The new upper class, the working class, and the group of "social outcasts" (forced labor, etc.) form the Soviet social pyramid. Each of these three major groups is then further divided into tightly drawn subcategories. It is the most layer-arranged structure of twentieth-century society.


Individuals are so confined to their own group, and there is so little communication between classes, that a society has been established which is sharply divided into separate and distinct layers. The image of Marx's visionary "classless society" has faded into a remote and impractical future. What is visible and present today is Stalin's, Khrushchev's, the current Soviet leadership's, and Mao's peculiarly class-conscious society.

By "social mobility" we mean the opportunity for an individual to move from one social class to another. This can be either "upward mobility," that is, movement from a low position to a higher social level, or "downward mobility," in which the individual moves from a higher standing to lower social strata.

In an analysis of communist-dominated societies, we find that in the early years of communist rule the pattern of mobility is quite flexible and is characterized by immense upward and downward pushes of large groups of people. This

Chart 3

THE SOCIAL PYRAMID OF SOVIET SOCIETY



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period of revolutionarily restructuring an entire society usually involves a process of great social changes and even crises. Then the period of flexibility ends; the friends of communism have been rewarded by abrupt shifts upward on the social ladder, and the enemies have been punished by mass downward moves into the lower strata of society. This reconstruction point was reached in the Soviet Union approximately in 1934-1935; in Eastern Europe around 1955; and in Communist China in 1961-1962. Soon thereafter, a second phase of social development emerges; mobility yields to stratification, and, after a period of rapid changes, the new communist society crystallizes.

There is less mobility in this new communist society than in any of its capitalist equivalents. The American worker may choose to change jobs freely, move his family to California on the spur of the moment, work hard to improve his economic position, and train his children to become doctors, lawyers, and college professors. Advancement, whether in the social, economic, or political sphere, rests almost entirely on the initiative of the individual. Comparable shifts are practically impossible in today's closed communist society. Frozen to the job and to his place of employment by government edict, the farmer remains a farmer, and the industrial worker who cannot as a rule leave or change jobs, can only hope for improvements in the same general environment. Their children do have opportunities to move upward (mostly by working hard in communist youth organizations or by showing unusual excellence in their schools), but these opportunities are far more limited and fewer than in the free and competitive atmosphere of American and British society.

In the Soviet Union, the new upper class is constituted of the economically and politically privileged individuals and their families, people who have benefited from the establishment and perpetuation of a communist system. Most Party members fall into this class since they are primarily components of the Marxist social and political network. Other categories in this upper class division are based on special activities or skills that serve the state. This new upper

class, in its broadest definition, is composed of somewhat less than 10 per cent of the Soviet population. Three primary groups, (a) the ruling elite; (b) the managers and the technical intelligentsia; and (c) the non-technical intelligentsia—each with distinct social characteristics and privileges—make up this new upper class.

At the very top of the Soviet social pyramid are the few hundred families of the ruling clique. This elite group is formed of the highest officials of the Communist party and the government, and the highest army and secret police officers. Their average income has been estimated as 9000 roubles a year, or, in terms of actual purchasing power, at least the equivalent of \$10,000 in the United States. In addition to the income, they enjoy many free privileges and benefits that raise their standard of living even higher. This level on the communist social ladder guarantees to the members of the ruling elite a luxurious standard of living which parallels that of a wealthy industrialist or businessman in the West. Its external characteristics are comfortable apartments in Moscow or Leningrad, palatial villas in the country, hunting lodges (*dachas*), or family retreats on the Crimean seacoast or in the mountains of the Caucasus, sleek automobiles, private railroad cars, and an elaborate social life with fellow-members of the group.

The "New Class," a term describing the communist top-elite, was coined by the jailed Yugoslav ex-party leader, Milovan Djilas. In his book, *The New Class*, he portrays the innate secrecy and suspicion of communism as illustrated in the everyday behavior of this group. Their lives are completely separate from the masses of the people. Special shops are open only for them (and members of the diplomatic corps), and their houses and vacation retreats are securely guarded by hordes of secret policemen. In Communist East Germany, in the midst of the most depressed and impoverished of all the Soviet ex-satellites, a whole city designed for luxurious living was constructed for the Party and government hierarchy, but was completely "off-limits" to the rest of the populace. Khrushchev's successors may have relaxed their secretiveness to some extent, but they have

not changed their way of life. A millionaire's standard of living and an ingrown cliquishness of the elite group is ever present.

Just below the superaristocracy of Party and government is a separate group composed of the leading managers of industry and of the largest state farms, artists, writers, actors, musicians, scientists, important technical personnel, and the top-rank white-collar professionals (teachers, etc.). Most of the membership of the secret police and the lower-echelon military officers are also ranked in this subdivision of the upper class. Income estimates of this group have averaged around \$8500 annually, in American terms; and some salaries are considerably higher.

The two significant components of this group are the representatives of the managerial class and of the technical intelligentsia. The former includes the successful executives of the largest industrial plants (armaments, chemical, and related heavy industries), while the latter refers to the scientists and technical experts. The managerial class consists of responsible and often Western-style "entrepreneur" types, who are well rewarded by a society intent on rapid industrialization. These administrators may earn up to the equivalent of \$25,000 and maintain a standard of living commensurate with this income. This degree of success is, however, not typical of the group; they may be entitled to state-furnished automobiles and pleasant vacation resorts, but, on the whole, their standard of living is considerably lower than that of the ruling elite.

The intelligentsia is harder to place into neat categories. The performing artists are treated better than others; if they cooperate with the regime politically, they are pampered and admired members of society, especially in the culture and art-conscious atmosphere of the Soviet Union. The line is often hard to toe; one day leading musicians are rewarded by the Party leadership with prizes for excellence, which may be revoked the next day if the dictator is displeased with their performance. Below the creative artists stand the scientists and technical experts, such as engineers, physicists, and agricultural specialists, for whom there is a great demand in a

newly industrialized society. The term "technical intelligentsia" is used to differentiate these specialists from the non-technical group, the lowest subdivision of the upper class, who are not given the same level of rewards or recognition.

The "non-technical intelligentsia" includes the marginal groups of the new upper class. Here we find the lower Party functionaries, engineers and managers of collective farms, but largely the non-scientifically engaged members of the urban classes. Their average yearly income has been estimated around 5000 roubles, or about \$6000. While surviving economically, this group finds its opportunities sharply curtailed. They can afford a private apartment or a small house and a pleasant vacation, but few luxuries.

Doctors, lawyers, journalists, and teachers of such social sciences as history, economics, and philosophy fit into this subdivision. The Communist regime has always eyed these professions with suspicion and has withheld the recognition generally accorded to them in the West. At least 65 per cent of the doctors in the Soviet Union are women; it would appear that men are not particularly encouraged to enter the medical profession. Political journalism is a dangerous profession under communism and, except for the fanatical Marxist-Leninist, so is the teaching of economics or history. "Lawyers are not really needed in a communist society," remarked an official of the Soviet Union. While their lot has improved since 1953, it cannot be compared with that of their Western colleagues who are prosperous, badly needed, and respected members of their society. The regime pampers the much needed scientist but does not offer the same rewards to the non-technically trained group, which suggests that it has a distinctly marginal role in the society of communism.

The two principal components of the second major group of the Soviet social pyramid, the working class, are the workers and the peasants. In a rigidly stratified society an immense cleavage separates these two groups. The workers divide into two groups: the skilled and the unskilled. The skilled industrial workers, who earn about 1000 roubles, or

\$1200 a year, have the advantage of job security and, if they are fortunate, possession of a tiny one- or two-room urban apartment. Their income is low, but they have a difficult time spending it anyway. Government-controlled rents are usually kept low, and, beyond food and drink, the workers have few outlets for improving their daily lives. Their difficulties stem from overlong working hours, crowded living conditions, and, typical of all communist societies, an often appalling lack of consumer goods for themselves and their families. The moment consumer goods appear on the market, the long pent-up demand of this group bursts forth in a spending spree on what for them seem to be luxuries, but to a Western worker would be normal items of daily life (radios, electric irons, washing machines, etc.).

In an industrializing society, the welfare of the working class can be measured by the availability or the scarcity of consumer goods. Economic relaxation with a relative abundance of such goods has been least obvious in Communist China and East Germany and most marked in the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European ex-satellites. In situations, such as in the post-Stalin U.S.S.R., where there are rising opportunities for spending and the expectations of a higher standard of living, family budgets become increasingly unbalanced. Consequently, the worker's wife must go to work; the children are turned over to state-controlled nurseries (*crèches*) or kindergartens for care and are gradually separated from the parents. At this point, economic pressure on the worker pays a handsome political and social dividend to the communist regime: it helps to break up the family unit, which has always been regarded as a stumbling block to communism, and thereby opens up endless opportunities for the children's early indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism.

The unskilled worker is considerably worse off than his skilled comrades. Earning only about 70 roubles a month, he cannot even afford to pay for his absolute necessities in addition to his rent, forced contributions to the government, and union dues. These desperately struggling urban workers, where even a working wife presents no economic solution, make up one of the most resentful and embittered groups in

the country. Their loyalty to the communist regime is minimal, and only police terror prevents a mass expression of hatred. As the East Berlin, Polish, and Hungarian revolts so clearly demonstrated, the moment this terror abates, the less fortunate urban industrial worker will rise up and vent his anger against communism.

The peasantry has been the neglected stepchild of communism everywhere. The continuing "problems in agriculture," as Marxist economists so often phrase it, is a camouflage term denoting human discontent and hopelessness. The spectrum is again a broad one, ranging from the famine-ridden communes of Red China through the totally collectivized, sullen villages of East Germany to the higher agricultural standards of the Soviet Union and to the relative abundance of the semi-regulated Polish and Yugoslav agriculture.

Despite the incredible brutality of Stalin's massive "dekulakization" campaign of the 1930s and the millions of casualties it involved, the Russian peasantry can still be divided into two distinguishable subgroups. One is the newly emerging well-to-do peasant group, those living on the more fertile, more productive farm complexes, and those whose skill and hard work make them prosperous. The other is the least productive and poorest peasant group, the communist equivalent of a tenant farmer, the permanently indigent and depressed who belong among the most unproductive inmates of the collective farm.

In the broad group of the working class, the peasant-farmer ranks well below the industrial worker and is only a shade above the "social outcasts" of communism. Collectivization, to him, is no abstract term since it has reached deeply into every phase and aspect of his daily life. It has deprived him of his home, his farm, and his freedom of movement and independent agricultural activity; and it has forced him into a vast community where the local agent (a Communist party secretary) of a distant and absentee landlord (the state) directs his movements and controls both his work and his personal life. The collective farm operates on a central plan, a long-range blueprint which does not allow for

individual enterprise or initiative. In such a totally collectivized system there is no escape: one farm complex operates much like the next. Only in such partially collectivized economics as Poland or Yugoslavia, where recent reports indicate that 85 per cent of the arable land is still regulated but largely free and privately held, is there a tangible hope of betterment for the farmer; there he may move from the collectivized-sector of agriculture and return to such capitalistic institutions as his own farm, fields, and cattle.

Communism has benefited from the fact that farmers as a class are usually the least likely to rise up in violent opposition to any regime. Conservative by nature, anxious to hold on to their landed property, they are not a revolutionary-minded group. Their opposition, as in the case of Red China's ill-fated people's communes, was more a civil disobedience campaign, a show of passive resistance to the dictates of an unpopular regime. Treated most poorly by an indifferent Marxist-Leninist system, they are not considered dangerous by their communist masters. Communism has much more to fear from the dissatisfaction of the urban industrial worker who may yet touch off massive popular explosions. Paradoxically, this is the group that Marx and Engels wanted to "liberate" from the yoke of capitalism and lead toward a utopian world order. Communism has not fulfilled its promises to the working class; its inability to do so has been one of its most conspicuous failures.

Communism is enemy-minded. From its perspective of life, it is ceaselessly concerned with enemies, domestic and foreign, present and future, and visible and invisible. The key doctrine of the permanent "class struggle" is predicated on the conflict between friends and foes of Marxism-Leninism. Those felt to be on the wrong side of the "class struggle" are punished. Social mobility for these unfortunates moves in a downward direction as they are forced into the punitive category of "social outcasts": slave-laborers, concentration camp inmates, and jail prisoners.

The high human cost of maintaining a communist society can be seen in the large number of its citizens who are kept in detention or who are under permanent police surveillance.

Among the "social outcasts," one group is used primarily to supply free or cheap labor to a vast economic system in the throes of rapid industrialization. Countless able-bodied young men and women are confined to "camps" to supply inexpensive labor for various projects, such as gold mining, lumbering, and road-building. Labor camps can be erected near the projects themselves, and the indeterminate sentences handed out by the secret police can easily be extended for the duration of the labor project.

Stalin's Russia specialized in this involuntary mass-recruitment of labor. The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) helped to launch the great Soviet industrial effort and led to the construction of hundreds of slave-labor camps that were to dot the countryside from the western borders of European Russia all the way to the wastelands of northeastern Siberia. Once a labor project was terminated, many of these slave-laborers were released by the regime with a perfunctory apology for a regrettable "administrative error."

Political prisoners, those who are labeled "enemies of the Communist State," form a second group of "social outcasts." They are the immediate victims of terror and mass intimidation, and their numbers are usually highest in the period immediately following the establishment of a communist regime. In the first revolutionary flush of the "takeover" in Lenin's Russia and Mao's China, hundreds of thousands were arrested. Many were shot immediately, as was the entire family of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, while others began 20- to 30-year prison sentences. They were imprisoned either for past "crimes" (opposing communism), for past activities (former landlords, aristocrats, officers, members of the hated bourgeoisie), or for fear of future trouble (the danger of continuing resistance to communism).

It is impossible to estimate accurately the percentage of "social outcasts" within a communist society. The numbers in Red China may exceed all previous estimates; its closed society and the fact of non-recognition by most Western countries preclude any statistical surveys. Estimates varied immensely in the Soviet Union, ranging from 2 million up to 20 million under Stalin. Rejecting extremes, expert observers

have talked in terms of 10 to 12 million people kept in camps and prisons during the 31 years of Stalin's rule. This amounted to five per cent of the total population who were abruptly purged and declassified beyond the limits of their own society. This astounding statistic has been considerably reduced since 1956 as Khrushchev and his successors, in a more relaxed environment, have dealt differently with the opposition. With the diminution of secret police terror, most of the camps have been closed in the Soviet Union, and while the class of "social outcasts" has not disappeared, it has greatly decreased in recent years.

F. Education as the Training Ground for Communism

The early indoctrination of the youth of the country in Marxism-Leninism is considered essential to sustain the system, for politics and education are inseparably meshed together in a communist society. Both the classroom and the politically-oriented youth organizations provide the only chance for the youth to move upward in the strict social structure of this totalitarian society.

Since the primary function of education in the Soviet Union is to serve the needs of the state, political and social education are a "cradle to the grave" phenomenon, available to the people throughout their lives. Such media of communications as the movies, radio, television, the press, music, and the theatre are used by the state to influence and shape the thinking of the people along communist lines.

The exaltation of a "Glory to the Party" theme is part of an aggressive anti-religious campaign in which Marxism is substituted for Christianity or Judaism as a new religion. The most sensitive and receptive youthful minds are taught in communist schools that Marxism has the answers for man's problems and that all forms of organized religion must be viewed with contempt as "unscientific superstition" serving only as an "opiate of the masses." Anti-religious instruction is regularly given in the schools with the result that this ceaseless din of Marxist-Leninist propaganda may well offset the efforts of the churches to insull religion into the minds of the young.

The church-state controversy is particularly bitter in the three East European countries, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where the population is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. Here the communist regimes have arrested and persecuted priests, closed down seminaries, and expelled most of the teaching orders which provided the backbone of secondary education. In East Germany, the Protestant church has resolutely opposed the Ulbricht regime which has tried to restrict Protestant influence. Members of the Jewish faith have also been obstructed in their educational and religious efforts.

The communist education system, controlled by the Party and the government, has waged a tremendous and often signally successful struggle against illiteracy. Both in the U.S.S.R. and in China, the number of people receiving an education has mushroomed almost beyond belief. Although secondary and higher schools have been built at a rapid rate, they can accommodate only a fraction of the applicants. Evening and correspondence courses have been developed to offer part-time education to those denied full-time opportunities.

The people of the various republics in the U.S.S.R. speak many different languages. In the non-Russian speaking regions, education is carried on in the native tongue of the area. In addition, Russian language, literature, history, and traditions have been incorporated into the curriculum.

Since many women in the Soviet Union are also part of the labor force, education begins with the nursery school, where state and Party personnel take the place of the working parents. Communist indoctrination surrounds the young child's earliest school routines even as he advances to the kindergarten. Some of the cost of this pre-school education is paid for by the parents.

At the age of seven, the law requires Soviet children to enroll in the first grade of the ten-year primary-secondary school program. This universal education is paid for by the state, and attendance is compulsory through grade seven. At this plateau, the program divides into three tracks: vocational, semiprofessional, and senior-secondary. Those who go on to higher education—universities, institutes, academies,

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and conservatories—receive an additional four to six years of education. Completion of the ten-year program (senior-secondary track) is a minimum requirement for admission to the higher education programs.

The needs of the state for skilled and semiskilled workers are determined by the government. The programs offered in the vocational schools reflect the changing occupational needs of Soviet society. In general, vocational education programs, varying in length from six months to two years, are terminal and are designed to train individuals for a specific type of work in industry or agriculture. Only a small percentage of the students have come to the vocational schools voluntarily; most of them have been conscripted by the local authorities to fill the needs of the state. In recent years, a new one-to-two-year vocational technical-training program was inaugurated to accommodate the graduates of the ten-year secondary program who are unable to gain admission into higher educational institutions.

The semiprofessional schools, known as technicums, offer specialized training in such fields as public health, teaching, music, and the arts; and develop technicians for industry, transportation, communications, and agriculture. Admission to these semiprofessional training programs is by competitive examination. Graduates of the seven-year general education program may enter a three- or four-year training period; a higher level training course of two to three years is available to graduates of the ten-year secondary program. In general, it is unlikely that a semiprofessional graduate can advance to the rank of a professional in a communist society.

On the university level, the students receive small subsistence payments in addition to full tuition. If the students fail to pass the many frequent severe examinations, they are subject to lose all of their benefits. Because Soviet institutions of higher learning can only absorb a small percentage of the grade ten graduates annually, the regime tightly controls and supervises the admission of students to the universities and institutes. Political reliability and the student's "socially correct" origin are just as important as his educational excellence. Theoretically, students with a "worker-peasant" origin

are given precedence over all others. In actual practice, however, the sons and daughters of the "New Class" are in the majority of those accepted for higher education.

Those who do not enter into the universities try to enter the technical institutes which are sponsored by the various ministries of the national economy. These schools offer practical, vocational training, and the graduates are considered to be skilled professional workers. For each of the scarce universities, there are dozens of such institutes of higher learning. Although the U.S.S.R. has about 740 institutes as contrasted with her 40 universities, there are still many more applicants for the institutes than can be accommodated; consequently, competition for admission is very keen.

The students' summer vacation is seldom their own. Students of all ages are encouraged, and often compelled, to undertake some form of productive labor during the summer months. This usually consists of farm work, harvesting in some remote agricultural area which suffers from a labor shortage. For engineers or technical students, it involves factory work or some mechanical type of labor. Careful records of student work are kept, and all details are entered into a passbook which each student is obliged to carry at all times. Students who refuse to "volunteer" soon find that their educational opportunities are blocked. "No extra work—no education!" is the motto. At the end of the education process comes graduation from the university or the technical institute. The regime, at this point, expects that the graduate will emerge a fully indoctrinated new "Communist Man" with total loyalty and automatic obedience to the Party and state.

Active participation in politics parallels every stage of the communist educational effort. The political assembly line begins with membership in the most junior branch of the youth movement (the *Octobrists*) at age seven; then comes the next level at ages ten to fourteen (the *Young Pioneers*); and then the regular youth movement (the *Komsomol*) which spans the years from fifteen to twenty-eight. Membership in the highest level of the Communist youth organization, the

Komsomol, is often a decisive factor in admission to a university. Such a policy accounts for the swollen membership of the Komsomol movement of about twenty-one million members. Other Soviet youth movement figures are correspondingly high. There are about ten million Octobrists and about twenty million Young Pioneers. Thus, we can see that the semicompulsory youth movement of the U.S.S.R. has mobilized a total of about fifty-one million young people.

Dedicated and loyal participation in the youth movement can, for the chosen, lead to membership in the Communist party and potentially a rise to higher Party and government office. For those not elected to Party membership, weekly evening seminars in communism provide a continuing and compulsory indoctrination. This assembly line is not only continuous with relatively few variations in the pattern, but it is also interspersed with frequent checks on the individual's loyalty to the Party and numerous examinations of his knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, an uninterrupted line of political training runs through every facet of youthful and adult life for the citizens of a Communist society.

Juvenile delinquency, or "hooliganism" as it is called, is a continuing problem in the Soviet Union. While major crimes are handled by the police, the regime has tried to combat hooliganism by setting up special squads of students, many Komsomol members, who are alerted to act against such offenses as drunkenness, disorderliness, and various forms of rowdiness. The Komsomol squads are also directed to correct such "anti-social behavior" as the wearing of Western hairdos and loud Western-style sport shirts, and dancing to decadent jazz and the "twist."

What is most disturbing to Soviet authorities is that the sons and daughters of high-ranking Communist officials and the "New Class" compound the problem. Communist law-enforcement authorities have an immense amount of trouble in cracking down on the son of an army general or the daughter of a secret police colonel. These children enjoy and abuse the privileges which come to the offspring of the affluent in a non-affluent society. These "golden youth," as they are sometimes described, are often found committing

acts of vandalism, theft, or even murder. Sentences tend to show leniency if the parent of the youngster involved is a top-level member of the "New Class." This pattern of behavior, as Louis Fischer observed in his book, *Russia Revisited*, may well be "a youthful translation of the lavish living at the Soviet social summit."

G. Culture in the Communist World

The Communist slogan "Socialist Realism" defines the relationship of art, literature, music, and science to the political system. All aspects of human culture and civilization must be subordinated to Marxism-Leninism. "Socialism" (by which they mean communism) and a sober form of "realism" (implying the acceptance and glorification of the ideas of communism) pervade every aspect of daily life. This philosophy holds that the arts are not to picture life as it really is, but rather as it will be.

Under "Socialist Realism," applied in a rigid Stalinist sense, the arts inevitably tend to be regimented and uncreative. Despite high literacy figures and technical achievements, communist art is drab and monotonous. The truly creative arts cannot survive without an individuality of ideals or human aspiration toward a vision of perfection; without idealism, the spark of inspiration is rapidly lost.

In communism's tightly centralized pattern, the poet, the writer, the composer, the scientist, the opera singer, and even the star athlete are drawn directly into the service of the state. In their various performances, they divide their energies between glorification of the leader (in the "cult of personality" system) and a proud reflection of the government's manifold achievements. Lenin Prizes (formerly Stalin Prizes) are usually awarded to the type of novel or play in which young lovers heatedly argue by the light of the moon about the latest advances in industrial production. Those artists who collaborate with the regime by extolling it are rewarded with high social positions and good incomes. On the other hand, any artist who does not cooperate with the political line and does not display it in his works will not be allowed

to find an audience. I may be punished in other ways. The eminent Russian composer, Dimitri Shostakovich, was charged with this type of indiscretion in the mid-thirties; until he recanted sometime later, his work was suppressed in the Soviet Union.

Within the rigidly drawn political framework, communist societies have encouraged a mass-base and a mass-appeal for culture, the arts, music, and sports. Millions of books are printed, sold, and read voraciously; hundreds of theatres present plays; and musical life flourishes and attracts countless thousands. Art, though shackled by the drabness of "Socialist Realism," manifests itself in endless exhibits which are attended by large crowds. Sports provide opportunities for the people to be active participants, or to be spectators at gala athletic meets sponsored by the Party. The outstanding athletes are subsidized by the government and carry the banner of the Soviet Union into international competition against the amateur athletic teams of the Western nations. With increasing literacy and a greater appreciation of culture in communist countries, the future will undoubtedly bring more demands for a de-emphasis of "Socialist Realism" and a stress on more individuality.

The years 1955 and 1956 were important turning points in recent communist history. They introduced a brief period of cultural and intellectual relaxation into the communist societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. To a lesser extent, the winds of change even affected the intolerant Maoist regime of Communist China. The true symptom of change was the public expression of dissent and dissatisfaction by poets, writers, journalists, and other literary figures. Suddenly it was safe to criticize the regime, the Party, or the drabness of daily life without provoking the sanctions of a Stalin-type purge. The 1956 Moscow publication of *Not By Bread Alone* by Vladimir Dudintsev touched off a great literary controversy in the communist world and ended in an official rebuke of the author. But Dudintsev's book, despite the government's criticism, continued to sell and be widely read. Ilya Ehrenburg, well-known journalist and author, published *The Thaw*, a novel which openly criticized Stalinism

and described the more relaxed period following his death. *The Thaw* offered the Western public the first insight into the Stalinist system by a Soviet writer.

Simultaneously, a great poetic revival occurred with the appearance on the Soviet literary scene of Yevgeny Yevtushenko. At the age of twenty-five, Yevtushenko was already the idol of Soviet youth. In hundreds of evening meetings, he read his fiery poems to large and responsive gatherings of youth. He has been the leader of the "angry young men" in Soviet literature; of all his poems, the most influential has been the courageous attack on Russian anti-Semitism in *Babi Yar*.

So too, in Communist China, Mao Tse-tung personally promised to relax domestic conditions. On two occasions, in May, 1956, and again in February, 1957, Mao spoke in favor of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend." This theme was interpreted as an open invitation to the Chinese to criticize and to make use of a newly won freedom of expression.

Communism and intellectual freedom, however, are incompatible with each other. Both in the Soviet Union and Communist China political controls were quickly restored when it seemed that a large sector of public opinion would exceed the freedom allowable in a communist society. Chinese intellectuals and Russian artists were made to realize that a communist regime will invariably suppress those who demand a full measure of political and cultural independence.

Mao's "Hundred Flower" era was short-lived. The critics expressed such bitterness against the leaders of Chinese communism and the institutions they imposed on the country that a speedy halt was called to the discord of the "hundred schools of thought." The relaxation was promptly followed by a new wave of repressions and a large-scale purge of government officials and middle class intellectuals. Some observers of Chinese communism have surmised that the sudden relaxation process was deceptively planned by the regime itself, which was anxious to identify its critics and to eliminate its potentially vocal opponents. In any event, the party's reaction to the brief blooming of the "Hundred

Flowers" was surprisingly harsh and arbitrary; it revealed great anger on the part of the Maoist leadership.

By 1958, the public discussions in the Writers' Union began to annoy the Party leadership in the Soviet Union; poets and fiction writers seemed to "abuse" their freedom of expression. Khrushchev met with a group of writers in mid-1958 and told them that the Hungarian revolution could have been avoided if some of its initiators had promptly been shot. "Our hand is not going to tremble the next time," he added significantly.

Let us look at the celebrated Pasternak case for an illustration of Soviet reaction to the freedom of expression. The Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958 was awarded to the eminent Russian poet and novelist, Boris Pasternak, for his works and widely acclaimed novel, *Doctor Zhivago*. Pasternak had allowed his manuscript, which was critical of the Communist Revolution and the Soviet system, to be taken abroad, and the book was first published in Italy. *Doctor Zhivago* has since been translated into many languages and avidly read throughout the world; yet, it has never been published in the author's homeland. Pasternak was severely reprimanded by the regime, attacked by the Soviet press, and expelled from the Writers' Union. At first, he was not allowed to leave the country; later, he was informed by Khrushchev himself that he was free to leave, but if he left, he was never to return. "Leaving my homeland would equal death for me," Pasternak said. Under such pressures, he was forced to decline the prize. Pasternak remained isolated from his public, ignored by his fellow citizens, and quarantined in his country home outside of Moscow until he died a broken man in 1960. The handling of the Pasternak case aroused considerable consternation abroad.

The lightning process over the freedom of expression has cautiously, but steadily, continued ever since 1958. The barriers of intellectual freedom have remained tangible and visible at all times. Yevtushenko accepted several invitations to lecture and to read his poetry in American universities, but under governmental pressure was forced to cancel his trip. In December, 1962, Khrushchev attended an abstract art exhibit

and, completely losing his temper, angrily threatened the artists with immediate political and social punishment. In the spring of 1963, he delivered a long tirade to artists and literary representatives stating ominously that the period of "limited tolerance" in cultural matters was over and that a new era of harsher controls was about to be initiated.

The press was also scolded for the weakness and laxity of its propaganda efforts. Throughout 1963, a determined campaign was waged to make the two leading newspapers, *Pravda*, the Party organ, and *Izvestia*, the government's mouthpiece, into a "militant arm" of the regime. These two papers, which have a combined circulation in excess of 12 million copies daily, have introduced a new and tougher Party line. Both are given the widest possible national distribution to act as the political propagandists and cultural guardians of Soviet communism.

It would be a mistake to assume from this discussion that Khrushchev was a Stalin, or that the Russian people are willing to return to the total inflexibility of the Stalinism of the 1924-1953 period. Khrushchev was shrewd enough to exploit the popular fear and hatred of those decades. In 1962, he personally authorized the publication of Alexander Solzhenitzyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, a terrifying account of life in Stalin's concentration camps. To the Russians, publication of this book represented a literary landmark: an officially sanctioned book which implicitly criticized communist institutions. It also gave the West the prison-inmate's view of a communist society. Its impact on the Russian reading public was immense and immediate, but what significance it will have on the future trends of Soviet literature remains to be seen.

Chapter V
**POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES**
By W. L. Gruenewald

Political and economic institutions are immensely important and inseparable elements of society. Along with marital, familial, educational, religious, and other institutions, they form the basic structure by which people order their lives and fulfill their individual and collective needs. These institutions are systems of concepts. They are basic systems of human activities, having considerable permanence, universality, and interdependence.

Society is the complex whole of human interrelationships in action. It includes the entire range of positions which humans hold with respect to one another and the reciprocal influence and actions which those relationships involve. Institutions constitute the focusing of all relationships in society on particular functions. Political institutions carry on the regulative functions, while economic institutions are concerned with supplying the goods and services necessary to sustain life.

As interrelated and interdependent parts of the whole of society, the nature and operation of any institution will be affected by other institutions in the same society. All function from a common base of usages, folkways, and mores. Thus, it is improper to consider particular institutions as complete and distinct entities. All institutions are parts of a "seamless web of society."

Political and economic institutions, like other segments of a dynamic society, are constantly in a state of flux. Change, struggle, and resistance occur in and transcend all institutions. One alteration in size, position, function, or form leads to another, and the latter, in turn, produces further changes. Functions are subdivided; new institutions or substitutions develop, acquire autonomy, and further proliferate. A change or innovation may have an impact on

all of society much as a pebble dropped in a pond sends waves to the farthest edge. Television and the computer are examples of inventions which illustrate the ramifications on many institutions of society. But scientific and technological innovations are not alone. Similar consequences result from sharply changed birth rates, wars, revolutions, depressions, and other social phenomena. Society and its individual institutions are always in a state of becoming. Changes or developments which manifest themselves first in one segment of society can be expected to appear in one form or another elsewhere in society. For instance, some of the results of the sharp increase in the birth rate in the 1940s is having an impact on education, governmental efforts to finance education, housing, and various industries.

Such changes in social and economic conditions are always accompanied by struggles among interest groups seeking to defend or secure advantage. Thus, with their jobs threatened by automation, workers may seek shorter hours in order to distribute the remaining work among more people or they may seek company- or government-financed retraining or other protective measures. Employers naturally resist. Both groups seek to enlist support from other groups and to secure governmental protection. The eventual accommodation, although temporary, is a compromise between the positions of the groups involved. The political struggle is always present.

Along with changing conditions and the never-ending struggle of individuals and groups for positions of advantage, ideas as to what is proper, necessary, or expedient also change. Thus, the assertion in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal served in the American Revolution to justify rebellion on the grounds that colonists were denied "rights of Englishmen" and equality with those living in the mother country. A generation later, the concept of equality was reinterpreted to justify the elimination of property qualifications for suffrage and an attack on aristocratic government. In later generations, it served the cause of abolition and was used to support equal rights for women. In our generation, it is a driving force in the struggle to end

racial discrimination. Ideas are powerful weapons in the relations of men.

Three factors—ecology, politics, and ideology—are inter-related and continuous factors in the development of American society. Together they determine the nature and function of the several institutions in our society, including political and economic institutions.

Having called attention to the societal context in which political and economic institutions should be considered and to the factors of ecology, politics, and ideas, we shall devote our attention henceforth somewhat more to ideas than the other factors. Such emphasis on ideas seems to be justified by the peculiar role they seem to have. They reflect changing conditions and political struggles in society. Frequently, they are called forth to justify a point of view or a course of action already taken. In this sense, they are a result. Also, they may serve a precipitating role. They may cause changes in conditions and precipitate new struggles. They may be generalized expressions of hopes, ideals, and goals. In any case, they give to society a sense of direction and purpose.

Ideas encompass both theory and doctrine, which are closely related but display different characteristics. Theory is concerned with systematic analysis and generalization of phenomena wherever discovered. Theory may be both speculative and descriptive. It is speculative where it deals with norms for prospective conduct. It is descriptive and comparative when its subject matter is found in the facts or behavior and institutions. It is logical because the complexity and nature of its raw material demand orderly classification and some means of extrapolation, if only that of the deductive syllogism.

Doctrine or ideology is sustained by belief or faith rather than by demonstration of fact or logic. Those in the eighteenth century who conducted revolutions in the name of liberty and equality did so in the faith that equality and liberty would bring satisfactions; and they did so without any substantial fund of historical evidence that could permit them to predict what realization of their announced goals of liberty and equality would mean in the lives of people.

The target of doctrine or ideology is action rather than speculation or analysis. At the time of its formulation, it is a prescription of faith dictating to its converts through concepts which promise radical progress. It cannot stand still and cannot stop for proof. However, those imbued with a doctrine of ideology or myth must be teachers also, and they do not oppose a teachable, consistent pattern for doctrine if it can be borrowed or easily assembled.

Obviously theory and doctrine overlap. They share common historical sources. Frequently, the theorist who analyzes and systematizes ideas doubles as a polemicist for the ideological faith of his day. Doctrine for which polemicists developed systematic expression sometimes receives later institutional implementation and becomes, to some degree at least, a description of actual political behavior. Effective politicians sometimes achieve posthumous recognition as statesmen. Likewise, dead polemicists may become statesmen.

A. Sources of American Democracy and Capitalism

The taproots of American political and economic thought lie deep in the past. It is never possible to determine where or how far in the past because investigation always reveals antecedent sources. Nevertheless, it seems that the climate of opinion produced by the Renaissance and the Reformation (1300-1600) was a bounteous well from which was drawn much that is fundamental in our thought.

The era of the Renaissance and Reformation was one of turbulent, rapid, and fundamental change. For nearly eight centuries after the fall of Rome, the civilization of western Europe was dominated by the universal Church. It ruled the minds and hearts of men, persuading them literally that they lived under the divine guidance of a divinely ordered universe. During much of that long period, life was rigidly structured in a feudal system which was characterized by a distinct division of the population into classes with the clergy at the top. Below them were the secular rulers (lords), members of their courts (nobility), and the ruled (peasant-serfs). The clergy were the moral guardians of society and, by broad

interpretation of that role, prescribed standards of conduct in virtually every phase of human activity. The secular rulers were a hereditary caste of warriors who possessed the soil and ruled those who tilled it. Peasant-serfs were attached to the soil and subject for life to the lord of the manor on which they were born. Feudal society basically was an agrarian society of men who were bound to God, Church, and lord.

Even during the Middle Ages, society was not completely static. During the later centuries, perhaps as a consequence of the Crusades, commerce, cities, and a commercial class (bourgeoisie) began to develop. Increasing numbers of people began to abandon manor and class to indulge a passion for adventure, wealth, learning, and freedom from the restraints of manor and lord. By the fourteenth century, these movements had achieved a momentum that was to transform society and thought in western Europe.

The growth of commerce fostered a new form of economic organization which was the germ of modern capitalism. The early stages of commercial development led to the development of towns which were largely community commercial centers and in which economic life centered around guilds. The guilds were organized with reference to the town market so that each guild enjoyed a monopoly in a given line of commerce. In return for the favor of monopoly granted by the town government, the guild assumed an obligation to furnish consumers a sound article at a fair price. Competition among members of a guild was not entirely absent, but it failed to become an important factor in commerce because of the prevailing Christian ethic with its ideal of a decent living on a basis of approximate equality for all members of the organization. Also, the guild sought to eliminate the middleman or trader by requiring the producer of an article to display and sell it in his own shop.

The development of trade with other towns and eventually with distant points rendered ineffective the guilds, which had been fashioned for purely local needs. Obviously, goods in foreign trade could not be sold in the shops of producers. The risks and profits in such trade were large and were a strong incentive to the adventurous and ambitious.

Consequently, there developed a body of merchant princes and capitalists who towered above the rest of the community.

Foreign trade produced the merchant company in which a number of partners would pool resources to acquire ships, buy cargo, and pay wages. Partners shared in profits in proportion to their individual contributions. The companies took advantage of the many opportunities for profit, which led them into a variety of financial operations, including banking. Money became king in the Renaissance. The bank of the Medici family is an illustration. It accumulated vast capital under the leadership of several generations of eminent merchants. By the second half of the fifteenth century, it operated banks in every important trade center in Europe. Its financial power enabled it finally to make its head the ruler of Florence. Similar developments in northern Europe prepared the way to subjection of all economic life of Europe to the power of money.

Although capitalism originated in foreign trade, it soon invaded and overwhelmed the guild system. The exporters and importers, with connections in every market and with ample resources, could buy wool, leather, and other raw materials cheaper than the local guild. By supplying guildsmen with raw materials and by contracting for their annual output, the merchant soon acquired considerable control over the guilds. This was accomplished in the textile market of Florence as early as the fourteenth century. A few great merchants bought and sold nearly all cloth without producing a yard. Hence, the guild no longer squared with its original purpose. Guildsmen began to look like shop foremen while journeymen and apprentices became more like wage-earners.

The decline of the guilds signified an economic revolution which resulted in crowding the socialistic guild system entirely from the scene and replacing it with a competitive, capitalistic order of society. This development harmonized with the ideas of the Renaissance: the enlargement of the world and its markets, the development of the new individualist ethic inviting every man to make the most of his

talents, and the replacement of the town as a politico-economic unit with the nation ruled by an autocratic sovereign.

The new social class (bourgeoisie) produced by these economic changes were the captains of commerce, the wealthy men of trade and city. As their wealth increased, so did their appetite for pleasure, power, privilege, and ostentation. The Church, with her ideal of poverty and chastity and her depreciation of moneylending, declined in influence among members of this class approximately in proportion to the increase of their wealth. They became patrons of the arts and of intellectuals who helped give them a good conscience in the work they enjoyed. The inability or lack of interest on the part of the Holy Roman Empire in protecting commerce from roving hands of marauders caused the merchants to seek protection from other sources. Ambitious princes became willing collaborators with merchants. As the power and success of such alliances grew, the participants became sufficiently bold to challenge the authority of both emperor and pope and thus helped to lay the foundation for modern nation-states as well as for the Reformation.

The political ideal of the Middle Ages was that of a united Christian family. Posited initially by St. Augustine in *The City of God*, the idea developed to envisage a Christian world-state committed to peace and justice under the combined guidance of pope and emperor. However, the united Christian commonwealth foundered in the power struggle between pope and emperor and finally sank in the Renaissance with the emergence of nation-states ruled by monarchs supported by city burghers.

The highly structured and integrated feudal society of the early Middle Ages embodied political as well as economic and social aspects of life. The lords were responsible for the well-being of both members of the court and the peasant-serfs. The lords owed allegiance to the emperor and to the pope. However, circumstances of distance and continual turmoil often made the obligation to the emperor largely a dead letter. The incessant local wars, alliances, marriages, and other forms of the power struggle among feudal lords led

gradually to the emergence in many areas of powerful lords who proclaimed themselves as overlords or kings. Members of the noble class, defeated in the power struggle and relegated to status inferior to the king, became his natural enemies. The rise of commerce, cities, and the burghers paralleled and often was deeply involved with these political struggles. The commercial class and the monarch had a common enemy in the feudal nobility. Hence, king and burghers were natural political allies.

When the king needed money, as he consistently did because jealous nobles would concede him nothing beyond their feudal obligations, he commonly turned to the wealthy burghers. In return for their generosity, the burghers sought and received advantageous municipal charters and membership in the feudal assembly. Originally, the assembly or parliament was composed of clergy and nobles and served as a national council of advisers to the king. With the admission of burghers to the assembly, a constitutional as well as a financial bond between king and burgher was established.

The clergy, as well as the nobles, were rivals of royal power. During the Middle Ages, the clergy had acquired privileges and immunities which gave them a substantial degree of independence from the state. This independence rested on control of vast tracts of land, tax immunity, and a papal decree which asserted that every sovereign in Europe held his dominion as a papal fief. Thus, it was necessary for the monarch to establish clear dominance over the clergy as well as the nobles and to establish a monarchy centered in his own person.

This goal was achieved again with the support of the burghers, who saw their own well-being enhanced by a nation-state sufficiently strong to maintain order and prevent their exploitation or restraint by the privileged classes. The king confirmed his position as head of the national system of justice, built a substantial royal administrative system, enhanced royal income by securing enlarged subsidies from cities in return for favors to the commercial class, and established a permanent military organization responsible to and dependent upon himself. This broad pattern of development

characterized France, Spain, and England, all of which had acquired formidable stature by the end of the Renaissance.

Economic changes were accompanied or followed by a widespread revolt of the bourgeoisie against medieval concepts and methods. During the Middle Ages, civilization was consciously shaped toward ends determined by the Church. Many of those ends were inconsistent with the goals of the merchant class and with the new discoveries in geography, science, and other areas. The voyages of Columbus and others led not only to discovery of new continents but to new knowledge of oceans, mountains, deserts, climates, and cultures. The curiosity and efforts of scholars produced remarkable achievements in the sciences and the arts. Greek and Roman writings on these subjects were re-examined and new contributions made at a remarkable rate. The lives of people were revolutionized by printing, gunpowder, chimneys, glass windows, spectacles, mirrors, microscope, clocks, the compass, and a host of other inventions. Nicolaus Copernicus, Leonardo da Vinci, Vasco da Gama, Hieronymus Bock, Albrecht Dürer, and William Shakespeare were only a few of the many who engaged in the search for truth and beauty in the contemporary world. Each new discovery increased enthusiasm for the struggle to extend the horizons of human understanding of man and his world.

This goal of learning was consistent with the interests of and was supported by the bourgeoisie. It was a departure from medieval scholasticism, which was man's attempt to justify the data of his faith by reason. St. Thomas Aquinas had employed Aristotelian logic to produce this culminating triumph of scholasticism—a faith rooted in reason—but Renaissance scholars were far more concerned with man's existence on earth than with his everlasting salvation.

The Renaissance was an age of profound change in medieval ways of thinking. One of the most important new conceptions was humanism, which is derived from the Latin word *humanitas*. Cicero had said that "We are called men, but only those of us are human who have been civilized by studies proper to culture." Those studies, he believed, should include literature, philosophy, rhetoric, history, and law.

These studies enhanced man's understanding and appreciation of man, the most noble of all goals of education and civilization. The humanism of the Renaissance also included a restudy of Scripture and severe criticism of those aspects of doctrine and Church practice which impeded pursuit of human-oriented goals. Eventually, this produced a decline in the binding power of religion in life and action; opposition to medieval theology, philosophy, art, and letters; and contributed significantly to the Reformation. The pagan aspects of Greek and Roman life, which had been ignored in the Middle Ages, attracted greater interest and inspired emulation because of their focus upon man.

Humanism concentrated upon man and his life on earth. It emphasized education which would produce intelligent human beings competent to assume a broadly active and useful role in society, rather than the scholastic goal of justification of faith by reason. Similarly, scholarly endeavour and institutional policies were directed toward knowledge of man and his universe and achievement of the good life on earth. Exaltation of the finest qualities in man was the primary concern. It encouraged tact and politeness in interpersonal relations. Women were considered equals of men. The potentialities of the human mind were considered unlimited, a view that was further substantiated by every new discovery, invention, and intellectual insight. Humanist culture was made possible largely by wealthy bourgeoisie who supported and encouraged able and industrious students, scholars, artists, and explorers. Often these patrons were men who had amassed great fortunes in commerce, such as the House of Medici.

By the sixteenth century, men had literally discovered a new heaven and a new earth. The invention of the printing press had made books and learning readily available. Immortal artists had given the world masterpieces of color, form, and meaning. New continents, oceans, and cultures had been discovered. Copernicus had established the fact that the earth was but a tiny planet spinning around the much larger sun. The medieval guild system had been largely replaced by a productive system based on capital and wages. The wealth

of the rising commercial class gave it the means to challenge the long established power of the privileged classes. The empire was being successfully challenged by princes in league with merchants. The inherited law and government were being made over to suit altered politico-social conditions. Men had developed a sense of hesitant skepticism regarding the dominant Church and its supernatural teaching. In the sixteenth century, the universal power of that Church was broken. In sum, man exhibited growing confidence in his own energy and intelligence. He began to emancipate himself from the theocentric or divine world which enveloped him in the Middle Ages and to lay the foundation for an anthropocentric or humanly centered world.

B. Individualism

One of the most significant developments of the Renaissance era was a new attitude toward man, individualism. It was a development fundamental both to the development of democracy and capitalism. Its central theme was the exaltation of the human individual. It was a declaration of faith in the autonomy of human reason and the essential goodness of man. The concept of the autonomous individual or "masterless man" embodied elements of Stoicism but much more. Its starting point was recognition of self-evident traits of the human individual—his interests, talents, desire for happiness and advancement, ambition, and especially his reason. This latter seemed fundamental to the successful use of one's faculties and also to the establishment of a stable society. The turbulent changes of the later Middle Ages and Renaissance rent asunder the authoritative feudal class codes which bound and dominated every concern of life by a multitude of meticulous prescriptions. The resulting rootlessness forced men to rely on their own resources rather than on traditional institutions and patterns for security and satisfaction. The growing number of trained and leisured intellects facilitated the search for solutions to instability, and those solutions further emphasized the need for and utility of self-reliance. Each new discovery, invention, or

other individual achievement strengthened the assumption of man's intellectual resourcefulness. They helped to produce an egoism and egotism which could be satiated only by greater freedom from those inherited structures and restraints of society which were obstacles to individual progress. Everywhere, it was evident that knowledge is power, and everywhere one looked he saw knowledge challenging old authority.

Achievements in commerce, science, the arts, and politics not only strengthened confidence in human reason, but they created new expectations. For centuries, Christianity had emphasized earthly self-abnegation as preparation for eternal salvation. The creativeness of the Renaissance greatly enhanced earthly pleasure of the creators and many others as well. In time, it became quite proper to create for one's own pleasure. Self-satisfaction became respectable. Eventually, the principal elements of earthly pleasure came to be viewed as rights. The rising commercial and intellectual class, as it became increasingly creative, insisted on the right to possess and benefit fully from that which it created (e.g., wealth). But, also, there were other rights equally essential to the enjoyment of one's powers of creativity and its product. Those included free speech and press, inviolability of the person, free trial, and freedom of conscience in matters of religion. Insistence upon such rights was in part a reaction against practices which were viewed as abuses and injustices in society, but the notion of rights also was an expression of a new sense of individual importance and of aspirations.

The concept of individual rights was buttressed by a new concept of the nature of man. This concept contained a number of elements. One was the moral worth of the individual. Essentially, this was a Christian idea derived from the notion that, as sons of God, all men are brothers and equal in his sight. The Reformation concept of the priesthood of all believers had placed man and God in one another's presence and condemned the notion of a hierarchy separating them. With each man responsible directly to God and each guided by the illumination of God in his own conscience, salvation became a personal and individual matter. The individual was

freed from the dictates of intermediaries. The concept emphasized the nearness of God and man and the importance to man of that relationship. Also, it established the concept of equality of all men before God regardless of their status. Thus, the responsibility, opportunities and perils of life and salvation were placed upon the individual, but these were accompanied by a new sense of individual power and dignity.

The religious concept of equality was given further support by the new science and philosophy. Natural scientists subscribed to the atomistic theory of reality, and philosophers followed their lead by applying the concept to society. Each human being was seen as an atom having its complete nature in itself. As social atoms, all individuals were equal, and society was a combination of equals. The application of the scientific method to what was basically a Christian concept provided further affirmation.

The new view of man which emerged in the Renaissance was the foundation for the concept of freedom. If individuals are of equal moral worth, it follows that no individual can be required to submit to any will capable of acting arbitrarily and capriciously. To do so would be a denial of his moral dignity and equality, would prevent such a person from realizing his full potential, and would deprive him of the respect to which he is entitled as a rational person. Such subservience would be a denial of moral autonomy and equality.

Individualism created a new problem which has plagued men ever since. That is the reconciliation of individual autonomy with the necessity for authority to maintain social order and stability. It was recognized that individual autonomy, hence freedom, in its most literal sense meant anarchy and, thus, chaos. The free individual could exist only in a society in which order and stability were maintained by some commonly recognized authority. Yet what authority could act objectively, impersonally, and without caprice? The answer was law. Only in a society governed by impersonal, calculable, and objective law could the individual retain his freedom and moral dignity.

If the authority of law were not to be arbitrary and capricious, it could not emanate from any individual will capable of acting capriciously. The solution was a conception of law as eternal, universal, immutable, and rational. The source of such law is nature, or "the order of things." It is the embodiment of values and truth which transcend individual wills and interest. Thus, it must be discovered, not made. Its validity derives from the inherent or natural rightness, rationality, and objectivity of its substance.

Yet the will and interests of the autonomous individual are subjective. How could it be assured that the individual would not will that which is subjectively desired rather than that which is objectively demanded by the higher law or authority? It was assumed that individual reason, conscience, and sense of duty would require the individual to follow the dictates of universal reason rather than personal, subjective interests. In so doing, he would realize freedom in its fullest sense.

The principal drive of Renaissance man was to break the rigid bonds of traditional institutions and customs which impeded development and expansion of economic enterprise. This meant an attack on all forms of absolutism, whether they were political, religious, intellectual, or social. The rationale for their attack was individualism, which demanded the unleashing of individual reason. Renaissance man was unwilling to trade an authoritarian society for the chaos which would have been the result had individualism been carried to its logical conclusion, anarchy. Instead, he posited a society based on the rule of law, the law of nature. This law was right reason in the universe, and its substance was universal and immutable. The individual's relation to it derived from individual rationality and conscience.

The theory was a practical expression of rebellion against what were regarded as specific abuses and injustices, but the problems left unanswered by the theoretical solution were formidable. They have been the subject of speculation and experimentation throughout the ensuing centuries. Modern capitalism and democracy are two results of those efforts to apply the concept of the "masterless man."

Modern individualism and related ideas were born in the era of the Renaissance and Reformation. They continued to develop in western Europe in the ensuing centuries. In England, in particular, religious, economic and political institutions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries underwent significant liberalizing changes. Religious controversy beginning in the reign of Henry VIII led eventually to toleration of religious groups other than the official state church. England became the leading commercial nation in the seventeenth century. The Industrial Revolution which began in the next century helped to make it one of the most formidable world powers in the nineteenth century. Capitalism reached a high level of development in those centuries. The civil wars of the seventeenth century, which culminated in the Glorious Revolution in 1688, resulted in the emergence of Parliament as the dominant force in government. Parliament certainly was not democratic at that time, but it was an instrument of representative government. The Bill of Rights (1689) was a statement of the inviolable "rights of Englishmen" and became a model for similar statements of individual rights, elsewhere, particularly in the United States.

All of these developments reflected in some degree ideas and forces of the Renaissance and Reformation. They represent an important step in the evolution of free society.

Although post-Reformation developments in western Europe were important, it was in North America that theories of individualism were given their fullest practical application. Circumstances involved in the migration of European people to North America and in colonial development provided fertile soil for those ideas. A large percentage of those who migrated did so because of political, religious, and economic repression in Europe. The traditions and institutional restraints of feudalism, church, monarchy, and class were absent from the North American wilderness. The plenitude of natural resources, favorable climate, and resourcefulness of immigrants assured success of the colonies. The great distance and difficulties of communication left the colonists largely to their own devices. They were free to devise procedures and institutions which embodied the indi-

vidualist ethic and the spirit of freedom. Democracy and laissez-faire capitalism were almost natural developments in that setting, but their evolution was gradual.

C. American Democracy

Governments and other social institutions in Britain's North American colonies were influenced by individualism and related ideas from the beginning, but nearly three centuries were required for them to evolve into democracy. In fact, the term did not become respectable until the nineteenth century. But the inherent optimism of individualist doctrines and favorable circumstances impelled men toward experimentation with the governmental forms and procedures which came to constitute much of modern democracy.

The first significant development occurred in Virginia in 1619. In response to continued difficulties in Virginia, the London Company decided to extend greater political and economic freedom to the settlers in the hope that such action would inspire greater enthusiasm and cooperation and prove profitable to the company. A new governor was dispatched to Virginia with instructions to liberalize the colony's government. This led to the establishment of the first representative assembly in America. It was composed of two delegates from each plantation, such delegates having been elected by "freemen." The assembly at first met with the governor and his council, thus participating in the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. As early as 1624, authority to impose taxes passed from the governor to the assembly.

This experience with representative government soon seemed to stimulate interest and enthusiasm for "Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities." When control by the London Company ended, colonists requested and received assurances from the king that the royal government of the colony would continue to recognize those rights and privileges. During the English civil wars, the Virginia colonists were largely royalists and opposed efforts of Parliament to legislate for them. When Cromwell was victorious in England and sought to establish

effective control of North America, Virginia succeeded in negotiating a compromise whereby the colony pledged obedience to the English government in return for recognition of the freedoms, privileges, and immunities which the colonists claimed. Shortly thereafter, a constitutional convention established a colonial government with supremacy clearly in the assembly. Authority to elect and prescribe the powers of the governor and council and to legislate was lodged in the assembly, thus creating for Virginia a parliamentary form of government which continued until the Restoration in 1660.

During the first generation of experience with representative government, Virginians became impressed with the merits of popular government and the value of law. They further developed the notion of no taxation without representation and asserted that law should be an expression of right, not simply an act of will. Any expansion of powers by king or parliament would, in their view, violate the established and known laws of England. Thus, only the previously known laws of England and acts of the Virginia Assembly were considered legitimate. This notion became fundamental in the American concept of representative government and had an important impact on the struggle for independence and the continuing issue of states' rights.

The Puritans who colonized in New England established an oligarchic theocracy which proved to be a surprisingly fertile seedbed for democratic ideas and institutions. The purpose of the founders was to establish a society in which their particular Calvinist religion would be secure. They had failed to "purify" the Anglican church in England, and their sometime substantial influence in Parliament was largely terminated during the decades of Stuart supremacy after 1629. Consequently, they turned to the unspoiled wilderness in North America.

The Puritan leadership was composed of men who, in England, had been middle-class country gentry, town traders, and ministers. The society they sought to construct in North America was stratified after the English pattern but with the leadership group constituting the highest class. It was expected that the much larger lower class, composed chiefly of

rural and urban laborers, would remain benignly subservient and properly deferential to the leaders. Mosiac law provided the legal foundation for their system, and all human laws (ordinances, administrative acts, etc.) were expected to conform to the laws of God. It was the prerogative of the clergy to determine whether human law met that standard, thus giving to that group a dominant role in civil as well as religious affairs.

Calvinist doctrine, to which Puritans subscribed, recognized God as the absolute sovereign of the universe and the source of a universal moral code. That code, based on the Decalogue, provided the standard of conduct for all men in all classes. The doctrine of predestination decreed that, although all men were sinners, some were preordained to salvation and all others to eternal damnation. The discovery of predestined election to sainthood might be manifested in an inward call to piety and service or worldly success in one form or another. Those already members of the elect passed upon the qualifications of those who presumed to worldly recognition as members of the sainthood. In effect, the aristocracy was closed to all except those who achieved the blessing of the existing aristocracy. The unredeemed were required to comply with the strict, universal moral code, attend church regularly, and submit to the guidance of God's saints on earth. Anyone failing to live up to the rigid standards, as interpreted by the leadership group, could expect exile or worse.

The doctrine of predestination was a denial of the innate equality of men in that only a few were presumed to have been elected to salvation and only those few were fitted for a guiding role in society. The monarchical conception of God denied the principle of government by consent. Control of spiritual and civil affairs by the elect (freemen), who constituted perhaps one-fifth of the adult male population, was distinctly aristocratic rather than democratic. The restriction of voting and civil office-holding to freemen assured church domination of civil institutions.

In spite of the narrow intolerance and the closed nature of the society, certain elements of doctrine and practice

contained the germs of democracy. One of those elements was the social contract theory. Puritans were opposed to the hierarchical structure of the Anglican and other churches, which placed control in the hands of bishops. Following Biblical references to a covenant basis for Christianity, they defined a church as a group of people combined together by covenant for the worship of God and gave it practical application by establishing a congregational organization based upon a compact among members of each congregation. The compacts, of course, were made by the spiritually elect. Nevertheless, the compact was an application of the social contract theory which had developed in the Reformation era.

The contract theory emphasized the importance of the individual as the basic unit in society, in that organized society, including government, was established on the basis of voluntary consent of the individual members of the community. The compact practice became widespread in seventeenth century New England and came to be recognized as the only proper basis for social organization. When conflict with England developed later in the eighteenth century, the contract theory became an important element in revolutionary thought and later became the basis of written state and national constitutions.

The Puritan system of local self-government based on the town meeting also contributed to democracy, even though it was aristocratic in its initial development. All inhabitants were permitted to attend the meetings and to speak. As public forums, the meetings stimulated discussion of public issues and social awareness of all who attended. However, only the spiritual aristocracy, the freemen, were permitted to vote in adopting resolutions and ordinances and in the selection of magistrates. Thus, effective control of civil affairs was confined to the same elite which dominated church and other social institutions. Near the end of the seventeenth century, suffrage was broadened by making property ownership rather than spiritual election the principal qualification, but even then many adult males were unable to participate. With the passage of time and the generally improving economic circumstances of the colonists, property-owning and, with it,

eligibility for political participation, increased. Thus, the democratic character of the town meeting increased in importance.

Doctrinal differences and internal conflicts beset Puritan congregations almost from their arrival in North America, and these at once undermined the theocracy and promoted democratic trends. Roger Williams was one of many who became storm centers, but his was a greater impact than the rest. He arrived in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631 and almost immediately became embroiled in controversy because of his insistence upon separation of church and state, his denial of the Biblical foundation of government, and his assertion that the king had no authority through colonial charters to grant land which rightfully belonged to the Indians. The indignant reaction of colony leaders to his views led to his flight from the colony in 1636. Thereafter, he established a community at Providence in which he had an opportunity to implement his radical ideas. He purchased land from the Indians, granted religious freedom to non-Puritans who joined his colony, established civil government based upon contract separate from the agreement which served as the basis of church organization, and implemented a governmental procedure based upon compromise and arbitration rather than on authority and coercion.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the English colonies prospered and developed identities separate from one another and from the mother country. Differences in background of the several colonies and the peculiar character of their individual development often led to jealousy and conflict which accentuated the sense of separateness. Difficulties of communication and English concern with more immediate European problems contributed to a neglect of the colonies, with the result that bonds with England were weakened and colonial self-confidence grew rapidly. It was not until after the middle of the century, when the threat of frontier conflict with the French and Indians became serious, that there developed a sense of urgency for cooperative action, in this case for the common defense. But colonial interest in cooperation was not encouraged by the British.

Near the end of the French and Indian War, the English government determined to establish more effective control of the colonies and to require them to pay most of the defense and future colonial administrative costs. Efforts to implement the new policies met determined resistance in the colonies. The twelve years following the Peace of 1763 were marked by increasingly precarious relations. Each act of Parliament or attempt at enforcement brought colonial resistance, followed by more determined efforts by Parliament. Violence was met with violence and revocation of charters.

Revenue legislation, especially, was anathema to the colonists. Persistence of the British in the exercise of the sovereign right to tax stimulated constitutional and political argument which became increasingly vehement. From that argument came ideas which became a part of democratic thought.

Early in the controversy, the colonists relied heavily on arguments based on the British constitution, but Parliament remained adamant. Then the colonists relied more heavily on the social contract and natural rights theories. The constitutional argument contained several elements. One was that the issuance of colonial charters had been an exercise of royal prerogative. The charters were contracts and, as such, conferred rights. In the British constitutional system, rights were amenable to judicial examination but could not be abrogated by the exercise of legislative power. Hence, in charter matters, Parliament was required to act in its judicial capacity and to adhere to the basic principles of justice, which included the right of the contracting parties to be heard.

Colonists argued that the power of Parliament was limited to England and did not extend to the colonies. Under the British constitution, taxes could not be levied except by consent of Parliament. The colonial legislatures were parliaments for the colonies. Taxes could be levied on colonists by consent of their own representative assemblies, but the Parliament of Great Britain could tax them only when and if the colonists were represented therein.

It was argued, also, that, since colonial legislatures existed in all colonies for the purpose of legislating for the inhabitants, there was no area of legislative authority unoccupied. Each colonial legislature was in the same relationship to subjects as was Parliament to English citizens. Hence, Parliament could not possess authority over people already governed. The unity of the British Empire derived not from parliamentary authority but from the common fealty owed by all to the king.

When it became apparent that parliamentary leaders were unimpressed by constitutional arguments, colonists began to rely more on the social contract doctrine. That doctrine asserted the existence of a primeval state of nature in which individuals were absolutely free and in which each individual enforced his own rights. When men established society, they did so by mutual agreement. Thus, the rights enjoyed by individuals in a state of nature antedated government and were superior to it. These rights were the foundation of political or civil rights after governments based upon consent of the governed. Since government was formed by free consent of the governed, it follows that sovereignty, or ultimate power, resides in that group. Furthermore, the government so created acquired no powers not possessed by individuals in a state of nature. The only right men surrendered upon entering the social contract was the right of individual enforcement of his other rights. Government, therefore, is limited by the inherent rights of men which no individual can alienate.

The logic of the social contract theory led easily to the assertion of the right of revolution. If man established government by his own contract and if the operation of government rested on his consent, then he could withdraw his consent. This withdrawal became an inalienable possession.

The concept of the right of revolution had been conceived and discussed in Europe as early as the sixteenth century, but it did not become an important part of the debate over British colonial policy until after Lexington and Concord. The most influential advocate of revolution was

Thomas Paine, who arrived in North America from England in 1774. His *Common Sense*, published in January, 1776, had the effect of quickly shifting colonial thought and purpose from a demand for recognition of their rights as British subjects to a demand for complete independence.

Prior to 1776, colonists had directed their opposition to Parliament and the new imperial policy it had adopted in 1763. Their denial of parliamentary authority and demands for colonial autonomy had been accompanied by assertions of allegiance and loyalty to the king. Paine directed his attack on the king. He ridiculed hereditary rule and the doctrine of divine right of kings, asserting that the latter was a prostitution of Biblical teaching. The king was a "royal brute" whose position was based upon usurpation rather than right. Colonists should not support the immoral institution of monarchy. Paine's attack on the king undermined royal allegiance, the last effective psychological bond between colonists and the British government.

Paine followed the natural law approach which characterized the colonial position in the controversy with Britain. Society, he said, is produced by our wants and promotes our happiness by providing a framework for the cooperative pursuit of happiness. Government is an evil made necessary by human fallibility and wickedness. In order to assure their freedom and security made tenuous by human shortcomings, men surrendered a portion of the remainder. Since the purpose of government is protection of freedom and security, that government is preferable which fulfills the purpose with the least cost and the greatest benefit.

The revolutionary views of Thomas Paine were expressed in somewhat more temperate form in the Declaration of Independence, which was adopted a few months after the publication of *Common Sense*. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the declaration, subscribed to the doctrine of natural rights and the right of revolution, considering the latter an "unalienable" possession of free men. A decade later, he asserted that the world belongs to the living rather than the dead. The best interests of the living, which are different in every generation, constitute the standard against

which government should be measured. Society cannot make a perpetual constitution. Hence, there must be regular constitutional revisions in every generation. In a free society, peaceful methods are available for renewal or revision of the social contract (constitution), but if the society should become un-free, then people have the right to withdraw their consent to the social contract and overthrow the government.

Although Jefferson and Paine both were influential in the Revolution, only Jefferson had the intellectual resourcefulness and adaptability to make the necessary adjustments which enabled him to continue as an influential figure in American politics and political thought.

Perhaps the outstanding quality of Jefferson was his faith in the individual. Whereas Paine had emphasized the wickedness in man, Jefferson emphasized the good. Man is far from perfect, but he has the potential for improvement, and education is the best means to that end. As early as 1779, he urged the establishment in Virginia of a state-wide system of free public schools which would have even included university-level education for those of demonstrated capacity. He saw education not only as a means of enhancing the wisdom of men but also as an essential of free society. The ignorant can never expect to be free. Government always degenerates, he said, when left entirely to the rulers. Control must reside in the people, but that control can be maintained and exercised intelligently only by educated minds.

Jefferson was devoted to the principle of decentralized representative government. Wherever possible, public action should be in the hands of citizens at the local level. Those affairs beyond the reach and competence of ordinary citizens should be handled by representatives elected and removable by citizens. There will always be differences of opinion and conflicting interests in a society of free men, so that government in such a society can never function on the basis of unanimity. The only solid and valid basis for operation is majority rule. In his first inaugural address, Jefferson asserted that "absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority" is a vital principle of representative government and one from which the only appeal is to force.

He was fully cognizant of the inherent conflict between majority rule and minority rights. The protection of minority rights lay, first, in the nature of free society and representative government. It should permit free discussion and frequent elections, making it possible for minorities to become majorities and reconstruct government after their own desires. Even more important in his thinking, was his belief in a "natural aristocracy" of wise and good men whose qualities were widely recognized by citizens and who would be elected to positions of responsibility. Government would be managed by men of superior talent, wisdom, and virtue who would be able to deal wisely and impartially with minority problems. Furthermore, as opportunities for education through public schools, libraries, free press, and free public discussion became more widely available, increasingly larger numbers could achieve places among the natural aristocrats.

The decision to break the bonds with Great Britain made necessary the establishment of state and national governments. Those governments reflected the basic elements of American political thought current at that time and represented another important step in the evolution of American democracy. The concept of the social contract had become so much a part of thinking in the century and a half after the Mayflower Compact that it seemed to be taken for granted the new governments would be established on the basis of written contracts or constitutions. Thus, constitutionalism became a distinctive characteristic of the American system.

The written constitution was the instrument by which the sovereign people created government, and it served to remind both people and their representatives that government must forever be the servant rather than the master. The maintenance of that relationship through careful definition and limitation of the powers of government was the essence of constitutionalism. Since governments derive their authority from the sovereign people, and since the constitution, or contract, is the means by which authority is delegated to government, that document is in the nature of higher law which binds governmental action. As an organic act, the constitution stands above statutes, judicial decisions,

and executive orders. The latter are acts of the representatives of the people who constitute the government, but the former is the source from which those officials get the power to act. Hence, governmental acts must conform to the will of the people as expressed in the constitution, making constitutional government one of limited powers.

Identification of constitutions with higher law carried with it the idea that constitutions are expressions of the moral purpose for which society exists. Realization of that moral purpose, often expressed as the good life, required a well-ordered state that could provide maximum opportunities for all people to achieve happiness and in which the rights individuals might claim by nature were guaranteed to them by the constitution. Those rights existed prior to the state and government and were of a higher order. This made it appropriate that they be considered a part of the higher law expressed in constitutions.

American constitutionalism made a unique contribution to political thought through the joining of the concept of higher law and the contract theory. Both were institutionalized in the Constitution and given an interpretation and practical application. The first, for example, served as a justification for judicial review, by which acts of government are held void if they are contrary to the higher law as found in the Constitution. The contract theory led to the practice of popular ratification of constitutions and of their amendments, which constitutes a method of achieving government based on consent of the governed.

The delegates to the Philadelphia convention in 1787 were confronted with the practical problem of devising a system of national government which would permit a reconciliation of political differences among sections, states, classes, and varied interest groups; which would facilitate national economic development; and which would serve as an instrument for reconciliation of future differences. Independence brought to the surface many divisive and centrifugal forces which had largely remained submerged during the conflict with Britain. Jealousy and competitiveness among states and sections undermined national cooperation

under the Articles of Confederation to the point where some states refused to send delegates to the national congress or honor the actions of that body. The trend clearly was away from union and toward state particularism. Commercial and tariff controversies raged among a number of states. Several states were in the grip of open conflict between the ruling aristocracy on the one hand and artisans, debtors, and frontier settlers on the other. Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786 was a dire warning to leaders everywhere that the future of free and orderly society was in jeopardy.

The plan of government which emerged from the convention in the autumn of 1787 was a remarkable combination of colonial-revolutionary political thought and practical arrangements for the reconciliation of internal differences. The principle of popular sovereignty was reiterated in the Preamble and implemented by provisions for constitutional ratification and amendment and by provisions for periodic elections. The doctrine of limited government was further expressed in the application of the principles of separation of powers, division of powers, in the power prescriptions and prohibitions, and in the Bill of Rights, which was added in 1791. The Great Compromise effectively dissipated the fears and jealousies between large and small states. Those between North and South, slave-owning and non-slave-owning areas, were resolved temporarily by provisions for ending the slave trade and determining the population basis for representation and taxation. The widespread concern over the particularistic tendencies of states and groups which threatened union was ameliorated by the proposal of a central government with coercive powers over states and individuals. To safeguard freedom from the possibility of a tyrannical central government, which was widely feared, the central government was delegated only those powers considered essential to effective government. All others were reserved to the states, which presumed to be less inclined toward tyranny because they were closer to the people. The central government was to be one of definitely limited powers. States were subject to certain limitations which might impede the operation of national government in

the exercise of its legitimate functions or which might be injurious to their own inhabitants (e.g., contract clause).

Economic development was also a major concern of the delegates. They realized that continued independence from foreign influence and the realization of individual freedom and happiness were closely related to economic growth and development. Equally important was the binding together of the several sections and states into an economic union as a supporting foundation for lasting political union.

At least a dozen provisions were included which had a significant impact on economic development. The commerce clause gave the central government power to regulate and protect the movement of goods and people among the states, thus depriving states of power to impede such commerce. The power to coin money and regulate its value provided a universal medium of exchange. The full faith and credit clause assured the enforceability of contracts and other official acts of one state in all others. Interstate citizenship, like the previous provisions mentioned, encouraged the mobility of population and business across state lines to the extent that, today, most people are hardly conscious of state lines. Other provisions, such as those granting powers to regulate weights and measures, grant patents and copyrights, establish post offices and post roads, and to tax and spend, have provided national protection to individuals and firms in the development of business and greatly reduced the restrictive tendencies of states which were common in the 1780s. These constitutional provisions have also provided a basis for positive action by the national government in promoting economic development, utilized from the beginning. National roads, protective tariffs, river and harbor improvement, and land grants to railroads are only a few examples from early history of promotional action of government.

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, American political thought and practice acquired a character that made the word *democracy* appropriately descriptive. Whereas the Jeffersonian revolution at the turn of the century was a generally peaceful rebellion of aristocratic and conservative landholders against commercial and industrial

pretensions of the Federalists, who dominated national government prior to 1801, the Jacksonian revolution was distinctly equalitarian in tone. It drew much of its support from the agrarian west and reflected to a considerable degree the commonly accepted values of frontier society, but the revolution could not have succeeded without the support it received from eastern agrarian, labor, and immigrant groups, intellectuals, and humanitarians. All were joined in a battle against aristocracy and privilege. All sought political and economic status and power under the guise of equalitarian democracy and economic opportunity.

The Jeffersonian revolution had utilized individualist ideals and republican techniques to achieve a temporary transfer of power from the commercial aristocracy to the southern agrarian aristocracy; but rapidly changing circumstances, produced largely by external threats and eventual war, led to continued great influence and growth of commercial capitalism. In a practical sense, the success of the Jeffersonian movement was short-lived. But the ideology of the movement, found largely in the writings of Jefferson, emphasizing individualism and natural rights, remained to inspire future generations in their democratic aspirations. In the Jacksonian era, that ideology was given an equalitarian emphasis that previously was absent.

The democratic movement, of which Jackson was a symbol, did not have a spokesman of the stature of Jefferson. Among the more prominent intellectuals of Jackson democracy were George Bancroft, Orestes Brownson, and Walt Whitman. Bancroft, in spite of his aristocratic background, believed that the greatest wisdom resided in the democratic mass and that this collective wisdom derived from reason, conscience, and an intuitive process of mind which inheres in all men. It followed that the best government vested authority in the whole people and was administered directly by the people *or* their responsible agents. In the 1830s, Brownson exhibited even more confidence in the wisdom of the masses than other intellectuals. He identified mass wisdom as the highest level of wisdom and the voice of the masses as the voice of God.

Walt Whitman preached a religion of democracy based upon faith in the potentialities of the common man. Those potentialities included not only reason and wisdom but also the emotions, attitudes, and beliefs of people. For him, democracy was as much a matter of the heart as the mind. His democracy was an expression of confidence in people, but it was also the love, faith and confidence of people in their fellowmen and in the society wherein they could achieve mutual happiness. Men had to have freedom from all but the absolute minimum of restraints in society. It was only in a climate of complete freedom that the human personality could develop fully.

The spirit of democracy expressed by these and other intellectuals was that of rebellion against the status quo in its broadest sense. Aristocracy, privilege, convention, law, and institution were all guilty of preventing the realization of the perfect society. These reformers argued that all institutions, and especially government, should be completely democratized.

The practical meaning of Jacksonian democracy can best be seen in the political attitudes and practices that emerged during the period. Property and religious qualifications for voting were abolished. Governors, judges, and administrators were made elective by popular vote. National nominating conventions replaced party caucuses for the selection of presidential candidates. The spoils system and rotation in office became common and were viewed as important instruments for democratizing government. Candidates who win elections can implement the will of the people only if they can appoint civil servants who are loyal to the victorious candidate. The spoils system assures that kind of a loyal staff. Rotation in office is necessary to prevent any individual or group from achieving too great influence. Thus, some states prohibited governors and other officers from succeeding themselves or holding office for more than eight out of twelve years.

It was the widely held opinion that expertise in government was antithetical to democracy. If any office became so complex that its functions could not be performed by the

ordinary citizen, the fault was with the office and not the man. Functions had to be divided and simplified to make them manageable by the non-expert in order to safeguard democracy. Experts in government were potentially as dangerous, if not more so, as kings and wealthy aristocrats. This opinion was reflected in an increase in the number of elective offices in state and local government and in the elimination of virtually all prerequisites. Anyone who could win enough votes could hold virtually any public office.

Reduced qualifications for office and rotation were justified as contributions to education in democracy as well as practical extensions of democratic government. If offices were easily accessible, more citizens would seek and hold office. Both experiences would greatly enlarge understanding and appreciation of the democratic system. The impact of Jacksonian democracy was large and lasting. Many of the ideas and practices inaugurated in that period are still important.

During the early decades of American independence, the principal political contest was between the commercial aristocracy of the northern states and the agrarian aristocracy of the South. The contest reflected different patterns of political, economic, and social development. Generally, the commercial aristocracy supported the development of a vigorous national government with power to implement policies to protect and encourage national and commercial and industrial development. Their interests required government action in the form of tariffs, trade treaties, naval protection, financial stability, and interstate transportation. The agrarian South sought free trade, laissez faire, and local autonomy. Increasingly with the passage of time, the divergent interests of the two sections tended to crystallize into a political controversy over the nature of the Union. The North emphasized nationalism and supremacy of the central government while the South supported particularism and states' rights.

The controversy over the nature of the Union swirled around a series of specific issues including the tariff, land policy, the national bank, and slavery. It was the latter issue

which dominated the debate in the 1840s and 1850s and was largely responsible for precipitating the Civil War. The war and Reconstruction resulted in the firm establishment of national supremacy. Even so, states' rights has been a continuing issue in American politics and thought. The federal system, with its recognition of two levels of sovereign power, cannot avoid the problem.

During the decades of debate and conflict involving the nature of the Union, natural rights, individualism, and equalitarianism were in process of reinterpretation. The Transcendental movement which began in the 1830s had a significant impact on that reinterpretation. The Transcendentalists tended to reject empiricism and to emphasize intuition. They saw understanding, reason, and conscience as the principal attributes of man. Empirical knowledge derived through sense perception, when subjected to intuitive reason which transcended sense experience, enabled men to grasp ultimate truth. Conscience enabled man to keep his actions consistent with divine and social justice. Intuitive truth was objective and its own proof. All men were said to have the intuitive faculty and, because of that fact, all men constituted a common mind. The individual mind is an incarnation of the universal mind. This resulted in a parallelism between the individual mind and nature. If individuals followed their intuition, all would come to identical opinions.

Transcendentalist stress on intuition exalted the individual and contributed to a reinterpretation of human rights to include slaves. Man's soul connected him directly with God and nature, making him much more than an atom in a mechanistic universe. Since all men knew God and truth directly, they were spiritually equal. Any earthy sanction of inequality was a violation of a higher order of equality. Intuition made the individual not only equal with all others but also made him self-sufficient. This self-sufficiency freed him from allegiance to traditional ideas and institutions not approved by intuitive reason. The infallible quality of intuition held by all men provided a justification for democracy. Also, it reinforced belief in the perfectibility of

man and society and thus contributed to a faith in progress.

Transcendentalism gave added stature to the concept of individual moral worth and dignity and to equalitarianism. In so doing, it made a positive contribution to the development of democratic thought. Transcendentalism was also deeply involved with the slavery issue, with members of the group leading the philosophical attack on that institution. They attacked it as a violation of both reason and revelation. Their reasoning supplied arguments for such radical abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison and such free-soilers as Abraham Lincoln.

Southern intellectuals responded to the attack on slavery by striking at fundamentals of the natural rights position. They said equalitarianism is nonsense. The phrase "all men are born equal" is patently untrue because infants, not men, are born. Infants grow to be men. Obviously, they do not have the same endowments at birth or in adulthood; thus, they cannot be said to be equal. Neither are men born free. Liberty is a condition dependent on human development and a condition realized only by the highly civilized. Freedom is derived from society and can be justified only by its advantages to society.

They denied the validity of the social contract concept. Force, not contract, is the basis of government. Government as an institution of social control cannot function as a controlling force if its actions are dependent on the consent of those to be controlled.

Following the Civil War, the United States was rapidly transformed into an urban-industrial society. In the process, many small enterprises became industrial giants. The more successful entrepreneurs became immensely wealthy and influential. The rapidity of the change and the large number of individuals who moved from humble beginnings to positions of wealth and influence tended to undermine earlier confidence in the equalitarian views of the Jacksonian era. To many, it became obvious that John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and others were men of unusual natural endowments. It was inconceivable that they ever were equal with the masses who toiled throughout life in comparative

ignorance and poverty.

This view received philosophical support following the publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin's *Origin of the Species*. His demonstration of the principle of natural selection in nature was used by Herbert Spencer, an English philosopher, as support for a parallel theory of society. Spencer and his American disciple, William Graham Sumner, argued that the struggle for survival ruled in society as in nature. The superior members of society eventually emerged dominant. Whereas Darwin had asserted that in nature the inferior of a species gradually become extinct, Spencer and Sumner seemed to imply the same process occurs in society. At least, nothing should be done by government or other agencies to impede such a process.

The Spencerian theory of society was a justification of wealth and of social dominance by the wealthy. The superior members of society were those leading the Industrial Revolution. The evidence of their superiority was the size of organizations they built and the wealth they amassed. Accumulation of capital and its wise use by this group advanced civilization, hence benefitting all. Any attack on the wealthy would undermine civilization. Government policies interfering with capital accumulation and decision-making by the wealthy would constitute artificial impediments in violation of the processes of nature. Social reforms in behalf of the inferior were equally intolerable violations.

This philosophy rejected the principle of equality as interpreted in the previous generation. In its place, there developed a "rags to riches" hypothesis that produced a spurious equality of opportunity. The brutal implications of the natural selection doctrine were modified somewhat by the later Gospel of Wealth which was paternalistic in character. It adhered to the success creed but tried to reconcile it with the traditional morality. The rich were urged to use some of their wealth for social welfare purposes.

Individualism was a basic element of the new philosophy, but it was laissez-faire individualism. Individual initiative was the dynamic force which could propel civilization to its zenith provided that government limited its functions to that of the

police man. This doctrine assumed that the individual was a free member of society and that his status depended upon himself. Possessing will and initiative, any individual could rise to the top (which meant material success). Since material success involved property ownership, there was no conflict between personal rights and property rights. The protection of property was to be the primary function of government and the chief element in civil liberty. Government action beyond this could only be deleterious. Society did not require supervision. Government control corrupted free institutions and individuals. It interfered with the progress of civilization.

The first two decades of the twentieth century constituted a pivotal period in American history. Social Darwinism and the Gospel of Wealth had aroused vehement protest in the latter years of the nineteenth century. With protest had come demands for reform. Many of those reforms were accomplished between 1900 and 1920.

The protest focused upon abuse of the public by economic giants, employee insecurity, the growing income gap between the rich and the masses, emphasis upon property rights rather than human rights, domination of government by powerful economic interests, political corruption, elitist doctrines, and laissez-faire economics. Doctrines and practice of industrial society were subjected to scathing criticism. Laissez-faire competition was condemned because it led to monopoly. Government regulation was urged as the only means of preventing exploitation of people and natural resources. The traditional view of liberty as freedom from governmental restraint was held to be inappropriate in a society in which industrial giants denied equality of opportunity. Government must assume positive responsibility for social welfare and justice.

The protest gradually produced a change in the concept of the good life. Wealth began to lose some of its aura of respectability. Humanitarianism and social reform regained some of the respectability lost during the Gilded Age. The humanitarian impetus of Progressivism led to a drive for such things as prison reform, better schools, government regula-

tion of hours and working conditions for women and children.

The Progressive demand for social justice was inconsistent with the Jeffersonian view that the best government was the one that governed least and upheld the doctrine of laissez faire. Government was held to be the only institution with sufficient power to counteract the influence of big business. Thus, the American people started the new century with a much different attitude toward the role of government than they had held in previous generations. The erstwhile enemy of individual liberty—government—now was looked to as the protector of liberty.

The reforms of the period were democratic and humanitarian in character. Although government was the principal agent of reform, it was also the subject thereof. Critics had emphasized the existence in government of corruption, inefficiency, and domination by big business and machine politicians. Reform was directed toward elimination of these conditions and the return of government control to "the people." The direct primary method of nominating candidates was widely adopted. Critics of traditional nominating procedures, caucuses and conventions, asserted that they were controlled by machine politicians who were hirelings of economic "interests" and that the candidates chosen were obliged to those groups. Voters in the general election were confronted with a choice between evils rather than between good and evil. The direct primary would place nominations in the hands of the people. Candidates thus chosen, it was implied, would be free of obligation to corrupt political machines and other evil influences. The drive for direct democracy also included the initiative, the referendum, and the recall.

The role of the presidency also began to change. During the first century under the Constitution, Congress generally had been regarded as the more truly representative of the three branches of national government. In the Progressive era, the presidency came to be regarded as more representative of all the American people in that it was the only office (other than the vice-presidency) filled by a nation-wide election.

Whereas members of Congress represented people of a state or district, the president represented all of the people. The change in role was speeded by a number of strong presidents, but, to many, the change seemed to be consistent with the changing character of the nation and its problems.

Closely related to the changing role of the presidency was the change from negative to positive government. Problems of the industrial period required more than a policeman. Uncoordinated decisions of individuals, it was argued, could not be relied upon to achieve a stable and just society. Conservation of natural and human resources, for example, required careful and coordinated direction on a national level. As a consequence of this changed attitude, the executive branch of government has increased in size and responsibility through the years.

The Progressive era produced numerous and substantial changes in government and in public expectations regarding government. People tended to look more to that institution for positive policies in behalf of social justice and welfare. During the decade of the 1920s, there was a "return to normalcy" in the sense of a dampening down of enthusiasm for vigorous national government, but the Great Depression led to further and rapid developments in the tradition of Progressivism.

The Great Depression brought desperation and demoralization. Unemployment, business failures, loss of savings, and a general sense of insecurity undermined confidence in traditional values, institutions, and procedures. Demands for governmental action became vehement, and proposed remedies from numerous sources ranged from the imaginative to the ridiculous and from liberal to radical.

The conditions of the period required bold action, but past experience did not include economic, social and political problems of such magnitude. There were no dependable guidelines from the past or at least none in which there was adequate public confidence. The administration which took office in 1933 was committed to action but, in the absence of guidelines from experience, that action was experimental.

President Franklin Roosevelt expressed the character of his New Deal when he said:

The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it; if it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something.

American behavior had always been largely pragmatic, but it was not until the New Deal that it became avowedly so.

The action taken in the early New Deal seemed to be directed to three goals, which have been expressed as the "three R's" relief, recovery, and reform. Relief measures were designed for the immediate alleviation of suffering and included such programs as the Federal Emergency Relief and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Other measures were intended to restore more normal movement in the economic system. The National Industrial Recovery Act, the Public Works Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act were characteristic of this effort. In order to prevent recurrence of severe economic ills, the government inaugurated programs designed to achieve the more long-range goal of reform. Social Security, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Securities and Exchange Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act were important examples.

The sense of futility produced by the Great Depression made the American people ready to accept significant changes in the role of government. Although many of the New Deal efforts were characterized by trial and error, the overall structure was built upon foundations laid in the Progressive era. The basic ideology adopted by the New Deal had been enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Croly, and Woodrow Wilson a generation earlier. The contribution of the New Deal to the progressive tradition was not so much in ideas as in bold and imaginative innovation, which produced a new merging of political, economic, and social policies. It was a reversal of the major goal and achievement of eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism, which had been separation of government from economic and social affairs or narrow limitation of its role therein. Whereas liberty in the two previous centuries had largely meant freedom from

government restraint, in this century it has come to mean security, equality, and social justice under the aegis of government. The role of government has changed from policeman to active participant.

Every generation of Americans has been confronted with controversy which has often given the impression that the nation was being torn asunder. During the Revolution, fully one-third of the colonists actively supported Great Britain. New England almost seceded from the Union in 1816. Congressman Abraham Lincoln and many others bitterly condemned United States policy toward Mexico and the Mexican-American War. Lincoln himself was so reviled during the Civil War that nearly all members of Congress opposed his re-election. Populists and Progressives bitterly attacked big business and the wealthy in the late nineteenth century. Super-patriots banned the teaching of German in twenty-five states during World War I. Millions applauded federal raids on "radicals" in the 1920s. "Hoover's Depression" led to a social revolution in the 1930s, and "Truman's War" became Eisenhower's path to the White House.

The controversies of earlier generations were comparable to those of today involving the "immoral" war in Viet Nam, civil rights, and the ghetto. They are unpleasant and frustrating, but they are a part of the price of free society. When sovereignty resides ultimately in the people and is exercised by representative government functioning by direction of the majority, there must be freedom for dissent. It is only in the free trade of ideas that "truth" can be ascertained.

Each generation of policy-makers quite naturally assumes that its policies are correct and that radical dissenters are guilty of unforgivable obstruction or treason. Yet, with few exceptions, the society has emerged from each controversy stronger and more just. There is little reason to doubt that the process will continue.

D. The Economic System of the United States

Like representative government and democracy, capitalism originated in the Renaissance era. As pointed out previously, the development of a highly lucrative foreign trade taught the ambitious and successful traders the utility

of capital accumulation and investment. Foreign commerce was incompatible with medieval doctrines and practices and, consequently, was resisted by the Church, guilds, and other traditional institutions. But the temptation of great wealth from commerce was overwhelming. The traders became participants in and patrons of the individualist trends which eventually undermined medieval institutions and values.

For more than two centuries after the discovery of the Americas, mercantilism was the prevailing economic policy of kings and the merchant class. The universal demand for gold and similar precious metals (bullion) as a means of acquiring other commodities impressed mercantilists to the point that they identified money with wealth. Since foreign trade was the most important source of bullion, it was favored over domestic trade and extractive industries. Government economic policy was an essential feature of mercantilism, and the basic policy was to build a favorable balance of trade. Domestic production was carefully regulated with the goal of securing goods which would net the greatest return in foreign trade. Imports, besides bullion, were limited chiefly to raw materials, while exports usually were manufactured products. There was a drive for colonies to be a source of cheap raw materials and a market for manufactured goods. In many instances, government extended exclusive trading privileges to selected companies, as in the case of the British East India Tea Company. Thus, the mercantilist system was characterized by extensive state control of economic activity, monopoly, discrimination among industries, and colonialism. It was a product of economic rebellion against feudal restraint and class privilege, but it, too, became the object of protest and rebellion.

A series of inventions and innovations in the eighteenth century produced an industrial revolution. Creators and direct beneficiaries of the revolution chafed under mercantilist restrictions which were considered to be inimical to the interests of industry. Their protests led to revolution and a new economic order.

Probably the leading contributor to the intellectual phase of the economic revolution was Adam Smith, a professor of

moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. His *Wealth of Nations* was published in the same year as Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* and the American Declaration of Independence. Although the latter two publications were political in orientation while the former was economic, all were expressions of the doctrines of individualism and attacks on institutions of privilege and tyranny. The *Wealth of Nations* was more subtle and less inflammatory, but its long-range impact has been no less significant.

Smith and other classical economists advocated an economy in which the individual would have free scope to develop his energy and talents through freedom of enterprise and freedom of contract. Man's talents and motivations, such as self-protection, ambition, and acquisitiveness, were natural endowments, the free development of which should not be hampered by unnatural restrictions imposed by government and other institutions. They argued that economic activities were governed by infallible natural laws. The law of supply and demand, for example, was said to be of the same order as the law of gravitation. Consequently, efforts by government to regulate economic activity were violations of the nature of man and the natural laws of economics.

It was argued that, in a free economy, fair prices would result from the operation of the law of supply and demand. Prices, profits, and competition would stimulate production and provide the necessary natural regulation of quantity, character, and quality of production. Under such conditions of decision-making freedom by enterprisers, business would prosper, and the nation, in turn, would prosper. Capitalists would earn profits, laborers would find employment, farmers would experience good prices, and landlords would receive high rents.

The proper economic role of government in a free society, they said, was only to protect the free market. It should enforce contracts, punish frauds and conspiracies, and maintain a stable currency. Positive action designed to direct and control economic activity was considered unnatural and should be prohibited. Government intervention on behalf of business was viewed as mischievous meddling, and on behalf

of workers as a futile effort to negate the normal functioning of natural laws. The laissez-faire views of the classical economists were much the same as those expressed by Thomas Jefferson when he asserted that the government is best that governs least.

Because of the basic element of individualism in capitalism, the circumstances which prevailed in North America were as favorable to the development of capitalism as to representative government. Pleatiful natural resources, favorable climate, sparse population, and relative security from external economic and political domination provided an excellent environment for the development of laissez-faire capitalism.

Although capitalism has undergone continuous, and sometimes rapid, change through the years, certain basic characteristics have persisted. One is private ownership of the means of production. Public ownership is not prohibited, but private property, including the means of production, is a cornerstone of capitalism. The overwhelming portion of productive facilities in the United States is privately owned and managed. Private ownership is considered an important element in individual liberty in that it permits wide diffusion of economic power in society. If all productive facilities were owned by the state, individuals would be completely at the mercy of the state. Also, it is assumed that ownership provides a strong incentive to individual experimentation and innovation, providing a strong base for economic progress.

Another feature of the capitalist system is the market economy. Ancient economic systems relied primarily on barter, but, as division of labor developed, exchange operations became more complex. Barter was replaced by an exchange system based upon money, prices, buying, and selling. Increasingly through the years, commodities and services produced have been designed for market rather than for the producers' own use. In the free market, supply and demand determine price and profitability. If a given producer cannot realize a profit, he will be forced out of the market. If a given product cannot be produced profitably, it will disappear from the market.

Competition is another basic characteristic of capitalism. Theoretically, each individual is free to enter the market as a seller or a buyer of any legitimate product or service. Thus, he is free to choose his own occupation. Competition assumes a large number of buyers and sellers for any given product with no one individual or firm being in a position to influence market behavior. Price, quantity, and quality of a given item are presumed to be determined by the bargaining between sellers and buyers and competition among sellers and among buyers.

The profit motive and risk are fundamental to the capitalist system. No one can expect to engage in business for long without realizing a profit, and it is largely the desire for profit which motivates people to produce. The enterpriser never has assurance of success, yet the opportunity to earn substantial profit is sufficient incentive to induce many to assume the risk of failure.

These are some of the more important features of capitalism. Some of them may be found in noncapitalist economies, but their presence may indicate common elements of historical development more than similarities in current goals and methods.

Price is the exchange value of a commodity or service stated in terms of money. Any commodity or service which has utility, is relatively scarce, and has worth which can be measured in some way, is said to have *economic value*. The economic value of one unit of a good compared with that of a unit of another good is called *exchange value*. Since it is usually inconvenient to exchange economic goods directly through barter, money has been utilized as a common measure of exchange value. It is the commonly accepted medium of exchange. Hence, prices are measures of exchange value expressed in dollars.

In addition to serving as a medium of exchange and a measure of exchange value, prices have other functions. For example, they determine production, influence the use of the factors of production, and apportion consumer goods. When prices are free to move up or down as they are assumed to be (and usually are) in a free enterprise system, they determine

the production of the kinds and quantities of goods people want. If the price of beef rises, farmers will produce more beef and vice versa. If the price of air conditioners is substantially above costs of production, manufacturers will produce an increasing number. If the demand for air conditioners should decline and their prices fall, fewer units will be produced.

The factors of production (land, labor, capital, and management) are devoted to the production of those goods which the owners think will be most profitable. If the price of soybeans is high, more land will be devoted to production of that crop. If salaries for engineers should rise sharply in comparison with salaries in other professions, larger numbers of men and women will elect to become engineers. Higher stock dividends paid in certain industries (because of higher profits) will attract greater investment capital to that industry.

Prices tend also to apportion consumer goods among the population. This is accomplished in part by the prices a consumer receives for the goods he sells or, in other words, by his income. Also, the amount and kinds of goods which one buys are determined in part by the prices of those items. The consumer allocates his income among goods he desires, in part, on the basis of the price of those goods.

Prices of most commodities are determined by one or more of the following conditions: 1) competition, 2) monopoly, 3) monopolistic (imperfect) competition, or 4) government regulation.

Perfect competition probably never existed, but it was the model used by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*. The concept suggests a market situation in which there are innumerable sellers and buyers of an undifferentiated product. It is a situation in which no seller or buyer or any transaction can have any influence on price. Competitive prices result from the relations of demand and supply or what Smith referred to as the higgling and haggling between buyers and sellers. Each individual is pursuing his own selfish goal, but, in so doing, contributes to achievement of the greatest good for all. Any interference by government with free competi-

tion could only be injurious. Thus, it would seem, as Smith said, as if avaricious individuals were led by some invisible hand toward promotion of the general welfare of society.

When a single firm acquires substantial control of the market for a given product, it may be in a position to determine prices with little or no regard for the action of other firms. If, for example, one firm were the sole producer of gasoline, it would be in a position to fix the price of the product substantially higher than if the market were competitive.

In recent generations, production in many industries has become concentrated in a few large firms. The production of any one may represent a sufficiently large portion of the total market for a given product so that pricing and related decisions will have an impact upon all. Thus, the element of monopoly power is present in the market. The market is not free in the sense that the purely competitive market is free but is controlled by powerful sellers or buyers. Even so, such large sellers or buyers may, and usually do, compete, but that competition tends to focus upon product differentiation through advertising and innovation. Prices are "administered" or determined by sellers rather than by bargaining between sellers and buyers.

The fourth method of price determination is by government regulation. The principal area of privately owned and operated business in which prices are so determined is public utilities. During the century since the Civil War, certain industries have come to be considered natural monopolies, or those in which competition is not feasible. Telephone service and electric power are examples of industries in which prices are determined by government rather than the producing firm or the market.

Even though monopoly, monopolistic competition, and government regulation are important factors in price determination in many segments of the economy, the scope of choice and decision-making by consumers and other buyers is very large. Those decisions constitute demand, and the freedom of choice available to buyers places substantial power over the direction of economic development in their

hands. Likewise, the area of free decision-making by sellers remains quite large. Ours is a free enterprise system in spite of the exceptions and limitations indicated.

Early in the history of western Europe, people recognized the importance of private property for individual liberty and for stability and progress in society. Aristotle argued that private property is important as an individual incentive to production and to progress of civilization; as a means to individual happiness; and for the general welfare of society. John Locke, writing late in the seventeenth century, asserted that property is a right which man acquires through his labor. Man, not government, creates property. Thus, it is a right which government must recognize. Government is an instrument established by men for the purpose of protecting rights, including property rights. The same view was expressed nearly a century later in the American Declaration of Independence. A few years later, John Adams asserted that: "The moment the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence." These views as to the fundamental importance of property have persisted throughout American history.

It is the ownership of productive property which has the greatest social significance. Control of productive property carries with it power over others because the owner is in a position to use such property to benefit others or to deny benefits. Control of productive property means power over employment, income, and security of others. Ownership of consumer goods is important, of course, but almost entirely to the owner. Such goods can satisfy the owner's immediate personal wants, but normally they do not give him power to control other people.

The more widely ownership of productive property is dispersed, the greater the freedom of individuals from control by others. If productive property is owned by government, that institution controls the lives of people. The same situation would prevail if ownership were concentrated in the hands of one or a few private persons or firms. Private economic power can be as dangerous as public economic power. Liberty requires widely dispersed ownership.

The basic source of dynamism in capitalism is the individual. Capitalism recognizes the basic human drives and seeks to harness them for the benefit of society as well as the individual. It assumes that if individuals have a maximum of freedom in the satisfaction of personal goals, ranging from acquisition of material goods to prestige and influence, they will produce those goods and services 1) for which there is demand, 2) which they can produce most efficiently, and 3) which will return substantial profits. The scope of productive activity will be as broad as human wants and talents. A free market system will permit flexibility in demand and supply, governed ultimately by the consumers' allocation of their available dollars among available goods and by the skill of producers in producing at a profit those goods which consumers (society) want.

Classical economists assumed that individual drives were fully adequate to the satisfactory functioning of the economy. Experience has shown that imperfections exist in the classical model and that they may become serious. A few individuals or firms may acquire sufficient economic power to distort the free market, resulting in injury to some segments of society. Also, advancing technology has made the economy and society so complex and has so greatly increased the rate of change that serious economic and social maladjustments have occurred. In order to alleviate the consequences of such imperfections, society has required government to regulate and direct certain aspects of economic activity. For example, government has acted to protect the public from impure food and drugs, workers from unnecessary health hazards and economic exploitation, and competitors from unfair and fraudulent practices. Also, government has been called upon to assist and promote stable economic growth and development. Such activities include the protective tariff, patents and copyrights, a uniform money system, land grants to railroads, agricultural extension services, small business loans, and many others.

During the first century after the American Revolution, the economic system was predominantly commercial and agricultural. A thriving trade with foreign nations developed, with exports consisting primarily of agricultural products,

lumber, and other natural resources. Imports included manufactured goods and products, such as spices, not produced in the United States. American shipping interests enjoyed large profits and substantial influence during the period.

After the close of the War of 1812, government policy was directed more vigorously toward the development of industry. Dependence on foreign manufactures had proved to be an Achilles heel in national defense and development. Industrialization moved slowly, however, until the Civil War, even though substantial progress was made. After the Civil War, the nation experienced a remarkable industrial revolution. By 1890, the United States ranked fourth among nations in the production of manufactured goods. Ten years later, it ranked first. By 1914, American production was greater than the total production of the next four industrial nations.

Industrialization greatly increased national wealth, power, and prestige. It attracted millions of immigrants and converted the United States from an agricultural to an urban-industrial nation. The 1920 census revealed that, for the first time, more people lived in urban than in rural areas. The trend has continued; by 1960, more than two-thirds of our population resided in urban areas.

Industrialization was accompanied by increasing use of the corporate structure, which permitted accumulation of vast quantities of capital in individual firms. This stimulated industrialization and permitted the development of increasingly larger companies. Big business became a fact of American life in the late nineteenth century and, with it, came problems of modifying social institutions and revising ideology to conform to new circumstances. Those modifications and revisions have been a major concern of Americans since that time.

E. Contemporary Economic Issues in the United States

In a society as complex as ours, with its large population and diverse interests, controversy and conflict are to be

expected. Commitment to individual liberty, property rights, and free enterprise inevitably leads to conflicts among individual interests and between individuals and public authorities charged with protecting and promoting the general interests of society. The specific issues are many, and most are never fully resolved. The search for a workable compromise is continuous, but the results always are temporary. Changing circumstances make each compromise obsolete almost as soon as it is effective.

Throughout its history, the United States has been committed to a competitive, free enterprise system. Yet, the concept of competition may be said to embody the seeds of its own destruction. Classical economists assumed that firms or individuals which could not compete successfully in one line of commerce would be forced out of that market by their inefficiency and inability to earn a profit. Those who freely entered a market also assumed the risk of failure. As the unsuccessful dropped out, their customers tended to turn to the remaining firms. Over a period of time, the number of competitors tended to become fewer but their size greater. The pattern has been demonstrated in most major industries. Of the more than one thousand manufacturers of automobiles in the United States since 1900, four major ones remain. The hundreds of thousands of small retail grocers have been replaced by corporate chains operating, in some instances, hundreds of individual stores. The most successful competitors, because of their success, tend to become monopolistic giants.

This seemingly natural process of evolution is not the only possible explanation of business concentration. The process has been facilitated by liberal corporation laws and the drive of firms for market power. Corporation laws of states permit accumulation of vast amounts of capital and the use of that capital to buy, hold, and vote the stock of other corporations; to combine physical assets of many separate firms; to engage in diverse kinds of business operations; to form subsidiaries without limitation; and to utilize corporate powers without assuming specific obligations and responsibilities in the public interest.

The privileges so gained by corporations have been used dramatically, and sometimes irresponsibly, to build an economic system in which power is highly concentrated. A study made by the Department of Commerce in 1947 revealed that in 150 different industries, four companies in each produced more than half of the output of the industry. In eleven industries, four companies accounted for more than ninety percent of the output. Three companies produced one hundred percent of the nation's aluminum. In three industries (linoleum, aluminum, and tinware), one company owned more than fifty-five percent of the net capital assets in the industry.

The trend toward economic concentration and giantism appeared early in the Industrial Revolution. In the 1870s, the Standard Oil Company acquired virtually complete control of petroleum refining by engaging in discriminatory pricing which destroyed smaller competitors. Competitors in a half-dozen industries were tied together in the 1880s by the trust device. Subsequent decades saw additional industries concentrated through mergers. Early mergers tended to be horizontal in that firms in the same line of commerce were joined into a single organization. Vertical and conglomerate mergers became more common later. A vertical merger is one in which the parent firm acquires producers of components for its own products, or distributors of its finished product. Conglomerate mergers, which have become quite common in recent years, involve acquisition of firms in different lines of commerce, as when an automobile manufacturer acquires a firm producing household electrical appliances. Combinations of competing firms have been effected in some instances by informal agreements on pricing and production. Similar results have also been achieved by interlocking directorates.

The net effect of economic concentration is to reduce competition. When one firm (or a few firms) achieves power to influence a market, the natural regulative aspects of the free market disappear. Pricing, for example, ceases to be a product of bargaining between sellers and buyers but is dictated by the economic giant. In the absence of competitive controls, society must turn to government for protection.

Government regulation has taken a variety of forms through the years. The Sherman Act of 1890 was the first of a series of antitrust laws designed to maintain competition and curb monopoly. Public utility regulation inaugurated in the 1870s subjects firms in certain industries to a variety of controls, including rates or prices, standards of service, and market entry or exit. Labeling and Pure Food and Drug acts regulate quality of products. Certain financial practices are subject to control by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Government regulation has become extensive and complex. It is also controversial. The decline of competition has made government regulation necessary, but regulation is contrary to our traditional concepts of free enterprise, competition, individualism, and property rights. A workable balance between individual and property rights on the one hand and the general welfare of society on the other is the goal of public policy. It is an elusive goal.

We have indicated that the American economy developed from a comparatively primitive agricultural system in the eighteenth century to a complex, wealthy, powerful, industrial society in the twentieth. That development was spectacular during the century following the Civil War. Between 1790 and 1960, population increased from four million to one hundred seventy-nine million. The standard of living increased remarkably, and the nation moved from a struggling infant republic to first place among nations in terms of power, wealth, and prestige. That transformation illustrates the concept of economic growth.

Prior to 1930, Americans marveled at their achievements and attributed most of the success to the free enterprise system; to the shrewdness, initiative, and energy of the people; and to the limitations on governmental interference with economic activity. The national ideology embodied a sense of American economic superiority. But that optimism and smugness were severely shaken by the Great Depression and by the spectacular economic growth of other nations following World War II. Economists began to concentrate much of their energies upon analyzing economic growth and stability. They sought the causes of both and the means of

achieving them. Although those goals have not been realized, a substantial body of knowledge has been accumulated. Much of it still is speculative and controversial, but interest in, and understanding of, the problems are much greater than before 1930.

One meaning of economic growth is an increase in the total quantity of goods and services produced in the nation as measured by the gross national product. Another meaning is a gain in average per capita productivity and average per capita income. Growth can also be expressed as a combination of national and per capita figures.

A projection of past trends suggests that average per capita productivity will increase about twenty-five percent per decade. Total national productivity will increase approximately fifty percent per decade. In other words, the gross national product will double in two decades, and the standard of living will double in three decades.

The level of prosperity depends on productivity and effective demand. Each sets the upper limit of prosperity. If spending grows faster than output, prosperity cannot go as high because spending would tend to push it and the result would be inflation. On the other hand, if spending does not increase proportionately to output, the eventual result will be a decline in production and employment.

National productivity is influenced by numerous factors. They include size of the population and work force, level of education and skills of the work force, incentives, technology, psychology, spirit of enterprise, and public policy. It is never possible to determine all of the influences nor to measure their significance, but it would seem that these are some of the factors involved.

Throughout our history, the federal government has been actively involved in the encouragement of economic growth. Even so, most Americans assumed that growth was exclusively the result of efforts of individuals operating in a free enterprise system. Beginning in the 1930s, the role of government in this area expanded rapidly in order to deal with depression and later with war. During those years, public attitudes and expectations concerning the role of

government changed. Fear of a post-war depression and mass unemployment led to a widespread demand for the government to assume responsibility for sustaining a high level of employment and prosperity. Congress responded by enacting the Employment Act of 1946.

The Employment Act declares that

It is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining . . . conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment . . . and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power.

Thus laissez faire was officially laid to rest.

In general, the act confers upon the federal government an obligation to use its constitutional powers to promote 1) high and expanding levels of output, 2) reasonably full employment, 3) price stability, and 4) a strengthening of our system of free and competitive enterprise. It does not specify the means to be used in achieving these objectives, but, instead, Congress and the president are charged with finding and adopting means which seem appropriate to circumstances existing at any given time.

The declaration of federal responsibility in promoting growth and stability implies systematic government planning toward that end. The act provides for a Council of Economic Advisers charged with making studies of the current economic situation and preparing recommendations to the president on what should be done to promote economic growth and stability. The act also provides for a bipartisan Joint Economic Committee composed of sixteen members of the House and Senate. The committee is charged with making continuing studies on matters included in the reports of the Council of Economic Advisers and preparing reports on recommendations submitted by the president. Although the extent of government planning implied in these provisions is

modest, it represents a marked change from traditional American attitudes toward the role of government.

Through the years, the federal government has developed a number of policies and techniques which were designed to, or may be utilized to, promote growth and stability. The primary ones are fiscal and monetary policies. Antitrust policies, Social Security, and the Tennessee Valley Authority are examples of programs which have a contributory role.

During and since the Great Depression, fiscal and monetary policies have been the principal instruments for promoting growth and stability. Fiscal policy means the purposeful use of public revenues and expenditures to influence the level of employment and business activity. In order to expand economic activity, the government may undertake large-scale borrowing and spending activities. Budget deficits would be incurred and programs of public works and subsidies expanded. Taxes might be reduced in order to increase purchasing power and total demand. Revenues would be derived in large part through borrowing from commercial banks rather than from the public, because borrowing from the latter would reduce spending by the public. When bonds are sold to banks, new money in the form of bank deposits is created, thus adding to the total money supply. In the event that the economy becomes "overheated" and inflation threatens, converse steps may be taken. The federal budget could be tightened and taxes increased.

Monetary policy may also be utilized to influence economic activity. Through its power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof," Congress has enacted legislation which empowers the treasury and the Federal Reserve authorities to implement numerous controls on money and credit which may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the supply of money and bank credit. Since an increase in the availability of money and credit stimulates private borrowing and spending (and vice versa), monetary controls are important.

During the 1930s, the treasury devalued gold and increased its purchases of silver for monetary use. Large

quantities of bonds were sold to commercial banks, and proceeds were used to finance government spending. These actions are illustrative of the techniques available to the treasury.

Federal Reserve authorities have three major powers to increase or decrease the volume of money in the form of bank credit. They are: 1) the power to raise or lower discount rates and regulate other conditions of member-bank borrowing, 2) the power to sell government securities in the open market to reduce the money supplies of member banks or to buy securities to increase the money supply, and 3) the power to increase or decrease the reserve requirements of member banks.

Fiscal and monetary policies are more flexible and have been used more extensively in some European countries than in the United States. As indicated by the recent controversy over tax increases and budget cuts, many Americans still have strong reservations about governmental action in overall economic planning and control. Even so, the evidence of their importance and effectiveness in today's complex society seems rather apparent.

Antitrust policies, inaugurated with the Sherman Act in 1890, are designed to restrain monopolistic tendencies in the economy rather than prevent major economic fluctuations involved in growth and stability. The chief evils of monopoly are long-run. They include inequitable distribution of income, uneconomic allocation of resources, price rigidity, and restrictions on investment capital. Monopolistic practices probably do not cause depressions, but they may make them more severe and prolonged. They may thwart innovation, encourage stagnation, and aggravate unemployment. Thus, antitrust policy which seeks to curb monopolistic tendencies can make a significant contribution to economic growth and stability.

The various Social Security programs provide assurances that most of the population will have at least minimal buying power in the event they are unable to produce because of age or disability. Individuals have some degree of economic security, but the economic system and society benefit from

the fact of demand, albeit restricted, which emanates from recipients of payments. This fact tends to reduce the "snowball" effect of economic recession.

Programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority enhance productivity. Much of the Tennessee valley region was wasteland, and inhabitants were poverty-stricken and poorly educated. The TVA reclaimed land and controlled erosion, produced electric power, and laid the basis for an economic revolution which brought industry to the region, spawned thousands of small businesses, and attracted a lucrative tourist trade. The project has made a significant contribution to national economic growth, as well as having an important psychological and economic impact on individuals living in the area.

It is generally agreed that a nation's economy must grow or decline; it cannot stand still. The optimum rate of growth remains to be determined. Some argue that the growth rate in the United States, which has been lower than that of Canada and several West European nations in recent years, is dangerously low. Others argue that a growth rate of seven or eight percent in West Germany as compared with three percent in the United States, cannot be sustained and that dangerous inflation will be the inevitable result.

Stability, likewise, is recognized as an essential of sound economic development. Sharp fluctuations create serious hardships for large numbers of people and undermine public confidence that could jeopardize the nation. Again, there is controversy as to definition and measures of stability as well as techniques to assure it.

In a democratic society, the ultimate test of institutions is their contributions to the well-being of individual citizens. If individuals are denied opportunities for development and utilization of their talents or to participate equitably in the benefits of society, there obviously is a negative discrepancy between social goals and achievements.

The test is not whether absolute equality and security prevail. Fallible men should not expect to create perfect institutions, but, rather, they should seek continuous improvement. Gross inequities which violate the goals and

philosophy of the system should be eliminated as they become apparent.

Probably the most important base for the development of maximum equality and security is education. Its aim should be to equip people for employment in the diverse categories of work required in a complex society and to maximize individual potentialities. At the same time, education should be sufficiently broad to facilitate adjustment to changes that inevitably occur in occupational demands during the normal life span of individuals. The broadest of educational programs will not eliminate the need for retraining in a rapidly changing society. Consequently, adequate adult re-education, or continuing education, should be available.

Education alone cannot solve problems of inequality and insecurity. Jobs must be available and accessible. The higher the level of education and training, the higher are individual expectations. If substantial numbers of individuals are denied access to employment as a result of discrimination or economic maladjustment, serious conflicts in society should be expected.

The vicissitudes of life make a degree of insecurity inevitable, but the goal of individuals and society should be to limit it as much as possible. As society becomes more complex, the individual's ability to cope with insecurity is reduced. Wage-earners cannot prevent layoffs, and individual investors cannot prevent sharp drops in security prices or dividends. Technological changes which destroy some businesses and jobs while creating new ones usually have a beneficial long-range effect. In the short-run, human suffering may be great. In such circumstances, society has an obligation to inaugurate policies to alleviate insecurity. Retraining, unemployment insurance, public employment offices, and similar programs are essential.

Chapter VI

INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS

A. MARXISM-LENINISM

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Concepts

- * An ideology, either religious or secular, is an irrational system of thought based on the will to see the world in a pre-conceived way by bending reality to fit doctrinaire ideas or "false consciousness," rather than viewing actual reality as given to man by his insight into life through his experiences.
- * Marxist ideology differs from other ideologies because of the claim to the "knowledge" of the laws of history moving forward and upward in a necessary, impersonal way toward a perfectly harmonious social order ushered in by a radical revolution. Man and society are "by-products" of these impersonal, historical forces.
- * A dilemma of man from time immemorial is his alienation or estrangement from himself, or society and the social order. Marx attributes this alienation to man's thoughts (religious, philosophical, etc.) and his economic system, which of necessity leads to a division-of-labor system permeating capitalist society.

- * Man's liberation from the present, completely false, irrational society can only be obtained by "radical revolution," which destroys so absolutely as to not leave "the pillars of the house standing." Marx first implied this would be a single cataclysmic event but later said it might require several decades. Present ideology refers to the struggle as a "continuous revolution," or "protracted struggle," caused by the "terrible force of habit."
- * Historical materialism views past society according to man's economic activities observable through the "laws of history," and then it "scientifically" predicts the future by these immutable laws moving history forward and upward.
- * All history is a series of class struggles between the minority owners of the means of production and the exploited workers, or majority, who produce. Each established mode or system carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction brought about as the struggle between the rulers and the ruled. Today's struggle in the capitalist societies is between the bourgeois (owners) and the proletariat (workers); the latter will effect a "radical revolution" and usher in a socialist society, classless in nature, because it is the only revolutionary and propertyless class.
- * *Capital*, Marx's analysis of the present economic structure and mode of production and its development toward its ultimate downfall, is a sociological treatise formulated around the widely-held labor-theory-of-value of his day. Its pivotal points are the concepts of surplus value and exploitation of labor, as based on Marx's "doctrine of economic value." The prediction of the inevitable collapse of bourgeois society relies on his "general law of capitalist accumulation," the law of declining rate of profit, and his theory of economic crises.
- * Between the overthrow of capitalist society and the "realm of freedom," the state will be under a "dictatorship of the proletariat," which will transform society by abolishing private property, raising production levels to where all human needs can be satisfied, and molding the new socialist man. When this level is reached, the state will wither away and perfect harmony will prevail.
- * Marx envisioned the class struggle as occurring within a given nation between owners and workers, but Lenin extended the struggle to a world conflict between two camps—the imperialist, capitalist, exploiting countries and the underdeveloped, colonial, exploited countries. Because of the export of finance capital and the competition for world supplies and markets, world war would be the inevitable result of capitalism's highest stage, imperialism.
- * Lenin's contributions to Marxist philosophy was to accept the latter's views of history and the class struggle, the complete worthlessness of present-day society, and the need for radical revolution. These ideas he enshrined in dogmatic terms that were never again to be questioned or critically analyzed.

Key Terms

- * Ideology
- * Alienation
- * Historical determinism
- * Dialectical materialism
- * Radical revolution
- * Realm of freedom
- * Dictatorship of the proletariat
- * Period of transition
- * Class consciousness vs. revolutionary consciousness
- * Class struggle
- * Totalitarianism
- * Division of labor
- * Capitalism
- * Imperialism
- * Socialism
- * Strategy and tactics
- * Bolshevik
- * Menshevik

Activities

- * Prepare a report on the following: George Hegel, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Engels, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Karl Kautsky, Mao Tse-tung, Milovan Djilas.
- * Draw a mural depicting typical scenes of these five societies of history: primitive, slave-holding, feudal, bourgeois (capitalist), and socialist.
- * Organize a panel discussion centered around major features of the above-mentioned societies, the strengths and weaknesses of each. Try to draw conclusions centering on the communist analysis that each society's institutions revolved around the economic base and that history has ordained the violent overthrow of capitalism.
- * On two world maps, name and shade the five most industrialized countries of Marx's day and the five most industrialized today. Compare the two in relation to where Marx thought the revolution would occur.
- * Have a committee prepare a transparency depicting "salami tactics" as used in taking over Czechoslovakia and explain the visual to their classmates.
- * Debate: The "realm of freedom" in the future justifies the hardships of the last fifty odd years of communist rule in Russia.
- * Prepare a bulletin board display of news clippings of world events directly related to the communist vs. free world conflict.
- * Organize a panel discussion on the pros and cons of trying to establish a utopian society. Individual members may investigate previous experiments of this type, such as the Fabian societies, Brooke Farm, etc.

Discussion Questions

- * What are some possible causes of man's alienation other than the economic structure which Marx saw as the cause?
- * Explain the role of history as a follower of Marx-Lenin believes it.
- * Identify the shift in the "class enemy" from Marx's view to Lenin's view.
- * Explain how "peaceful co-existence" does not mean there will be a complete absence of wars in the future.
- * Does history always move forward and upward? Justify your position.

- † What is the "dictatorship of the proletariat?" How is it supposed to differ from other dictatorships? Does it really differ?
- † In light of the UN debates and voting records, do you agree the world is divided into "two camps?" Explain.
- † Would you like to live under a system arranged "from each according to his ability to each according to his needs"? Why? Why not?
- † Has exploitation disappeared in Russia and other communist countries with the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and distribution?
- † How mobile is the class structure within the Soviet Union?

Educational Media Materials

- * LENIN. 28 minutes. Ridgely, New Jersey: Association Films, Inc.
- * LENIN AND TROTSKY. 27 minutes. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * MARXISM. 30 minutes. Los Angeles: University of Southern California.

B. THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET COMMUNISM

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Concepts

- * Russian populism of the 1860s and 1870s emphasized the debt of the intelligentsia to the people, Russia's unique destiny and course of social development, and the special role of peasant cooperative institutions in building a new society.
- * The formation of Marxist groups in Russia during the 1880s and 1890s led to the organization of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDLP) in 1898. This party emphasized radical revolution and the seizure of political power in Russia.
- * Legal Marxism, the revisionist Marxist ideas of Eduard Bernstein, favored abandoning the revolutionary objectives of the party and concentrated upon building a legal, mass social democratic party to work for the establishment of a parliamentary order.
- * The Russian Social Democratic Labor party was split in 1903 into two groups, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, on the question of party organization and ideological and tactical questions. Lenin, as leader of the Bolsheviks, insisted upon a small, disciplined, dedicated party of professional revolutionaries, plus an alternative conception of the stages of revolution and of the class struggle and party alliances.

- * Lenin's concept of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism led to the conclusion that World War I was "the imperialist war" and "must be turned into a civil war" and that the proletariat must turn its aims against the bourgeoisie in order to achieve both peace and socialism.
- * After the overthrow of the Russian monarchy in February, 1917, a provisional government, composed of both liberal and moderate socialist leaders, was established until the Constituent Assembly could be convened. The Provisional Government was compelled to share its power with the Petrograd Soviet.
- * With the inadequacy of the Provisional Government to deal competently with the major problems that beset the country, Lenin and his Bolsheviks collaborated with the non-Bolshevik socialists in the soviets and were able to seize control of the government in October, 1917.
- * After the Revolution, Lenin consolidated his power, which included during 1918-1920 a program of socialization of the economy. However, with the appearance of popular discontent and organized political protest against the Bolshevik leadership, the situation became dangerous; therefore, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) at the Tenth Party Congress in March, 1921, which made a series of concessions to the peasants—allowing some peasants private land, trade, and small industry.
- * The Communist International (Comintern) was organized in 1918-19 as a center of world communist revolution. Lenin placed orthodoxy of doctrine and organizational loyalty above mass appeal, excluding membership to anyone who refused to accept his own notions.
- * Stalin's rule of the Soviet Union initiated the first Five-Year-Plan (1928-1933), which meant a complete and rapid socialization of industry and agriculture by vigorous and uncompromising industrial expansion and agricultural collectivization. As a result, a full-fledged Soviet totalitarian structure reached complete development.
- * After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet leaders realized that a monolithic Stalinist totalitarian type of rule was not possible without a Stalin; thus, a series of concessions were made along with a de-Stalinization campaign.
- * Polycentrism is the notion of independent national communist parties which form many centers of communist power.

Key Terms

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| * Russian populism | * Dictatorship of the Proletariat |
| * Russian Social Democratic Labor party | * All Russian Congress of the Soviets |
| * Legal Marxism vs. Orthodox Marxism | * War communism |
| * Bolsheviks vs. Mensheviks | * New Economic Policy (NEP) |
| * "Professional Revolutionaries" | * Comintern |
| * Leninist "Imperialism" | * First Five-Year-Plan |
| * Russian Provisional Government | * De-Stalinization |
| * Constituent Assembly | * Polycentrism |

Activities

- * Have a panel discussion on the political, social, geographical, and economic factors which led to the Russian Revolution of 1917.
- * Have students produce a "You are There" broadcast of the Bolshevik Revolution of November, 1917, with interviews with the leading figures.
- * Arrange a debate on the question: Resolved, the Western powers should have forestalled the takeover of Russia by the Bolsheviks.
- † Prepare a time line showing the sequence of events leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution.
- * Draw cartoons depicting the Revolution of 1917.

Discussion Questions

- * Compare the program of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party with the populist movement.
- * Give the political, social, and economic factors which made Russia vulnerable to a revolution.
- † Explore the basic differences between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.
- * Summarize how Lenin was able to seize political power in Russia and what measures he took to crush the external and internal opposition to his rule.
- * It has been stated that communism was imposed on the people of Russia. How was this possible?
- * Summarize the economic conditions in Russia during the period of "war communism." What was the cause of these conditions? Explain how Lenin made efforts to suppress the protests against his policies.
- * Name the major concessions made to peasants and merchants under Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP).
- * Discuss the formation, purposes, and organization of the Communist International (Comintern).
- * Describe the economic goals of Stalin in his first Five-Year Plan and the methods used to attain them.
- * Give the reasons for the "de-Stalinization" movement and discuss its effects on the European communist nations.

Educational Media Materials

- * THE KREMLIN, 60 minutes.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * LENIN TAKES OVER, 29 minutes.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.
- * NIGHTMARE IN RED, 54 minutes.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER, 54 minutes.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * RUSSIA: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 60 minutes.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.

C. WORLD COMMUNISM

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Concepts

- * None of the four promised attainments of communism have been realized--freedom, abundance, equality, or the "new man."
- * Communism is not a product of any historical or socio-economic necessity, but was created as a political ideological act of determined men. Thus, communism is man-made, and not preordained by history.
- * According to Marx, communism would appear first in such highly industrialized societies as Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. However, it has only appeared in much less industrialized societies such as Russia and China.
- * No communist party has obtained power by free elections in any major nation.

- * The "united front" was one of the most important tactics which the communists used to avoid isolation and to achieve political power by allying themselves with any non-communist parties that were willing to enter into a coalition with them.
- * Not one of the established communist party-states has been overthrown, and the communists believe that this represents a trend toward global victory.
- * The central concept of Stalin's rule was the building of "socialism in one country," but Trotsky attacked this view from a position of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and argued for an immediate world revolution.
- * Marx was a student and critic of the capitalistic society, but he left no practical blueprint for a future socialist society. Thus, the communist parties which have seized power cannot profit from Marx's classical teachings in building a socialist system. Marxism was, and remains, an effective tool of critique and struggle against capitalism.
- * With the establishment of the Comintern in 1919, all communist parties of the world took orders from Moscow.
- * The right wing Marxists in the Second International believed that socialism would be achieved through full democratization of society and not through radical revolution. With the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the Cominform in 1956, all announcements of the future come either from the party congresses of the USSR or from individual party headquarters.
- * The world communist movement has no longer a single world-wide organization, a single doctrine, or a single center of gravity, but is essentially divided into three orbits: Russia, China, and the "Independents."

Key Terms

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| * Castroism | * "Socialism in one country" |
| * Khrushchevism | * Monolithic |
| * "Different roads to socialism" | * Titoism |
| * "Lenin of our time" | * Maoism |
| * New Left | * <i>History Will Absolve Me</i> |
| * Popular Front | * Polycentrism |

Activities

- * Debate this topic: The United States could have prevented a communist take-over in China.
- * Prepare a tape on "de-Stalinization" and include the schism that resulted in the communist world.
- * Make a world outline map with an appropriate key and show the three axes of world communism today.
- * Write a paper showing the results of communist parties forming coalition governments with non-communist parties. Show what positions in the government the communists desire.
- * Prepare a large outline map and show the communist party-states.

- * Collect articles dealing with world communism for discussion and reporting.
- * Prepare a display of communist magazines and newspapers.
- * Write a short biography on one of the following: Lenin, Marx, Stalin, Mao, Khrushchev, Tito, or Castro.
- * Present a panel discussion on the question of what the Western powers could have done to prevent the advance of communism in Eastern Europe following World War II.
- * Debate: Can the free world "coexist" with the communist world?
- * Debate: Every high school student should know about the nature of communism.

Discussion Questions

- * In your opinion, which is more faithful to Marxist-Leninist doctrine: Soviet communism or Chinese communism? Why?
- * How did the communists seize power in Hungary?
- * How might the West have prevented the USSR from taking control of Eastern Europe?
- * What is the doctrine of "separate paths to socialism?" What does it signify to the nations in the Soviet orbit?
- * Why did the Poles and Hungarians rebel in 1956 against communism?
- * What is Castroism? Why does Castro taunt Russia when Cuba's economic life is supported by Russia?
- * What does the term "Lenin of our time" mean? Why does Mao accuse the Soviet leaders of being revisionists?
- * What are the basic differences between communism and democratic socialism?
- * Why was the Comintern dissolved in 1943?
- * Why were the Chinese Communists victorious over the Nationalists?
- * Why did Khrushchev denounce Stalin and change his policies? What effect did this have on the world communist movement?
- * Why is education a good weapon to fight communism?
- * Are treaties such as the Nazi Soviet Pact and Soviet participation in the United Nations in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology?

Educational Media Materials

- * CHINA: CENTURY OF REVOLUTION. 80 minutes.
Detroit, Michigan: Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corporation.
- * THE CHINESE-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. 28 minutes.
Ridgefield, New Jersey: Association Films, Incorporated.
- * THE COLD WAR: 19 minutes.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * RED CHINA DIARY. 54 minutes.
Hollywood, California: Bailey Films, Incorporated.

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D. THE SOVIET COMMUNIST REGIME

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Concepts

- The ruling organization of the USSR is the Communist party. The government is a subsidiary organization created to implement the policies of the Party.
- Top government officials are also top Party officials serving as an "interlocking directorate" which has monopoly control over both Party and government.
- The key position in the Soviet chain of command is the secretary general, or first secretary of the Party. He directs the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, whose members meet in secrecy and decide upon internal issues, foreign affairs, and problems involving the economic, social, and cultural life of the country. These decisions form the basis of the daily "party line" which must be followed and executed by both the Party and the government.
- The secretary general of the Party is also in charge of the Secretariat, which controls the selection of Party secretaries to the lowest level. These secretaries carry out orders from above, serving as the transmission belts.
- The watchdog is the Party Control Commission and is composed of full-time Kremlin professionals, the "apparatchiki," who enforce the "party line" and act as the CPSU's professional staff, as well as a court to reprimand or dismiss violators of the Party directives.
- The Central Committee of the Party acts for the party Congress when it is not in session and serves as an arena for policy making. Its real influence shows when there is a struggle for succession or when collective leadership is involved. The party Congress in full session enforces the leaders' decisions and serves as a major propaganda agency, as well as an instrument for initiating new government and party policies.
- The Presidium of the Council of Ministers directs all major cabinet officers such as the ministries of foreign affairs, economy, foreign trade, transportation, and industry. Nominally, the Presidium is selected by the Supreme Soviet, a bicameral legislature representing both the population and the nationalities of the USSR. Since all actions of the Supreme Soviet require party approval, the Supreme Soviet has become the echo of party policy. The same holds true for the soviets of the Republics, city soviets, and rural councils.
- A semblance of democracy is maintained with the election of candidates to these legislatures, but party authorities invariably assume the roll of endorsing the candidate first.
- Soviet society is totally controlled by the Communist party. It is not "classless" as prophesied by Marx, but a pyramid of groups representing the new upper class and working class, as well as the social outcasts. Distribution of income is not based on "to each according to his needs."

- * The Party alone is the possessor of truth, which is expressed according to "the laws" of history. Party membership is contained through the principal youth organization, Komsomol.

Key Terms

- † "Interlocking Directorate" † Soviets
- † First secretary of the Communist party † Totalitarian
- † Politburo of the Council of Ministers † Social pyramid
- † Party line † "New Class," or ruling elite
- † "Transmission Belt" † "Social outcasts"
- † *Apparatchiki* † Technical intelligentsia
- † Central Committee of the Party † "The Thaw"
- † Presidium of the Council of Ministers † "Hundred Flowers"
- † Socialist Realism

Activities

- * Have students read George Orwell's *Animal Farm*. A discussion could evolve about these concepts: (a) the seizure of liberty; (b) the command apparatus running the economy; (c) the need of a party loyal to the leader; (d) the leader becoming superhuman; (e) the ideology serves the state, ordains the present, and predicts the future; (f) the state enforces conformity; and (g) the state will use any means to enforce control and to move towards defined goals. If a single student makes the report he could follow the above outline for his report.
- * Use *Justice in Moscow* by George Feifer and have students prepare skits based on real incidents from the People's Courts published in the book. The students will gain insights into the government's effort to build socialist morality.
- * Have a student make a chart of the twenty rules which are applied to every Soviet school child. They are available in *Soviet Education* by Grant Nigel.
- * Have the students make "flash cards" to test each other in the meaning of the communist vocabulary.
- * For students who like to make graphs, have them prepare line graphs comparing the American and Soviet production of iron, coal, steel, petroleum and manganese.
- * For students who like to make charts, one could be made of the interlocking system of Party and government.
- * Have a student read *The New Life* by Fyodor Abramov. This story is an excellent fictional account of a day on a collective farm after the death of Stalin.
- * Students can select political cartoons dealing with communism and evaluate the effectiveness of them.
- * Prepare a debate on the topic: The exchange of students and scientific information will lead to greater understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

- * A group of students can prepare a bulletin board of up-to-date information on the Soviet Union. Additions can be made as developments occur.
- * Prepare a debate on the topic: Unrestricted trade between the United States and the Soviet Union brings mutual benefits and lessens the chances of war.

Discussion Questions

- * Why can it be said: "the Soviet Union is a Party structure and not a government"?
- * How does a totalitarian society nullify Marx's dream of "the realm of freedom"?
- * If only a small percentage of the population in any communist country are party members, how is it possible for the party to remain in power?
- * If you were a Soviet citizen, why might you be eager to become a party member?
- * Give reasons why communism often appeals to developing nations.
- * Discuss the characteristics that are common to a totalitarian society.
- * In the Soviet Union, education serves the needs of the state. Do you think this accounts for the USSR's achievements in space? Why or why not?
- * In your opinion, what class of society in the USSR is the most dissatisfied? Why?
- * Discuss the differences that one might find in the daily living of families in the USSR and the United States.
- * Would you agree with a Soviet citizen when he said his society was "classless"? Why or why not?

Educational Media Materials

- * THE KREMLIN. 60 minutes. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * LIVING IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. (Filmstrip - 380 frames). Chicago: Society for Visual Education.
- * MEET COMRADE STUDENT. 54 minutes. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- * RUSSIA: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. 60 minutes. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.

E. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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Concepts

- * Democracy refers to a political organization in which ultimate sovereignty resides in the will of the people at large.
- * The early Christian heritage, with its emphasis on individual rights and reciprocal responsibilities, embraces mutual respect, equality, justice, and charity.
- * The unifying of national states was a precondition to liberty.
- * Political thought of the American Revolution on the crucial points of representation, property, taxation, and personal freedom was contained in literature written in the seventeenth century during the English Civil War and its immediate aftermath.
- * Colonial governments favored the dominant economic interests in agriculture and trade.
- * Limiting the power of the state established rights and liberties of the people: that is, a system of checks and balances and the Bill of Rights.
- * Three major developments in the original frame of government are the constitutional amendments, judicial decisions, and growth through the political party system.
- * Economic concepts found within the American democratic way of life include free enterprise, capitalism, supply and demand, laissez-faire, and unionism.
- * Individual conduct should be viewed in relationship to democratic values.
- * Individualism was a direct product of the Renaissance.

- * A key problem created by individualism is the reconciliation of individual autonomy with the necessity of maintaining social stability.
- * The "Jacksonian Revolution" brought greater democracy to the American people.
- * In a democratic society, the ultimate test of institutions is their contributions to the well-being of individual citizens.

Key Terms

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| * Democracy | * Referendum |
| * Reciprocal responsibilities | * Contract theory |
| * Divine Right of kings | * Natural law |
| * Toleration | * Competition |
| * Reign of law | * Property |
| * Sovereignty of the people | * Gospel of Wealth |
| * Federalism | * Renaissance |
| * Separation of powers | * Progressive movement |
| * Free enterprise | * The New Deal |
| * Laissez-faire | * Social Darwinism |

Activities

- * Since the availability of natural resources is one of the prerequisites of economic productivity, compare the relationship of the United States and the USSR in this area by the construction of a series of bar graphs.
- * Students may write a play portraying a comparison of the American democratic way of life in relation to life in the Soviet Union.
- * Photographs and news articles may be daily arranged on bulletin boards by students to make them alert to current happenings in both the communist and free worlds.
- * Pre-tests may be useful to identify many fallacies concerning American democratic principles commonly found among students.
- * Through the co-operation of county, state, and federal officials, students may be taken on field trips to observe the work being accomplished by the various branches of government and to witness such ceremonies as naturalization and other courtroom procedures.
- * Through the use of a crossword puzzle, the student can learn terms used in studying about the American democratic way of life. The following terms may be useful in completing the activity:

a. appeasement	g. containment	m. free market
b. Bill of Rights	h. democracy	n. laissez-faire
c. capital	i. republic	o. liberty
d. capitalism	j. equality	p. loyalty
e. Civil Rights	k. freedom	q. Magna Carta
f. cold war	l. free enterprise	r. patriotism
- * Instruct students to make a list of federal governmental regulative bodies as existed in the years 1860, 1900, 1930, 1950, 1971. Encourage the use of history texts for the early years and newspapers for the later ones.

Discussion Questions

- * What ideas found in the history of democratic thought enabled our forefathers to write such a successful constitution in 1787?
- * While democracy has flourished in the United States, what are some of the internal threats to its continuity?
- * Since democracy rejects economic absolutes, one finds that there is no one economic system essential to its vitality. Can capitalism, therefore, be considered the best economic system for American democracy?
- * After an examination of American social institutions, relate how these institutions contribute to our democratic way of life.
- * What conditions make membership in the Communist party different from membership in a political party in the United States?
- * If freedom and equality are linked with the democratic tradition, do they presuppose some kind of ultimate moral worth?
- * What are some of the basic democratic principles that are the foundation of American life?
- * How can these basic principles of democracy be more fully carried out in the lives of ordinary American citizens?
- * Would you prefer to live by the economic guidelines set forth by Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*?
- * How revolutionary was Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal?
- * Discuss the effect of the frontier on American ideas and institutions. Was its effect greater than our European heritage?

Educational Media Materials

- * THE CORPORATION MAN. 29 minutes.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.
- * THE FRONTIER AMERICAN. 29 minutes.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.
- * OUR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
(Filmstrip — 190 frames)
Chicago: Society for Visual Education.
- * THE RED, WHITE AND BLUE. 29 minutes.
Detroit, Michigan: Encyclopedia Britannica
Educational Corporation.